No, you have just made an invalid inference. You claim that if the child has learned how to use the word "cup", this implies that the child has learned how to follow rules. That is begging the question. It's only true if using language requires following rules. But that's what you need to prove, not assume. You will never prove it though, because the converse is obviously what is true. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I have not made an invalid inference. Your understanding of this point is just confused. When you learn to use a word, then you have also learned how to follow a rule. There is an implicit rule involved in using the word correctly, it goes hand-in-hand with language. So, to learn to use a word, as in my e.g., is to learn a rule about how to use the word. One knows that the child has learned to follow a rule by observing how they use the word. Just as we know that someone knows the rules of chess by observing their moves. This is not rocket science.

To say that you need to prove that using language requires following rules, is akin to saying that you need to prove that chess moves involves following rules. By definition a language involves rule-following, its an essential property of language, just as the rules of chess are essential to the game of chess.

I could give the following proof, which is not begging-the-question. This is also a valid inference.

Premise (1): If all languages are rule-governed, then necessarily, learning to use a word is a rule-governed activity.
Premise (2): All languages are rule governed.
Conclusion: Therefore, necessarily, learning to use a word is a rule-governed activity.

Consider what Wittgenstein demonstrates at the beginning of The Philosophical Investigations. If learning a language consisted of learning rules, then one would already have to know a language in order to learn a language, because the rules would have to be communicated to that person, via language. This is what drove him to inquire into private rules, and private language, to account for the capacity to understand rules, if learning rules is necessarily prior to using language. But that whole line of investigation breaks down into nonsense. So we ought to conclude that learning language does not consist of learning rules at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is just not true. Think of how a child learns to use the word cup. The child has no idea what a rule is, but by learning to use the word in social settings they implicitly learn to follow rules. The two go hand-in-hand.

I found this post on Quora written by Jun-Ichi Yano to be a good guide to objective and subjective. The following is taken word for word from his post at - https://www.quora.com/Whats-the-difference-between-the-concepts-subjective-and-objective

For understanding basic meaning of words (or concepts), it is often wise to take an etymological approach: we just trace the basic meaning of words by examining the form of words (and in some cases, tracing their historical roots, though this is not important in case here).

The basic meanings of “subjective” and “objective” are something to do with “subjects” and “objects”, respectively. Then, what are the “subjects” and “objects”? In a way, this is a grammatical concept: for example, if you say, “I have an apple”, “I” is a subject that takes an action (“to have” here), and “an apple” is an object that is affected by an action.

By following these basic meanings, it immediately follows that when we use these terms in philosophy, “subjective” and “objective”, respectively, mean “from a point of view of the subject” and “from a point of view of the object”.

You can talk about an apple subjectively, that is from a point of view of the subject, that is yourself: it is about how you see it, how you feel about it. More specifically, it looks delicious, you may find it beautiful, etc. All the statements are subjective, that is only from your own point of view. Some other people may not think this apple is delicious, but your judgment that the apple is delicious is not disputed by someone else’s opinion, because it is your subjective manner.

At the same time, you can talk about an apple objectively, that is from a point of view of the object, that is apple: you examine an apple just as it is, forgetting about yourself, but talk about the apple only as if you are actually not there. A given apple may be red, if may be round, or not quite round, etc. All these statements are objective, because you can discuss about it with the other people: you may not be looking at the color of the apple carefully enough. It may be actually more like pink, rather than red, etc. You can discuss about this matter with the others, because it is an objective matter.

These are basic meanings of these two concepts.

However, in actual application of these concepts, the things are pretty much immediately getting complicated, because you cannot talk about anything objectively without yourself, that is the subject: if you are not there, of course, you cannot see the apple, henceforth, you cannot talk about this apple. We can develop a long argument about subjectivity and objectivity, and in short, we must realize that we can talk about subjectivity and objectivity only in a dynamical manner, under interactions between a subject and an object. From this dynamical perspective, subjectivity and objectivity rather mean which has a stronger role between subject and object: there is no pure subjectivity without object, nor pure objectivity without subject.

However, apart from this complication, as I said in the first part, the basic meaning of subjective and objective is very simple, and if you stay with this basic meaning, you will not be confused with many confused arguments about subjectivity and objectivity, as some of the answers try to point out.

This is all well and good, but rules are immanent to use, and it's not a case of 'group consensus' which determimes them, as if from above and without. — StreetlightX

All facts whether subjective or objective operate within some system of use. And it is the case that some rules are determined by group consensus. The rules of chess for example, or the rules of baseball. Even reality itself, i.e., what's veridical is decided pretty much by what the group calls reality, or what the group calls a hallucination. It doesn't necessarily have to be from above and without, although that can work too.

Arbitrariness by consensus is still arbitrariness. — StreetlightX

All languages are based on rules of use, so in that sense one doesn't just get to arbitrarily choose one's own meaning, no more that you would choose to move a piece in chess one way when the rules dictate another. The rules when set up may be arbitrary, but once set, like the rules of chess, you don't get to arbitrarily suspend the rules to suit your own particular view of the game. If you did you wouldn't be playing chess.

The same is true of language, if you just arbitrarily decided to use your own definition, you would not be playing the language-game by the rules. There are rules of use, i.e., the logic behind the uses of concepts. By the way, the following of those rules is what's objective about language. I can observe your actions to know if you're following the rules of the game. When I say "Slab," did you in fact bring the slab, objective observation.

I didn't say they were. I said attempts to give them substance in the absence of any conceptual motivation would make them so. The OP is one such attempt. It is preferable that people disagree on the use of terms when motivated by different problematics, than trivially agree on such uses without being productively constrained by a need to address a well-founded set of issues. — StreetlightX

But it's not conceptual motivation that gives these concepts substance or meaning, and I would say that conceptual motivation plays little to no part in the meanings of these words. If the primary factor is conceptual motivation, then it is purely subjective and arbitrary. Unless your saying that part of the way one expresses certain meanings or concepts within a particular argument, is that we choose particular uses of those concepts. However, you seem to imply that conceptual motivation gives them substance.

Another way to interpret what you said is that unless we are talking about a certain context of use, which would involve the use of particular concepts in certain ways based on goals, then we are just fishing for a definition which may or may not work in the context of the problem at hand.

However, my problem is that we shouldn't just arbitrarily pick meanings out of thin air, that there is a general consensus of correct use among concepts. I shouldn't just pick my own meaning based on some conceptual motivation, that's part of the confusion of doing philosophy.

Finally, even outside of a particular theoretical problems words generally have meanings, or at least guides that suggest possible uses. So we might list a variety of definitions of the word game for example, and those definitions have uses that fit within certain language-games. My goal was to come up with certain generalized definitions that would be starting points for pointing out the objective nature of language.

Sam’s problematic revolves around objective validation of something which can only ever be known first-person — Wayfarer

This is a misinterpretation, first, in my argument, if you would have read it carefully, you would see that there is much more to the testimony on NDEs than subjective experiences. They are experiences that can be corroborated by the objective observations of those who were there, but I don't want to start that argument in here.

Why? Without some conceptual motivation to which the distinction responds to, it's just an arbitrary excercise. Kant, Scotus, and Poinsot all had a set of conceptual motivations which made their employment of the terms non-arbitrary. In the absence of this, its just a trivial bit of language wringing. Linguistic engines on idle. — StreetlightX

This is just so much nonsense. It's an arbitrary exercise, it's arbitrary because you think it's arbitrary. Concepts like subjective and objective aren't arbitrary concepts. And your last sentence, which refers to something Wittgenstein would say, kills me, because your about as far from understanding Wittgenstein as you can get. Stupid philosophy has turned concepts like these into arbitrary notions.

The fact that people are having such a difficult time understanding what should be fairly simple concepts to understand generally, tells me just how philosophically confused people are.

One of the reasons I wanted to stick to coming up with a working definition for these words, is that I knew people couldn't even agree on this. If there is any "language wringing" it's in these kinds of statements.

But are you looking for some everyday meaning - when everyday meanings are never sharply demarcated anyway? Or are you seeking a well-founded philosophical distinction? In which case clearly it is the metaphysical-strength claims the words might invoke that are in contention. You can't avoid that by some kind of ordinary speech manoeuvre. — apokrisis

You haven't read what I said closely enough. How many times does the mantra have to be repeated, that there are no clearly defined overarching meanings to these words. There is a built in vagueness to these concepts, and Banno also pointed out this fact. However, by the same token it doesn't mean that we can't use the words in contexts where we're being precise. This is true of the word game, there is no clear definition that will subsume every use of the word under one definition. However, if I say, "Baseball is a game," am I being imprecise? No. So context sometimes will drive the precision, based on that one contextual use, but the trick is in realizing that that one use is not indicative of one overarching definition that fits all uses. All games are not baseball games.

You keep making the same error, that I'm talking about ordinary speech in the sense that the meanings are based on what someone might say on the street. I've tried explaining this earlier, at least partially, but your brain seems locked into position.

Fred believes that common salt is composed of chlorine and sodium.
again, making propositional attitudes central. — Banno

I don't see how the proposition you've used here is an example of a subjective statement. Just because one utters a false statement, that in itself doesn't mean it's subjective. Fred may think he has uttered an objective statement, but has just got the objective facts incorrect. It's not like, using your words, the archetype subjective statement, "I like oranges," or even, "Sam likes oranges."

This is an error on my part, the statement isn't false. Duh. Thanks Banno for pointing that out.

I will never not take joy in pointing out that 'objective' used to mean exactly the opposite, and that for the Scholastics, that which was objective was that which existed for - and only for - a mind: — StreetlightX

Of course, the meanings of words often change over time, but how does this hurt the goal of this thread, at least the beginning goal, that we should at least be able to agree upon a working definition of what the concepts subjective and objective means. I can always say that at some time in the past such-and-such a word meant this. I don't see how this helps the discussion right now, except to point out that meanings change over time. It surely doesn't mean that the concepts are useless, we use them every day.

So a pair of technical terms are developed within metaphysical discourse. And instead of applying dichotomous rigour to clarify the intelligible basis of those terms, we should ... go listen to ordinary folk to see how they bumble about with them? — apokrisis

Did you even read this part, or do you see what you want?

And everyday use doesn't mean that we take what the man on the street says. It means that words develop in everyday uses, and those uses can tell us much about what words/concepts mean. It's the very logic in back of the development of words and language.

Contrast "I live on the planet Earth" and "Sam lives on planet Earth". The former is tied to a speaker by its grammatical structure; the latter is not. — Banno

I see both of these as objective facts, and both can be tied to speakers, but in different ways.

Another approach worth considering is that first person statements are subjective, while statements in the third person are objective. — Banno

So, "I live on the planet Earth," is subjective? Say what?

I can't tell if you're agreeing or disagreeing. Read the second sentence of my original post.

Exactly, that's what I've been saying.

But are you looking for some everyday meaning - when everyday meanings are never sharply demarcated anyway? Or are you seeking a well-founded philosophical distinction? In which case clearly it is the metaphysical-strength claims the words might invoke that are in contention. You can't avoid that by some kind of ordinary speech manoeuvre. — apokrisis

There is no definition that will cover every correct use of many of our words, so I think the pursuit of exactness, in many ways, is an illusion. Especially when discussing subjectivity and objectivity. That's why I usually say that it's generally the case that... I take a Wittgensteinian approach to the study of these subjects, especially as it relates to epistemology. And everyday use doesn't mean that we take what the man on the street says. It means that words develop in everyday uses, and those uses can tell us much about what words/concepts mean. It's the very logic in back of the development of words and language.

there are underlying issues, which give rise to these deep questions of epistemology and metaphysics. — Wayfarer

I agree Wayfarer, but I was trying to find a baseline in which to proceed. My metaphysics when pushed, is that at the bottom of reality is consciousness. I believe it to be the unifying principle of reality in all its forms. So I agree with Max Planck.

I guess another way to talk about objective facts for instance, is to say they are independent of my thoughts, feelings, perceptions, intuitions, etc. Can we agree on this definition?

If we can't generally agree on a basic definition there is no way to continue the discussion, is there?

But the question is, what role does 'the observer' play? — Wayfarer

Actually my question has to do with the concepts of objective and subjective. What do these concepts mean. Already people are going way beyond the opening statement, which is understandable, but I'm trying to reach a consensus on the use of these words.

I see a conflict if you want to both use dualistic terminology and yet claim that you might as well just be talking physicalism. This is what leads to all the problems with theories of truth. — apokrisis

It's not necessarily dualistic. In fact, many non-dualists will use this kind of terminology. For the purpose of our discussion I have no problem with the term viewpoint. I don't think you can escape the metaphysical by choosing those words though.

A triadic modelling relations approach - semiotics - is the consistent way to make sense of what is going on. Rather than the mind receiving the truths of the outer world into its inner world minding is about forming embodied and adaptive points of view. Mindfulness is the larger thing of that relation in action. — apokrisis

Are you saying that I'm saying, by using the word mind in reference to my particular epistemological view, that it receives truths from the metaphysical? I don't understand your point.

One context where making the distinction happens is between events that are disclosed to all who are close enough to perceive it and events that can be hidden from others because it happens to a particular individual. Of course, when I put it that way, all events are equally real in so far as they are experienced. — Valentinus

The problem I have with the first part of this statement, is that proximity may have nothing to do with whether something is objective or subjective. For example, one could make the argument that there are objective facts that have nothing to do with my proximity to them, or nothing to do with the fact that they may be hidden.

I do agree that all experiences are real. So even if your experience is a hallucination it still is a real experience, maybe not objectively real, but real nonetheless, at least subjectively real.

So the argument against private language in Wittgenstein, for instance, is not a denial of the reality of private experiences. It just puts talking about them in a particular light. Also, many of our language games play on the theme that what seems private may be easily perceptible by others. Many choose silence as the way to be alone. — Valentinus

I agree with this, but what was the point of it as it relates to my opening remarks? Was you referring to my other thread where I referenced Wittgenstein?

So, and you would be right, especially as it concerns my views, mind invokes a particular philosophical dualistic idea, although not necessarily, but certainly it has a tendency to point to something in back of the brain, something metaphysical. So your way of separating this is what leads to your choice of words?

While it's true that I'm a dualist it doesn't really effect what I'm saying, mind could simply be a reference to the brain, and in fact it's often used as a synonym for brain activities. I'm not trying to evoke anything metaphysical here. In fact, my argument can easily stay within the realm of the physical universe. At least at this point in the discussion.

My general definition of “subjective” would be claims that are viewpoint dependent, and “objective” would be claims that are viewpoint independent. — apokrisis

I'm interested in your choice of wording. I say mind-independent or mind-dependent. Are you saying there is a significant or even a difference between my wording and your wording, that is, your choice of viewpoint dependent or viewpoint independent?

Maybe I'll start a thread on the subject of language, and the objectivity of language-games.

None of this will be settled here. I read some of the comments, and some of you haven't understood what I've said, and the confusions still stand. I don't want this thread to be solely about epistemology, although it's important to my claims about consciousness.

Some of what I said isn't clear enough, so I'll have to re-write some of it.

I spent a lot of time writing that long post to answer these questions, and you're making me re-write what I already wrote.

I'm talking about the act of communicating with concepts using language. The creation of language is mind-dependent, but the actions as we use language with one another is mind-independent, it's part of the reality of language use. For example, you can watch someone play chess and know objectively that they are familiar with the rules. You can see them move the pieces and plan their moves. Part of the objective nature of language is how people use the concepts, are they using the concepts according to the rules of language.

Hi, I think your approach to the idea of life after death is decent. However, I was wondering, if you avoid the religious/spiritual point of view, what will you say about consciousness that makes it something that should survive after death. In other words, why should it?
Secondly, how is consciousness in relation to our human lives, that is, does it have the capacity to act beyond our physical domain while we're still alive or does it have to wait until the body dies? — BrianW

Good question. One of the reasons to conclude that consciousness survives death is that one of the common elements of NDEs is that people see their deceased mother and father, and deceased friends. So the continuity of our consciousness seems to remain intact after we die, and there are other reasons too, but this is one of the common reasons.

Your second question is more difficult to answer. My opinion, based on some evidence, is that we do have contact with the other side, and the other side is familiar with what's going on here. I also think that we are much higher beings than we are in this human form. This reality is a dumbed down version of reality, almost like an illusion of the mind, and there is good evidence for this.

I addressed this in my long post. The facts of logic are instantiated in language use. Language has a reality of its own, and we can observe this reality as we observe how language is used amongst people.

Ya, I turned into Michael on that last post.

Nope, not confusing anything. Whether the Earth has one moon is an objective fact. Whether x justifies the claim that P is not an objective fact. And no knowledge is objective. (Propositional) Knowledge is justifed true belief. Well, least controversial there is that beliefs are mind-dependent. Beliefs do not obtain mind-independently. — Terrapin Station

You agree that the Earth having one moon is an objective fact. Okay, we agree on this. However, you also say in your next statement that "[w]hether x justifies the claim that P is not an objective fact." I would say it depends on what you mean. I'm assuming you mean that in logic when using a deductive or an inductive arguments, the method used in logic to justify an argument is not objective fact. In other words modus ponens is not an objective fact of logic.

I still think that part of the problem is in our views of subjective and objective. I would say that something that is subjective is mind dependent, so I like orange juice is dependent on what I feel or think about oranges. So the fact is dependent on me in a significant way, the fact would cease to be a fact if later in life my tastes changed. This is not only an example of a subjective fact, but also contingent fact. Of course all subjective facts are contingent. One could also say that it is a contingent truth, since the truth of the statement depends on me. It must also be pointed out that statements are said to be true or false, that is, epistemology (knowledge as justified true belief) is something that occurs in language (language-games). Facts, whether subjective or objective either obtain in reality or not. We use statements to reflect facts, so if I say, "Sam likes oranges," then I'm saying that it is true of that statement, that it reflects a particular fact, viz., that I like oranges. So there is a correspondence between this particular statement and the fact in reality (whether subjective or objective). The statement mirrors, reflects, or corresponds with reality. Note also, that the fact associated with the statement, "I like oranges," is also an abstract fact, or an abstract truth, it does not reflect a physical object like the statement, "The Earth has one moon."

Objective facts are mind-independent, that is, the fact is not dependent on me, but is separate from how I think about it. No matter how I feel or think about the fact that the Earth has one moon, the fact will still be a fact even if I cease to exist, and even if there are no minds to apprehend the fact. This is quite different from a subjective fact, which is dependent on me. If I cease to exist there would be no present case of Sam liking oranges. It would only be a fact of the past. The statement that the Earth has one moon is a statement that reflects an objective truth. Again, though, when talking about truth, we are talking about statements. When talking about facts we are talking about things, whether physical or abstract, that exist in reality, apart from how we talk about them. There is much more that can be said about abstract ideas and minds in relation to reality, but I will refrain for now.

There are facts about language too, so facts can reference things in or about language, and this is also part of reality. However, it is also true that language is mind-dependent, so how can there be objective facts of language? Is not part of the definition of subjective, mind-dependent? Yes. However, not everything that is mind-dependent is subjective. There are things that minds do that reflect facts in the world. Thus, minds create language, and as such language is an objective fact of the world.

There is something interesting here that makes me think of Wittgenstein's private language argument. Wittgenstein points out a problem with trying to create a private language, and the problem is associated with rule-following. Rule-following is not something I learn in isolation, that is, I learn to follow rules in a linguistic culture, so it necessarily has a social component. Note that we can objectively observe whether someone is following a rule, based on the rules of a particular language-game. Thus, correct language usage is an objective part of the reality of our lives. This is true even though minds are a necessary component of language.

Now let us consider the statement, "...x justifies the claim that P is not an objective fact." Logic is a language, and logic is based on the rules that define how we justify arguments. The rules that define how this is done is not based on any one person's idea of how or what it means to justify an argument (it is not subjectively defined). The rules of logic are objective, that is, mind-independent in that they are part of the reality of language use. We can objectively observe whether or not you are following the rules of logic.

There are two aspects of mind-dependence that we have to be clear about. It is true that language is mind-dependent, but this does not take away from the fact that language, although created by minds, has an objective reality that is independent of any one mind. The creation of cars is dependent on minds, but once the car is created, it is an objective fact of reality, and the fact is independent of a mind/s. There is a lot more to this idea, and it is not simple to understand. Unfortunately I will not be able to work out all the details of this in a few short paragraphs.

My point though, is that it is an objective fact of logic, that arguments are justified in particular ways. Thus, I would dispute the idea that "...x justifies the claim that P is not an objective fact." And while it is true that propositions reflect truth, it is also true that the way propositions are used, can reflect objective facts about their use in language.

I cannot believe that you think there is no knowledge that is objective knowledge. This is a misunderstanding of knowledge, and the meaning of knowledge. There are tons of examples of objective knowledge. I do not feel I have to even defend this, because it is so obviously false, for more reasons than I can count.

Of course beliefs are mind-dependent, but so what, that does not mean that beliefs cannot reflect or mirror objective reality. Stated beliefs do occur independently of minds, they occur in language, which although created by minds, has an objective component as part of the reality of language. There are beliefs that are nonlinguistic, but this is outside our epistemological language-games.

Where in the world did you get this epistemology from? It would takes months of writing to unravel so many confusions. It did make me think of some new ideas though.

You certainly don't think that anyone equally has every opinion of the tastiness of anchovies simply because it's only a matter of personal taste. (As if you'd think that anyone simultaneously thinks all of "They're yummy," " They're awful," "They're my favorite food," "They make me nauseous," etc. --you'd have to have no conception of what opinions even are to think that something being an opinion would suggest that anyone considers all opinions to equally apply.) — Terrapin Station

You seem to be confusing the concept of subjective and objective. It's true that my personal tastes about anchovies is subjective, and it's based on a subjective opinion. My personal tastes are mind-dependent. So if I say I like anchovies based on my subjective opinion, that in itself doesn't hold much weight in terms of other subjective opinions on anchovies. However, I'm not talking about subjective feelings, which don't amount to a hill of beans in terms of having objective knowledge or asserting an objective truth. My feelings about the Earth having one moon has nothing to do with the objective knowledge or truth about the Earth having one moon. It's an objective fact that the Earth has one moon, and your feelings about that fact, have nothing to do with whether the fact obtains.

That said, what I was asserting in my previous posts, is that correct reasoning is not based on your feelings either, it's not like giving you my feelings about anchovies. Take a test in calculus based on your subjective feelings or opinions and see how far that gets you. There are objective rules and principles that guide correct reasoning (logic), so it's not a matter of subjective opinion like you're claiming. This is also true of mathematics, we're not talking about subjective feelings when it comes to doing the problem correctly. You either follow the rules, or you get it wrong.

I don't know how much you've been following my writings on epistemology, but I'm not new to this subject. I've been studying the subject for many years, and I've given a lot of thought to it. That in itself doesn't make me right, but it does lend weight to what I'm saying. I'm not just pulling these thoughts out of midair.

First, were not talking about something true or false. We're giving opinions about what sorts of epistemic grounds justify actions, beliefs, etc. — Terrapin Station

This is the difference between what you're saying and what I'm saying, viz., I'm not giving opinions, you are. Opinions in my book aren't worth much. How to correctly reason to a conclusion is not a matter of opinion. Besides if you're just presenting an opinion, why are you so adamant that you are correct. One opinion, as far as I can determine, is as good as another.

Physical evidence is necessary. — Terrapin Station

This is obviously not true, and can be demonstrated with even a cursory examination of the subject of testimonial evidence. I don't need physical evidence, although it helps, to make a reasonable conclusion, we do it all the time. Not only do we do it all the time, but it's central to how we form many justified beliefs. For example, if I have ten people who make the claim that you shot someone at 10th and Main street in Pittsburgh, PA at 2 pm on Monday October 3, 2018, then after a careful examination of the testimony (as presented in my argument on page 14), I can reasonably conclude that you in fact shot someone. Obviously there are things that can strengthen the argument, that's the nature of these kinds of inductive arguments.

On the other hand, if I had one person making the claim, and that person's memory was incomplete, or it couldn't be corroborated, or there was no other evidence, then you would be correct. However, in the cases I'm citing there is a ton of testimonial evidence. It is corroborated, and it can be objectively verified in many of the cases.

If we couldn't generally trust the testimony of people, much of what we know would be invalidated. In fact, much of what we know is based on the testimony of others. There is a huge amount of information about science, history, philosophy, etc., passed to us through testimony. It would be irrational to doubt most of it. Why? Because our very understanding of each other, the world around us, our society and culture is based on the concepts and words we learn from others. Without such testimony we would be lost and reduced to silence, period, end of story. What we learn from our culture and from others relies on the truthfulness of most of what is conveyed to us.

We shouldn't just go by testimony in cases where anything important is at stake. — Terrapin Station

Of course, and if you read my argument carefully, you would know that I deal with this question. I deal with it by pointing our what makes testimonial evidence strong, as opposed to weak.

This is the unedited preface to my book.

Preface

The goal of this book is to look at near death experiences (NDEs) in terms of the testimonial evidence. Some of the questions are, starting with the primary question of this book: Does consciousness survive the death of the body? Do NDEs give us enough testimonial evidence to warrant belief in an afterlife? Will we see our loved one’s again? Should we be afraid of death? These are some of the questions that mankind has grappled with for thousands of years; and although the conclusion of the main argument is about whether consciousness survives death, there are many other implications and conclusions that can be inferred from the evidence.

We will not only examine the testimonial evidence, but we will examine it as a measure of what we can claim to know about surviving death. Can we say with confidence that there is enough evidence to make the claim that, “I know my existence extends beyond the scope of my physical body.” So, part of the thrust of this book is an epistemological journey, namely, one of knowledge. This is what will separate this book from others that have been written on the subject of NDEs, namely, what can we know?

The subject of what we can claim to know, especially in terms of testimonial evidence, is highly controversial. Especially since testimonial evidence is seen by many in the scientific community as not reliable enough to establish the conclusion we are seeking. In fact, according to some, testimonial evidence is generally not seen as a reliable source for grounding many of our beliefs. While this is true in many instances, we will try to disabuse you of the notion that testimonial evidence is always weak. In fact, testimonial evidence can be very strong under the right conditions.

The analysis of the testimony will not be from a religious perspective, which is to say, that we will not look at the evidence in terms of any religious point of view or doctrine.

The book will be divided into three parts. Part 1 is a common-sense view of NDEs, which will present the facts and arguments in a relatively easy to understand format. Part 2 will be about what we can speculate about, that is, a portion of the speculations will have some evidentiary support, while other speculations will have little to no evidentiary support. This will be the fun part of the book. Sometimes it is fun just to speculate what might or might not be the case based on little to no evidence.

For those of you who want a more in-depth analysis of some of the subject matter, there will be a third section added at the end of the book. This third section will defend, for example, the epistemological view taken in the first chapter.

Finally, after looking at the evidence we will make a bold claim about what we can know, if anything, about surviving death. So, part of the goal of the first section of this book is to establish knowledge, not to express an opinion, nor to express an article of faith. We want to know! Can we?

I'm currently writing a book on this subject. I've started the first chapter, and I have an editor lined up. My book is going to be a bit different from many of the books on NDEs, because I am concentrating on what I believe is a mountain of testimonial evidence in support of the claim that consciousness survives bodily death.

I will be posting only the first chapter in this thread, starting with the preface. The members of The Philosophy Forum will get the first look at the book. What I start posting in here will be the unedited pages. Once I have the edited pages, I will repost the chapter. I have been wanting to do this book for years, but keep putting it off, and I am not getting any younger, so I better get going.

Posting in this thread has helped me make the argument stronger, so I appreciate those of you who have given good arguments against my argument (as stated on the 1st and 14th page). Also, since I am in the middle of writing the book, any suggestions to make it better would be appreciated. I want to thank @fdrake for his comments, because some of the issues he raised has helped me to think about the testimonial evidence in other ways.

Thanks,
Sam

P.S. I am still trying to decide on a title. One possible title is...

Does Consciousness Survive Death?
A Philosopher's Look at the Evidence

Can either of you please suggest a good book in the secondary literature as an introduction to Wittgenstein? — bloodninja

Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy by K. T. Fann - you can get it used for a few dollars.

The objectivity in the example you gave that you mentioned above seemed to be that the pain was undeniable and it was caused without reason, thus it must be immoral. You are assuming I suppose that this is a necessary fact about the world we live in? Is it that we call actions that promote life “moral” and things that promote death we call “immoral”? — tenderfoot

Yes, the pain is undeniable, i.e., we can be as objectively certain about the pain, and the other components of the act (the arm on the ground, the blood, the pain of observers, etc). And of course the other important component is that the act was committed without good reason.

I don't want to word it the way to you did, viz., "...actions that promote life "moral" and things that promote death we call "immoral"?" For purposes of my argument, all I want to say is that all immoral acts have the property of causing harm, and for most of these kinds of actions we're able to discern the harm, and thus make the claim that it's immoral. Again, though, it must be pointed out for others reading this, that not all harm is immoral, but all immoral acts do cause harm.

is it possible for this biological basis to be independent of evolution? Looking at the tenacity of life and how throughout history there is a drive in human beings to survive and create good lives, it makes sense that these life-promoting values be things we know a priori due to the “background reality of our biology.” If the inclination to follow that objective moral truth is innate in human beings, is it distinct from an evolutionary mechanism optimizing survival and reproduction? The question becomes: are actions moral on account of evolutionary advantage or are they moral in themselves and also coincidentally evolutionarily advantageous? The core of my questions here is whether these morals are based on an independent truth value or the product of random variation and natural selection (I sure hope not — tenderfoot

When I talk about biology in reference to this argument, I'm simply pointing out that it's a fact of our biology that we experience pain; and this fact is part of what contributes to our experiences of pain, and how we talk about pain (pain behavior). Moreover, it's not something derived from my personal experience of pain, although there is that component, but our concepts are developed as we interact with others in social settings. So, we use the concepts of immoral, pain, objective, subjective, reason, etc., as we interact with others, so we learn to use these concepts in relation to others. They aren't dependent on metaphysical constructs. That doesn't mean there isn't a metaphysical reality, only that the way we talk about things, including immoral things, and what we mean by these concepts, is not dependent in a way that forces us to appeal to the metaphysical.

Let's use this analogy, let's say that I learned logic from professor X, but I don't need to appeal to professor X every time I make a claim about a deductive argument. So, if I say a deductive argument must be valid, I don't need to also add, because professor X said so, but I make the claim because those are the facts of deductive arguments. This analogy isn't perfect, but it illustrates an important point.

One could claim, if you believe in God, that God has access to the same facts about what makes something immoral, and therefore gives a set of commandments based on the same reasoning about harm.

I think there is something much deeper here than evolutionary mechanisms. I see some things as having an intrinsic worth, or intrinsic value, and causing harm without good reason is one such value that serves us well across a wide swath of our lives.

To answer your last question would take a lot of time, but since I've been writing about epistemology in another thread, let me refer you to the last few posts in the following:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1314/a-wittgenstein-commentary

I disagree with the claim that this would be objective. You already state it yourself; "... for no good reason." Who decides what is a good reason? The perpetrator? The victim? A neutral third? All of these will have very different ideas of what a good reason might be. And why would any of their opinions be more valuable than that of the other? — Tzeentch

This response is also to Tenderfoot.

Let's get back to my example, which by the way, needs no appeal to anything higher in order to determine that it's immoral.

If I walk up to any person and cut their arm off without good reason, then I've have committed an immoral act by definition. Moreover, it's not a subjective claim, it's objectively immoral based on the harm done; and I don't have to appeal to anything religious to recognize that it's immoral.

If I understand you correctly, there is nothing about this example that is objectively immoral? The screams of the person in pain, the arm on the ground, the blood, the anguish of friends and family, none of this is objectively true? This, it seems, is a paragon case of immorality. One doesn't need to appeal to anything beyond the case itself. Are you saying that the concept of immorality doesn't apply in this case, independent of what I happen to think?

If I was teaching someone how to use the concept immoral, and they didn't use it in this case, I would assert that they didn't know how to use the word correctly. In virtually every case of immorality, the harm done is the reason it's referred to as immoral. And in cases where we argue over whether something is or is not immoral, usually it's because we don't see the harm, i.e., it's not clear that harm was done.

The question is, why do I need to appeal to anything beyond the example to defend the idea that this act (my example) is immoral? Are you making the claim that the only way I would know this act is immoral is by appealing to something metaphysical, for example, God?

All I need to appeal to is the harm, nothing further. If I can make a clear case of the harm done, then I can make the claim that it's immoral, as in the example.

Who decides what's reasonable? We do. There are principles of correct reason that are applied, just as there are principles of mathematics that determine the correct and incorrect use of mathematical symbols. Moreover, I would say that these principles are discoverable. They are built into the universe, i.e., they are built into the background of reality. For example, the principle of noncontradiction is not something I can simply deny based on someone's whim. If you deny it, then you deny the very ability to talk about these ideas in a rational manner. You couldn't even posit if there was religious truth without it. How would you argue that your ideas are true verses my ideas or arguments? So it's not a matter of someone deciding what's reasonable, it's about the objective principles. It's about the very idea of reasoning from one proposition to another.

However, I think the question still remains: where does this notion of morality come from? When you say, “it’s objectively immoral based on the harm alone,” do you mean that there is some independent moral truth that exists which humans have the ability to perceive, connecting the pain to “wrongness”? Or, do you mean that the widely accepted idea that senseless suffering is wrong is a sufficient basis for the term “objectively immoral” because of its popularity? — tenderfoot

There is an error in the quote, it should read, "...it's objectively immoral based on the harm done," that's what I meant to say. However, your questions stand.

I think there is an objective moral principle that we generally follow as people, viz., that we shouldn't inflict undo pain on others for no good reason. I believe this is an objective moral truth that most civilized people adhere to. I don't think popularity has anything to do with it. It may be true that most people believe it, but it's not a matter of popularity. Even if a majority of people rejected it, that still would not make it right.

There is an objectivity to the facts involved (in the e.g. I gave above) that make it stand apart from what I happen to think, i.e., it's not dependent on what anyone thinks. It has to do with what makes for a good life for humans, inflicting pain on others without good reason is not something anyone in their right mind would desire. In fact, we tend to generally avoid pain, even if the pain may have a good outcome, like having an infected tooth pulled. I believe what I'm saying is not only objectively true, but I'm saying that most people recognize it as true, it's self-evident for most people.

Another final point that I already alluded to, but needs to be emphasized. It also has to do with what we value in our lives, and a life free of senseless pain seems to be a something that almost all people value; and this arises out of the kind of biological beings we are (and I'm not thinking necessarily in terms of evolution), i.e., it's the background reality of our biology, what we value, what we feel, how we reason, etc.

Hope this helps.