There is some help in understanding or identifying a bedrock belief (or hinge-propositions) — Sam26
Once I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do."
341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.
342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in
deed not doubted.
343. But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason
we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.
94. But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it
because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I
distinguish between true and false.
95. The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology. And their
role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without learning
any explicit rules.
96. It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were
hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid;
and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became
fluid.
97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I
distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself;
though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.
99. And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an
imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or
deposited.
166. The difficulty is to realise the groundlessness of our believing.
The contention of this paper is that hinge-propositions are prelinguistic or nonlinguistic — Sam26
It is this system that is foundational or bedrock to hinge-propositions or hinge-beliefs, these beliefs give life to language, and to our epistemological language-games. — Sam26
108. "But is there then no objective truth? Isn't it true, or false, that someone has been on the
moon?" If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has ever been on the
moon. Not merely is nothing of the sort ever seriously reported to us by reasonable people, but our
whole system of physics forbids us to believe it.
The foundation then of our epistemic system is ... [our] subjective certainties — Sam26
Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory.
but hinge-propositions are not traditional propositions. — Sam26
They are beliefs, but very basic beliefs that can be shown in our actions. — Sam26
Bedrock beliefs (hinge-propositions) are not part of a noetic structure, they are probably formed causally based on our interactions with the world around us. — Sam26
All propositions are beliefs — Sam26
All beliefs, if they are said to be beliefs, are reflective of states-of-mind, no minds, no beliefs. However, not all beliefs are confined to language, that is, there are other kinds of actions that can and do reflect states-of-mind. Thus, the act of picking up a cup of coffee, or the act of brushing your teeth, or the act of digging for worms, all reflect states-of-mind — Sam26
If I pick up my tooth brush, that act shows my belief about the tooth brush, that there is a toothbrush. — Sam26
My conclusion based on these ideas is that many bedrock beliefs or hinge-propositions are causally formed, that is, there is a causal connection between the reality around us, our sensory experiences, and our mind. This, it seems to me, is what triggers the belief. — Sam26
475. I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but
not ratiocination.
476. Children do not learn that books exist, that armchairs exist, etc.,etc. - they learn to fetch books,
sit in armchairs, etc.,etc.
478. Does a child believe that milk exists? Or does it know that milk exists? Does a cat know that a
mouse exists?
479. Are we to say that the knowledge that there are physical objects comes very early or very late?
480. A child that is learning to use the word "tree". One stands with it in front of a tree and says
"Lovely tree!" Clearly no doubt as to the tree's existence comes into the language-game. But can the
child be said to know: 'that a tree exists'? Admittedly it's true that 'knowing something' doesn't
involve thinking about it - but mustn't anyone who knows something be capable of doubt? And
doubting means thinking.
402. In the Beginning was the Deed.
My conclusion based on these ideas is that many bedrock beliefs or hinge-propositions are causally formed, that is, there is a causal connection between the reality around us, our sensory experiences, and our mind. This, it seems to me, is what triggers the belief. — Sam26
A proposition may express a belief but it is not a belief. — Fooloso4
Are you claiming that there is a picking up a cup of coffee state of mind or the act of brushing your teeth state of mind? — Fooloso4
I do not pick up a toothbrush because I believe there is a toothbrush. My belief about the toothbrush is not simply that there is a toothbrush but that it is used to brush teeth and that brushing my teeth is an important part of hygiene. — Fooloso4
Do you think that this is in line with or contrary to Wittgenstein's claim about the spade being turned at bedrock?
Do I see the duck-rabbit one way or another because something causes me to see it one way or the other? Can the cause of seeing one way be the same as seeing it the other? — Fooloso4
I said, that the act of picking up a toothbrush shows that I believe there is a toothbrush to pick up. — Sam26
The other reasons you give are linguistic reasons. — Sam26
I'm not trying to be in line with or against Wittgenstein's ideas, I'm developing a theory of epistemology based on some of his ideas, and my interpretation of where some of his ideas lead. — Sam26
I don't understand what the duck rabbit idea has to do with what I'm saying. — Sam26
The following is a link to some similar ideas to mine, although not entirely similar, but close.
https://www.academia.edu/7298912/Hinge_Propositions_and_the_Logical_Exclusion_of_Doubt — Sam26
342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in
deed not doubted.
Moore's propositions are in fact hinge propositions. — Sam26
655. The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of
incontestability. I.e.: "Dispute about other things; this is immovable - it is a hinge on which your
dispute can turn."
I have seen some commentators who treat them as such, but I have found nothing in On Certainty or other texts of Wittgenstein's that make that identification. — Fooloso4
The whole book is about Moore's propositions, and the fact that they are hinge propositions. If any commentator said otherwise he would be laughed at. — Sam26
I would challenge you to find someone who said otherwise, especially a philosopher. — Sam26
152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.
So, how does the proposition "I know that here is one hand" serve as an axis? Moore's proposition: "The earth existed for a long time before my birth" might function in this way, but just because I don't doubt that I have hands does not mean it is a hinge. — Fooloso4
What would make one a hinge but not the other? — Luke
[Edit]: More precisely it is not Moore's claim that the earth existed for a long time before my birth that serves as a hinge, but rather, propositions that inform it. Propositions about the age of the earth. — Fooloso4
341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.
342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in
deed not doubted.
343. But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason
we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.
Propositions are beliefs, they are statements that are true or false. The only time they wouldn't be beliefs is if you're giving one as an example or something where they're not attached to someone. — Sam26
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