How can you know that something will happen if that thing won't happen? It doesn't make sense to know that X is true and for X to be false. — Michael

I never said any such thing, that's your interpretation of what I said.

So you're saying god can be wrong, right? — VagabondSpectre

Well, first, I don't believe in the religious idea of God. However, if we assume there is a God that is omniscient in the Christian sense, i.e., that this being knows all that can be known (just a basic definition), then what we mean by know has to be in some way related to the concepts we're using. Second, I'm not sure that an omniscient being would arrive at knowledge in the same way we do, or that you could even say it's knowledge in the sense we mean. However, let's assume that it's possible that there is a being that's omniscient in the way many Christians believe for the purpose of this discussion.

I said was that knowledge of a future event doesn't necessitate the event. We know this from our own understanding of knowledge. For example, "I know the sun will rise tomorrow, but my knowing this doesn't cause the sun to rise tomorrow." So there is no causal link, as some might think.

My only point is that if God knows before he creates you, that you will make choices that necessitate being sent to hell, why would he create you? Why even bother to create a being that will spend eternity in hell? I can't make any sense of a God like this.

I further stated that the free will argument doesn't defend against my argument, because your free will is taken into account by God. For instance, if God is omniscient, then before he created you, he would know that you would exercise your free will with the kinds of choices that would send you to hell. This is not a loving being in my mind, it's a being that people have created in their own minds.

Finally, the Christian idea of God, makes God responsible for evil. For example, if I created a robot with a free will knowing that robot would kill millions of people, then I would be responsible for the evil. This is why I think that the God of the Christians is ultimately evil, given the way they define God. It's not a loving being at all, it's a being that you should despise. I don't think such a being exists. If there is a God, then this God doesn't have the attributes Christians assign to him/her.

I have no idea what you're talking about. If you're trying to tell me that God's knowledge necessitates events, I disagree. Knowing that some event will happen, doesn't necessitate the event. We know that from our own knowledge.

I think of it just a bit differently. If God is supposedly omniscient, and he knew what choices you would make before he created you, why would he create you knowing you would end up in hell? That for me, makes God immoral. And the tired free will argument doesn't work if this is true, because he knew what choices you would freely make, and those choices would lead to hell.

What I was/am thinking is that justification requires reasoning and that reasoning sometimes consists of contemplated or expressed causal relations. — javra

I understand, but I think this is an error. I was trying to point out that reasoning is separate from causality because it involves intention and choice. Causality, as I see it, is quite separate in terms of reasoning, but not separate in terms of some beliefs. Not all beliefs are a matter of reason. However, the beliefs I'm specifically referring to, are those beliefs that are connected with JTB.

Also, there are no prelinguistic JTBs, but there are prelinguistic beliefs. Justification is a linguistic endeavor, and always has been. There is no medium for justification apart from language. It necessarily involves others within a linguistic setting.

A reason, by definition, is a cause, motive, or explanation. It then naturally renders reasoning as the process of providing causes, motives, or explanations for. To justify a belief as true, I then argue, is to provide valid reasoning (a set of valid, i.e. consistent, causes, motives, and/or explanations) for a belief being true. — javra

There is an important distinction that needs to be made in reference to justifying a belief by giving reasons as opposed to citing a cause for a belief. First, causes happen before their effects in time, i.e., they precede their effects. Reasons on the other hand may or may not precede a particular belief. Second, causes have nothing to do with purpose or intention, but reasons do. Third, reasons can be good or bad reasons, but causes are not good or bad in the same way, i.e., my judgment about a cause is different than my judgment about your reasons. This has to do with intentions, or with choices made by persons.

Again, as I said before, there are beliefs that are caused, but to justify a belief, as in JTB, we're not referring to causes but good reasons.

I get it, I just don't thinks its correct. — Cheshire

I'm always presenting knowledge, by definition. :nerd:

Another point of emphasis, is that you can be justified in believing that something is true, but that doesn't mean it is true. It not only must be justified, but the belief must be true for it to be knowledge. Justification alone isn't enough.

If I recall it wasn't simply a matter of knowledge being subject to time, but rather a case where JTB criteria was met but the matter still found to not be knowledge — Cheshire

Yes, I understand that, but what I said still holds. For example, let's say that I see what I think are five red barns in a field at time T1. I justify my belief based on my general belief that my sensory perceptions are generally accurate. So I believe that I'm justified in believing that I see five red barns, i.e., JTB. However, later at T2, I see that they aren't barns at all, but something else. So the question arises, were you justified (justified in the sense that you have knowledge) at T1? The answer is, no. Why? Because the justification was not warranted in that instance, because of what we found out later.

The error idea is a point in my favor. Basically it says that the instance above is only probable knowledge, i.e., it takes into account that I could be wrong about my claim; and we know this based on past experiences. If you were to ask the person who claims to see the five barns, "Is it possible you're wrong about your claim?" - They would probably respond, "Yes." It often happens that people think or belief they're justified when they're not. Again, because one thinks one is justified, and has indeed followed the rules of justification, that doesn't mean they are justified. There is a difference between the definition of knowledge, which necessarily is JTB, as opposed to your belief that you have knowledge. One is true by definition, the other not.

It doesn't make JTB untenable. In fact, it just shows that not all claims amount to JTB. You seem to be applying some absolute sense to our claims of knowledge. What would be the point to challenging someone's claim to knowledge (a justified claim), if one couldn't be wrong about the claim. This goes directly to the idea of a doubting a claim.

There is more to this, but this is a start.

Fire causes discomfort when touched. That doesn't require language to learn. Is it not the ground for believing that touching fire caused pain? — creativesoul

There are causal beliefs. For example, my belief that snakes are dangerous was caused by the bite of the snake. But I would take issue with the idea that the cause is a ground or justification, as in an epistemological ground. Why would you think that causal effects are a grounding. Moreover, to answer the question why I believe something, it may take into account both causality and reasons/evidence, but there is a big difference in terms of epistemology. If a cause is the same as a justification, then we can justify all kinds of weird things. When I talk about justification or a grounding, I'm talking about reasons/evidence, and I think most philosophers are talking about reasons/evidence.

One cannot provide the ground of a belief to another privately. Providing ground is existentially dependent upon language. Language is social. — creativesoul

Yes, we seem to agree here, providing you're using ground as a synonym for justification, as I am.

I'm saying that one need not provide the ground in order to have the ground. — creativesoul

Which seems to be another way of saying the following:

It's in the private setting, after I learn it in a social setting, that I don't have to state it. I know what it means to justify, so in this sense I don't need to state anything. — Sam26

I can have the ground without stating the ground, but learning the ground is social.

It may be obvious to you, some of this, but I'm still trying to get clear on how you're using the words ground and justification. For me, to say a belief is well-grounded is essentially the same as saying, the belief is justified. Are you also thinking of a grounding as in bedrock?

And before you object, I mean to say especially philosophers, when I say people. My primary reason for making JTB a target is just because it's so well guarded from criticism and taught as if were a law of thought; when as Gettier showed in nearly satirical fashion the emperor has no cloths — Cheshire

This idea that Gettier somehow showed that JTB is flawed is just not the case. It's as if Gettier performed a slight of hand, and people think it's an actual picture of reality. It's true that some philosophers think this, but I would consider that all Gettier pointed out is the difference between a claim to knowledge, as opposed to actual knowledge. So if I make a claim, and that claim appears to be JTB, but in the end turns out to be false, then it's simply not knowledge. There is nothing difficult here. No amount of thinking something is JTB, amounts to something actually being JTB.

There are very few absolutes when it comes to JTB. Much of the time what we believe is justified is based on what's probable, not what's absolute. I can perform all the experiments in the world that confirm a theory, but that doesn't mean that that one chance in a million cannot occur and flip your theory on its head. Depending on how you take your theory of course, if you understand that's it's just based on probability, then it won't have much of an affect on your theory. However, if you think that what you know is an absolute, then it might turn your theory on it's head.

There are a lot of variations, but I would say that JTB fits about as well as one might expect, given how we use the term.

Nothing sensible can be said here. The category Philosophy of Religion ought be empty. — Banno

Wow, we are far apart on this one. :gasp:

I think the question of the importance of the understanding of language (over and above the mere ability to use it, obviously) to philosophy hinges on the question of intellectual intuition. When philosophers claim that abstruse metaphysics is 'language on holiday' this is grounded on the empiricist assumption that concepts such as, for example, 'infinity' and 'eternity' are not somehow directly intuitive 'graspings' of something 'beyond', but are simply arrived at by negating ordinary empirically derived concepts such as 'space' and 'time', and that they are subsequently reified as transcendent actualities.

So, in this sense philosophy of language, so-called analytic philosophy is firmly underpinned by empiricist assumptions which are themselves based on science and it's exclusion of the non-empirical, of any notion of the transcendent.

The problem for any transcendence talk would seem to be that its very indeterminacy renders intersubjective corroboration impossible; which makes it unsuitable for science and even for philosophy conceived as a search for determinate truth. If philosophy is conceived as being more akin to poetry than to science, then this problem of indeterminacy need not be so fatal to philosophical dialogue.

It all depends on what you think philosophy is, or on what you want it to be. — Janus

Thanks Janus for your thoughts, your post is in keeping with the spirit of this thread. I was looking for both thoughts I agreed with and disagreed with.

Much of my thinking these days is focused on two subjects, epistemology (as it connects with Wittgenstein) and near death experiences. I've been reading a book called Longing to Know by Esther Meek, and her epistemology is very different from my own. The disagreements between Esther Meek's philosophy and my own are profound, as I believe our disagreements are. However, I think there are interesting points of overlap with her epistemology, and some of what you said. In some ways they're similar.

As someone who believes that we do survive death, and (by survive I mean that we survive as who we are, not just as energy, but as the person we are) that there is some connection between the two realities. Moreover, since it's my contention that consciousness is the unifying principle of the universe, and that we're all connected to this consciousness or mind, then there is a connection in some profound way between that mind and ours.

Just to be clear I don't believe in God in the traditional sense, nor are my beliefs connected with a particular religion, but I do believe there are mystical facts of reality (based on my studies of NDEs). Also, I don't believe language goes on a holiday when talking about some of these ideas, although, it probably does in some or many contexts.

As I said above, I think there is a connection between the two realities, viz., a mind-to-mind connection. How this takes place is a mystery, although I do have some speculative ideas. What I mean is that there are nonlinguistic beliefs or ideas that seem to be generated from a place of transcendence (to use your wording); and that these beliefs, ideas, intuitions, whatever you want to call them, are not language based. They seem to be thoughts generated from some kind of mind-to-mind interaction, and I believe there is evidence for this. And although they're not language based, they can be put into language, i.e., the thoughts can be transformed into language. So we're going from a place of metacognition, or as you say, the intersubjective, to a language based epistemological belief system. And I connect the two based on the idea of prelinguistic beliefs, of which many are empirical, but some are not. Some are abstract, and they get translated or transformed into our language-games. Thus, they become public.

The problem I had with Esther Meek's position is that she wants to claim that the metacognitive or intersubjective is a kind of knowledge, and here's where I disagree. I do think there are beliefs that are prelinguistic, but I don't think there is prelinguistic knowledge. I'm not sure we even have words that fit that transcendent reality in some instances. So although there is overlap, it's very difficult to describe because of the nature of language, and the nature of the reality in which we now reside. The tendency is to bring language into the transcendent, which I think can be done, but it doesn't always work. In cases where it doesn't work, I think we can say that language has gone on a holiday. What I mean is that certain words/concepts only make sense within the language-game of their residence, so we have to choose are words carefully. How we describe the transcendent is very difficult, but I do believe there is a flow from the transcendent to our linguistic world.

This is what I meant when I said there is overlap in some of our position, at least it appears so.

That's funny.

I am fascinated by the philosophy of language and at an advanced age am in the middle of a Master's where I am covering lots of topics but focused on language. I don't think Wittgenstein claims as much as some here think: 'some' problems can indeed be clarified by attention to the use of language, but not 'all' or 'most'. — mcdoodle

Good luck Mcdoodle on your masters. How old are you, if you don't mind me asking? I'm 68, in just a few days. Keep thinking it's good for the brain.

My own thinking is that Wittgenstein's methods can be used across a wide array of philosophical thinking. For example, in answering questions such as - what is reality, what is knowing, what are beliefs, objective and subjective ideas, and the very expansive topic of how meaning is derived, which goes to the logic behind the use of words/concepts.

However, to make the point some have already made, just because you get clear on the use of these words, that doesn't mean the problem vanishes. It does help clarify the problems. Many of the problems that disappear, aren't really problems in the first place. Some or many are just linguistic illusions.

It sounds to me like some people's interpretation, even in this very thread, of the later Wittgenstein is that he was trying to cure the philosopher in us from the need to do philosophy. — Marchesk

Well, Wittgenstein did believe that much of what passes as philosophy is just misunderstandings of the logic of language. This is seen from the Tractatus to On Certainty. There's disagreement over this, but I think Wittgenstein would say that if you can clear up the linguistic confusions, it will help clear up the philosophical muddle, and that will enable you to stop. I don't think he meant that all philosophizing would stop, I don't see how that would or could be the case.

All I'm saying is, and you've agreed with me before, that one need not provide their ground to another in order for the belief to be well-grounded. Being well-grounded is the criterion for being justified. It is not providing that ground to another. — creativesoul

The confusion may be in the following: I learn through the language-game of epistemology, i.e., what it means to justify a belief. Once I learn it in the proper setting, then I'm able to apply it privately. I don't learn it privately, but I can apply it privately. Just as I learn mathematics within the language of mathematics (socially again), and then I can do it privately.

It's in the private setting, after I learn it in a social setting, that I don't have to state it. I know what it means to justify, so in this sense I don't need to state anything. Unless someone asks for the justification, then I can give it. The social, or the language part comes first though.

Are you saying that it can be done totally in private? Just trying to clarify.

I understand that you don't. Do you know whether Wittgenstein thought so? — Marchesk

I don't believe so.

I hope in my writings I haven't given that impression. Although at times it might appear that that's my view.

Does anybody understand Wittgenstein? :wink: :razz: — Pattern-chaser

You do, don't you!? :wink:

As do I! The only thing I'd add is that a coherent problem is a grammatically well-formed one. This does not mean the problem of time is 'merely' linguistic: it simply means that it meets the minimal criteria of being a problem that can be addressed at all. It's like saying: "all problems of vision are problems of light": in some sense, this is true and undeniable - but it is also misleading. The disjunction between "all philosophical problems are linguistic" and "philosophical problems are real" is a fake one: philosophical problems are real - are only real - when they have a well-formulated grammar that makes sense of them. — StreetlightX

Well said, I concur wholeheartedly.

Sure, but that's a lot different than the claim that linguistic analysis can potentially dissolve philosophy problems across the board. That philosophical inquiry is itself an abuse of language. That philosophers for two and half thousand years have been misunderstanding language. — Marchesk

I'm wondering what philosophers have thought this? I know that in Wittgenstein's early writings (The Tractatus) he believed that the major problems of philosophy were a result of not understanding the logic of language (mainly an a priori endeavor). Moreover, in thinking he solved this problem, he thought that he had solved the major problems of philosophy, so this may be true of the early Wittgenstein. Are there others that you're thinking of?

But what if dog didn't do way instain mother? Dog is would be, maybe. But definitely dog wasn't. Would be isn't is and wasn't isn't is, can talk that. But only is is is! Therefore wasn't isn't is and isn't isn't was, and would be isn't is and isn't isn't would be. But isn't is maybe would be some of the time. Would be and wasn't isn't is. — fdrake

I definitely will suspend belief when it comes to these statements. :gasp:

Who's Stove?

Later: Oh, now I remember. DUH

The primary reason for creating this thread was to get people to expose their own thinking on the importance of philosophy of language. It may be that it's not that important for some, or it may be of primary importance, or somewhere in between. People tend to gravitate to debating the differences between their ideas, and that's okay, but I was looking for what people have learned as they have studied this particular area of philosophy. This is why I wanted people who have spent a lot of time thinking about philosophy of language. However, I did open it up, because I didn't want to restrict people.

Thanks Blue Lux, for the most part I'm looking for what people have learned, and your post is in keeping with the spirit of my thread.

I went through that link rather fast, but it seems to be the writings of a skeptic, in terms of what we think we know. After all there are many ways we can go wrong in our thinking, as the article points out. Much of this needs unpacking, but I would say that I disagree with the article on many levels.

It would take another thread to discuss it.

That is to say, it describes W.'s method of philosophising as a picture which holds captive its practitioners, as a condition (theoriophobia) which requires therapy! It is said, or at least implied, by its proponents, that someone can be immersed in W.'s method of linguistic analysis only through a volitional switch, which takes place once we have seen and understood what the method shows us. This, of course, is something Virvidakis is sarcastic about. — Πετροκότσυφας

Maybe you could expand a bit on this, and on any of the comments made in that post.

Hm. Philosophy of language or linguistic philosophy. Perhaps we have started out with an issue of ambiguity. I do tend to use "philosophy of language" when strictly I mean "linguistic philosophy"; but then, it was the philosophy of language that led to my adopting linguistic philosophy as a srt of default position. — Banno

When I talk about philosophy of language I'm referring to a Wittgensteinian process, for the most part. Although I sometimes use linguistics to refer to some of the same things, strictly speaking linguistic philosophy is much different.

From the SEP...
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/linguistics/

"Philosophy of linguistics is the philosophy of science as applied to linguistics. This differentiates it sharply from the philosophy of language, traditionally concerned with matters of meaning and reference.

"As with the philosophy of other special sciences, there are general topics relating to matters like methodology and explanation (e.g., the status of statistical explanations in psychology and sociology, or the physics-chemistry relation in philosophy of chemistry), and more specific philosophical issues that come up in the special science at issue (simultaneity for philosophy of physics; individuation of species and ecosystems for the philosophy of biology). General topics of the first type in the philosophy of linguistics include:

"What the subject matter is,
What the theoretical goals are,
What form theories should take, and
What counts as data.
Specific topics include issues in language learnability, language change, the competence-performance distinction, and the expressive power of linguistic theories.

"There are also topics that fall on the borderline between philosophy of language and philosophy of linguistics: of “linguistic relativity” (see the supplement on the linguistic relativity hypothesis in the Summer 2015 archived version of the entry on relativism), language vs. idiolect, speech acts (including the distinction between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts), the language of thought, implicature, and the semantics of mental states (see the entries on analysis, semantic compositionality, mental representation, pragmatics, and defaults in semantics and pragmatics). In these cases it is often the kind of answer given and not the inherent nature of the topic itself that determines the classification. Topics that we consider to be more in the philosophy of language than the philosophy of linguistics include intensional contexts, direct reference, and empty names (see the entries on propositional attitude reports, intensional logic, rigid designators, reference, and descriptions)."

I'm not prepared for a formal debate. It's just that those debates seemed to be well structured, and this sort of topic has the chance of being all over the place, since it attempts to cover the entire reach of philosophy. — Marchesk

Ya, this is a rather broad topic, but don't hold back.

unless some philosophy of language is philosophy of mind...

Profesional philosophers have moved on, it seems; but then, they have to do something in order to convince others to pay them. — Banno

Language seems foundational in some sense to philosophy, as per StreetlightX's comment, but then moves on as we learn to use it in these other subject areas.

I'm wondering how much we can agree on within the scope of philosophy of language. I'm trying to take this thread in a different direction from the typical threads. I'm trying to be a bit more open-minded and not as combative, but it's difficult to do. I guess I'm looking for wisdom from those of you who spend a lot of time thinking.

Nice post, I'm always looking for ways to debunk my own ideas. It's so easy to get into a rut about a particular way of thinking, i.e., it's easy to get tunnel vision. It would be interesting to hear more of this. There are parts of this that I would take issue with, but it does seem interesting.

He is, if you like, a struggling Christian in various stages of retreat and denial. — Snakes Alive

This doesn't seem to fit the Wittgenstein I know, although I can see how you might think this from some of what he said. Wittgenstein definitely believed in the mystical, and he admired the writings of some Christians, like Kierkegaard.

Indeed; Philosophy of Language is, in the end, the whole of philosophy. — Banno

Yes, this is why I think philosophy of language is so important, and this seems to me to be a very important discovery about the philosophy of language. Maybe one can debate the idea that every philosophical problem is a language problem. I know I did leave open the idea that not every philosophical problem is a language problem, but in a sense it is.

The great joy I had from PI was due to reading it as a set of tools more than for the content. Consider, for instance, "Don't think, but look" from ⎰66. It's just brilliant - as in, it illuminates what goes wrong in so much philosophical thinking.

The vast majority of philosophical problems derive from grammatical muddles; here I am using "grammar" in the broad sense of the structure of language and language games. Indeed I am tempted to say if it's not a grammatical problem, it's not a philosophical problem - it belongs to some other field.; That is, it is tempting to posit that philosophy is exactly the study of confusions of language. — Banno

Your post is the kind of post I'm looking for, i.e., the ideas that you gleaned from Wittgenstein. Some of you may have a different perspective, so it doesn't have to relate to Wittgenstein.

I'm not necessarily looking for debate, but having a debate about what's said is part of the process. I'm looking for your perspective in relation to philosophy of language, and it doesn't need to be from Wittgenstein's perspective.

Getting Banno to write more than a sentence or two is an achievement in itself. Maybe I should close the thread.

Its particularly true of child development issues. You have to know when to stop asking the child to further define their issues, and simply accept the rough sketch. In my experience, it usually much earlier than many psychologists seem to think. — Pseudonym

This seems, although I'm not sure, to go along with Wittgenstein's foundational ideas, or what appear to be foundational ideas.

I share the positivist view that there is something 'wrong' with philosophy, that the questions it asks are somehow confused. Philosophy therefore can't be addressed on philosophical terms — Snakes Alive

Can you give an example of what you mean.

I simply mean that language is a practice like any other: playing football, walking a dog, brushing teeth; to use language is to do something. And 'doings' are not specifically linguistic. Moreover they can only be made sense of in wider contexts that might involve everything from economics to power relations to biology and so on. Language is embedded in a world, and to understand language we must understand the world. Witty would capture this in his recourse to his reference to the form-of-life in which language-games operate. — StreetlightX

Yes, I would definitely agree with this.