Then can you advise us on which companion to use? Or PMS Hacker?

The best book I've read that sums up Wittgenstein is K. T. Fann's, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy. You can get it used for just a few dollars. It's sums up his philosophy from the Tractatus to the PI.

The best book on Wittgenstein's life is Monk's Ludwig Wittgenstein.

https://www.amazon.com/dp/B07922L4HW?tag=opr-mkt-opr-us-20&ascsubtag=1ba00-01000-ubp00-win10-other-nomod-us000-pcomp-feature-scomp-wm-5&ref=aa_scomp#customerReviews

If you listen to MU you'll all be screwed in the head. — Sam26

We're all fucked in the head. Isn't that what Wittgenstein demonstrates in PI?

Anyway, those are my thoughts for what they're worth. — Sam26

Seeing as you don't seem to have anything useful to add, I'd say your thoughts aren't worth very much. But we're all fucked in the head anyway, so who cares?

The best book I've read that sums up Wittgenstein is K. T. Fann's, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy. You can get it used for just a few dollars. It's sums up his philosophy from the Tractatus to the PI. — Sam26

Thanks for mentioning it again. I just bought a paperback for a cheap 14 greenbacks. It arrives Friday. I'm busy with my other reading groups on Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Representation and Kripke's Naming and Necessity. I'm enjoying them both and hope I can find time to address the Investigations thread here. It's definitely a tough book to analyze given its format and lack of apparent narrative, which can only be seen (IMO) through a resolute reading of the Tractatus and then the Investigations. There are of course reoccurring themes in the Investigations from the Tractatus if one is observant enough.

http://wab.uib.no/agora/tools/alws/collection-7-issue-1-article-21.annotate

As Wittgenstein remarks, the crystalline purity of logic (and, a fortiori, of the Tractarian eliminativism) rendered it no longer applicable to actual uses of language (Wittgenstein 1958/1999, §107). Instead of pursuing the former, Wittgenstein decided to return to the rough ground, to the philosophical problems of everyday language. Although this violates the principles of scientific philosophy, it allowed his work to have content that would have been lost with the Tractarian eliminativism. Thus, instead of throwing away the ladder after ascending it, Wittgenstein threw it away before climbing it, for in order to get to the rough ground, no ladder is needed. — William Manninen

That pretty much sums it up.

It is going too fast. Plus a silly tit-for-tat which I wasted time reading didn’t help.

The professor I studied under studied under Cora Diamond who is one of the proponents of the resolute reading. I'm definitely not a fan of the resolute reading, and that article explains part of the reason.

The professor I studied under studied under Cora Diamond who is one of the proponents of the resolute reading. I'm definitely not a fan of the resolute reading, and that article explains part of the reason. — Sam26

I think there is some merit to that professed belief; but, it is common knowledge that Wittgenstein wanted the Tractatus to be published alongside the Investigations. Even if on face value it doesn't seem that Wittgenstein has no continuous narrative between the two works, that simply cannot be true.

There is definitely a continuous narrative between the two works. He didn't completely disavow everything in the Tractatus. One of the continuities, is that there is a logic behind the use of words. Although the way he applies that logic is different.

Although the way he applies that logic is different. — Sam26

What do you have to say about that, if you don't mind me asking?

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein believes that the structure of language is revealed by logic, and that the main function of language is to describe the world. The three main issues of the T. are - logic, language, and the world. His investigation in the T. is purely a priori.

In the PI he still believes that the logic of language is important, but the investigation of that logic is different, it's more of an a posteriori investigation. The logic in the PI is seen in the language-game, and the grammar and rules that make up the language-game. It's also seen in how we use words in social contexts. These social contexts (language-games) reveal the logic behind the use of the words or propositions. Our actions as seen in a form of life also reveal the logic within the language-game.

On forums people will shout and battle it out.

I am not “leading” because there is no chance I can stop anyone from posting or readin ahead. I can try amd ask people to stick to the text (and have) but then there is the egotistical exchange.

Looking at the Routledge edition there is nothing much there that does more than the text itself. It is NOT a complex text at the start. Anything I have said is to reference the text and expand a little on what W says. For example I like the term “ostensive” as something to apply to non-verbal thought (I haven’t said this because it is irrelevant.

At the moment comments on 1-30 are welcome ... no doubt people will ignore this and plough ahead with pet theories. Maybe they’ll take the hint? Maybe more than two people will respond? Maybe people have been put off?

We’ll see :)

Note: Why doesn’t the Routledge edition refer to what I referred to regarding “numbers” and “counting”? Seems strange and shows that the guides don’t cover everything. If reading a book for the first time I generally don’t use a guide EVER! Only once have a done so because I never got hold of the original text. Guides are better read after in my opinion (but it is my opinion.)

Looking at the Routledge edition there is nothing much there that does more than the text itself. It is NOT a complex text at the start. Anything I have said is to reference the text and expand a little on what W says. For example I like the term “ostensive” as something to apply to non-verbal thought (I haven’t said this because it is irrelevant. — I like sushi

I'm not familiar with the Routledge edition.

Actually, the way Wittgenstein is using "ostensive," as in "ostensive teaching of words (PI 6)," is not in connection with non-verbal thought, but in connection with how words are taught, and he thinks this view is very primitive, viz., it doesn't account for how we learn many words. For example, I may point to a cup while saying the word cup as I teach a child how to use the word. However, there is nothing to point to when using the words nothing or the, we learn how to use these words in other ways.

Think of the "ostensive teaching of words" in reference to the primitive language-game at the beginning of the PI.

Another key element to the continuity of his early philosophy and his later philosophy is how we come to mean something by our words. What constitutes meaning? In the T. he does it through the picture theory of meaning. In the PI meaning is seen through the eyes of the language-game and use, i.e., meaning happens in linguistic rule-governed social settings. Your private experiences have nothing to do with meaning.

I attached some other supplementary reading books in my previous comment here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/231811

Let me know what you think.

I know what he meant by “ostensive’. That is why I said it was a personal thought and irrelevant to the context of this thread.

It was an example of what I am NOT doing here.

:ok:

I like what it says at the start of the Cambridge one. Like I’ve already said I believe in reading the text first and not relying on guidebooks or the summations of others. Often I’ve found that I make some happy mistakes that spark new ideas or branch my thinking into directions the author doesn’t take.

The problem of using references as first time guides is quicker, but I feel you may lose something by blinding yourself from your own thoughts under the weight of other views.

I’m not going to look at any of the references you’ve give properly and I’m not encouraging anyone else to either. I’ve read PI once quickly and now this opportunity has arrived I’ll slowly go through it again and once I’m done with a section and expressed my thoughts (if I choose to) I’ll then, and ONLY then, refer to the guides.

I’m only taking on the role because I aim to improve my “people management” skills (or lack of) as well as hoping to see many different takes on W expressed/discussed whether they are deemed right or wrong.

Here, here.

Seeing as you don't seem to have anything useful to add, — Metaphysician Undercover

Says MU of the chap who has added the most, and the most cogent, stuff on Wittgenstein in this forum...

Come on! Is this merely a forum for pointless sniping?

Would it hurt to refrain from making useless posts ... like this one?

The discussion is Philosophical Investigations. Add to it or leave please; hoping for the former :)

Far from being useless, I'm advising you and those here about to listen to Sam; certainly he will be a better guide than MU.

A remark about the 'difficulty' of the PI: one should be careful about taking a priest's approach to the book, as if reading it requires some series of initiation rites and ritual incantations. It is a difficult book, but one eminently approachable when read with care - that is, when read with the attention appropriate to any good work of philosophy.

One element of difficulty specific to the PI though, is that it develops its arguments in two contrasting temporal keys: on the one hand, the arguments develop over long stretches of discussion, where nascent points are slowly and deliberately teased out bit by bit. There's a need to keep passages in mind that might have long ago been read. This contrasts with the PI's otherwise very tight argumentative structure were points are taken up and dropped very quickly in the space of a single subsection or two, and which themselves require close attention in order to grasp them.

The fact that the book largely operates at these two different scales at the same time is not easy to square with our usual habits of reading, and it can be hard to coordinate the two with each other. Still, it can be done, and it doesn't require some kind of kabbalah-like esoteric hermeneutics that often and damagingly gets associated with the work. Just a bit of hard work, nothing more.

In terms of this little reading group, I'd simply suggest to be careful about getting to caught up in local arguments and particular subsections without trying to relate them to the global whole of the work. It's far too easy to get stuck on one or another example without trying to understand its place in the larger narrative (and there is a narrative arc or arcs to the PI, fragmentary looks notwithstanding). I would also add that I agree with Sushi that for those reading the PI for the first time it might not always be beneficial to track secondary readings along with it. It's hard enough to keep the double tempo of the book in mind without adding a third.

It is going too fast. Plus a silly tit-for-tat which I wasted time reading didn’t help. — I like sushi

Some of us have more free time than others in the present context, so our paces vary. The tit-for-tat develops in the wait period as a wasting of time. It's a natural manifestation of this type of forum, a social medium which allows the commentator access 24 hours a day, seven days a week. If it stays relatively on topic, it's a harmless digression.

But if you do not read the text thoroughly you'll have difficulty distinguishing the personal opinion of the commentator from the material of the text. This is a very important, and difficult aspect of interpretation, to exclude your personal opinion, box it out of your interpretation, and failure to do this leads to a faulty commentary. This is why secondary sources ought to be approached with caution, and I like your attitude toward such, read them afterwards, after you've developed your own interpretation. At this point one might carefully analyze the places where one's own interpretation varies from the interpretation offered in the secondary source, in an effort to determine why such a variance has occurred.

At the moment comments on 1-30 are welcome ... no doubt people will ignore this and plough ahead with pet theories. Maybe they’ll take the hint? Maybe more than two people will respond? Maybe people have been put off? — I like sushi

I'm a little bit unruly myself, so I'll mention a passage at 31. It's just outside your arbitrary divide of 30, but very relevant to the material of 1-30, which we all seem to have a grasp of by now. So please don't expel me from the group for going out of bounds.

This passage, I find to be very complex and difficult, and my inclination is to read it and skip along without understanding it, as I am inclined to do in many passages from Plato, where too many ideas are intermingled in a small space on the page, transposing to a short time in the mind. This passage seems like it was intended to say something very important about how we learn a word, (though he says "name"), which is not really an ostensive learning, but I can't quite put my finger on what exactly is being said. The key point in the analogy which is hard for me to grasp and apply, is that the chessman corresponds to the physical word. And, the (ostensive) demonstrations referred to are meant to demonstrate the use of the word, as a physical object, analogous to the use of the chessman. But at the end, he explicitly refers to "name" as if the physical word is supposed to be a name. Here's the passage:

31. When one shews someone the king in chess and says: "This is
the king", this does not tell him the use of this piece—unless he already
knows the rules of the game up to this last point: the shape of the king.
You could imagine his having learnt the rules of the game without ever
having been shewn an actual piece. The shape of the chessman corresponds
here to the sound or shape of a word.

One can also imagine someone's having learnt the game without
ever learning or formulating rules. He might have learnt quite simple
board-games first, by watching, and have progressed to more and
more complicated ones. He too might be given the explanation "This
is the king",—if, for instance, he were being shewn chessmen of a shape
he was not used to. This explanation again only tells him the use
of the piece because, as we might say, the place for it was already
prepared. Or even: we shall only say that it tells him the use, if
the place is already prepared. And in this case it is so, not because the
person to whom we give the explanation already knows rules, but
because in another sense he is already master of a game.

Consider this further case: I am explaining chess to someone; and I
begin by pointing to a chessman and saying: "This is the king; it
can move like this, . . . . and so on."—In this case we shall say: the
words "This is the king" (or "This is called the 'king' ") are a definition
only if the learner already 'knows what a piece in a game is'. That is,
if he has already played other games, or has watched other people
playing 'and understood'—and similar things. Further, only under these
conditions will he be able to ask relevantly in the course of learning the
game: "What do you call this?"—that is, this piece in a game.

We may say: only someone who already knows how to do something
with it can significantly ask a name.

And we can imagine the person who is asked replying: "Settle the
name yourself"—and now the one who asked would have to manage
everything for himself.

Is there anyone here who is ready to tackle this passage, and render clear the meaning of the closing statements? I get lost at the second paragraph, the second imaginary scenario. because it seems like the person in the scenario already knows how to use words, yet is also being shown words for the first time. Or is this meant to be like translation, the person is being shown new words which correspond to the ones already known? If so, how could a name be translated?

Far from being useless, I'm advising you and those here about to listen to Sam; certainly he will be a better guide than MU. — Banno

I explicitly stated that I am not going to lead this discussion, so I am not trying to guide anyone. If anyone decides to follow me and ends up screwed in the head in accordance with Sam26's experience, that's not my responsibility.

This thread is like the blind leading the blind — Sam26

Well, or maybe like the patronizing leading the patronizing. Which is what the entire board is like sometimes. Why we get a parade of people through here who seem to believe that they're the only one with a philosophy background, with philosophy degrees, with philosophy teaching experience, with a philosophy publishing history, etc. I don't know, but we do.

Obviously not everyone is going to have the same background, but we seem to get the old "you must not have a comparable background to mine if you have such different views than I do, if you have such a different disposition than I have," which you'd hope would be almost immediately dissolved in anyone with an actual philosophy background, given the variety of views and personalities found under its umbrella, but such poor reasoning seems to persist.

It is going too fast. — I like sushi

Again, why are we doing "reading group" threads where no one is leading them via directing just what we're going to discuss as we systematically go through a text? What sort of reading group is that? Heck, so far the Schopenhauer and Kripke threads have seemed to amount to "make some comment about the book if you want to.". That's not a reading group thread.

We should be saying, "Okay, tomorrow/in two days/whenever we'll be discussing sections/pages nn" and then the leader starts the discussion on the day in question and gives the next target at the end of his/her post, with everyone else then giving their comments, getting into discussions about that content, etc. And then if the leader is going too fast or too slow for most participants, they make the appropriate adjustments.

Why are we not doing that?

I am not “leading” because there is no chance I can stop anyone from posting or readin ahead — I like sushi

I've participated in a lot of reading group and a lot of listening group threads. (Re the latter, where we do something like go through a musical artist's entire discography song-by-song.) In my experience people are usually cool with sticking to the "chunk" being presented as it's presented.

The fact that the book largely operates at these two different scales is not easy to square with our usual habits of reading, — StreetlightX

Well, and for some of us, our sometimes crappy memory. :razz:

doesn't require some kind of kabbalah-like esoteric hermeneutics that often and damagingly gets associated with the work. — StreetlightX

Yeah, sometimes I get the (extremely distasteful) impression of some philosophers treating Wittgenstein more or less like Jesus.

Reel back 5-6 pages and look? I cannot help if people ignore what I propose. I said to discuss the intro and 1-7 and you started jumping ahead.

This isn’t a classroom so you don’t have to follow what I propose.

Should dictate everything? If so then let us reel back and look at what I proposed. If not continue with looking at the first 30.

You all have a week (until Dec 6) then we’ll move on from 8-30 (until Dec 14) then leave it to the New Year to discuss reading up to around 50-60 mark.

Anyway, that’s as much as I’m willing to do. None of that means hold off from reading the whole text.