The point is to show that your awareness can be completely internal. One could even imagine, without contradiction, everything completely generated by a mind or minds, without external stimulus at all. All reality could be generated by a mind.

There is no meaning without something external to thought. So, if consciousness consists of thought, then there is no consciousness without something external to it. — creativesoul

I'm not sure I agree with this. I guess it depends on what you mean by external to thought. Let's consider a thought experiment. Let's suppose that there are a group of us existing as brains in a vat, and let's further suppose that the reality we are experiencing is fed into us via electrodes. Thus, everything we experience is within the mind/brain, all of us could be linked into a reality that we perceive to be independent of us, but actually all of it is happening within our minds. All of us can communicate via language, thus the meaning we attach to the words would have the same impact as any language, but it would be all internal, even though we believe we are seeing real things, objective things, it wouldn't really be external to what we thought. It would appear to our senses to be external, it would feel like we could move from place to place, but it would be a kind of illusion based on what our brains were fed via the electrodes.

Thus according to this thought experiment meaning wouldn't be external to what we thought, that is, we would derive all meaning based on the illusion of reality, the illusion of an objective reality.

Since questions have become apparent in terms of how meaning emerges within language, I've decided to give a more in depth analysis of this idea in terms of how I believe Wittgenstein handles this question.

In Wittgenstein's Tractatus (his early philosophy) meaning is associated with an object, that is, the object for which the word stands is it's meaning. This was the traditional view of language since Augustine, and to be fair the ostensive definition model (associated with certain words) does account for a large class of words, but not all words. Thus, mastering the use of language consisted in learning the names of objects according to many traditionalists. Wittgenstein points out that one seems to be mainly thinking of specific words like chair, pencil, cup, etc, but not words like soon, five, that, this, time etc.

Wittgenstein uses the example of someone going to the store with a note that reads "five red apples." Now we can imagine the objects associated with apple and red (a color chart for e.g.), but no such object appears for the number five. The word five belongs to a different category of words, and although one can associate the objects in terms of apple and red, no such thing emerges in terms of the word five, only how the shopkeeper uses the word. So in terms of the ostensive definition model, what does the word five refer to? I suppose one could have an ontology of numbers that associates number words with abstract objects. Nevertheless, there is a distinction between objects associated with apple, that is, a thing with spatial extension, but nothing like this emerges with the word five, it has no spatial thing associated with it.

The problem of course is that certain words cause a kind of "mental cramp," we feel that there must be some thing directly associated with these words - something we can point to. For example, "what is truth," "what is beauty," and "what is time," and thus we come up against the source of philosophical bewilderment, as Wittgenstein pointed out.

The tendency is to want to lump all words into the same category, that is, something exterior to the word, as if all words get their life from something external. Of course it's not just that we want to associate words with some objective thing, sometimes we are tempted to associate words or propositions with internal mental events, which is just as incorrect.

Words have a variety of uses in a variety of contexts, thus we understand them by understanding this multiplicity. We should think of language as an activity of uses, like tools in a tool box which have a variety of uses.

It's not that use necessarily drives meaning, because one can always use a word incorrectly. It's use coupled with language-games within and amongst language-users, and the implicit and sometimes explicit use of rules associated with such use.

The other problem of course is our need for precision, which is why philosophers and others are always trying to find definitions that add precision to a word or theory. Again, it's true of some words that there are very precise definitions, triangle for example, but not true of words like perfect, exact, game, etc. There are so many philosophical problems that could be eliminated if one simply understood how language works. Most or many of the philosophical problems in these threads are related to misunderstandings of language.

How we use words tells us something about what we mean. My point is that it's not dependent on a dictionary or objects. It's dependent on the language-games associated with language users.

Consider the following Harry: When we teach a child the use of certain words we sometimes do it by using the ostensive definition model, that is, by pointing to an object and giving it a name. For example, I say cup, and I then point to the object associated with the the word cup. We may do this a number of times before the child starts to associate the word with the object. However, note that the way we are able to tell if the child has used the word correctly, is if they demonstrate the proper association - word/object. So do they use the word correctly in a particular context? For example, you tell them to get a cup, and they bring the cup. If they brought a pencil, then they would not have used the word correctly. One does not teach the meaning of the word cup first, one teaches the child how to use the word first, meaning comes later.

This would also be seen in primitive man, before the advent of writing. Primitive man may have a sound associated with a particular action, a grunt or some such noise. However, if you don't perform the correct action associated with the sound, then you don't understand how the word is used within a community of language users. It's the community who establishes the correct use of the words, that is, they have established implicit rules associated with the noises they make. Note that there are no dictionaries at this point, they don't come along until much later in history. Moreover, when someone decides to write down meanings, these meanings come from how words are used in a variety of ways and contexts.

Thanks Jupiter, I stopped posting in the Wittgenstein threads because I wasn't getting any responses, although that shouldn't really stop me, since most of this is already written.

Ya, the video does get into panpsychism, and I'm skeptical of trying to fit any view of consciousness into some existing view of reality, or some religious view. I think it's going to take thinking outside the box, but that takes courage.

What if your spouse cheats on you and you never know about it? As they say, "what you don't know cannot hurt you". But surely, cheating is immoral. — Samuel Lacrampe

I foresaw this in my argument look closer at the types of harm.

But these three reactions would still occur if you had good reasons to cut someone's arm, like out of self-self-defense. So if the same things are observed for both a moral and immoral case, then they cannot be the criteria to determine if the act is moral or not. — Samuel Lacrampe

If you have good reasons to cut the arm off, then obviously it's not immoral, which is why I differentiate between having good reasons for the harm as opposed to not having good reasons.

We need to differentiate between two types of evil. Moral and physical. You are correct that 'harm' is an essential property of evil, when it comes to physical evil. For moral evil, the essential property is intention; intention of not treat others like we want to be treated. So accidental harm and natural disasters are examples of physical evil. Attempted murder and looking down on others are examples of moral evil. And intentionally cutting someone's arm for not good reason is an example of both. — Samuel Lacrampe

I also covered this, I pointed out the difference between intentional moral evil, and evil that's not intentional, like natural disasters.

Like I said, we're far apart, even your ideas of what Wittgenstein is saying in On Certainty.

What counts as objective morality? — creativesoul

My own view is that there is an essential property to an immoral act, and that property is harm. All immoral acts cause harm to the one committing the act, or to the one who is the object of the act, or to both. If there is no harm, there is no immorality. When I say this I'm not saying that every harmful act is an evil, only that all evil or immoral acts cause harm.

The second component is that immorality is objective, that is, it's not subjective, or a matter of opinion, or a matter of consensus. For example, if I cut someone's arm off without good reason, there are several factors that make this an immoral act, and moreover, make it an objective immoral act. First, it's objectively true that the arm has been cut off, we can see it on the ground. Second, we can objectively observe the screams of the victim. Third, we can also witness the screams and tears of family and friends. These three reactions show the objective nature of the harm done. No opinion or consensus will or can change the objective nature of these observations.

This is not to say that we're always able to detect the harm, which is why in courts of law evidence is brought forward to show the harm done.

Intent can be tricky because while there are clearly immoral acts that involve intent, there are also acts that cause harm without intent, like accidental harm, which we can be held accountable for. Furthermore, there are evils caused by natural disasters that don't involve intent at all, yet they are often referred to as evils because of the great harm done. One might say then that while we can refer to all immoral acts as evil, not all evil involves immoral actions because they are not always the result of an agent.

The absence of god does not entail nihilism. — charleton

I definitely agree with this. Some religious people have bought into the idea that somehow right and wrong, moral and immoral cannot take root unless there is a lawgiver. Nothing could be further from the truth. You might despair at the thought of your life having an absolute end, but that doesn't mean we should retreat into nihilistic thinking.

I was just wondering because we're pretty far apart on some of this stuff, so I thought you may have been reading something other than what I was reading. I too have read most of those books, although I haven't read completely through Remarks on Color, and very little on Culture and Value. Two really good books that I recently read are Ludwig Wittgenstein by Monk, and Wittgenstein, by Schroeder. KT Fann's book is really good if you want to get a good overview. I spent a lot of time reading and re-reading On Certainty, I find it fascinating.

Lately though I've been caught up in the arguments about consciousness.

But your replies don't to seem to fit with my understanding of the later W., and much of the reading I've done on W. Who are you reading? I haven't seen anyone describe sign and symbol the way you do. Maybe you can refer me to someone.

The later Wittgenstein is not a logical atomist. I'll stick with his later philosophy when it comes to language, because, I believe, it clarifies linguistic problems, such as the ones we're talking about.

In the Tractatus what Wittgenstein means by sign are 'perceptible sounds or inscriptions,' and symbols, are signs that have been projected onto the world or reality. And propositions have a sign, because of their projective relation to the world, and a sense because it is associated with a situation. Moreover, a name is a sign that has been associated with an object. Of course Wittgenstein is using name and object as the smallest parts of propositions and facts respectively.

Symbols are signs that have a projection in the world, so, since I'm writing about Wittgenstein, I'm using these terms in the Wittgensteinian sense.

In Wittgenstein's later philosophy he continues to talk about signs, and what gives signs meaning, but what gives signs their life is not some thing associated with them, as he thought in the Tractatus, but their use.

You seem to be confusing signs and symbols, and in places are referring to symbols as signs. Thus the term tree is a sign, and the symbol is the tree. The sign points to the symbol (the thing) associated with the sign. When we type or write, we type or write the sign. Propositions are also signs that have a sense, and in the Tractatus, that sense is associated with some thing, but in the PI, it's use that gives the proposition its sense.

So when referring to reality, there is no thing to associate with the sign, the key is how we use the term in a variety of ways. Some philosophers want to give the word a definite sense, that is, a precise definition, however, that doesn't exist. There are just a multiplicity of uses that have a sense in a particular context.

And to get back to my point with Sime, definitions are just guides, they don't give us, nor could they cover all possible uses, there are just too many possible uses. This can be seen in trying to use dictionary definitions to cover each and every possible use of the term game. The term reality is just like the term game, probably more so.

There is a lot of philosophy written in the name of Wittgenstein that's not really representative of his thoughts on language. I've done a lot of study over the years on Wittgenstein and most of it is done using primary sources. Much of what some philosophers believe about Wittgenstein is based on what others have interpreted, some of it's good, some not. I have a good grasp of his philosophy, but I'm sure that my own interpretations have fallen short too. To neglect his philosophy, or to sell it short, is akin to neglecting Einstein if you're a physicist. He was probably one of the greatest philosophers in the past two to three hundred years. Moreover, to not understand what he said about meaning as use, and to think that a dictionary is something other than a guide, is doing a disservice to oneself and to those who read the posts. I'm mainly referring to what Harry posted above. It's fine to disagree with Wittgenstein, but to misunderstand this very important point is to remain in confusion as far as I'm concerned. I disagree with some of Wittgenstein's metaphysics, and also what he said about ethics, but not with the core of what he wrote in the PI. On Certainty is another important work that has important implications for what it means to have knowledge.

I posted hundreds of pages of Wittgenstein in another philosophy forum, and started to post it here, but most of the philosophers in here have already read most of my posts, so it didn't get much attention. It's mostly an exegesis of Wittgenstein.

I'm sorry but you're way off on this. Read some Wittgenstein.

A new way of thinking about consciousness...
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ApXndYEpQhs

Is consciousness entirely physical...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ApXndYEpQhs

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eskWYOH-Oxs

This is an interesting video about Richard Feynman "The World From Another Point of View"

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GNhlNSLQAFE

My point was on the level of existential contingency. All meaning requires something to become sign/symbol, something to become signified/symbolized, and an agent to draw the correlations/associations between them. — creativesoul

This is my point, this idea, that all meaning requires something to be signified is just incorrect. Some things fall into this category but not all things. The term reality is just such an example, so is the word game. By signs I take it you mean the sounds we make when talking, or the marks we make when writing, and the symbol is that which correlates with the sign. But many words have no symbol, other than how we use them in different contexts. For example, what is the symbol that correlates to the sign reality. There are just rules of use (or grammatical rules) determined by different language-games. Language is simply a form of human behavior, thus, what we do with words, and how we use them in practical situations is what's important more often than not. There is no symbol that correlates with the word five. Wittgenstein points this out in his example "buying five red apples," and what's important here is the use of the word five. Thus the idea that there is something that exists, an ontology associated with the word is wrong-headed. Now you know this, so maybe I'm misinterpreting what you mean by sign and symbol.

You also said, "All meaning requires...and agent to draw the correlations/associations between them," but again this is something Wittgenstein would have said in his early philosophy (Tractatus), but it's not something that he would have said in his later philosophy (PI). You seem to be saying what many have believed throughout history, that the meaning of a word is associated with some thing, or some object out there in reality.

Yes, if your view is that there is no afterlife (I'm not talking about religion here - just to be clear) and that this is all there is, then that changes much of what I'm concluding. However, I do believe that I know there is an afterlife, that is, that consciousness survives. Now that may sound arrogant, but I base it on the argument I presented in my thread Evidence of Consciousness Surviving the Body.

And what is the difference between someone thinking they had an OBE, and someone thinking that they are sitting at a computer desk typing, other than someone thinking the one can't happen. Millions of people claim to have had ultra-real experiences outside their bodies, and some of it can be objectively verified. I don't know how we can dismiss this idea because we think it's wrong.

The argument is a bit more nuanced than your interpretation. I'm not saying you don't feel pain. I'm saying that in terms of a higher level of reality, this reality, and all that goes with it will seem illusory, that is, dreamlike. That ultimately we are not harmed. Thus, the harm that we experience in this reality will not carry over into the reality of the afterlife. There is plenty of testimonial evidence for this from those who have experienced an NDE.

Well, then you need to demonstrate that. I don't see how your argument works here.

If this were the case, then calling it a mind would be incoherent. If there is no reality outside a "mind", then the "mind" would essentially become reality. We use different terms to refer to minds, and reality. To switch the meaning of the two is ridiculous and unnecessary. One simply needs to follow the implications of what they are saying. If "mind" is the only thing to exist, then the "mind" is simply reality and there is no such thing as "mind". — Harry Hindu

There is no meaning without something external to thought/belief. So, if consciousness consists in/of thought/belief, then there is no consciousness without something external to it.

One finger cannot point at itself...

Spatiotemporal distinction requires a plurality. — creativesoul

I'll address both of these together. Basically you're argument is that since we refer to reality and mind as two separate things, then it doesn't follow that they could be one thing, as if the words point to two different objects. Thus, since object X is separate from object Y, then my argument is incoherent or possibly inconsistent. This, to me is just a misunderstanding of how language is used. Use is key (Wittgensteinian use) here. It's true that sometimes words do refer to objects, but words don't exclusively point to objects. There are two many uses of the words mind and reality to give them such precise definitions. If you define these words as you have done, of course you're conclusion is going to be, " If 'mind' is the only thing to exist, then the 'mind' is simply reality and there is no such thing as 'mind'." It's like (Wittgensteinian e.g.) defining all games as board games, and thus someone who calls "playing catch" a game is incorrect because it doesn't fit the definition, or their definition.

This, it seems to me is a perfect example of how many of us create problems that don't exist. Part of the problem here is with the word reality, it's just to vague a term to try to fit it into some precise definition, that is, as something definitely separate from the mind. And since reality is objective, then it has to be separate from the mind. You're definition is keeping you locked into a particular view, as if the word has some definite sense (word = object).

I think both of you have fallen prey to this problem.

I'm thinking of attending the conference on The Science of Consciousness in Tucson, AZ April 2-7. Those of you who are interested and can make it should come.

https://eagle.sbs.arizona.edu/sc/index.php

But if gods forbid you run over a kid in the street because you looked down at your phone when the kid ran out in front of you, no amount of growth and making better decisions will bring that kid back. You can tell yourself whatever you want, but not having a reset button sucks big time for some things. — Marchesk

That would definitely suck, and I can understand why someone would want to change that outcome. My views on this are very unorthodox, because ultimately I don't believe any of us can be harmed in this reality. Yes, we feel deep pain, but I think that's just a function of a body (at least for much of the pain). My view is that the pain we experience here is similar in some ways to the pain we feel in a dream, although it's much more profound than a dream. But it's similar in that once we leave this reality we'll see it for what it is, that is, one of many realities we can experience. So the pain in this reality is a kind of illusion, albeit a very strong and persistent illusion. I know it sounds a bit crazy.

I'm thinking about attending a conference on The Science of Consciousness, which will be held on April 2-7, 2018 in Tucson, AZ. Those of you who are able and interested should come.

https://eagle.sbs.arizona.edu/sc/index.php

Very interesting video by David Bohm.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QI66ZglzcO0

Getting back to the title of the post, what if everything is simply a construct of consciousness, then everything we're experiencing could be within that consciousness or mind. There would be no reality outside that mind, every reality that's experienced could be a kind of holographic reality that we simply engage with from within a mind. There are some physicists who think that at the bottom of everything is simply consciousness, that reality is part of that consciousness. Consciousness may be the unifying theory of everything. In fact, the very particles themselves may be part of that consciousness. Of course much more needs to be done in terms of science, but it's very interesting.

https://tmhome.com/news-events/unified-field-of-consciousness-onemany/

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mst3fOl5vH0

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QI66ZglzcO0

Once I know that I'm in a VR, then it would only be useful to refer to the things inside the VR when speaking to others inside the VR that AREN'T aware they are in a VR. In other words, I'd have to speak on their level of understanding, which would be different than mine. Ignorance doesn't make one's objective language actually true. We can make objective statements about reality all the time that simply aren't true. Just look at the rest of this forum. Every post is filled with objective claims about reality - most of which, if not all, aren't true. — Harry Hindu

I agree with much of this Harry, and I agree that people make claims about reality thinking their claims are objective when they're not. I think what's important is understanding that objectivity is contingent on many things, it's especially contingent/dependent on what we're experiencing within a given reality. What about the one who creates the VR, isn't that program objective for him/her? It has an existence, it's just a different kind of reality, a different metaphysical domain, so to speak.

Here's my take on this Xander. Unless your going to bring the knowledge you have now back with you when you start over, what makes you think you would do anything different? And if you did start over with the knowledge you have now, it wouldn't be the same you. It would be like cheating. In other words, it wouldn't be the "you" that originally made decision X. However, as in the movie with Cruise, even if you have more information when you go back that doesn't mean you'll necessarily make the best choice. Cruise had to keep doing it over and over until he knew many of the possible outcomes, because each outcome had it own set of problems.

Maybe it's not about making or doing everything the right way, whatever that might be, maybe it's about how we deal with these problems as we grow and gain more knowledge. There are problems however, that cause pain to others and even to ourselves that we wish we could change, and I can see how we might want to go back and change these things.

Of course my metaphysical outlook has changed drastically in the last 7-8 years, because I'm no longer a religious person. It's not that I don't think there isn't a reality beyond death, it's that I think many of our ideas of this reality are tainted by a certain religious dogma. That said, it's not just that there is religious dogma, there is also a scientific dogma that can be just as limiting, but in different ways. Actually my beliefs have freed me to think beyond what is normally thought, in terms of reality. It's a different way of thinking with it's own set of problems, dogmas, and egotistical points of view.

This doesn't seem to be much different than my explanation in making category errors when referring to something in the VR as if it weren't a representation of a computer program. You seem to be saying that it is true from a VR person's perspective that there really is an enemy robot chasing them, but isn't that because they don't have access to more knowledge - that they are in a VR program? So, it would be more accurate to say that the computer user has more knowledge than the VR person, which means that they have access to the truth, while the VR person doesn't. — Harry Hindu

It's true that the person in the VR program has less knowledge than the computer user, but it's much more I believe. For example, let's suppose that you know you're in a VR, but you don't have access to the same reality the user has, you are still going to refer to things in your VR as real, and rightly so since you're living there. You can still refer to things in the VR as objective even if you know it's not as real as the reality the user has access to. So things are objective within a reality, much of this is relative and dependent on how we describe, or use the term reality. Reality is a vague term, and is subject to a wide variety of uses. I don't think there is going to be some definition that will solve this problem. I also don't really think it's a category error, although I can see how someone might think so. A lot of this also depends on one's ontological or metaphysical outlook.

(Y)

If the answer is both yes and no, then you have problem called inconsistency.

Being inside the VR or outside of it doesn't matter. The VR exists objectively for everyone. For the person in the VR, their tree would refer to an objective aspect of the world - the computer code of the VR. To say that one is subjective and one isn't is really just talking about making category errors, where those that are making "subjective" statements are making category errors, while those making objective statements aren't. — Harry Hindu

No, it's not inconsistent, it's similar to a contingent truth, that is, it can be true in one setting and false in another depending on the state-of-affairs. I didn't say it was subjective, I said it was relative, there is a big difference.

Yes, but my point is that we might assume, for example, if we lived in a virtual world that it had an objective nature, but that's only true within that reality. If you were looking at that reality from outside, like outside a virtual reality, then you might not say it's objective. It just depends on where you're standing in relation to that reality. So in a sense the answer to the question is both yes and no. So what we call objective is relative.

Good. If you could not imagine a greater 'you' why keep living at all? To become worse over time? The key here is defining what makes you happy. Once you recognize what makes you happy, it's just a matter of doing it. So if being around others and building your community makes you happy, you do it. If refining your ideas into a book, maybe no one will read, makes you happy, then you do it. If I could not imagine a greater happiness than what I've already experienced; why keep living at all? I'd say the only reason we keep living is specifically because we still feel we might end up with a greater sense of purpose, happiness, whatnot than we have so far felt. — Frank Barroso

It's feels good to be happy, and it would be nice if we could always do the things that make us happy, but in my humble opinion life is not about being happy. It's about doing the right thing, even if it costs us our happiness. So life is about things like love, which sometimes requires sacrifice, and in turn doesn't necessarily make us happy. The things that are really important in life are much higher on the scale of values than happiness.

Nothing against you Frank, I just had to rant against happiness.

If there isn't an external world, then all of our words don't refer to, or mean, anything. We would never be talking about things that exist independent of the words themselves, or states-of-affairs that exist independent of our experience of them. Language is built on the premise of object permanence. — Harry Hindu

This isn't necessarily the case. It's possible that a very powerful mind/s could create a reality that's a virtual simulation, and while you're experiencing that reality with others you might refer to things in that reality as objective. That is to say, language would dictate how you would refer to that reality, because you have no other reality to compare it to.

Language isn't built on objective permanence, language generally takes hold as people agree on the use of words. Although a reality does have to have some permanence, whether it's a simulation or not.

That's the point, they're called NEAR DEATH experiences - not death experiences.

Here's a really interesting video between Sam Harris and David Chalmers on the hard problem of consciousness.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1bmHL1sbntw

David Wallace giving a contrary view.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HQbjP5XjEnA

I do believe people can experience an OBE while in a deeply meditative state. And my inclination is to think that OBEs can occur without experiencing trauma as most do when having an NDE. If this is what you mean by lucid dreaming, then we're just using different words to describe the same thing. When I refer to lucid dreaming I'm referring to what most people call lucid dreaming, that is, that low quality dream state while somewhat awake.

There is a correspondence between all OBEs, that is, what they experience is hyper-real. I haven't studied many of these states. However, I have done some research into DMT, which is an amazing experience. If I had the chance I'd try it myself just to have the experience.

Sounds more like an empty post. We're talking about near death experiences, not death experiences - obviously there's a difference. Moreover, there are things we can learn about death, since people are reporting what they see when they leave the body.

My question is - why post if you don't have anything of value to say? It's a philosophy forum, generally we give arguments, not opinions. I have no problem if someone wants to attack the argument, but I have little patience for people who give empty-headed opinions.