I suggest we go back to working out exactly where you and I differ on the nature of hinge propositions?

Where was that... — Banno

I posted a paper earlier in the thread about states of mind. Did you have a chance to read it? It's on page 11, the very first post. I provided a link.

I can't reply to him any more, it's useless. I'm beginning to wonder if he has any background in philosophy, or he just pulls this stuff out of the air. This has been going on for years. I think I know what I'm saying, but he wants to tell me what I'm saying, as though I don't know my own thoughts. It's just crazy. I was watching his responses to Michael in another thread, and it's the same bull, so it's not just me.

Where did I claim that those were hinge-propositions?

This goes back to Sam26's claim that hinge-propositions — Metaphysician Undercover

I never said those propositions were examples of hinge-propositions. We've been talking about this stuff for years. You'd think by now you will know my position.

This goes back to Sam26's claim that hinge-propositions (I'll just refer to them as "some rules") ought not be doubted, because they are necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover

MU I never made any such claim, that rules shouldn't be doubted because they are necessary. This is what I mean by not understanding what's written, or at the very least misinterpreting what people are saying.

So I think that Wittgenstein has taken two world views which are completely incompatible and attempted to establish compatibility between them with the proposal of hinge-props. In my opinion it fails because the two world views are incompatible, and so the attempt is misguided. — Metaphysician Undercover

You know MU, I read your responses not only in this thread, but your responses to Micheal in another thread, and the only one misguided is you. What you write isn't even coherent at times. You talk about Wittgenstein, but you don't even understand much of what he is saying. So don't give me this crap about being misguided, or that Wittgenstein's proposals fail, because it's clear that you're the one who doesn't understand what you're criticizing. Reading your posts reminds me of reading Ron L. Hubbard, most of it is gibberish.

The argument has been that it is unreasonable to doubt specific fundamental propositions. This implies that these propositions cannot be reasonably doubted under any circumstances. That is what is supposed to form the foundation of justification. It prevents the infinite regress of asking for justification of a proposition, then asking for justification of the justification, etc.. — Metaphysician Undercover

Banno was correct in saying that there are certain proposition that cannot be doubted within a given language-game, or within a particular context. W. demonstrated that while Moore's proposition, as stated before the audience was senseless, viz., could not be known or doubted. He also demonstrated that Moore's proposition could be doubted under the right conditions or context. So it's the phrase "under any circumstances" that I take issue with. I think that we can safely say that Moore's propositions cannot generally be doubted. I think this is more accurate. Moreover, it's true as you say, that these propositions when acting as bedrock, I believe, solve the infinite regress problem.

Witt held that belief has propositional content. Thus, he insisted that a belief must be stateable. — creativesoul

You said that a belief must be stateable. However, OC 284 and 285 implies that beliefs can simply be shown in the actions of people. Why does a belief have to be stateable? It's true that within language beliefs do get stated, but that doesn't mean they have to be stateable or stated, which seems to further imply that beliefs aren't beliefs unless they're linguistic. Also, does this mean that if the actions of "rooting around," as W. puts it, never get stated, that it doesn't imply a belief. It doesn't seem to me that W. held that beliefs (necessarily (my words))have propositional content, some do, but others do not.

Anyway Creative, that's my take on it. I understand though that you seemed to leave open the possibility that beliefs are not necessarily propositional.

There are other passages, but I'd have to look them up.

284. People have killed animals since the earliest times, used the fur, bones etc.etc . for various
purposes; they have counted definitely on finding similar parts in any similar beast.
They have always learnt from experience; and we can see from their actions that they believe
certain things definitely, whether they express this belief or not. By this I naturally do not want to
say that men should behave like this, but only that they do behave like this.
285. If someone is looking for something and perhaps roots around in a certain place, he shows that
he believes that what he is looking for is there.

Witt held that belief has propositional content. Thus, he insisted that a belief must be stateable. — creativesoul

Just curious, where did W. say this? And how do you reconcile this with OC 284?

I'll wait for Πετροκότσυφας to respond. He's done a pretty good job of answering.

Sam, just to mention that although I'm not participating in this thread, I'm finding your contributions really interesting and useful to my own thinking. I wouldn't want you to feel you were just whistling into the wind :) — mcdoodle

Thanks Mcdoodle.

Must a belief be argued for in order for it to be well-grounded? Isn't a well-grounded belief exactly what justification shows? — creativesoul

When I use the term justification it has a specific application, and in particular to the uses of JTB across a wide spectrum of language-games. It means being justified not only in terms of arguments, but also in terms of the other uses that I mentioned early on in this thread.

The term well-grounded can also be used as a synonym for justification in the JTB sense, but it also has an application quite apart from epistemological applications. Thus, well-grounded also applies to those applications that are not epistemological, like Wittgenstein's bedrock propositions. So Jack's belief is grounded, but not justified in the JTB sense (language-games of epistemology). Jack's beliefs are grounded in reality, but not linguistically grounded, i.e., they're not dependent on a statements.

Of course someone could ask what it means for a belief to be grounded in reality.

I don't know about all of you, but it takes me a lot of time to respond to your remarks. I've been sitting at this computer for about 4 hrs. This is why I can't always respond to everything. It just takes too damn long.

I agree that animals certainly hold beliefs. While Jack cannot believe that "the bowl is empty", he most certainly can look at the bowl and see that there is no food in it and hence believe that the bowl is empty. If that is not well-grounded and true belief(assuming it's empty) then nothing can be. Moreover, on my view, a justified belief does not necessarily require justification(providing one's grounds to another). So, with that in mind, Jack has formed and holds justified true belief. Jack knows that his bowl is empty, despite his not being able to justify his belief. That is a metacognitive endeavor. It requires thinking about one's own thought and belief. Metacognition requires language. Thus, Jack cannot justify his own belief to us, nor can he even be aware that he has such belief. — creativesoul

I think there is a sense where one can be grounded in one's belief apart from epistemological ideas. One's experience as one acts in the world provides a kind of grounding. Jack's belief has a grounding to it, but it's not an epistemological grounding, i.e., the epistemological grounding that occurs within the language-game of knowing. So knowledge, in terms of how I'm using it (JTB), is something that necessarily occurs within language. Justification is something we do with others, i.e., it gets it's meaning within a rule-based language. If it's something one can simply do on one's own, then whatever seems justified to you, is justified. It would seem to lose it's meaning if we separate the idea of justification from a linguistic format. Not only can't Jack justify his belief to us, but he can't justify it period. He just HAS the belief - the state of mind reflected in his actions.

Again, well said. I agree, there is a kind of certainty regarding the external world that's different from the certainty that arises out of epistemology. This certainty in many ways is reflected in our actions. It's a kind of trust that arises out of the backdrop of reality.

I was talking to Πετροκότσυφας but I'd be interested to hear why you think it's more nuanced than that — Janus

Before I respond to this let me get a little more familiar with what you contending.

But if there can be no coherent skepticism about our hands existence, then to say that we know that they exist is incoherent as well. If Moore gives perceptual evidence for the existence of hands, then he accepts skepticism as coherent. — Πετροκότσυφας

Well said, I definitely agree with this. The knowing and the doubting in Moore's context are incoherent, which is why Moore's answer doesn't work. It's important to understand the connection between knowledge and doubt.

This point, which Wittgenstein suggests, "whether it makes sense to doubt the statement", is just an arbitrary line, a division which Wittgenstein seeks to impose. In reality, "whether it makes sense to doubt", is just a decision which we all must make, and a decision which is specifically formulated for each particular instance of usage. There is no general principle, of this or that statement ought not be doubted, as Wittgenstein might appear to imply. In reality any statement might be reasonably doubted under the right circumstances. So your claim that there are foundational statements which are outside the epistemological language-games cannot be supported. Otherwise we would have to admit that there are statements which are "necessarily correct". But the correctness of statements is contingent on how the statements relate to the world, and this contingency denies the possibility of "necessarily correct" statements. If you go that route, toward necessarily correct statements you validate Platonic Realism.
— Metaphysician Undercover
(My italics)

I decided to quote this in full, since it shows not only the inoperability of Meta's position, but also the misunderstanding of Wittgenstein that underpins his criticism of Sam.

That the bishop moves only diagonally is, in the context, arbitrary. And it makes no sense to doubt it in that context - the playing of chess.

Nor is the movement of the bishop a decision that we all make. I never made that decision. But I did learn the rule. That rule is the general principle that underpins the absurdity of doubting that the bishop only moves diagonally!

And... saying that the bishop moves only diagonally is not playing chess. Similarly, saying "here is a hand" is not doing epistemology. It is a foundational statement that is outside of epistemology. It's not a necessary statement - necessary being a term that Meta uses in his own curious way - it is a foundational statement, in the same way that "the bishop moves only diagonally" is not necessary, but foundational. — Banno

I thought I would respond to both of these points. First, MU's comments...

My contention from reading Wittgenstein isn't that Wittgenstein is drawing an arbitrary line as to whether it makes sense to doubt a particular statement/proposition. As I read you MU, you seem to suggest that whether we can doubt a particular statement is purely subjective, i.e., dependent on a "decision we all must make." You seem to suggest that each person must decide for him or herself, whether say, Moore's proposition is doubtable. I'm suggesting based on my understanding of Wittgenstein, that it's senseless for anyone to doubt Moore's proposition, and that it's not an arbitrary decision, but one that's rooted in the nature of Moore's proposition. What is this nature? Certain propositions have at their core something basic, foundational, or bedrock, which makes doubting them nonsensical. This is rooted in the language-game of doubting. There is a kind of logic built into a language-game that dictates how words are used. And although context plays an important part, context does not drive correct usage. Correct usage can be seen in particular contexts, but it's not the context itself driving correct usage. If this were true (and I'm not necessarily suggesting that you think this), then any word would have an arbitrary meaning based on whatever context I choose to use it in. So if I use the word car to refer to the moon, then it would be correct, because meaning is driven by a context. However, this is not the case, it's the implicit rules of usage within a wide range of cultural driven language-games, that provides the logic behind correct usage. Sure these correct uses of words do take place within a range of contexts, but that's not the driving force behind correct usage. Think of contexts as having importance in terms of the rules of language within a context.

So is there a general principle that dictates whether some statement is doubtable? One cannot tell this by looking at a written statement alone, apart from how that statement or word is used within a wide array of language-games and contexts. How could all statements be doubtable? If that were the case, then doubting would lose it's meaning. Doubting only makes sense against a backdrop of non-doubt. We learn what to doubt, and what to not doubt. There have to be good reasons to doubt.

There are statements that are necessarily correct. For example, triangles have three sides, or bachelors are unmarried. There are many necessarily correct statements. And I would disagree that this would validate Platonic Realism. There are also statements that are contingently correct, for example, the Earth has one moon.

I agree with your response Banno.

There is a lot to respond to in these posts. I just won't be able to respond to everything. There is something though that I think is worth pointing out, and that is, what is a brain state? This is important to understanding the idea that beliefs refer to brain states. It's my contention that brain states "are synchronized neuronal activity in a specific frequency," based loosely on, What is a Brain State? (2006) Philosophical Psychology 19(6) 729-742 Richard Brown. There is a distinction made in this paper between "brain states" and "states of the brain." This paper doesn't bring up the idea that beliefs are brain states, but it does point to the idea, which is a basic intuition of mine (and others) that there is something specific going on in the brain that is associated with beliefs as brain states, which is then correlated with actions that are related to that brain state. This is an interesting paper. If you would like to read it I have provided a link... https://philpapers.org/archive/BROWIA-2.pdf

If you're talking to me, I think it's just a bit more nuanced than that.

It's nothing new, it happens all the time. That's just the way it is.

It's interesting how many different ways all of you have interpreted what I've said. Half of what's attributed to me is not what said at all. I thought my writing was very clear, but I guess not clear enough.

Some beliefs are caused, but not all.

I think I see more clearly now, what you mean by "hinge-propositions", and why you assume that they are bedrock, or foundational. Is it correct to say that hinge-propositions would demonstrate, or show the use of the individual words, such that the hinge propositions act as fundamental justifications in themselves? Moore's "here is a hand" acts to demonstrate the meaning of "hand". If this is the case, then the hinge-proposition would take the place that definitions hold in formal logic, or axioms in mathematics. — Metaphysician Undercover

Moore is trying to answer the skeptic, who in this case seem to deny the existence of physical objects. Moore points out that there are certain things he knows, things that seem indubitable. These things, like Moore's assertion that has knowledge of his hands, are beyond doubt. Wittgenstein who is sympathetic to Moore's cause, because it seems that in Moore's quest to answer the skeptic has pointed out something special about these kinds of statements, something bedrock. Moore just didn't seem to understand the fundamental nature of these statements. Therefore, we get Wittgenstein's more nuanced view of just what kind of statements, Moore's statements are.

Moore's justification, as far as I know, isn't about the "meaning of hand," which would be a linguistic justification. I don't believe the skeptic is doubting the meaning of the word hand, although in a sense if the skeptics are able to doubt Moore's propositions, then certainly they couldn't be certain of the meanings of their words. However, it's important to keep in mind what Moore is responding to, and it doesn't seem to be about linguistic justification. It's about the knowledge of whether one knows that we have hands, i.e., the object hand. In a practical sense the skeptic probably wouldn't doubt such things, but there seems to be a doubt beyond what's practical, Wittgenstein points this out. So Moore doesn't seem to be "demonstrating the meaning of 'hand.'"

All statements including hinge-propositions show the use of individual words. Here we must be careful what we mean by justification, and we can see this is Creative's question about being grounded as opposed to being justified. These statements are grounded, but not justified in an epistemological sense. Just as the rules of chess are the ground of the game, so to speak.

Didn't Witt use the notion of "well-grounded" as compared to "justified"?

If a prelinguistic belief cannot be argued for, which by definition it cannot, does that mean that it cannot be well-grounded?

Banno's cat Jack. Jack can believe his bowl is empty. Does his inability to argue for that render his belief unjustifiable, and hence he cannot know that his bowl is empty simply by virtue of looking? — creativesoul

I think there is a difference between being well-grounded and being justified, at least as Wittgenstein seems to use the terms. Hinge-propositions are grounded, but not justified. Justification takes place in epistemology, as in JTB. However, hinge-propositions, don't need to be justified, at least generally. We can always think of an example where one could justify Moore's propositions, i.e., where it would make sense to doubt that this is my hand, as in the examples I gave in other posts.

Consider the rules of chess, i.e., we can state the rules, but there is no need to justify the rules. They are simply the ground of the game, and in this case quite arbitrary. But to ask how you justify that the bishop moves diagonally is simply nonsense, and it seems that this is why Wittgenstein referred to such propositions as bedrock or hinge. There seem to be certain things that we just accept as part of reality, things that we trust, things that make it possible to have, for example, the language-game of epistemology.

The cat cannot know in the sense that it can use the language-game of epistemology. It's obvious, at least to me, though, that animals show beliefs, i.e., they act in ways that demonstrate their beliefs.

So this is my problem right here. Why ought we assume that some statements fall outside the need for justification? We are talking epistemology here, and knowledge is assumed to be justified true belief. So if a statement falls outside justification, then what that statement says cannot, by definition, be considered to be knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover

The problem with this is that you're not following closely what I'm saying, and that's part of the problem. I answered this a few posts back. Wittgenstein points out, and I believe correctly so, that Moore statements are outside the purview of epistemological concerns. And of course, if a statement is outside of epistemology, then it doesn't concern itself with JTB, and that's the point. Moore's propositions are nonsensical, it's not about knowing, it's about something that's bedrock or basic, which is why Wittgenstein refers to them as hinge-propositions. Think of the door as the language-game of epistemology, and the hinge allows it to swing. Without such basic beliefs there would be no epistemology. The door wouldn't swing, so to speak.

Thanks Creative. My ontology of a belief is that it starts pre-linguistically, so it tends to be broader in its scope.

Don't you see this as a big problem for any epistemology? What "justify" means for me is completely different from what it means for you. Isn't it absolutely necessary to have some form of agreement on word usage in order to have any success in epistemology? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, it's important to understand what it means to justify a belief, and I'm not sure we can come to any agreement on a general definition. I'm with Wittgenstein when it comes to understanding the meanings of words, viz., that how we use words tells us much more about correct usage than looking at a definition. I look at definitions simply as guides, but not the be all and end all of meaning. So my examples of justification point to the many uses of the word in various language-games. That said, a very simple definition is that a belief is justified if there are good reasons or good evidence to support the belief.

Getting back to sensory experiences, do our sensory experiences give us reasons or evidence to believe, for example that the desk is hard by touching it. If someone asks me how I know the desk is hard, my evidence for the claim is that I touched it. You can either accept the claim, based on the knowledge that most people don't make false claims about the hardness of desks, and most people know the difference between a hard surface and one that's not hard.

I think we should try to address the justification problem first, and we should also try to keep the posts limited to a couple of paragraphs if possible. It's much easier for people to follow.

I like to lighten things up, a lot of people are just too serious. Life's too short.

The PTSD comment was a joke. lol

Part of my response to MU...

So there's no confusion, let me suggest that there are sensory statements (like Moore's claims to knowledge about having hands in response to the skeptic) that lie outside of epistemological language-games. However, much of this is driven by context, but not all of it, since one can use statements like "I know..." in context, and still use the words incorrectly (Moore's case). The point is that we need to be able to distinguish between the two, viz., those that are understood in terms of justification, and those that fall outside any need for justification. Wittgenstein makes this distinction in On Certainty again and again. Thus, the question arises, what separates the kind of sensory statements that are perfectly normal in terms of being justified, from those that need no justification (again Moore's statements/propositions)? The answer to this question lies in another question, "Does it make sense to doubt the claim?" One must not forget the language-game of doubting when trying to understand the difference between these two kinds of sensory claims.

Moore is standing before an audience raising his hand and makes the statement that this is a hand, i.e., that he knows it's a hand. But what would a doubt here look like? Did Moore double-check to make sure those were his hands? Moreover, what would making sure look like? We can juxtapose this with a statement that does make sense to doubt, and Wittgenstein gives just such an example in the following: "And if he says he knows it, that can only signify to me that he has been able to make sure, and hence that his arms are e.g. not still covered in bandages, etc. etc. My believing the trustworthy man stems from my admitting that it is possible for him to make sure (OC 23)." In this case one may awaken from an operation in which it was in doubt about whether the infection was so severe that one might lose a hand. I wake up, my hand is still bandaged and numb from the operation, so I'm still in doubt about whether I have a hand, i.e., I don't know that I have my left hand. The bandages are removed, and I see (sensory observation) that my hand was not removed during the operation. I now know, based on what? How did I make sure? What is the justification? Lo and behold, I still have a hand!

Science also makes use of sensory observations in terms of what they claim to know. They observe experiments, and write down their observations. They make discoveries of new planets based on what they SAW through their telescopes. How do you know there is a planet in such-and-such a place? I observed it, and you can observe it too, look and see. These are not subjective observations. They can be objectively verified. The same is true in my orange juice is sweet example. How do I know the orange juice is sweet? I tasted it. Here, you can taste it too. Ahh, yes it's sweet, or no, it's not sweet. Obviously if others taste the orange juice and it's not sweet, then the person wasn't justified in making the claim that it was sweet. Just like scientists can verify a claim that such-and-such is planet, i.e., others can observe (see) whether the claim is true (objective verification) - making sure. Many claims are justified in just this way.

It would be ludicrous to claim that sensory experiences are not acceptable methods of justification. Obviously this doesn't mean that we accept every sensory observation, but generally it's true that we can rely on sensory observations as a perfectly acceptable method of knowledge.

I'll be responding Banno, it's just that I had a momentary flashback to some other conversations with MU. In fact, I copied all of the conversations from philosophyforums and I was getting PTSD reading MU's responses. - roflol - I had to take some meds. I'm starting to recover, my head is clearing, and I'm returning to my senses. :B The fight must go on! It reminds of a Jerry Seinfeld episode.

:D

As usual we're just too far apart on these issues.

Thanks for sharing that Larynx, and welcome to the forum.

What about the belief that belief should be abolished, should that belief be abolished too? Thus, this thread should be abolished.

:-O

Thanks for your input. I also learned much more outside the class setting, but the class setting enabled me to understand how to do research, and to know what and who to read. Writing is the key to philosophy, but the one thing that I picked up from my professor many years ago was the ability to write simply. I try not to use a lot of philosophical jargon when I write, although sometimes it's unavoidable.

:-O

So far in this thread we've talked a bit about beliefs, and we've talked a bit about justification, or the different ways in which a belief is justified. Next we will talk about what it means for a statement, or more accurately a proposition, to be true. However, we should preface the upcoming remarks with the following: I.e., much of what is written in this thread is based on, or is at least loosely based on Wittgenstein's notes in the Philosophical Investigations, and on his final notes in On Certainty. For example, when trying to give a precise definition of some of the terms used in epistemology, it's the contention of this thread, that it's very similar to trying to give an absolute definition of the concept game. The point is that there is no one thing that is common to all uses of the concept justification, or the concept truth; or there is no one property that can be ascribed to these terms that will cover every possible use within a language. It doesn't mean that every definition has this characteristic, but many definitions, and by extension many theories of epistemology have this problem. Wittgenstein points this out in PI 66, "Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? - Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games'"- but look and see whether there is anything common to all. -For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that....I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances between members of the a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc overlap and criss-cross in the same way (PI 66,67)."

The problem with many theories, this includes many epistemological theories, is that we (many philosophers) are trying to be as precise as we can. Precision is important, but sometimes concepts don't lend themselves to such precision. Many concepts fit the family resemblance model as presented by Wittgenstein in the quotes above. Just as there is no one definition that can describe all games, so there is probably no one definition that will fit every use of our epistemological concepts. There are just various general definitions that fit a wide swath of uses.

The problem is that when we think we have described every possible use of a concept with a particular definition or theory, and we hear of something that doesn't fit our definition or theory, we have a tendency to think it's not an example of what we're trying to define. And indeed it may not be a counter-example, but one has to "look and see" if the example has a "family resemblance." Of course this is not as easy as it sounds because many philosophers spend their whole lives developing theories, and sometimes one counter-example will destroy much of their work. This is why it's important to not be so dogmatic about some of these ideas or theories.