:up:

I don't find much to disagree with here, and I didn't skip over objects.

Post 11

We know, according to Wittgenstein, that propositions are pictures of possible states of affairs (facts). “A picture has logico-pictorial form in common with what it depicts (T. 2.2).” It has logico-pictorial form in common with the facts it depicts. And, as we’ve said over and over the picture (the proposition) by itself only represents the possibility that it mirrors or reflects reality or the facts (T. 2.201, 2.202, 2.203). “A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree [with reality]; it is correct or incorrect, true or false (T. 2.21).” How does it do this? The picture does this by displaying its pictorial form, and what the picture represents is its sense (T. 2.22, 2.221). The sense of a proposition is separate from whether it agrees with the facts. If this wasn’t the case, we wouldn’t understand the sense of false propositions. We cannot know from the picture alone whether it is true or false, it must be compared with reality (T. 2.223, 2.224). In other words, “There are no pictures that are true a priori (T. 2.225).”

This ends my comments on the second of the seven main propositions of the Tractatus.

Post 10

We know that the idea of propositions being pictures, as presented in his picture theory of propositions, is central to his thinking in the Tractatus. So, propositions represent reality through their pictorial form. The elements of a picture include several things, including the following: Names, of course, are part of what is included in the elements of a picture, names correspond to the objects, i.e., the arrangement of names corresponds to the arrangement of objects that make up atomic facts and hence complex facts.

Second, is the logical structure of the picture (all propositions whether true or false have a logical structure). The logical structure of the picture (the proposition) also includes the logical connectives, such as disjunction, conjunction, negation, etc., and they determine the truth-possibilities of propositions (T. 4.31).

Another way to talk about the elements of a proposition is to refer to the representational content of the picture. So, the elements of a picture can be talked about in different ways. A propositional picture is a particular picture, say of A as opposed to B, because of how the pictorial elements of A (the form of the picture) relate to the situation pictured. They are identical (T. 2.15).

Geez, I think I'm misreading @013zen I need a break. Talk later.

You mean atomic facts, right?

I agree with that, I've said that over and over again. Do you disagree with that @Banno?

I may have read it years ago. I should re-read it. I don't think I'm at odds with her, am I?

I haven't read everything. :gasp: I only read every other word.

I agree with that.

You're not saying there are untrue facts are you? Every proposition represents a possible fact, but whether the proposition is true or not is dependent on whether it is a correct picture of the fact/state of affairs.

What? I don't follow.

All propositions picture possible facts, a true proposition is one where the fact obtains.

Yes, I agree. I think maybe Wittgenstein's negative facts cause some problems, but I'll let @013zen explain what he means.

@Banno

It's easy to be misunderstood because of Wittgenstein's use of these concepts. Hell, even Wittgenstein couldn't remember what he meant by certain statements. Years after he wrote the Tractatus he was asked about what he meant by this or that statement and he couldn't say. So, I'm not going to claim that my interpretations are always correct. We're all going to be off to one degree or another, and we're certainly not all going to agree.

The logical form of a true or a false proposition shares the same logical form as that of a fact; As you point out, a fact can either be true or false. So, that sentence, I'd remove. It might be more helpful at that point to reference 4.063, which reads: — 013zen

I would probably clarify it this way: The logical form of a true proposition matches the logical form of a positive fact. Some of the confusion has been that when I've been talking about states of affairs or facts I've been talking about positive facts/states of affairs.

Post 9

Just a couple of points of clarification before I continue.

When a proposition is true it mirrors a positive fact. False statements are possible states of affairs not actual states of affairs, in other words, they don’t obtain, but they still have sense because they picture a possible fact. Again, there is nothing in a false statement that connects with reality, i.e., it’s a picture that isn’t representative of a positive fact. The logical form of a true proposition matches the logical form of a fact. “Logical form is mirrored in propositions. Propositions show the form of reality (T. 4.121).” In the proposition a world is as it were put together experimentally (Nb p. 7). A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it (T. 4.01).”

Post 8

I will continue with a few more remarks. All of this is still under the second main proposition of the Tractatus.

“What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs (T. 2).”
What’s obvious is that states of affairs are real. For example, “The Earth has one moon,” Is a state of affairs. The proposition represents a picture of a fact. A fact is something real, not imagined. The two parts of complex facts are atomic facts and the objects that make up atomic facts. These things (things in the normal sense) are real for Wittgenstein. “Objects make up the substance of world [reality] (T. 2.021),” so substance and therefore objects are real.

Philosophers going back to Augustine have believed that names, in the normal use of the word, refer to objects (objects in this sense are things like chairs, pencils, cars, etc.). Wittgenstein develops this idea into his theory of names and objects. Of course, his idea of names and objects is much different from what philosophers traditionally meant, at least up to Frege, Russell, and maybe a few others.

“If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true (T. 2.0111). In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false) (T. 2.0212).” Pictures, of course, are sketched by propositions, and names are the smallest component of propositions. The names within a proposition refer to objects in the world. All propositions for Wittgenstein are logical pictures. A picture presents a form, i.e., the arrangement of the elements of the picture, and the “…elements of the picture are the representatives of objects (T. 2.131).”

So, the form of a proposition, which is the arrangement of the elements of a picture (made up of names), must match the form of a fact, which is made up of the arrangement of the objects. “There must be something identical in a picture and what it depicts, to enable the one to be a picture of the other at all (T. 2.161). What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it—correctly or incorrectly—in the way it does, is its pictorial form (T. 2.17). A picture can depict any reality whose form it has. A spatial picture can depict anything spatial, a coloured one anything coloured, etc (T. 2.171).”

All propositions have a sense, and that sense is represented by its pictorial form. Whether that sense is representative of reality depends on whether its logical form matches the logical form of reality. The sense of a proposition is independent of whether it matches the form of reality. This must be for us to understand the sense of false propositions or pictures that do not match reality.

“A picture represents its subject [the subject being the possibility of the existence of a fact] from a position outside it (Its standpoint is its representational form.) That is why a picture represents its subject correctly or incorrectly (T. 2.173). A picture cannot, however, place itself outside its representational form [a picture presents or shows its form] (T. 2.174).”

Much of what we know is probabilistic, i.e., I know based on inductive reasoning. E.g., I know my car will start tomorrow morning, and I know I will probably wake up tomorrow morning. Much of science is probabilistic knowledge.

What I know absolutely or with absolute certainty are things that many people have already mentioned. For example, I know that I'm sitting here in my office typing with 100% certainty. A doubt here wouldn't even make sense. There are millions or even billions of conscious things we do that we know with absolute certainty. This is not to say that people don't express doubts about these things, it's just that certain doubts people express aren't reasonable or justifiable.

I'll answer some of this as I continue.

But the picture might be true or false. This cannot be determined by the proposition. The proposition might be a false picture of reality. — Fooloso4

Every proposition (true or false) presents a picture of a possible state of affairs. If the picture matches the facts (state of affairs) of reality, then it's true, if not it's false. Of course a proposition may be a false picture. I don't see the problem.

"When the sense of the proposition is completely expressed in the proposition itself, the proposition is always divided into its simple components-no further division is possible and an apparent one is
superfluous-and these are objects in the original sense (Nb. p. 63)."

I'd have to do a careful reading of the preceding pages but keep in mind that the Tractatus is the final arbiter of how to interpret propositions and facts. The Notebooks are not the complete story, the Tractatus is. That's not to say that it's not important, it's just that he's working through these ideas in the Notebooks. Besides I'm not sure I see your point.

I'm trying to give an accurate presentation for people to read. I don't want to get sidetracked with every little disagreement with you. I only say this so I can focus on my goal. If you want to present a different interpretation that's fine, but don't be surprised if I don't respond. I'm not always going to be correct with every nuanced word, but I think I can give an accurate overall interpretation.

If I understand you correctly, I agree.

Wittgenstein cannot mention a single simple object because he could not find one. He simply assumes them. They are a priori objects of human thought. His concern is with propositions are how they make sense. — Fooloso4

I don't disagree with these statements.

The analysis of language does not reveal simple names of simple objects — Fooloso4

I might argue over the wording of this, i.e., the analysis of language brings us to names, the smallest component of an elementary proposition. Names correspond to objects, which make up atomic facts. A proposition is a picture, according to Witt, its "...end-points [names]... actually touch the object (T. 2.1521), like a measure laid against reality (T. 2.1512). Another way to say it, is that the proposition mirrors or pictures reality.

The terminus of a proposition is that point at which the meaning of the proposition requires no further analysis. We do not need, and it would be counterproductive, to chop Plato up into simpler components for a proposition about him to make sense. He is in such cases a simple propositional object with the elementary name 'Plato'. — Fooloso4

I definitely wouldn't say that Plato is a "simple propositional object." I would say that Plato, as part of a proposition about the person, is either part of an atomic fact (simple fact) or a more complex fact. There are no simple propositional objects. There are simple propositional names, but not objects. Objects are connected specifically to atomic facts. Names point to objects, which again make up facts or reality.

Post 7

Wittgenstein wasn’t blind to the fact that he was unable to give examples of objects. He says for example, “Our difficulty was that we kept on speaking of simple objects and were unable to mention a single one (Nb. p. 68).” For whatever reason Wittgenstein suppresses his doubts and proceeds with his analysis.

I’ll try to define objects as I see them, i.e., based on, I believe, a reasonable interpretation. Let me say first that you don’t need to have a perfect understanding of names or objects to have a clear understanding of the general ideas of the Tractatus, this seems obvious. You can be wrong about this or that interpretation (within reason) and still have a clear picture of most of his ideas.

First, we know that Wittgenstienian objects are independent of human thought and perception, i.e., their existence persists regardless of what we claim. Their subsistence or their persistent nature is independent of thought and language.

Second, being subsistent in the case of objects, means their reality is not contingent on any observation or linguistic description. This implies that their existence is objective, which is the case with atomic and complex facts.

Third, objects are unchanging or unalterable.

Fourth, as we’ve already pointed out, objects form the substance of reality. They form this substance by combining into atomic facts or the structure of the world (reality).

Fifth, the implications of all this are closely related to the limits of language. Objects represent all that can be meaningfully said about reality. Why? Because combinations of objects represent every possible state of affairs. They are the building blocks of reality.

Thanks for the compliment. As for Russell being influenced by Mach, I agree. The physicist and philosopher Ernst Mack did influence Russell's work, especially his early work.

Post 6

Wittgenstein’s reasoning was that if I assert that “Plato was a philosopher,” I know what I mean. But who is Plato and what is a philosopher? If we try to answer the questions, the questions may be open to more questions. Therefore, the process of analysis might go on and on without resolution. Wittgenstein believed that the process of analysis must come to an end (Nb p. 46), but what is that end? The end for Wittgenstein, as stated in the Tractatus and the Notebooks, are elementary propositions made up of names, “…which will correspond to... simple objects (Nb p. 61).” The point is that even though Wittgenstein was unable to give examples of names and objects (names being simple signs, and simple objects being the basic substance of the world), he believed that logic dictated that this is how it must be. Wittgenstein believed that the idea of a simple is already contained in the idea of a complex and the idea of an analysis (Nb. p. 60). For us to say things about the world, our statements must come in direct contact with the world. This is accomplished via names. “A name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition: it is a primitive sign (T. 3.26).” And, although Wittgenstein was unable to carry out the analysis completely, he was sure that this is how it must be. Of course, we remember that Wittgenstein inherited many of these ideas from Frege and Russell, which provided the impetus for his logic.

Post 5

In the previous post we talked a little about the 2nd of the seven main propositions of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein spends about six pages on this topic.

We know based on 2.01 that a fact is made up of a combination of objects. Objects are the fundamental building blocks of reality; they make up the substance of the world. They cannot be further analyzed into simpler parts. Think of them as irreducible (T. 2.021). (They are sometimes referred to as “atomic objects.”) Objects have an independent existence (if you’re thinking of what we mean by ordinary objects, then you’re far from what Wittgenstein meant by objects in the Tractatus), free from the existence of other objects.

Wittgenstein uses the idea of objects as a necessary ingredient to his a priori analysis. He doesn’t just create objects out of thin air, i.e., at the time Frege and Russell were thinking along similar lines. This is most likely why Wittgenstein created both the name and the object. Names being the smallest component of an elementary proposition, and objects being the smallest component of an atomic fact. Names in propositions represent objects. This is a source of confusion for many who read the Tractatus for the first time. Also, objects have no material properties because propositions represent properties, “…and it’s only by the configuration of objects that they [material properties] are produced (T. 2.0231).”

Frege developed a system of logical notation to express logical relations in mathematics, and he played a significant role in the development of formal logic. Wittgenstein extended Frege’s ideas of logical notation to show the logic behind the proposition and its connection to a fact, so the Tractatus reflects Frege’s influence.

Russell’s influence is significant in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy (up to about 1929). Russell’s work on logical atomism, particularly in his book Our Knowledge of the External World (1914) is particularly impactful for Wittgenstein. Russell believed that thought and language could be reduced to atomic propositions that correspond with the basic elements of reality. So, the ideas of the Tractatus were extensions of both Frege’s and Russell’s ideas, but there are also important differences.

“It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have something--a form--in common with it (T. 2.022). Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form (T. 2.023).” You can think of form as the way things are arranged in a picture. So, if a proposition presents a picture of a possible fact, then it has a particular logical form, and that form either matches reality or it doesn’t. Its form is the arrangement of things in the picture. So, both the proposition and facts have forms, but whether a proposition is true depends on whether its form, the arrangement of names in the proposition, matches the arrangement of objects composing the atomic fact. Even space, time, and color are forms of objects (T. 2.0251). In other words, objects that have a particular arrangement, make up space, time, and color. Every fact of the world is composed of a certain arrangement of objects (again, objects make up the substance), including space, time, and color.

You don't seem to be thinking about Wittgensteinian objects, which are not objects in the traditional sense.

Post 4

It's important to understand that Wittgenstein is trying to answer the question of why it’s possible to make statements about the world. He answers this by doing an a priori investigation, which is very distinct from his later philosophy. Wittgenstein believes that it’s through purely logical analysis that we can come to understand how propositions connect to the world of facts. He assumes this from the beginning. It’s an a priori investigation that will provide the solution to philosophical problems. He also believed that even vague propositions (Nb p. 70), once logically understood, are not vague, but have a clear logical structure. Once you have a clear understanding of the logical structure of propositions, then you essentially have a clear understanding of all the propositions of philosophy. This is partly the reason why Wittgenstein believed after completing the Tractatus that he had solved the problems of philosophy. It’s his logical analysis of the proposition, and specifically how it connects to the world, that draws him to this conclusion.

“What is the case-a fact-is the existence of states of affairs (T. 2).” We use language, specifically propositions, to make statements of facts about the world. States of affairs are not the same as propositions, they are quite distinct. The world is made up of facts (states of affairs), viz, the totality of all the facts (T 1.11). You might not agree with Wittgenstein’s notion of facts being composed of objects (objects being the simplest component of an atomic fact), but his notion of facts as states of affairs existing in reality and quite separate from propositions, I believe, is a good one; and many philosophers, including myself, use it. States of affairs make up reality, but not as Wittgenstein envisioned it in the Tractatus, but I digress.

Much can be said about Frege’s influence on the Tractatus. In fact, some of Wittgenstein’s ideas reflect Frege’s ideas. For example, Wittgenstein and Frege are trying to break down propositions into their simplest form. Frege’s work marked the beginning of what became known as logical atomism. Frege also introduced the distinction between sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung) in linguistic expressions. There are other important ideas that Wittgenstein got from Frege, but it’s beyond the scope of these remarks.

For me it's important to distinguish between claims (statements/propositions) and facts, i.e., states of affairs. If a statement is true, then it represents a fact or facts in reality. The idea that there is an ontology connected with the truth has some merit, i.e., we're referring to the existence of particular states of affairs or the possible existence of a state of affairs. A statement is true if it mirrors a fact, but facts exist apart from the statements themselves (at least many facts). A statement can be true quite apart from any justification, which is to say, I may not know the justification, in which case I don't know it's true. I may claim it's true as a matter of opinion or mere belief, but it's not knowledge. All of us have opinions, some of which are true, and some are false. A claim is never knowledge in itself unless we're referring to statements like "All bachelors are unmarried men." Of course, one could claim that the statement refers to linguistic facts based on the meanings of the words. So, even in this e.g., we could use a linguistic justification.

Truth is always about claims, which come in the form of propositions. I can claim that X is true with little to no justification, but it's not knowledge unless it conforms to one of the many methods we use to justify a claim. I'm a Wittgensteinian when it comes to justification, i.e., we use several methods in our language-games to justify a claim—for example, testimony, reason (logic), linguistic training, sensory experience, and others. Justification is much broader in its scope than many people realize.

I think there is an ontology behind the truth of our statements, and it's in the form of facts, the facts of reality.

I agree, I wouldn't say you have a conviction that you have two hands either. What Moore is saying amounts to a conviction according to W.

My point is in the context of Moore's statements in his papers A Defense of Common Sense (1925), and Proof of an External World (1939) in which Moore lists several propositions that he claims to know with certainty, and Wittgenstein's responses. Moore claims that he knows that he has two hands, but Wittgenstein argues against this idea, although he sympathizes with Moore's claims.

The point here is to see Wittgenstein's connection between knowing and doubting, i.e., the logical connection between the two concepts. I don't think anyone has ever pointed this out in the way Wittgenstein has in OC. When someone claims to know, one of our natural responses is "How do you know?" This question introduces the doubt into our epistemology. We want to know how it is that you know, what's your justification; and when someone points to their inner feelings (their convictions), this is not the language-game of epistemology, although some argue otherwise. I think they're mistaken.

(Sometimes we forget that we often use the concept know as an expression of a conviction. It's not an epistemological use of the word know as JTB, it's just an expression of how strong our conviction is about the belief. These convictions are often expressed with great emphasis but have very little or no justification. They're mere beliefs or opinions.)

Wittgenstein sees statements like "I know I have hands." more akin to an expression of a conviction because he views these kinds of propositions as bedrock, i.e., they form the backdrop of reality that allows us to create epistemological language-games. One of the ways to identify these kinds of bedrock propositions is to ask if it makes sense to doubt them (in a particular context), which is an identifying mark of being bedrock or hinge. A difficulty arises because there are instances where these propositions can and are justified within a particular context and Wittgenstein points this out, but he believes that in Moore's context they are hinge propositions, not generally susceptible to doubt. They give life to our language-games of knowledge and doubt, just as the pieces, board, and rules of chess give life to the game of chess. Doubting hinges would be akin to doubting that a bishop moves diagonally.

You missed my acknowledgment of that mistake, you are correct about the things in 1.1 being objects, which he points out in 2.01.

Continuing with the summary...

Post 3

"A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things)." The things/objects are possible constituents of states of affairs (2.011). It's not a perfect example, but think of the points on a line, the points aren't much of anything by themselves, i.e., until they're combined to form a line or a circle. It's somewhat similar to Wittgenstein's objects (although we have no examples of objects), i.e., objects by themselves don't do much of anything, other than to provide the substance that makes up the possible world of facts. It's a kind of metaphysical reality that Wittgenstein believes is dictated by logic.

From what I've read and heard things in this statement are not objects. We're not at the object stage yet. However, that is a possible interpretation of this passage. And I know what objects are, namely that they're simples. I'll talk more about objects later.

Facts themselves are made up of things like tables and chairs. However, facts are then broken down into atomic facts, which are broken into objects. Objects being the smallest component part of an atomic fact. The atomic fact is what's broken into objects. He hasn't started down this line of thought yet.

He does explicitly state that things are objects in 2.01, so I stand corrected.

Post 2

The Tractatus is divided into seven major propositions, and these propositions are divided and further subdivided. The seven propositions are the following:

1. “The world is all that is the case (T. 1).”
2. “What is the case-a fact-is the existence of states of affairs (T. 2).”
3. “A logical picture of facts is a thought (T. 3).”
4. “A thought is a proposition with a sense (T. 4).”
5. “A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions (T. 5).”
6. “The general form of a truth-function is [p, ξ, N(ξ)]. This is the general form of a proposition (T. 6).”
7. “What cannot speak about we must pass over in silence (T. 7).”

I’m not going to give a detailed account of all of these propositions. I’m only going to give some of the highlights of the book. You don’t need to understand all of the details, nor do you need to understand the logic to understand the main ideas of the Tractatus.

The Tractatus begins with “The world is all that is the case.” For Wittgenstein, this is all reality or all that exists. “The world is the totality of facts, not of things (T. 1.1).” Facts for Wittgenstein are states of affairs which are not things (not a list of things like table, chairs, mountains, etc), but the arrangement of things (things are Wittgensteinian objects) and their relationship to each other.

“The world is determined by the facts, and their being all the facts (T. 1.11).” It’s all the facts in combination that make up the world, and thus define the world as Wittgenstein envisions it. Moreover, it’s “…the totality of facts [that] determines what is the case, and also whatever is not the case (T. 1.12).”

“The facts in logical space are the world (T. 1.13).” I’ll say more about this later.

“The world divides into facts (T. 1.2).” My interpretation of this is that when talking about what’s factual we are talking about a small part of the totality of facts. For example, the Earth has one moon is a fact, but it’s only one part of the larger whole. The larger whole being the totality of facts that make up the world.

Facts are separate from propositions, that is, a true proposition is a picture of a particular state of affairs. We'll talk more about this when we get to proposition 2 and 3.

edit: 3/11/24

I agree.

2/29/24
The Tractatus:

In light of some of the remarks made in the thread “Wittgenstein’s creative sublimation of Kant,” I will explain some parts of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus again. This will be done without regard to what has been said in the earlier parts of this current thread. In other words, I will be starting over from this point forward.

Wittgenstein covers a wide range of topics in the Tractatus, including, but certainly not limited to the nature of the world, the nature of language, logic, mathematics, and even mysticism. Wittgenstein did not think that many philosophers would understand his thinking in the Tractatus. However, today it is not as daunting as it was when it was first written because we have access to much more information about Wittgenstein and the backdrop of the times. The Tractatus is a difficult work to master, and there are many disagreements about what Wittgenstein meant by this or that remark.

We know what the Tractatus is about, namely, that many of the problems of philosophy are related to a misunderstanding of the logic of language. He states this in the preface. What Wittgenstein means by the logic of language is spelled out in his account of the nature of language and how language connects with the world. He believed that logic was key to this understanding. So, the three major subjects of the Tractatus are logic, language, and the world. For Wittgenstein philosophy was about logic and metaphysics (Nb. p. 93). Wittgenstein never changed his mind, even in his later philosophy, that logic revealed something important about language. Although in his later philosophy vis-à-vis the Philosophical Investigations logic is more expansive, that is, it is not restricted to an a priori investigation. His later philosophy gives logic a much wider role, which is revealed in the cultural uses of language.

There seems to be no doubt that Wittgenstein believed the world had an a priori structure, and it is logic that would reveal this structure. Specifically, logic would reveal how language connects to the world. “My work has extended from the foundations of logic to the nature of the world (Nb. p. 79).”

Right, but you never will have all true propositions. All that we say does not limit what there is. — Fooloso4

That's not the point. The point is that all true propositions according to W. would completely describe reality or the world, and that's all I was saying. Quit trying to put words in my mouth.

The picture does not depict a particular form. — Fooloso4

I'm using depict in reference to what the picture displays, i.e., the content of the picture. Wittgenstein is saying that a picture doesn't represent its form, it shows or displays it. I'm not disagreeing here.

So far nothing you've added does anything to falsify what I've said. If you want to say that I'm not using depict as W. did, fine, I agree.

When I say, “…there is a one-to-one correspondence between what can be said about the world, and the facts of the world…” I’m referring to true propositions. If you have all the true propositions, then you have completely described the world.

To describe the world accurately, in terms of the Tractatus, a proposition, which is a picture, must have the correct form (T. 2.2). The picture, and thus its form must correspond with a fact (an actual state of affairs) as opposed to a possible fact or possible state of affairs. Think of the form of the picture as the arrangement of things in the picture. If a proposition is true, then the picture, which depicts a particular form, correctly matches reality. If the proposition is false, then the picture, and thus its form, incorrectly matches reality. All propositions represent possible states of affairs. I’m not talking about true and false propositions (all propositions).

My point, again, is that if you have all the true propositions, then you have completely described the world. I’m sure it could have been said more clearly.

I don't take the picture theory of the Tractatus seriously. However, I do think there is something to the idea that some true propositions picture, correspond to, mirror, or reflect reality. In other words, I think the correspondence theory is generally better than other theories of truth, at least the theories I'm familiar with.