Wittgenstein's logic of use in his later philosophy is much different from his early philosophy. I don't think it's as precisely used. The logic of language in the PI seems to entail something that's not so easy to pin down. Maybe the kind of logic entailed in our ordinary uses hasn't been invented.

You probably have a point, so I'll just substitute another more exact measuring device to make the point, i.e., the point of the post still stands. I don't know enough about measuring with lasers. Interesting though.

All our talk is only ever approximation when it is about the world — Janus

I agree, but I wonder about the above statement. It probably depends on how we're using the concepts approximation and exact, i.e., whether we are talking about a scientific measurement using lasers or a measurement using a ruler. However, even a scientific measurement that's considered exact in one setting, will only be an approximation in another setting.

Sam, do you think our everyday language is insufficient for explaining the Liar and/or all its permutations? — creativesoul

I think the problem lies in the vagaries of language, and trying to fit language into a very precise medium, like mathematical logic. Logic is a guide for our reasoning, but it has it's limits. The two mediums of logic and ordinary language are very different, and it's this difference that may contribute to the problem.

My guess is that Tarski is basing his theory on false premises. For example, the liars paradox.
— Sam26
Odd, since it's clear he explicitly deals with the liar by introducing levels of language. It's certainly not a premise in his argument, obviously. — Banno

My point is simply that he feels he needs to address the liar paradox, viz., that our everyday language is insufficient.

I'm asking because there is a substantive body of work, by the strongest logicians of the last hundred years, that depends on t-sentences. It would be odd if that were irrelevant. Worse if they were wrong. — Banno

They're irrelevant to our social uses of propositions as they correspond to facts. We don't need to understand Tarski to understand the relationship between propositions and the world. It would be odd if we did. I can see the attraction to 'p' is true, IFF p, but, again, I don't see a need for it.

Although, I do feel the need for speed. :gasp:

I haven't spent much time on his works. I've mostly been reading secondary sources, and even there, it's sporadic. My main point, is that it doesn't help to define truth for everyday usage. I don't think it advances much in terms of that.

This, perhaps, is the point Sam26 makes when he says that the T-schema is irrelevant? — Michael

My point was, that it doesn't help us understand the meaning of truth in the object language. The object language is fine without it. It just adds a layer of confusion to the nature or meaning of truth.

Think it's Davidson rather than Tarski. Tarski's work came out of considerations for formal languages right, — fdrake

From what I've read, it's Tarski, in "On the Concept of Truth in Formal Languages" (1935), where he's trying to resolve the liar paradox. Also, in the course of his thinking he uses Godel's incompleteness theorem as a model for his theory. This includes a meta-language to talk about our everyday language, in terms of truth, that's my understanding.

Thanks.

Yes.

I think we generally agree, with some differences. I have to calm my mind down before bed or I'll be thinking about this stuff into the early morning hours. Take care all.

It really gets back to Wittgenstein (unbelievable, I know), how do we learn to use concepts? I'm saying, if you want to understand what truth is, then you look at use in social settings. I don't believe that 'p' is true IFF p helps us to decide meaning as it takes place socially. We could completely disregard it, and it wouldn't change a thing. There would be nothing lacking.

Janus, while that is true, it is also true that "cat" is meaningless beyond what is communally perceived and conceived to be a cat. — creativesoul

Yes, the concept cat is meaningless beyond our social linguistic uses.

The cat can be hunting a mouse and that would be the case, even if there were no one around... ever. — creativesoul

I agree. The use of the concept fact goes beyond the linguistic.

Agreed.

I think if you were to analyze the uses of truth in social settings it would be more in line, generally, with a kind of correspondence. Would you agree?

My guess is that Tarski is basing his theory on false premises. For example, the liars paradox.

Like with Sam26 (I imagine), a theoretical emphasis on pragmatics and a central role for T-sentences in that theory are strange bedfellows. — fdrake

Yes, to say the least.

And yet, they are correct. I mean, you would not disagree that ("p' is true IFF p), would you? — Banno

I would disagree. I don't see that as helping people to understand the concept truth.

On this we agree, so far as substantive definitions. The idea that there could be a single or algorithmic definition of truth is self-defeating. T-sentences just point to the relation between use and truth. — Banno

T-sentences, in my view, do nothing to help people understand how truth is used in social settings. All it does is attempt to define truth in a setting that's so far removed from reality, one wonders if it has a use at all.

Your ability to misunderstand (whether deliberate or not) is remarkable. — Janus

I agree.

↪Sam26 repeats mention of the social aspect of language, combined with what looks like the picture theory of meaning. Truth is defined negatively, "If the proposition misses the mark, or does not accomplish its goal, as a picture or a correlate of reality, then it is false". — Banno

I think my view is a bit more nuanced than your interpretation. I don't subscribe to any "picture theory of language." I don't like any of these theories. If I'm close to a theory, then it would be something close to a correspondence theory. I also said, "If the proposition misses the mark, or does not accomplish its goal, as a picture or a correlate of reality, then it is false." How you get from this remark to "truth is defined negatively" is beyond me. If this is defining anything negatively, it's a false proposition, which misses the mark. The goal of a truth claim is to hit the mark, namely, does it correspond with the facts of reality, which, if anything is a positive.

There is no one definition of truth that will satisfy every use in our language. I thought I made this clear in my opening statement. "What we mean by our concepts, in this case truth, is a function of how we use concepts in our “forms of life,” that is, it is a linguistic social construct." So, if you want to know what we mean by truth, then you look at how we use the concept in a variety of social settings. Any definition of truth, is going to be inadequate, like trying to define, as in W.'s example, a game.

I agree.

"How would you say a proposition corresponds to a truthmaker? Where do we look to see this relation?"


"I think you're making things far too complicated. We use speech and writing to talk about/describe the world. If there's nothing mysterious about this then there's nothing mysterious about correspondence."


"It's not me. This is a long standing objection to correspondence: that it lacks analytical clarity."


"We use speech and writing to talk about/describe the world. If there's nothing mysterious about this then there's nothing mysterious about correspondence."


I think sometimes we expect more from certain concepts than they give us, or we over analyze certain concepts in search of a some phantom that will answer our intellectual itch. Philosophers have a tendency to take concepts out of their natural habitat, and place them in an unnatural one.

Good job mate, and a good read. Yes, I read it, including the replies. We have our differences, but I admire the effort.

To answer this specific question, "What Does it Mean, Philosophically, to Argue that God Does or Does Not Exist?" Very basically, it boils down to, does the concept God have an instance in reality? I use the concept reality in a very broad sense.

Another point about the concept God that seems to get lost in many of the discussions, is that you don't need a precise definition to understand the general idea behind the concept, at least in the western world. In fact, even a vague notion of the concept still has its uses. Many of our concepts are like this, but that doesn't mean there is no use for the concept. For example, the use of the concept game, depending on context, has very different properties from one use to another. This is where Wittgenstein's family resemblance comes into play.

That said, even with my belief in metaphysics, such as they are, I see no argument, deductive or inductive that supports the belief in God. That doesn't mean that God doesn't exist, it just means that as far as I can tell, there is no evidence, or there is weak testimonial evidence to support such a belief.

What is truth?

What we mean by our concepts, in this case truth, is a function of how we use concepts in our “forms of life,” that is, it is a linguistic social construct. These linguistic social constructs are governed by implicit and explicit rules (rules of grammar and other socially contrived rules), but these rules are not always hard and fast, they allow for expansion and contraction. However, expand too much, or contract too much, and you are pushing the limits of what can be said, or constricting what can sensibly said.

Our use of the concept truth is a function of statements, more precisely propositions. Propositions are used to express one’s belief or claim within a rule-governed social context. These propositions are for the most part binary in nature, that is, if the claim/belief is true, then the proposition aligns, corresponds, mirrors, correlates, pictures, a fact (state-of-affairs) in reality (reality being anything that can be said to exist, even the abstract, as well as the stories of fiction). If the proposition misses the mark, or does not accomplish its goal, as a picture or a correlate of reality, then it is false.

The ontology of facts is quite broad in its depth, as I have already hinted. We can speak of facts in objective reality, for example, “The Earth has one moon.” We can speak of the facts of logic and mathematics, which are governed by the rules of these particular languages. We can also speak of subjective facts, for example, “Sam likes apples.” There are even facts of fiction, which have no objective instance in reality, other than the story itself, and the expanded use of concepts within that story. The relation of our claims to truth (statements/propositional claims), or our denial of said claims, namely, our beliefs that such and such is the case, is a relation between our statements/propositions within our “forms of life,” and what we believe are the actual facts of reality.

That's pretty close to what I've written, but haven't posted. I guess I should just post and get it over with.

The invitation is open, especially to those who participated in the discussion, and even those who didn't participate. It's a wide open invitation. Like the World Open chess tournament. :wink:

Anyone who wants to reply.

I'll wait until everyone gives their version before I reply. Some of you participated in the discussion much more than I did, so I'll wait to see if anyone else replies.

Why doesn't everyone just sum up their views of truth in roughly two to three paragraphs. No responses to the summation, just your particular point of view. At least no responses until the summaries are complete.

Okay, thanks for the discussion.

Fred's belief is different to what is true. — Banno

What does this difference amount to? How is Fred's false belief different from someone's true belief, other than one propositional statement is true and the other is false, which amounts to a difference about the facts. Also, I do believe truth and falsity are properties of propositions.

For me, the content of a belief is expressed as statements/propositions. Moreover, I don't see how Searle can get away from the idea that there is a relationship between what Fred believes and his statement that he believes it. As if there is some mistake here to be avoided. The only mistake is adding in these extraneous notions. I don't see any of these theories adding anything important to the idea of truth. I think Wittgenstein had a point about these kinds of theories, which is why he tried avoiding them.

You don't see the difference between what I wrote and what you wrote? Are you suggesting that what you said is the same as what I said? I see a difference.

We can perhaps see the difference most clearly if we look to the use of each rather than meaning. Let's look at an example in which it might make sense to separate truth from belief.

There's a tree over the road. Suppose Fred believes the tree is an English Oak. But it is a Cork Oak.

We might write, in order to show the bivalency of the belief:

Believes ( Fred, The tree over the road is an English Oak)
And
True (The tree over the road is a Cork Oak). — Banno

"There's an English Oak over the road." This is Fred's belief. So, instead of it being the English Oak, it's a Cork Oak. So, Fred's belief is false, it doesn't match the facts. So, Fred believes one thing, but the fact is, "The tree over the road is a Cork Oak." It's not, as I see it, a difference between a belief and true, it's a difference between what he believes is true, and the fact of the matter, viz., "The tree over the road is a Cork Oak."

I don't' think your explanation is clear at all. It seems confusing to me. Okay, let's drill further down on this part.

And the difference can be best seen in that truth ranges over propositions, while belief relates a proposition to a person. — Banno

Let's stay with this for a moment.

I don't see how a proposition that's true, has meaning apart from what one believes to be true. What I'm saying is that it doesn't seem to make sense to separate propositional truth from beliefs. It's as if true propositions exist in some metaphysical reality, apart from beliefs. I'm assuming that what you mean by "truth ranging over propositions," is that propositional truth can stand on it's own apart from belief. What does it mean for a proposition to be true apart from someone's belief that it's true?

The point, so far as there was one, to this discussion is to find a grammar for our notion of truth that holds together in a more or less consistent way. — Banno

That's basically what I've been saying, but in terms of use within our forms of life. So, I think the best way to look at the concept truth is in a Wittgensteinian way, i.e., via the PI and OC.

The core of that consistent grammar is, roughly:
Truth is different to belief, justification, agreement, and so on.
Truth ranges over propositions and such.
"p" is true IFF p, where p is the meaning of "p". — Banno

I'm not inclined to separate true and false from belief. What we believe to be true and/or false is where these concepts get their life. Moreover, why would we need another meta-language to explain what we mean in our everyday language? And, how many other meta-languages do we need to explain our other concepts? I find this problematic to say the least. In other words, to explain "p" is true IFF p you have to go back to our everyday speech (give e.g's), otherwise it has no meaning apart from our everyday uses. I don't believe "p" is true IFF p adds anything significant to the discussion of truth, if anything at all.

I agree with this. Philosophy is useless, after all. — Moliere

Philosophy isn't useless, that's not what I'm saying, some philosophy maybe useless, but to lump it all together as useless is to not understand the nature of philosophy. For example, you're putting forth a philosophy when you respond to what's been said. If you have a set of beliefs about life, science, morality, truth, etc., and you're using reasoning to explain your arguments, then you're doing philosophy. It's just a matter of doing philosophy well, using well reasoned or well grounded arguments. Everyone does philosophy in some sense. Especially if you think about life.

We understand the animals, being animals ourselves, and we're speaking of their psychological states through the folk concept of "belief" -- and I say "folk" non-pejoratively, because I think the folk concept of belief -- and truth, for that matter -- is actually better than a lot of philosopher or scientific inventions. Just not as precise as philosophers or scientists like, as Sam26 said, since they really really like being right about things in lots of circumstances, when folk-notions simply don't work that way. — Moliere

lol
Is that what I said, that philosophers and scientists really really like being right. I cracked up when I read this. Although the latter part of that sentence, viz., everyday speech doesn't work that way, is something I would say. I think I may know where this comes from, but it's the way it's worded that I thought was really really funny.

I do think this whole notion of looking for a precise definition of truth is just a waste of time. It's like trying to find a precise definition of the concept game, or, trying to find a precise definition of pornography. There are just to many uses with too many variables. Do I know all the variations of the use of the word game? No. Do I understand what a game is when I see it, most likely. Is the word useless without a precise definition, obviously not. A vague use might just be what we need in many social interactions.

I like the notion of correspondence, but that doesn't mean that I'm going to try to come up with a theory that explains every use of truth as correspondence. I like that it generally works. Probably in most or many cases we can see what corresponds, like how a painting of Joe's farm corresponds to the arrangement of the house, the barn, the pig pen, etc., at Joe's farm. Is this how every use of the concept truth works? No. Does this mean that I don't know what truth is? No.

There are just too many lines of thought, distorted by hundreds of different uses of concepts. It's like trying to find the best move in chess, sometimes you can, but often you make the best move based on a variety of factors. Again, there are just too many variables.

The only thing odd, is that you didn't see the connection between my reply and your response.