Unlike redundancy theories, however, the prosentential theory does not take the truth predicate to be always eliminable without loss. What would be lost in (11′) is Mary’s acknowledgment that Bill had said something. — IEP
truth a property of sentences (which are linguistic entities in some language or other), — Pie
Don't fall to the idealist error of thinking truth is dependent on you. Down that path lies solipsism.
It could still rain without you noticing. — Banno
2. T(q) → ∃x(x=q) — Michael
Okay. That's the conventional view when it comes to belief as propositional attitude. I agree that propositional content is necessarily linguistic, but I see no reason to agree that all our belief amounts to an attitude towards a proposition which represents that belief such that we take the proposition to be true.
For example, if one believes that a sheet is a sheep(a common cottage industry Gettier example), they do not have an attitude towards the proposition "a sheet is a sheep" such that they take it to be true, but they most certainly believe that that sheet is a sheep. — creativesoul
How could a language less creature believe that a mouse is behind a tree if it has no linguistic concepts? — creativesoul
If the existence of a river accounts for the truth of a proposition (e.g. “this river contains many fish”), then it is a fact.
Just as the existence of snow accounts for the truth of “snow is white”.
Is a river an individual? If the existence of a river makes a proposition true or accounts for the truth of a proposition, then it is a fact - at least, according to one view of facts. — Luke
So non-existent rivers are not facts? I might agree with you there. — Luke
That depends on whether you count it raining and not raining at different times at the same place or at different places at the same time as counterexamples to "it's raining or it's not raining". It's a matter of interpretation; is its both raining and not raining a counter-example under your interpretation? If not, then what do you take the formula to mean? — Janus
And here I am again at a loss to say what that correspondence amounts to. "it is raining or it is not raining" does not seem to mean "anywhere". — Banno
It corresponds to the fact that it is always either raining or not raining at any place and time; shortening that to just "anywhere" which says nothing about time or raining is misleading. — Janus
“It is impossible for the same thing to belong and not to belong at the same time to the same thing and in the same respect” (with the appropriate qualifications) (Metaph IV 3 1005b19–20). — Aristotle in the SEP on Logic
I think I'd say the above is not a belief, but a belief-mediated perception. We see the sheet-as-sheep. We might hold beliefs about sheet-as-sheep -- but note how this strays from logic, and is clearly phenomenology, — Moliere
I'd say perception is linguistically mediated in us, but that perception simpliciter, in all species, does not require language. When we talk of beliefs in animals we're speaking in folk psychology. We understand the animals, being animals ourselves, and we're speaking of their psychological states... — Moliere
We understand the animals, being animals ourselves, and we're speaking of their psychological states through the folk concept of "belief" -- and I say "folk" non-pejoratively, because I think the folk concept of belief -- and truth, for that matter -- is actually better than a lot of philosopher or scientific inventions. Just not as precise as philosophers or scientists like, as Sam26 said, since they really really like being right about things in lots of circumstances, when folk-notions simply don't work that way. — Moliere
Also feel like noting that all of us have already undergone that transition, having started without language but then, through exposure to the language-using social world, we learned it through our social practices. (and hasn't anyone noticed how dogs, and our fellow apes, learn bits of language with training? That is, if the Lion spoke to me, I'd know what the Lion said -- at least as I think of things) — Moliere
What is it for snow to be a constituent of the fact that snow is white? Facts have parts? — Banno
lol
Is that what I said, that philosophers and scientists really really like being right. I cracked up when I read this. Although the latter part of that sentence, viz., everyday speech doesn't work that way, is something I would say. I think I may know where this comes from, but it's the way it's worded that I thought was really really funny. — Sam26
I do think this whole notion of looking for a precise definition of truth is just a waste of time. It's like trying to find a precise definition of the concept game, or, trying to find a precise definition of pornography. There are just to many uses with too many variables. Do I know all the variations of the use of the word game? No. Do I understand what a game is when I see it, most likely. Is the word useless without a precise definition, obviously not. A vague use might just be what we need in many social interactions. — Sam26
I like the notion of correspondence, but that doesn't mean that I'm going to try to come up with a theory that explains every use of truth as correspondence. I like that it generally works. Probably in most or many cases we can see what corresponds, like how a painting of Joe's farm corresponds to the arrangement of the house, the barn, the pig pen, etc., at Joe's farm. Is this how every use of the concept truth works? No. Does this mean that I don't know what truth is? No.
There are just too many lines of thought, distorted by hundreds of different uses of concepts. It's like trying to find the best move in chess, sometimes you can, but often you make the best move based on a variety of factors. Again, there are just too many variables. — Sam26
This seems consistent with indirect realism, idealism, and similar frameworks which work from the same fundamental mistake. Namely, that we have no direct access to the sheet(in this case), so we're not seeing the sheet, but rather only our perception, conception, sense datum, etc. thereof. I reject that view because it is based upon invalid and/or untenable reasoning(argument from illusion, etc.). — creativesoul
I agree with this. Philosophy is useless, after all. — Moliere
"Snow is white" is true by definition. — creativesoul
Truth ranges over propositions and such. — Banno
The point, so far as there was one, to this discussion is to find a grammar for our notion of truth that holds together in a more or less consistent way. — Banno
The core of that consistent grammar is, roughly:
Truth is different to belief, justification, agreement, and so on.
Truth ranges over propositions and such.
"p" is true IFF p, where p is the meaning of "p". — Banno
I'm not inclined to separate true and false from belief. — Sam26
Why would we need another meta-language to explain what we mean in our everyday language. — Sam26
And the difference can be best seen in that truth ranges over propositions, while belief relates a proposition to a person. — Banno
"p" is true IFF p, where p is the meaning of "p". — Banno
Let's stay with this for a moment. — Sam26
How? I don't see anything like that.It's as if true propositions exist in some metaphysical reality, apart from beliefs. — Sam26
If you are asking if there are truths that no one believes, then I think a few considerations will show that this is so. Antirealists may well argue otherwise, and sometimes I would agree, It depends on context. That's the topic in another thread.I'm assuming that what you mean by "truth ranging over propositions," is that propositional truth can stand on it's own apart from belief. — Sam26
I hope it is apparent that we seperate truth from belief in those language games around error, mistakes, lies, and so on.What does it mean for a proposition to be true apart from someone's belief that it's true? — Sam26
We can perhaps see the difference most clearly if we look to the use of each rather than meaning. Let's look at an example in which it might make sense to separate truth from belief.
There's a tree over the road. Suppose Fred believes the tree is an English Oak. But it is a Cork Oak.
We might write, in order to show the bivalency of the belief:
Believes ( Fred, The tree over the road is an English Oak)
And
True (The tree over the road is a Cork Oak). — Banno
2. T(q) → ∃x(x=q) — Michael
Puzzling.I don't' think this is clear at all. It seems confusing to me. Okay, let's drill further down on this part. — Sam26
"There's an English Oak over the road." This is Fred's belief. So, instead of it being the English Oak, it's a Cork Oak. So, Fred's belief is false, — Sam26
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