I think in the Tractacus he's presenting that as the way we normally imagine things: propositions corresponding to the world the same way a photograph corresponds to a scene. — Tate

Exactly.

But the picture can never be in the picture. When we present a theory of propositions, we've strayed beyond what language good for, into nonsense. We're just so enthralled by the theory that we don't realize this. We've forgotten that some things can't be explained. We should pass over them in silence. — Tate

Parts of this I agree with, other parts would have to be explained further. I'm not a fan of passing over anything, or much of anything, in silence. This has become a kind of cliché for many philosophers.

If the picture is that the cat is on the mat, then Davidson's criticism applies. If the picture is "the cat is on the mat", then it doesn't. — Banno

The model is my or someone else's contention that there is a cat on the mat in my living room (that there's a fact of the matter). A proposition by itself, without the belief, is just a potential picture of a fact that hasn't been presented as a particular belief about the world. It's neither true nor false.

At least a dozen more. :yikes:

My concern with this approach is that it's not clear what the pictures are picturing. How does language function as an image for what you insist is not already linguistic ? — Pie

So, if I describe a picture to you, you wouldn't be clear what the picture is picturing. Now I'm not saying that all propositions fit this approach, but I am saying that some propositional uses do fit this approach.

Yes; it's in a sense the elimination of the picture giving the meaning in favour of the use replacing the meaning in an expression. That the cat is on the mat is not a picture of the world, it is the world. — Banno

He didn't eliminate the idea that propositions can picture. He just expanded the idea. Some propositions are a kind of picture. Propositions can be a model of reality, and that model either agrees with reality or it doesn't. Even Einstein's theories were models that were confirmed, i.e., it agreed or it didn't. When the experiments confirmed the model, then the model was accepted as a fact of reality.

I think the point is that reality, the one we (can) talk about, is 'already' linguistic...and not something 'subintelligble' that words can somehow picture, as if holding up concepts to judge against something real-but-non-conceptual. The 'picture,' if true, is the world. — Pie

If that's what Davidson is saying, then I disagree. Reality isn't, in my view "already linguistic." We use language (propositions) to describe reality, propositions are separate from the facts of reality.

I'm not even sure what Davidson is saying, it seems a bit confusing to me. I'm pretty sure I understand what Wittgenstein is saying, at least in terms of the picture theory. A proposition, whether true or false presents a picture of reality. So, if a proposition gives us a picture of a cat on the mat, then that pictorial form either matches reality or it doesn't. If it does, then it's true, if it doesn't, then it's false. W. didn't give up the picture theory (i.e., some propositions are a kind of picture of reality), he just gave us a much broader conception of language based on how we use the concepts.

"NDE" is not the (existential) death-state itself so it's not informative about life after life. If it were death, then (A) it's irreversible brain decomposition would somehow reverse itself and yet no such "reports" are forthcoming and (B) irreversible brain decomposition entails absence of memory-formation and cessation of "experience" of a purported life after life. This 'folk interpretation' of a brain-state phenomenon is absurd (ludicrous) on its face and even worse under both philosophical and scientific scrutiny. I think it's far from "closed-minded" to say so."


I will agree that a near-death experience is not a death state, if we’re using the word death as you’re using it. However, clinical death is another matter, and it’s different from your use, and it’s the use that most use in this context. However, the point of near-death experiences (I’m using bold to over-emphasize the point) is not that they are death experiences, it’s that they are near-death experiences. I would never claim that a near-death experience is the same as death.

I would dispute the claim that NDEs are not informative about the death. And, my inductive argument, which is given at least twice in this thread, explains why it’s informative. Your contention that it’s absurd is going to need a bit more support, to say the least. Here’s why…

Why do I say that the testimonial evidence, and it is evidence, is strong in support of consciousness surviving the death of the body (here I’m using the word death as you’re using it)? Because the same criteria that makes any testimonial evidence strong is the same criteria being applied in my argument.

These criteria are as follows:

1) Number of reports (although numbers are not enough)
2) Variety of reports, variety adds to the strength of the reports.
3) Truth of the reports, which is determined in the following ways:

(a) Since we are dealing with testimonial evidence, in order to know if the testimonial evidence is true, we need corroboration, i.e., we need an objective way to verify some of the testimonial evidence. This helps to establish the truth of the testimonial evidence, and since the evidence is testimonial evidence, it helps to establish the truth of the premises.

(b) Another important factor in determining the truth of testimonial evidence is firsthand testimony, as opposed to hearsay or secondhand testimony. Firsthand testimony is stronger than hearsay or second-hand testimony, all things being equal.

(c) Consistency of the reports is another important criterion in terms of getting to the truth. However, testimonial evidence does not have to be perfectly consistent to be credible. When dealing with a large number of reports you will inevitably find some inconsistency. So, inconsistency itself is not enough to rule out the reports unless the inconsistency is widespread, and of such a number, that it affects the quality and number of consistent reports. So, although consistency is important, it must be looked at in terms of the overall picture.

There are other criteria used in my inductive argument that make a strong inductive argument, but these are enough to make my point. There has been quite a bit of data by scientists that support the consistency of the reports. This consistency has been compared to the consistency of veridical reports and shown to be at least as consistent. Moreover, the memories of these reports tend to be stronger than many of the memories of veridical reports.

To say that this kind of testimonial evidence is just “folk interpretations,” is not to understand the nature of the testimonial evidence. We’re not dealing with a few stories, or a few anecdotes, that haven’t been scrutinized in the ways I’ve outlined. We’re dealing with millions and millions of reports that have come from every culture from around the world; and many thousands of these reports have been analyzed in the way I’ve outlined.

I keep talking about the testimonial evidence, but where is it? It’s on sites devoted to collecting such material, such as https://www.nderf.org/Archives/NDERF_NDEs.html

This is not the only source. There have been hundreds of books published about people’s experiences, and there have been hundreds of scientific articles published from various universities from around the world.

Further data to support my argument.
https://med.virginia.edu/perceptual-studies/wp-content/uploads/sites/360/2020/11/Nov-2020-NDE-C-CC.pdf

There are other universities from around the world involved, not just the University of Virginia.

All of the testimonial evidence must be looked at in terms of the whole of the reports. Moreover, to say that this evidence is ludicrous or absurd is a comment that is itself ludicrous and absurd. And, given the strength of such evidence, it is absolutely closed-minded to reject it in such absolute and dogmatic terms.

The argument also applies to , who says that this inductive argument is just an opinion.

:up:

I can think of some people on this forum who could use a DMT trip. :nerd:

This is just saying that the solipsist could be wrong about solipsism. That's not my argument. My argument is that the solipsist cannot be wrong about anything else, if they are right about solipsism. — Isaac

I would take this further. It seems to me that if the solipsism is correct, then how is it that there is a language (PLA)? There would be no argument about other minds, language is logically dependent on other minds, if W. is correct, and I believe he is.

do you believe all living things are conscious? — dazed

There are different levels of consciousness. For example, dreaming, meditative states, DMT states (and other drug induced states) , monkeys, dogs, all the way down to insects. It's not clear how far down the biological life scale this goes, but it's clear that there are levels of consciousness, and different states of consciousness. Based on my research, and the research of others, I believe we are in a dumbed-downed state of consciousness as humans. This isn't our natural state of being or existence. Death returns us to our natural state, which is probably why so many NDErs feel like they're home when they experience an NDE.

A peer reviewed study is consistent with my own research, viz., that NDEs are not consistent with hallucinations. This is confirmed in the following study:

https://www.eurekalert.org/news-releases/948999

Moreover, research is being done all over the world into the experiences of NDErs, including the following universities and disciplines.

The following quote is take from the above link:

"The researchers on the study represent many medical disciplines, including the neurosciences, critical care, psychiatry, psychology, social sciences and humanities, and represent many of the world’s most respected academic institutions including Harvard University, Baylor University, University of California Riverside, University of Virginia, Virginia Commonwealth University, Medical College of Wisconsin, and the Universities of Southampton and London."

In other words, unlike other philosophical ideas, Wittgenstein's views remain unchanged or static since the time of its inception. Is it, in that case, a work that's perfect as it is? — Agent Smith

I wouldn't quite go that far. There are people who are trying to work out the implications of his ideas, but as far as I know, and I'm just guessing, it's a small number. Moreover, I'm not up to date on some of this.

Reason (inference or a proof) has its limits. Not every premise in a chain of reason can be proven. At some point you just choose an ending, if not, then you would never conclude anything. Moreover, some premises can be known by other means, such as testimony, experience, or linguistic training. Dr. Bitar (a former friend) says, "Inference or proof is parasitic; it requires knowledge by other means which it can then use to extend what is known."

I would agree with you. Most are just trying to understand what he said, but few are working out the implications of what he said, especially the nuanced implications of this very abstract linguistic subject.

I seem to see other people, but I can't be sure, because what I mean by person is roughly what I mean by 'I,' this existence I know 'directly.' My states of mind, my thoughts and sensations, are phosphorescently present for me, infinitely intimate. — Pie

I think a good understanding of the Philosophical Investigations and especially On Certainty should dispel one of the notion that our internal “states of mind, [our] thoughts and sensations” are things which we “know directly.” We simply have these experiences. In other words, we don’t learn that we have these experiences, as if we discover them through some investigation.

To know means to have an understanding of what it means to know, and what it means to not know in a given context. Otherwise, we could infer that someone knows based on their claim that they know. So, how would a doubt arise in this context? The very act of doubting shows a particular state of mind (shows that it exists). If you can’t doubt someone’s claim to knowledge, then you can’t know that it is knowledge. It’s not a matter of knowing at all, no more than I know I’m having a pain in my foot, as I scream out holding my foot, which is bleeding profusely.

The act of knowing is not a private matter, which is what this quote implies. I know based on my direct experience with my inner self. As if knowing is directly connected with some inner thing. This is an easy mistake to make. It’s a confusion between my subjective certainty and objective certainty (knowledge). It’s as if we equate feeling certain with being objectively certain, or knowing. They are not the same, but they are often confused.

What might be added, to comfort those who find this troubling, is that these social constructs aren't rigid and eternal. Meanings can drift. Wittgenstein himself kicked a few around. — Pie

True.

The problem with all of the testimonials is the brain wasn't fully dead. Just because you are not conscious or responsive, does not mean you are not collecting smells, sounds, and even visuals if your eyes are opened by a doctor or your lids fail. — Philosophim

First, there are plenty of NDEs where there is no sign of brain activity, where the blood has been completely drained from the brain; or, that the brain is so compromised one wonders how their having any experience, let alone hyper-experiences (more real than real). Second, your speculating about what the brain is capable of in these conditions, you don't know. It seems rather obvious that the brain is definitely in a degraded state based on monitoring procedures.

All you're doing is giving your opinions on the subject, which isn't much of a counter-argument.

That would be your argument, not mine. I do believe that there is evidence for past lives based on NDEs and DMT experiences, but this would entail a different argument.

The argument, if you read it, doesn't conclude anything about past lives, it concludes that consciousness survives the death of the body. Past lives is a side issue that has some evidence (based on what has happened in many NDEs), but it's has nothing to do with the thrust of my main argument. So, again, you're not following the argument, or you haven't read it closely enough.

Address specifically how I've lowered the bar. Don't just make statements without good reasons. Where specifically did the inductive argument fail? Did I not provide enough numbers, variety of NDEs, corroboration, consistency, etc? All your comment does is show that you don't follow the argument.

The interesting philosophical issue is the language around what it is that might survive death, especially how it could be identified with the deceased individual. The notion of soul is problematic. — Banno

I agree that the notion of a soul, in terms of pointing to something inner is problematic, which is why I talk about consciousness instead of a soul. However, we don't have a clear idea what consciousness is, so the question about what survives is not clear. There would have to be some continuity of consciousness, viz., memory, continuity of experience (subjective and objective experiences), etc.

Question: What about consciousness proves, no, suggests, its survival/continuation post death? — Agent Smith

If the testimonial evidence is reliable, and I believe it is based the corroboration of many of the testimonials, then when people talk about meeting their deceased parents, friends, and other family members, including seeing people they did not know had passed, this suggests that those who have passed continue to exist as themselves. This is one reason, there are other reasons, including what goes on in hospices just before people pass away.

Why think the experiences are veridical as opposed to dreams? — Bartricks

One reason is, they're much different from dreams. In these experiences people are describing what's going on in the operating room, for example, in real time. They're are describing the conversations that the doctors, nurses, and other medical personal are having while their heart is stopped, and while there is no brain activity. Since when do dreams give accurate details of what's happening around you while your unconscious (there are some exceptions, but generally dreams don't give this kind of information)? Moreover, these kinds of testimonials have been corroborated over and over again. I don't think it's reasonable at all to think they are dreams. All you have to do is read 20 or 30 of these to understand this. Moreover, dreams usually occur in REM sleep, and that's not what's going on here at all. These people are in a completely different state of awareness.

I read your post previously, or at least the first 10 pages. It seemed to go in circles after that. I really need more than sheer number of testimonials of the experience. I need information gained from the experience that can't be gotten by a person unmoving and stuck in the room. Like for example I heard such a story of a person who had an out of body experiences and claimed to see a sneaker on the roof of the hospital, and strangely enough that was true. I like to hear more like that. — TiredThinker

Ya, I repeat myself because people don't always read what is written carefully. So, I can see why it may appear to go in circles, but there is a lot that's covered. If you don't read it, you won't get the full impact of the argument.

And, you said you read the first ten pages, if you did, then you should know it's not just about numbers. I explained this in the first couple of pages. Moreover, why would you think that it's about someone "unmoving and stuck in a room?" It's much more substantial than that, and the experiences are much more than that. I'm not going to rehash the argument in this thread, but you don't seem to understand the impact of the inductive argument.

I assumed in my argument that most people have at least read some of these experiences, so I don't get into the various experiences, other than to point out the common elements of the experiences. Many of the experiences were taken from https://www.nderf.org, so if you want to read about these experiences, this is a good place to start.

The link that was provided in the above post, is a link to a thread that I created on the subject of Does Consciousness Survive Death? I make the claim based on the strength of the testimonial evidence, which is quite substantial, that we can know that we survive the death of the body. It's not speculation or an opinion, it's knowledge, based on the strength of the testimonial evidence. Don't be put off by many of the comments that there is no evidence. I would read through some of my posts in that thread, and decide for yourself, either for or against.

Most of what we believe comes in the form of testimonial evidence. If you read a book, listen to a lecture, and even listen to a podcast, you're getting testimony from someone. You have to know how to evaluate testimonial evidence, no matter what form the testimony takes. Testimonial evidence can be very weak at times, but it can also be very strong under the right circumstances.

Most people in here haven't studied NDEs, and you can see that in their responses. There was only one person who responded to my argument with thoughtfulness, and that was @Fdrake. He responded directly to the argument. We didn't agree, but at least he took on the argument directly.

By the way, my beliefs on this subject have nothing to do with any religious ideology. I'm not religious.

PI 43For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

Right, I wasn't suggesting that W. was dogmatic about the connection between meaning and use. In fact, meaning can be associated with an object also in the PI.

In terms of the Tractatus meaning (Bedeutung) is the thing that is referred to in a proposition. Logic is the transcendental condition that makes this possible. — Fooloso4

In the Tractatus meaning is associated with the object, i.e., the name in the proposition is directly connected with the object in a fact. It sounds like you're saying that meaning is found in the proposition, but that can't be the case. The proposition gets its meaning by reflecting or mirroring the fact, which is W.'s picture theory of meaning.

In the Investigations reference is problematic when it comes to such things as sensation. If I am in pain I am not referring to some public thing that can be pointed to for others to see or experience. But this does not mean: — Fooloso4

We know, for the most part, when someone is in pain (having the sensation of pain) because of their very public cries, screams, moans, and other bodily or linguistic acts. There is a difference between the inner experience and the outward manifestation.

If it "doesn't latch onto the inner thing in terms of meaning", then why would the disconnect "eventually show up in our uses of the concept". Meaning is use. — Luke

First, I don't know about you. but for me, "meaning as use" has it's limitations. It seems rather obvious that not all "uses" of a word, equate to meaning. Obviously people use words incorrectly all the time. However, "use" is the best way to determine meaning, generally. Use must be seen within the context of a form of life, and it's within these forms of life that we are able to say that "your use" is incorrect. I say this as a point of clarity for others reading this, not necessarily as a point of disagreement. My guess is that you would agree with this.

To answer your question, I'm not sure I have a clear idea of how this would happen, it's more of an intuition. I was thinking that if people see different colors from what I see, then this would come out in the detailed uses of what we mean, for example, by red. So, as we get into the different shadings of red, and make detailed comparisons with other color samples, the idea that you're seeing yellow instead of red would seem to break down at some point. We would begin to recognize in our various uses that we're not seeing the same color or colors. If, on the other hand, there is no way to tell if you're seeing yellow instead of red, then the whole point is moot. Whatever's happening in the mind would fall away as as so much chaff, but I suspect this is incorrect.

My original response to your previous post, before I edited it, was going to be that you seem to be arguing that Wittgenstein's beetle is both necessary and unnecessary to language use. Wittgenstein tells us that it drops out of consideration as irrelevant; that it cancels out, whatever it is; that the box might even be empty; and that the thing in the box doesn't belong to the language-game at all. — Luke

Ya, my argument can be seen in this way, but how this plays out is complex. Moreover, I disagree with some of Wittgenstein's notions. It seems to me that if you remove what's going on in the mind, then your left with nothing. I don't think Wittgenstein goes this far, even though his beetle in the box seems to remove the thing as having any great import. Much of this, obviously, has to do with how certain passages are interpreted. And, I suspect we'll never arrive at a consensus.

It appears to me that Wittgenstein is saying that language takes its meaning entirely from behaviour, from use, and only from a third-person, external standpoint. Pain and other sensations do not refer directly to the private feelings but to the public expression of those feelings; to how you (and others) act when experiencing those sensations. Therefore, that is what a sensation is; what the word "sensation" can only refer to: its public expression. — Luke

Yes, I agree.

And if that is the case - if language is entirely behavioural/external - then we cannot talk about sensations in terms of private subjective experiences or qualia or any of that. This is where we run up against the limits of language, and where Daniel Dennett is correct that qualia cannot possibly be private, ineffable, intrinsic and immediately apprehensible by consciousness. On the other hand, it seems as though we can talk about sensations and feelings directly in terms of the private subjective experiences and the sensations themselves, and not only in terms of their expression, because that is what we are doing now - or at least trying to do! In that case, Wittgenstein would be wrong about language or grammar being entirely behavioural/external. — Luke

I definitely disagree with Wittgenstein's notion of a limit to language, at least in part. He basically still believes, as he did in the Tractatus, that there is a limit to language. If there is a limit, I suspect that it's not as limiting as he thinks it is. The fact that we can talk about some of these subjective experiences, as we're doing, seems to point at something problematic with Wittgenstein's limit. I'm sure that much of my disagreement has to do with my view on consciousness/minds.

It's not as though the concept needs some inner thing to latch onto
— Sam26

This seems at odds with the rest of your post. If this is true, then I don't understand why you would also say:

I would say that everything speaks in favor of common inner experiences, and generally nothing against it. Moreover, isn't this how "we know" that our inner subjective experiences are the same. If they weren't the same experiences, I believe the conceptual public use would break down.
— Sam26

If our concepts do not need "some inner thing to latch onto", then why would our "conceptual public use" break down without "some inner thing to latch onto"? It need not be that: — Luke

It doesn't latch onto the inner thing in terms of meaning, which isn't to deny that there is some relationship between the inner and the outer public manifestation. There is a correlation or relationship between our inner experiences and how we use the words, and this, it seems to me, would be severed, or would break down publicly. The disconnect would eventually show up in our uses of the concept.

I believe we do know with a high degree of certainty that people have the same inner experiences, which is based on the public use of the concepts. The assumption, which has no standing, as far as I can tell, is that we can't know, and this seems wrong to me. Maybe we don't know with absolute certainty, but we know, again, with a high degree certainty.

Not sure if that clears it up.

I thought it was an interesting question. Can we even talk about experiences or sensations in subjective terms? Or is doing so “running up against the limits of language”? — Luke

Why wouldn't you think that we can't talk about subjective sensations? We do it all the time. Moreover, we understand, for example, what people are talking about when they describe a beautiful sunset. We also understand when someone tells us the orange juice is sweet, which describes their subjective experience. There is common agreement, generally, about our subjective experiences. Everything speaks in favor of people seeing the same colors, tasting the bitterness of dark chocolate, feeling the hardness of a table, etc. I don't see how this runs up against the limits of language, unless I've misunderstood your point. It's not as though the concept needs some inner thing to latch onto, it just a use that latches onto our "form of life." Our inner experiences get their life through the way we interact linguistically or conceptually.

I would say that everything speaks in favor of common inner experiences, and generally nothing against it. Moreover, isn't this how "we know" that are inner subjective experiences are the same. If they weren't the same experiences, I believe the conceptual public use would break down.

What is the difference between Russell's and Wittgenstein's logical atomism? — Banno

I know there is a difference, as you do, because Wittgenstein challenges both Russell and Frege's views. You're right, it's a matter of exegesis, and there is a lot of disagreement over the details. I know that Wittgenstein had a different view of logic, and a different view of propositions, but I'd have to do some reading to review the material. This goes into much more depth than my little mind is prepared to go right now. People are having a hard enough time just trying to understand what W. meant by object and name, among other things.

Good to see your involvement. — Banno

Thanks Banno.

I'd taken it that the world in the Tractatus is all that is the case, not a collection of simples. — Banno

Yes, for Wittgenstein, "The world is all that is the case (T. 1)," that's true. However, he breaks the fact into parts, viz., atomic facts, and atomic facts are broken into objects. "Objects [which are simples] make up the substance of the world (T. 2.021)." These simple objects, which he gives no examples of, are the simplest building blocks of atomic facts. The correlate is the proposition, the elementary proposition, and the name (the name is also a simple). "In an atomic fact objects fit into one another like the links of a chain (T. 2.03)."

Malcolm once asked Wittgenstein if he ever decided upon anything as an example of an object, but his reply was that it wasn't his job as a logician to decide whether this thing or that was a simple or complex. He said it was an empirical matter. Wittgenstein understood this problem when he was writing the Notebooks, "Our difficulty was that we kept on speaking of simple objects and were unable to mention a single one (p. 68 The Notebooks)." The way the proposition reached out to reality is through the name, which corresponded to the object. Wittgenstein was driven by this logic, i.e., there must be these simples in both elementary propositions (names) and atomic facts (objects). "Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be composite (T. 2.021)." Later he thought this was just silly, but he stuck with his logic and created the Tractatus. Remember the traditional way philosophers thought of meaning, it's the object it denotes. Wittgenstein stuck with tradition and created the logic to support this view.

Russell completely misunderstood the Tractatus. In fact, most who read the Tractatus misunderstood it, most notably the Vienna Circle who thought that Wittgenstein held their views of the metaphysical.

I'm sure this won't help much, but maybe.

And so a true proposition is a fact — Banno

True propositions mirror or picture facts, they are not facts in themselves. This is explained in W. picture theory of meaning.

Well, what is his aim in writing the book? He says, "Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather--not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts:" He does this by showing how language is limited to the facts of the world, and that there are no facts of metaphysics that language can latch onto.

Facts are all around us. It's not difficult to find facts. There are many facts that haven't been discovered, but his aim is very specific.

Q: What is meant by “facts”? Isn’t a fact something which is true? And isn’t truth a property of propositions? So, the world consists of all true propositions? If so, then “world” doesn’t refer to the physical universe but to the collection of true propositions about the physical universe. — Art48

So, a proposition is broken down into elementary propositions and names. Facts are broken down into atomic facts and objects. Think of elementary propositions as pictures of reality, if they are true (this is Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning), or if the elementary proposition is false, then the picture doesn't represent anything in reality. In other words, a false proposition is a picture with a form, but the form has no instance in reality. Think of a painting, a painting has a form, whether it matches something in reality or not. The form of the picture, is the arrangement of things (houses, trees, valleys, etc.) in the picture. If the arrangement of things in the picture correctly picture reality, then it is a true picture of reality.

Only true propositions connect via names to objects. However, don't think of names and objects in the ordinary sense. Names and objects as used in the Tractatus are simples. They are the smallest component parts of propositions and facts, respectively (Wittgenstein never gives e.g.'s of either of these, but he believes that logic dictates their existence). The elementary proposition, which is composed of names, asserts the existence of some state-of-affairs, or some fact. Only propositions can be true or false, depending on whether they reflect facts or don't reflect facts. There is no such thing as a true or false fact, only true or false propositions. So, again, whether a proposition is true or false depends on whether it correctly pictures a fact. "A proposition is a picture of reality. A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it (T. 4.01."

When thinking of a fact, an analogy might help. For example, think of a chess board and the pieces as the world, then think of the arrangement of the pieces (facts in logical space) on the board, as the facts in the world (the facts of the game). If you correctly describe the game, then you are describing some arrangement of the pieces on the board. I.e., the language you use correctly (if true) or incorrectly (if false) is supposed to picture the facts (arrangement of pieces) of the game.

The world consists of facts (T. 1.13, 2.04). However, the totality of true propositions describes the world, i.e., describes the facts of the world.

Hopefully this partly answers some of your questions.

Good Luck,
Sam

Does she answer them aside from taking them? — god must be atheist

She answers questions, but some of them are hard to hear.

If one limits propositions to spoken statements then the belief that we will find the parts of animals is not propositional if it is not expressed. But is this what Wittgenstein means by a proposition? — Fooloso4

In W. later philosophy propositions are functions of use, rule following, and forms of life; and, the definition of a proposition shouldn't be seen as some one essence that governs what we mean by all propositions. The definition of a proposition should be seen under the rubric of family resemblance. To demonstrate this it would take a separate thread, and an in depth analysis of the nature of a proposition in the T., and W.'s criticisms of how a proposition functions in the PI and in OC. And, not only how his view changed, but specifically, what remains of his early thinking, and, of course, what was discarded.

Finally, there is not going to be some final correct interpretation of W. which we can all agree is what W. meant by this or that. Wittgenstein's writing style, in particular, doesn't lend itself to easy interpretations. This doesn't mean that we can't agree on W. general themes (although, even here there is disagreement, to some extent), it just means that some of these difficulties will never be resolved.

Clearly Wittgenstein is connecting beliefs and propositions here. Does he distinguish between propositional beliefs and non-propositional beliefs elsewhere? — Fooloso4

"People have killed animals since the earliest times, used the fur, bone etc. etc. for various purposes; they have counted definitely on finding similar parts in any similar beast.

"They have always learnt from experience; and we can see from their actions that they believe certain things definitely, whether they express their belief or not [my emphasis] (OC 284)."

This is about as clear as it gets. These kinds of beliefs are not tied to propositions and/or statements, they are primitive, animal if you will. They are belief states revealed in a non-propositional way. We show these beliefs in innumerable ways. They are non-linguistic beliefs.

All beliefs are expressed in acts of one kind or another, i.e., either in linguistic and/or nonlinguistic acts.

Wittgenstein continues this thinking, viz., that beliefs are shown in our actions (OC 285). I interpret this to mean that our actions reflect what we believe apart from statements/propositions.

I agree, but my point is that more generally we should not read the later Wittgenstein in the same way we read someone whose work leads from premise to conclusion. — Fooloso4

I agree, but that doesn't mean you can't formulate an argument based on some of his ideas. Although doing that may distort his ideas.

We disagree about the nature of a belief. And ya, I'm not going to go over this ground again, at least not right now.