I'm going back to Wittgenstein. I'm not getting into arguments over this or that translation, or whether the Greek or Hebrew says this or that. What I know for sure, is that regardless of whether this or that person is stupid or ignorant, that's what they believe, and that's the point.

I mean have you read the OT? God commanded the Israelites to go into villages and slay every man, women, child, and animal, what does that say about this concept of God? All it tells me is that the concept is flawed, and the concept probably has no instance in reality. If there is a God, he probably is nothing like any religious idea of God.

The point is that people can easily interpret this or that verse, in this or that way. But there are plenty of verses in the Bible that indicate, at the very least, there is separation from God for the unbeliever. I spent years studying the Bible, and memorizing large portions of the Bible, but I'd be hard put to recall much of it. There are a lot of references to hell in the Bible, and those references go to the unbeliever.

I think we should judge other’s moral character based on the totality of their actions. Beliefs, in and of themselves, do not cause harm. So their beliefs are irrelevant. Even if we take things a step further and say that this belief causes them to ridicule, belittle, etc. atheists, that alone isn’t enough evidence to judge their moral character. Perhaps they also believe in giving to the poor, forgiving others their trespasses, etc. Are we to exclude these other, more noble, moral beliefs when we judge them? — Pinprick

Well, it's debatable whether having a belief can cause harm. Having any belief is assenting to something, so it's a kind of action. It may not be overt, but it requires a willful mental act on one's part. And, if you take things a bit further, as you say, and include ridicule and belittling, that to me does say something about someone's moral character. However, all of us have flawed moral characters, so it goes for all of us. And yes, when judging someone's character, one should look at the totality of their character. We all know people who generally have good characters, but are flawed in this or that way.

I'm not sure Christians say or believe any of this. Cite? (Lots of people who call themselves Christians do say this, but they're not Christians.) — tim wood

Many Christians believe this Tim, and they infer it from verses like 2 Thess. 1: 8,9 "...in flaming fire, inflicting vengeance on those who do not know God and on those who do not obey the gospel of our Lord Jesus.They will suffer the punishment of eternal destruction [my emphasis], away from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his might"

However you interpret this, it's not a pretty picture. In flaming fire is not something I want to be associated with, figuratively or not.

Cheers.

There are those who disagree with you. — Joshs

Ya, there are always those who disagree, that's part of the philosophical world. But, I don't want to turn this thread into an argument about Wittgenstein and phenomenology. But there is a connection between the PLA and consciousness.

Those who do not believe in god, when they die, will be cast into eternal torment.

This is a punishment out of all proportion with the offence.

Christians hold that the person who inflicts this unjust punishment - God - is worthy of worship.

So what is one to make of the moral character of folk who hold someone who tortures folk unjustly in the highest esteem? — Banno

Ya, I agree with you, this kind of thinking is really weird. I don't know how any person with an ounce of moral aptitude could possibly think that this kind of God could be loving or just. Moreover, how could this God create anyone knowing full well that they would make choices that lead to torture or their destruction?

I'll tell you something else that seems weird to me, and I was talking to a friend about this the other day. Even if you assume there is a God with some of the Christian attributes, omniscience, omnipotence, loving, for e.g., I couldn't imagine a being like this wanting people worshipping him/her, that seems like a human construction. When I think of how people worship God in church, it seems bizarre, raising their hands praising him, etc. What kind of God would want people doing this? The idea seems to come from our understanding of Kings, viz., how a king might want his subjects to respond, but this seems like an ego trip, not worthy of a God.

I spent 35 years of my life thinking like this, and it wasn't until I was willing to examine my beliefs more closely, that I removed myself from this kind of thinking. It's like being in a cult, you don't really see what's happening until you remove yourself from it. However, to be fair, this happens in other kinds of ideologies, including politics. This has driven me to think more carefully about what I believe, but even so, we're all susceptible to varying degree of weird thinking.

Yeah, I think the concept of ‘facts of reality’ is highly problematic for both Wittgenstein and phenomenology. — Joshs

I would not say that Wittgenstein is a phenomenologist or even close to a phenomenologist, and I don't think that "facts of reality" is problematic, nor is it problematic for Wittgenstein.

The incoherence or lack of sense of the uses of certain concepts is one thing, but that's separate from reality itself. For example, I may use a concept correctly within a particular language-game, but that doesn't mean that that meaning actually lines up with the facts of reality. The two are quite often different things. I think sometimes we confuse talk of reality, with reality itself, or the facts of reality. Our talk may line up with the facts, but our talk may not. My point would be that our talk of consciousness is in its infancy, and probably is far from the facts of reality.

How in the world did Wittgenstein do that?

Part of what I see happening with Wittgenstein's ideas of meaning, is that it's used almost as a denial of internal experiences, or if you will, the denial of the self (not everyone, but some). As if you can't talk about your internal experiences without saying something senseless or meaningless. We wouldn't even have language if it wasn't for what's happening internally, i.e., the mind. So, the point here is that you can go to far in either direction. For example, saying things like the self or consciousness is an illusion, or associating what we mean by consciousness as a kind of inward pointing. Like looking inward and thinking, there it is, that's consciousness.

If you want to know what consciousness is from a conceptual view, or how we think about consciousness in our everyday lives, then you have to understand how it is that we acquire, or attach meaning to our words. Moreover, it must be said over and over again, our concepts don't necessarily equate to reality, which also means, that what we mean by this or that, doesn't necessarily equate to reality. This is the difference between language about reality, and reality itself.

Wittgenstein linguistic analysis doesn't answer the "hard problem," it's still there. However, understanding Wittgenstein helps with how we talk about consciousness, which inevitably will influence one's theories of the self, and what can be sensibly said. Part of the problem with understanding consciousness is that we lack the advanced conceptual framework to discuss it (viz., its composition or source). It would be like the ancient Romans trying to understand the physics of today, they lack the concepts, so there's no foundation to work with. I don't think we're even close to understanding what consciousness is. I wonder if we even know how to frame the questions. That's my take.

(I had to re-write this post to clarify what I was thinking.)

Oh, so here we go with the ad hominem fallacy. You thought that I misunderstood something in the past, therefore everything I say ought to be dismissed as misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

Did I say anything close to, "...therefore everything [you] say ought to be dismissed as a misunderstanding[?]" No! Again, another misinterpretation of what's being said. I'm just going to move on MU. I can't talk philosophy with you, it's pointless.

Notice how you've moved from "object and designation" here, toward "description". These two are fundamentally different types of language use which cannot be conflated without the creation of misunderstanding and confusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

The point here, is that if someone says (not me or W.), that the inner thing is a kind of picture of some thing (which it's not, i.e., it can't be construed in this way), then this use of the word picture is a bit weird in terms of W.'s beetle example. Why? Wittgenstein answers, "If you [who do you think the "If you..." refers to?] admit that you haven’t any notion what kind of thing it might be that he has before him [referring to the beetle] —then what leads you into saying, in spite of that, that he has something before him? Isn’t it as if I were to say of someone: ‘He has something. But I don’t know whether it is money, or debts, or an empty till (PI 294).’”[/quote]

The only misunderstanding, is if someone wants to talk about the thing in the box in this way (again it's not me or W.). It would be the interlocutor responding to Wittgenstein's beetle example, i.e., they would be trying to describe the thing in the box as a kind of picture. So, the only confusion here, is you not understanding the point of W.'s remarks.

I don't know what to tell you MU, you do this all the time, and no matter how many times people try to explain it to you, you seem stuck in a place that no one can free you from. And, this is why I generally don't respond to your posts. @Luke spent a long time with you trying to explain your misunderstandings, but to no avail. All I can tell you is that your interpretations of W. are so far from the norm, that I wonder if we're both speaking English.

Much has been said in these posts about using words to refer to some inner experience; not that we cannot use words in this way, but that when we attach the meaning of a word exclusively to the private experience, to which no one else has access, then the use of the word becomes problematic. It is not an easy error to grasp. In fact, this is difficult to understand, and it is difficult to explain. However, understanding what Wittgenstein is saying does produce some enlightenment.

Another example Wittgenstein used to explain the problematic nature of associating meaning with the private inner thing, is the beetle in the box example (PI 293). It shows how associating meaning with the private inner thing, which is based on a misunderstanding of the “grammar of the expression,” in terms of “object and designation (PI 293)”, cannot gain a foothold.

“Now someone tells me that knows what pain is only from his own case!—Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a ‘beetle’. No one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at beetle.—Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing.—But suppose the word ‘beetle’ had a use in these people’s language?—If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a : for the box might even be empty.—No, one can ‘divide through’ by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

“That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and designation’ the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant (PI 293).”

Again, keep in mind that the purpose of these paragraphs is to say something about the meaning of a word in relation to the “object and designation” model. And, what stands out about what Wittgenstein is saying, is that the object could literally be anything, any internal thing we could imagine. This thought experiment demonstrates that the language-game used in such a context would not be dependent, especially in terms of meaning, on the thing in the box. Thus, it would be irrelevant, again, irrelevant in terms of the “object and designation” model of meaning.

Let us continue with Wittgenstein’s thinking: “If you say he sees a private picture before him, which he is describing, you have still made an assumption about what he has before him. And that means that you can describe it or do describe it more closely. If you admit that you haven’t any notion what kind of thing it might be that he has before him—then what leads you into saying, in spite of that, that he has something before him? Isn’t it as if I were to say of someone: ‘He something. But I don’t know whether it is money, or debts, or an empty till (PI 294).’”

Even if you say that the inner thing is a kind of picture, you are still making an assumption with no content. There is no way to describe it, you cannot see inside the other person’s box, so it is an empty assumption. And, of course, if you admit, Wittgenstein says, that you have no notion of the thing in the box, then how is it that you want to say there is something there? Maybe you could respond, “Because I have these kinds of inner things.” Yes, there are these internal experiences going on, but none of us can observe these internal happenings, it is like the beetle in the box example. Does it then follow from this that we cannot talk about our internal experiences of pain, hope, joy, sadness, etc? Obviously we can talk about these things, we do it all the time. This then brings us back to the notion of how meaning does get a foothold.

Each of us lives in a world of subjective experience, based on social meanings and logic, and thoughts may come somewhere in between. Plato spoke of the Forms outside of us... — Jack Cummins

I don't quite agree that each of us lives in a world of subjective experience. I think we have both subjective and objective experiences. However, both worlds are real, and both are important to who we are as individuals.

I'm sympathetic to Plato's ideas, because my own take is that the unifying principle of the universe is consciousness itself. My reasons for believing this have to do with my studies of NDEs and DMT, and what people are describing during these experiences. If it's true that consciousness is the unifying principle of the universe (by universe I mean all that exists), then there may be some deeper connection between each of us. Moreover, if there is an intelligence in back of the universe, not some religious God, but something much more profound, then Plato might have a point. However, some of this is speculation, but I think more and more, the scientific community is considering consciousness as a possible candidate for a unifying principle. I strongly lean is this direction. I think the truth lies somewhere between the dogma of religion, and the dogma of the materialist.

It's difficult to say what role the subconscious has on us, no doubt some role.

The idea of thoughts as 'shadows of our feelings' of Nietzsche is interesting here. I also wonder where dreams fit into this because they may be shadows of thoughts and feelings. — Jack Cummins

In one sense we are inclined to say that if I express my thoughts or feelings, then those are my thoughts or feelings. They're not shadows of my thoughts or feelings. We just don't talk like this, at least generally. Imagine someone saying, "Here is a book that expresses my thoughts, but they're not the real thing. They're only shadows of my thoughts or feelings." So, the wording is a bit strange, to say the least.

On the other hand, if I use a concept to refer to objects in space, that concept is not the actual thing, it's simply used to refer to the thing in space, depending on the context. So, we think of the concept as a kind of reflection of the thing. In this sense, one might say that the concept is a kind of shadow of the thing, it's not the real thing. However, if you're not careful in your wording, you're going to run into problems.

Lastly, to refer to dreams as "shadows of thoughts" also seems a bit strange. Last night I experienced shadows of thoughts. What would that even mean? This seems like even more of a confusion. However, I think we can sympathize with the questioning of what dreams are, many of us do have questions. Again, we have to go back to how we use the concept generally.

The way I think about this, is the following: Thoughts, and for that matter consciousness, and here we're talking about the concepts, are reflected in two ways. First, our bodily actions (digging a ditch, or building a home), and second, linguistic actions (talking and writing). So, consciousness as a concept, is reflected in things we can observe. However, this doesn't deny that there are internal reflective experiences, but as soon as we try to make the meaning of the concept the internal thing, then we run into problems. Pointing to the internal is not the same as pointing to a cup (which we all can observe), obviously, but that is what people do. So, they ask, "What are thoughts?" - and they try to focus on some thing (I'm talking generally, not necessarily referring to the OP) that corresponds to the concept thought, and it is here that they go astray. What can help, is to try to focus on that which gives the concept its footing, viz., how we use it with one another. And, what we see are the expressions (both physical and linguistic), that give substance to these concepts, that is, the social setting.

I'm not saying that the internal experiences are not real, or that there is no connection between what's happening in our minds, and the concepts we use. I'm saying that we lack the objective component to be able talk sensibly, in some cases, about consciousness or the self. In other words, we can't get beyond ourselves, we lack the proper view.

I think each side of the argument tends to go to far in one direction or the other, and they stick with their particular conceptual view. The problem is probably linked with linguistic boundaries, i.e., what can be sensible said about the subject without talking nonsense. So, I see the problem, at least much of the problem, as a conceptual one. We have a tendency to limit our conceptual view based on a theory, and if this theory comes up against another theory, with a different conceptual view, then the clash. It's like chess conflicting with checkers. My piece doesn't move like your piece, etc.

Just some thoughts.

I don't see that any progress can be made, so I don't see the point. More importantly, I don't see that your interpretation has any traction.

What kind of bullshit purpose is "congenital" supposed to serve here? Are you racist? — Metaphysician Undercover

How do you go from having a "congenital logical problem," to racism? All he means is you have a persistent or chronic problem. That's kind of a low blow, don't you think? People just love to throw this word around to make people look bad. The only people who look bad are the people using it without a good reason.

:gasp:

What you describe here is a sort of paradox, which might even be called a contradiction. If a word's "home" is its position within a particular language game, but the same word might be used in different games, then it has distinct homes. So we have the problem of the same word having numerous homes. To resolve this problem we ought not think of these numerous and distinct uses, of what appears to be the same word, as actually being instances of "the same word". — Metaphysician Undercover

You should think of a word like a tool, as Wittgenstein said. Each use of a tool can be compared to each use of a word (each use being differentiated by a context or language-game). Now, would you say that because a tool is being used differently in a different context that it's a different tool? Obviously you wouldn't because that would be silly. It's the same tool or word used in a different way, with a different function or sense depending on the language-game. The idea that it's a paradox or possibly a contradiction is just not the case.

I've been writing in other places, including my Facebook page, and I thought that some of what I wrote would be appropriate here.
_____________________
"There are numerous interpretations of precisely what Wittgenstein's Private Language argument is, where it begins and ends in Philosophical Investigations, what its target is, and whether it is successful...so it was nice to discover Stewart Candlish's one sentence summary of it in Edward Craig (ed.) The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy:"

' ...a language in principle [is] unintelligible to anyone but its user would necessarily be unintelligible to the user also, because no meanings could be established for its signs'

The above was take from the following link:

https://virtualphilosopher.com/2006/10/the_private_lan.html
_____________________

How does Wittgenstein demonstrate that a private language is unintelligible? In order to be clear about what Wittgenstein is doing, you must be clear about what is meant by a private language. It is a language that is only understood by the person inventing it. This means, obviously, that the meanings of the words or signs are also generated by the person creating the language, and herein lies the rub.

Wittgenstein wants us to imagine, in PI 258, trying to give meaning to a sign “S” (Think of a sign as any written designation used to refer to something, be it a sensation, as in this example, or some other object.) by associating “S” with a private sensation, and this we do by keeping a diary. So, every time I have a sensation, I mark it in my diary. The only kind of definition I can give is a kind of ostensive definition, that is, it is a kind of pointing to the sensation, but “[n]ot in the ordinary sense.” What I am doing is focusing my attention on the sensation, “…and so, as it were, point to it inwardly.” Thus, the meaning is supposedly established by my focus on the sensation, where the “impression” is made between the sign and the object of the sign, namely, the sign’s designation. However, Wittgenstein points out that the impression can only serve as a future reminder, namely, that I have made the correct association between the sign and the object. “But in the present case [forget about remembering in the future] I have no criterion of correctness (PI 258).” Therefore, it is not about our memory, as some might interpret this passage, but about how we could establish any correct use of sign “S.” And, if there is no correct use of the sign, then how could any remembrance of its use have anything to do with future uses in terms of meaning?

Ya, I lost it about 10 pages ago. :grin:

Cheers

Yes, exactly.

His point was that you cannot doubt your existence. It's not the kind of thing that can be doubted. I took that to be your point. — jamalrob

Well, my opinion is that his whole approach is incorrect. Of course I'm not a fan of Descartes.

It is my point, but Descartes analysis is not the same as Wittgenstein's analysis in OC, which is what I was trying to represent. :grin:

What? Descartes was confused about the whole notion of doubting.

For those of you who haven't already, study On Certainty (Wittgenstein's final notes), it helps to clear up some of these misunderstandings. Then again, you might read it, and think, what in the world is he talking about? :wink:

"Cogito ergo sum." I think therefore I am. If I did not exist, I could not think, therefore thinking alone proves undoubtedly to myself that I exist. — god must be atheist

The idea that one would need a proof to convince oneself that you exist, is ridiculous, better yet, it's just nonsense. How would a doubt about your own existence arise? And, if you could doubt your existence, which again, is nonsense, who would be doing the doubting, if not you? Presumably a proof is supposed to give you knowledge of your existence? I mean, if you could doubt your existence, then surely you could doubt the very words you're using to form the proof. There are certain beliefs that are so fundamental, so bedrock, so basic, that they need no justification, i.e., they fall outside the domain of epistemology. These beliefs form the very backdrop needed to have these kinds of conversations. If you can't be certain of your own existence, what could you be certain about? Nothing! Even being certain would lose all meaning.

Saying some of the same things again, from a slightly different angle.

If Wittgenstein is correct about meaning, viz., that it’s a rule-based use that happens in social settings, then it’s an error to think that one’s use of know is based on some internal mechanism of the mind. In other words, the association of the word know with some internal or subjective mechanism gives us the false idea that we have privileged internal access to knowledge. This idea removes the concept know from its social foundation where its meaning, again, is derived.

Wittgenstein asks the following question in PI 243, “…could we imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences—his feelings, moods, and the rest—for his private use?” He’s not asking if we can use the language that we’re familiar with, to write down our private feeling, moods, etc., obviously we are able to do this. He’s asking if we can use words “…to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations.” So, the person in this example is using a completely private language, to refer to his/her private sensations. Remember, no one else understands the language of this person, it’s completely devoid of any social context.

Next, Wittgenstein asks, “In what sense are my sensations private?—Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it.—In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense (PI 246).” It’s wrong to think that people “surmise” you’re in pain, as if they have to guess it, i.e., they see your screams of agony, or they see your injury - it’s not a matter of surmising. Of course, someone could be faking their pain, or lying, but generally it’s true that for the most part we know when someone is in pain. Wittgenstein’s interlocuter asks, “Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself (PI 246)!” It’s here that we get to the crux of the matter, for what could such a statement mean? Do I discover or learn that I’m in pain? Having knowledge, or the process of knowing, is a process of discovery. Again, do I discover that I’m in pain, or learn that I’m in pain? This seems to be, and is, nonsense. Wittgenstein asks, “It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain (PI 246)?” The adding of the word know is meaningless in this situation. It’s as if you’re discovering your own awareness, “Oh, I’m in pain, gee, I didn’t know that until just this moment.”

Could you be in pain and not know it, then somehow discover it? The closer we look at these kinds of statements, the more nonsensical they become. We need to ask, “What would it mean to not know I’m in pain?” One of the ways to understand the use of the word know, is to consider its negation, again, “I don’t know I’m in pain.” Knowing and not knowing have to be seen in juxtaposition. This seems to be why “I know I’m in pain,” amounts to no more than, “I’m in pain.” Why? Because there is no not knowing I’m in pain. I’m either aware of my pain, or I’m not aware. It’s part of being conscious.

No harm done.

That's true, but not applicable here. If I tell you I've solved the hard problem, you wouldn't just take my word for it. — RogueAI

Ya, you're right, it isn't applicable to the hard problem. I was just addressing something Janus said as a side issue.

I was pointing out that in certain circumstances, just telling someone what's in your back yard doesn't cut it as a good explanation. As the stakes go up, the need for verification increases. — RogueAI

Of course there are exceptions where we need to verify someone's account of things, but my point is, that there are many instance of knowing that don't involve the perspective of science.

What if your life somehow depended on guessing correctly that there is a tree in my yard? Would you just take my word for it if I said there wasn't, and that answer would get you killed? Wouldn't you want to verify my answer? — RogueAI

But my life doesn't depend on guessing correctly, if it did then things would be much different in terms of what we know.

they cannot be counted as explanations, because a good explanation should be testable. — Janus

If I explain what's in my backyard, isn't that most likely a good explanation of what's in my yard, or do you need to test it. There are plenty of good explanation we use everyday that don't need testing. This gets back to the notion that somehow if science can't do experiments to confirm one's claim, then it can't be knowable, or it's somehow not real knowledge.

Gertie says, "Experiential states exist as private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject. — Sam26

Getting back to the reason this thread was started, which had to do with the idea or belief that knowing can be something coming from within, i.e., it can be generated from the mind, a kind of self generation of what it means to know. I think this confusion may arise from the use of the word know as a kind of subjective certainty. In other words, one may say, "I know X is true," as a way of emphasizing one's subjective certainty. Hence, one confuses one use of the word know with another. In the case of the quote above, Gertie equates know with an experience, but not a sensory experience, but a kind of pointing to something unknown, the beetle-in-the-box kind of thing. Often religious people do this when they say that the Holy Spirit revealed something to me.

The reason the PLA was invoked was to dispel the notion that meaning can arise in this way. It seems then, that using know as an a kind of emphasis, can be shown in the way one expresses the word know, or gestures as one uses the word know. This is legitimate use, but it shouldn't be confused with objective knowledge or objective certainty.

It's as if Gertie has some private interpretation of know, an epistemological use without any objective confirmation.

Looking again at the matter of rule-following, and its importance in determining how a word is used, and how use is related to meaning. This must be seen the idea that meaning somehow arises in the mind, as an idea, or some other mind-dependent phenomena. The tendency is to give too much credit to one’s own mind as the determining factor in meaning. Although the mind is crucial, meaning is not a function of one’s own mind, rather, it is a function of many minds working in conjunction with one another. Many minds being the correlate to a group of language users, and how the practices of language users determines meaning. Its these practices that show the rules of the language-game. Just as the movement of the pieces in chess, show or demonstrate the implementation of the rules of the game.

What needs to be emphasized over and over, is the idea that meaning is an outward manifestation of language as a “form of life.” Forms of life have to do with “customs (uses, institutions),” namely, those things Wittgenstein cited in PI 23 (giving orders, reporting an event, play-acting, telling a joke, speculating, testing a hypothesis, etc.). The focus should be on what is happening in language from us as individuals. This change of focus, helps us to see the nature of meaning, i.e., it changes the focus from what is happening in my mind, to what is happening as the group functions in social settings (going from the internal to the external).

What is problematic is that since language is an activity of the mind, in the sense that it is me who is speaking, one wants to overemphasize the importance of the “me” or “I” in terms of meaning. However, it is not the “me” or “I,” it is the interaction of each of us with others, viz., the other language users. It is this interaction, that gives us a regularity, or a norm of use.

Another confusion that seems to raise its ugly head, is, my intention, what was, or is my intent as I use the words, i.e., some think that intent drives meaning, or has a significant role in meaning. However, this is also a misunderstanding. Our intentions have nothing to do with meaning. We learn the meanings in social settings, and use what we’ve learned to convey our intentions.

But hobbits are part of a shared game, the rules of which, although set by Tolkien, are subject to modification; Hobbits are a communal exercise. — Banno

Well, people so all sorts of strange things, maybe hobbits are running around in people's minds. :wink:

existence is not treated as a predicate in logic. That is, there is no simple way to parse. "Xtrix exists". — Olivier5

I think it's correct to say that existence is not a predicate or a property to be ascribed to individuals such as God, unicorns, Abraham Lincoln, or any other individual (fictional or not). When we say that X exists, we're saying something about the concept, i.e., either the concept has an instance in reality or it doesn't. This would seem to be the case in order to make sense of the statement, "Hobbits do not exist." In other words, for a claim to have meaning it must be about something, but since Hobbits don't exist, what could the statement be about? Simply put, it's about the concept, Hobbits. Thus, existence is not something individuals possess, but is rather, a way of expressing something about concepts.