There is no way to know if our inner experiences are the same except through our common reactions to these experiences. It's our cries coupled with language that gives life to these experiences (e.g. pain experiences) in a public way. The evidence for the experience is the commonality of reaction, whether it's non-verbal or verbal. The same is true of consciousness itself, viz., how we know someone or some other living organism is conscious is by the way they act (acts referring to language or other kinds of nonverbal acts). So, these concepts don't describe pain or consciousness, they simply show that I'm having an inner experience of some kind, in which I react the same as you, or similar to how you react. We can't peer into the mind to observe these inner experiences, and looking at brain activity does little to help in the way of describing the experience.

So, essentially you're saying it's like a brain that's biologically alive, but shows no evidence of consciousness, because all that makes it conscious (metacognitive stuff, or the stuff of consciousness) is not there. For example, it would be like turning on a radio, but there are no electromagnetic radio waves for the radio to pick up. Is this what you're implying?

Death, defined as the end of consciousness can't be distinguished from consciousness that isn't conscious of anything. As far as I'm concerned, a person who exists but is not doing anything can't be told apart from a person who doesn't exist. — TheMadFool

What's "...consciousness that isn't conscious of anything[?]" If your conscious, then being aware (in some way) is a necessary feature of consciousness. Maybe you're thinking of someone who is in a coma (or something similar), so they're unconscious, or they're not aware of anything. Sometimes people who we think aren't aware, are indeed aware, as has happened in some cases. Even if a person is in a coma and not "doing anything" that's much different from a person who doesn't exist, whatever "doesn't exist" means in this context (I assume you mean dead.).

Yes, I do agree that generally "...the implausibility of a claim tends to undermine the credibility" of that claim.
— Sam26
The point I was considering is that the implausibility of a claim tends to undermine the credibility of the witness who makes that claim. If the expert can't provide enough support to make the claim seem plausible, but persists in asserting the claim, this tends to count against the expert's credibility. The witness must be able to provide some reasonable account of the justification or basis for the claim, and that account must stand up to scrutiny. If it stands up to scrutiny, it's plausible. If it doesn't stand up to scrutiny, then on what grounds would the expert affirm it? — Cabbage Farmer

I agree, that an implausible claim undermines the witness making the claim. I will go a step further, and say, that a claim given by a group of people (say, as part of their worldview) is also undermined when it's implausible. Whether some claim is implausible also depends on who is making the claim, i.e., are they an expert in the field, are they in a position to know, are they giving a good argument, and what are they relying on to justify their claim? So, there are many factors (including psychological factors) that drive why people consider some claims implausible or not.

I agree generally with the last part of your statements above, but I would add that justification isn't always about giving good reasons (logic). There are other ways of justifying a belief. For example, sensory experience, testimony, and linguistic training. When I think of reasoning (specifically, correct reasoning), I think of inductive and deductive arguments. But yes, if someone's claim fails to give a good justification, then it's certainly suspect. It must also be pointed out that whether some claim is plausible or not, doesn't equate to the claim necessarily being true or false, it just means they don't have a good justification. And, it's also true that any claim must stand up to scrutiny, so I agree.

However, I don't think that because something seems implausible, that it follows that it is.
— Sam26
Do you mean something like this:

The fact that a claim seems plausible to me or to anyone does not entail the claim is true. Likewise, the fact that a claim seems implausible to me or to anyone does not entail the claim is false.

Plausibility is always plausibility relative to some epistemic context. Our evaluation of the plausibility of a claim is in principle open to revision. — Cabbage Farmer

Yes.

Many discoveries have been overturned in science because people considered what most find implausible. So, there has to be the right kind of balance, we tend to get to invested in certain worldviews, which can impede new discoveries.
— Sam26
What's the right sort of balance?

There's always the problem of allocation of resources. There's always the problem of prioritization. It would be as disastrous for our global society as a whole, as it would be for any single person, to continually commit a significant share of resources to every conceivable investigation.

When I lose my eyeglasses or my house keys, I don't book a flight to every city on Earth to track them down. I look in a few places nearby, beginning with the most likely. Sometimes they don't turn up and I broaden the search. Occasionally I've found my keys still in the lock on the door. Once I found my eyeglasses in the refrigerator. — Cabbage Farmer

In terms of balance, we should allow people, within reason, to freely pursue their intuitions (there are limits to this of course, like resources, etc), this helps to make advances in areas we wouldn't normally pursue. I generally agree with your statements, so for the most part we agree.

Nothing personal, I just don't want to keep repeating myself.

I'm not going to argue about this issue. It's been argued about a millions times in this forum.

I agree, language can be friend or foe depending on your understanding of how language works. I don't think that language is used to give us mental pictures to allow us to understand reality. I'm not saying we don't get mental pictures, but this isn't something we should rely on to understand reality. Who's mental picture is correct? In many ways it's correct to say that propositions picture reality, or mirror reality, but this isn't the same as a mental picture. You're close to falling into the hole of words equating to mental objects.

Meaning is not use. You have to be a bit more precise.
— Sam26

The notion itself lacks exactitude. You can't fix a blurry image by getting corrective glasses.

And, why would you wonder if we could do philosophy without language. Of course we couldn't. It would be like asking if trains could pull themselves without the locomotive.
— Sam26

IF you're right, all hope is lost. — TheMadFool

I said you have to be a bit more precise, not exact. In language, sometimes a blurry image is just what we need. However, in this case, if you're correct that meaning equates to use, then any use of a word in any context would necessitate its meaning, and this isn't true. What about incorrect uses? People use words incorrectly all the time, is their incorrect use driving the meaning of the word? No.

Language is the main tool of philosophy, it's where philosophy lives and breathes. Why would you suppose that all hope is lost if this is the case?

Meaning is not use. You have to be a bit more precise.

And, why would you wonder if we could do philosophy without language. Of course we couldn't. It would be like asking if trains could pull themselves without the locomotive.

You agree that Wittgenstein dismisses the inner sensation completely, or you agree only that most people tend to think this? — Luke

I don't think that Wittgenstein dismisses the inner sensation, but some people do think this is the case.

Do we not have an epistemic responsibility in life? If our actions have ripple effects, and our actions are largely an outgrowth of our beliefs, then isn't it irresponsible to believe in things that lead to harmful actions? Shouldn't we be more careful about what we believe in? — Xtrix

Once you come to understand that much or most of what people believe is a matter of psychology, which is to say, that beliefs, in general, are more influenced by things other than epistemology. Even people who are well trained in epistemology are quite susceptible to the power of psychological influences on their beliefs (their politics, their religious views, their friends, their family, the influence of their peers, etc.).

So, my point is that the subject of beliefs is much more complicated than you realize, including your own beliefs. Many philosophers can't even agree on what's good epistemology. If they can't agree, then how's the ordinary person trying to live their lives going to have any epistemic responsibility that's coherent. Most people have just enough understanding to live their lives and that's about it.

https://philosophynow.org/issues/58/The_Private_Language_Argument — Luke

Thanks for the article. It raised some very interesting points.

I think most people tend to dismiss the ("inner") sensation completely (it "drops out of consideration") and presume Wittgenstein to be identifying a sensation only with its expression. — Luke

Yes, I agree with this.

Geez, these arguments over tokens and types are torturous. :lol:

The funny thing is that there is never a contradiction if you only look at what arrives in the consciousness. Every consciousness carries out its own private collapse of the wave function (->Wigner's friend).

If every observer has his own wave function according to his state of knowledge, then the contradictions are cancelled. — SolarWind

Contradictions are about statements or propositions, reality itself is not contradictory. Contradictions only occur in language, i.e., when using concepts.

Man, if you don't believe I'll just die. Just do a little more reading, and you too, will agree. lol

I am right, this is a common misunderstanding.

It's a misinterpretation of Schrodinger's cat to think the cat is both dead and alive. You can never observe the cat in both states. And, once you do observe it, it's then in one state or the other, so no contradiction.

The measuring can happen in a variety of ways. It seems to be a kind of disturbance, conscious or otherwise. It's a disturbance of the wavefunction. The main point, though, is that there aren't contradictions happening, as far as I can see.

Does " belief' make any sense at all beyond the scope of personal meanings, and how can the idea of belief be seen in the wider scope of philosophy, especially in relation to objective and subjective aspects of thinking? — Jack Cummins

The idea that a belief is dependent on personal or subjective meaning is just nonsense. Meanings occur within a culture of rule-based linguistic use. However, don't confuse this to mean that there are no subjective experiences or mind-based states, they are two different things. If we are talking about beliefs as expressed in language, then we are referring to those beliefs that can be said to be true or false based on what we, as language users, mean by those words, viz., true and false. This doesn't mean that there can't be subjective truths. For example, "I like orange juice" is either true or false based on my preferences, but what we mean by true and false is not determined by your preferences or your subjective experiences. It's a matter of understanding the difference between conscious experiences and language about conscious experiences, or any language that describes reality. So, whenever we speak about anything, subjective or objective, the language we use as a community has an objective component to it, viz., the meanings of the concepts/words.

My own view is that there can be beliefs (states-of-mind) that are quite apart from language, and these are reflected in our actions (i.e., we know that such beliefs exist based on the actions of individuals). These kinds of beliefs are not true or false (true and false are reserved for propositions, states-of-mind are not intrinsically propositional, no more than a pain is intrinsically propositional). To speak of them as true or false is to bring them into a linguistic setting. Part of the confusion is that we don't always see the difference between these two kinds of beliefs, i.e., the different settings or environments in which they occur.

The electron is not in any state until it's measured, so there is no contradiction. One could think of it as the potentiality of states, or, there is the probability that it will be in this state or that state when measured. So, it's not that it's both up and down at the same time.

This reply is only meant to address some of your concerns. It doesn't address your comments or questions about Godel.

Yet I suspect that many philosophers are skeptical about Dummett's argument: it smacks too much of positivism and Wittgensteinianism

Something is odd here. — Banno

Yes, I noticed that too. Devitt seems to mischaracterize Wittgenstein, at least it seems that way from this statement. Positivism doesn't equate to Wittgensteinianism, if that's his point. Although I'm not completely sure of his point.

I'm now reading the paper by Devitt.

Dummett's arguments are confusing, to say the least. If you can't be clear, one wonders if you have a good argument.

So to the first section, in which Devitt characterises realism as the view that physical entities exist independently of the mental. Devitt notes with considerable glee that there is nothing in this definition about truth. He goes on to point out that truth is independent of the evidence at hand. "Truth is one thing, our means of discovering it, another". Hence, according to Devitt, "no doctrine of truth is constitutive of realism". — Banno

I read the SEP article, and if I was to align myself with anyone it would be Devitt. Truth it seems is a property of language (proposition claims). However, reality (that which exists independent of the mind) is not about what we claim (what we claim may or may not align with reality), but about facts or states-of-affairs (things that are generally considered to be independent of minds) quite apart from what goes on in language. This has been my understanding of this argument, and I believe it's why Devitt says, "no doctrine of truth is constitutive of realism."

Hell, some of Wittgenstein's comments confuse the hell out of me. They almost seem to break down at a certain point. I'm still learning Banno, maybe if I live another 71 years I might grasp some of his thinking.

Ya, I agree, how we refer to these experiences can be a bit muddled. However, I won't resort to saying your English is poor. :wink:

I mean, do you agree that the implausibility of a claim may tend to undermine the credibility of the witness who makes the claim? Do you agree that "extraordinary cases" like those you indicated typically involve claims that are considered prima facie "implausible", regardless of the general credibility and expertise of the witness who makes the claim; and that for this reason, something in addition to that testimony is typically required to support the claim in question? — Cabbage Farmer

Sorry it took so long to respond. I think we generally agree, with some clarifications, or maybe some disagreement. Yes, I do agree that generally "...the implausibility of a claim tends to undermine the credibility" of that claim. However, I don't think that because something seems implausible, that it follows that it is. Many discoveries have been overturned in science because people considered what most find implausible. So, there has to be the right kind of balance, we tend to get to invested in certain worldviews, which can impede new discoveries.

I do agree that more is needed than just a claim, i.e., we need some objective way to verify claims that seem implausible. I'm not sure you read my argument which was given further down on the first page, but I go into detail about what is needed to support my inductive argument, i.e., what drives good testimonial evidence.

What is philosophy? — Bret Bernhoft

Philosophy uses philosophical methods of inquiry (logic, language, epistemology, etc) to analyze beliefs or belief systems. You can't escape philosophy, we all do it, its just a matter of whether we do it well or not. If you have beliefs about life, morality, politics, science, mathematics, family, business, then you're doing philosophy. So, all of us are philosophers to one degree or another.

"Hmm. Internal... you mean private? Something is amiss."

It can't be completely private. What I mean by private is that it's me having the belief, just as I can have a private sensation. However, if we are to refer to beliefs or sensations as part of language, there must be something to refer to (something the community can get a hold of, which is not the internal private thing), and these can be linguistic, or just simple non-verbal acts (opening a door, building a hut, etc). We show (linguistic or otherwise) what we believe, or that we're in pain, i.e., there are outward signs. We don't believe a stone is conscious, because there is no sign of consciousness - there just isn't anything to latch onto. You seem to want to deny that there is or are private experiences (but I'm not sure). I think we both agree that we can't talk to each other in any meaningful way if meaning is dependent upon an internal thing or object - it has to have an external component for meaning to grab hold. That's my take. I think we're close, but there may be some differences. I think we can refer to the private, as long as we don't think meaning is solely derived from the private.

I think poetry escapes confusion because it is not trying to arrive at clarity, or at least any definite propositional kind of clarity, lacking any ambiguity. Perhaps by "confusion" you mean more uncertainty, and if this is the case I would agree with you because I see (at least much of the best) poetry as a celebration of uncertainty. Would you include the other arts in this judgement as well? — Janus

Ya, I think you could include dancing, acting, meditation, etc, - which are outward expressions of the inner self. Of course, even language is an outward expression of the inner self (this would have to be further clarified), but it's governed by rules, without which it would fall apart. Even poetry is still governed by grammatical rules, but it lends itself to more of the subjective. There is a kind of balancing act between the subjective world and the objective world around us.

I'm not sure what you mean when you say language is a muddled approach to reality. And again I'd ask whether you would include the language of music and the language of the visual arts in this. Perhaps you mean that what we say about reality is never reality itself? But then the very idea of reality would seem to be impossible without language. — Janus

When I say muddled, I mean reality, and talk about reality, it's a bit ambiguous. Even the word reality is a bit ambiguous. Hence, all the discussions about, "What IS reality?" Wittgenstein is certainly ambiguous in certain passages, i.e., it's difficult to get clear on what he's trying to communicate. I'm not saying it's all ambiguous, and I do think there is a correct and incorrect way of interpreting Wittgenstein.

Animals participate in reality - they use it, in Wittgenstein's terms. Calling this a belief is surely a retrojection. — Banno

All of us participate in reality. However, what that participation amounts to is where the disagreement occurs. My use of belief is no more a retrojection than your use of participate. All talk of pre-linguistic persons or animals is a retrojection, but this doesn't mean we can't describe what's happening in linguistic terms. All acts, whether pre-linguistic or not can be talked about. Why? Because of the acts themselves, be it non-linguistic or linguistic. Therefore, a belief for me is not just expressed in language, but is expressed in the way we act within the world. My beliefs are internal to me, just as my sensations are internal to me, so just as an expression of pain, which is something internal (the sensation) is expressed via ouch or a cry (external), so too, are our or my beliefs (internal) expressed via acts in the world (external), whether linguistic or not. So, just as we can have sensations apart from language, so too, can we have beliefs apart from language.

It can "gain a grounding" by building on that use - the same process as we see in showing rather than stating. After all, there is a way of understanding a rule that is not an interpretation - not a belief - but which is found in enacting the rule: §201 — Banno

Reality has to be a certain way, i.e., objects, persons, thoughts, etc., in order for there to be a language at all. The foundation, viz., reality (where we act), gives us the grounding. These are the arational beliefs that arise quite apart from language. It's not just that these beliefs are pre-linguistic, we (the linguistic we) also show that we have such beliefs, i.e., we open the door, we sit down, we do a myriad of things that show that we believe certain things. Things which are not expressed in language, but nonetheless, demonstrate what we believe.

I'm not saying there isn't a kind of grounding that takes place in language, via what Wittgenstein is referring to in PI 201, but I'm not talking about a linguistic grounding, I'm talking about what necessarily comes before what Wittgenstein is talking about. Wittgenstein alludes to what I'm talking about in several places. Again (as I've mentioned in other posts), though, I'm not pretending this is a Wittgensteinian idea.

I think this is right: it is only the language of poetry that can escape the mire; because it doesn't aim to be propositional but rather allusive and evocative. — Janus

For me, probably not Banno, there is a kind of mystical experience in poetry, music, art, and even prayer, that transcends language to a point, not completely. So, the mystical can be seen in, for example, an act of prayer, and it's not about being true or false, it's about what the experience shows us. Wittgenstein admired some of the writings Kierkegaard (I don't put that much value in Kiekegaard), but I think it had to do with admiring the transcendent reach, right or wrong. The mire I'm referring to is confusion, but I don't think poetry escapes this - depending on what you mean by the mire. As long as we use language, in whatever venue, we are in the mire. Don't think I'm saying something against clarity, because I'm not, I'm just saying that language is a muddled approach to reality. I do think that Wittgenstein's thinking helps to bring us one step closer to clarity, if clarity is the objective.

I'm not sure I communicated my point well, but there you have it.

I'd also like to hear something about what you think our use of language does exactly. Psychologists test how infralinguistic children model the world, and how crows do for that matter. Why language? — Srap Tasmaner

I think this is important, so I'll put my two cents worth into the mix. I believe there is something important to say about reality prior to language; and how children and animals model reality. This modeling (I talk about it in terms of pre-linguistic beliefs or states) is essential, and prior to the formation of language. In fact, it's hard to imagine how language would gain any kind of grounding without such a model (using your terminology). Language, it seems to me, builds a linguistic structure that allows us to structure reality in social ways, i.e., we can talk with others about epistemology, psychology, science, etc, which allows us to go beyond our pre-linguistic modeling.

If a poorly constructed building fails to meet certain criteria, we call it bad. We decide for ourselves what those criteria are depending upon the utility we seek from the building. There are no objectively good or bad buildings. It's just a matter of preference. On the other hand, the building itself exists regardless of my preference or opinion. — Hanover

I don't think we're going to make headway here. There's a sense where you are correct, viz., we do use the concept bad in a subjective sense, but we also use it to refer to objective reality, as I pointed out. Moreover, the statement that, "There are no objectively good or bad buildings" is or is not true depending on how we are using the concept (bad being of poor quality). There are obviously buildings, and from a structurally sound point of view, it can be said that they are poorly built, it's not a matter of opinion. On the other hand, one can use the word bad (obviously, not morally bad) in a subjective way, which would take into account its use as an opinion.

My point in bringing in the building example is to show the use of the word bad in reference to something objective, gives it an objective connection, which removes it from being purely subjective.

As to morality, are you claiming that bad buildings are akin to bad acts, and saying that rape (for example) is bad if it meets our criteria for badness based upon whatever social objectives we might have,? Or, do you subscribe to the position that rape is bad regardless of what I think, much like the building exists regardless of my opinion? — Hanover

No, I'm not saying that bad buildings are akin to bad acts. As I said above, I'm saying that the use of the word bad is not always subjective, it depends on what our point of reference is.

I do, believe rape is bad or morally wrong because of the objective nature of the harm done. It's just as objective, in my view, as the existence of the building. And ya, rape is bad regardless of what anyone thinks.

No, there are two things (1) badness and (2) suffering. #2 is an emotional state. #1 is a judgment about that emotional state. If I say "you are suffering," that will be true if the event of your suffering is occurring. If I say "your suffering is bad," that will be true if your suffering is bad. What is "bad" here other than an opinion? Your suffering is occurring (or not) regardless of my opinion. Why doesn't this apply to "bad"?

I can't dictate whether your pain is real, but can I dictate whether your pain is morally bad? If I can't, how do I know? — Hanover

It's not my opinion that the suffering is bad, my use of the word bad or immoral is directly connected to the objective truth of the statement that, "Bill is suffering," if he is indeed suffering. Are you trying to tell me that bad has no objective meaning in relation to what Bill is experiencing? What about my use of the word bad in relation to "That building is poorly built (as an engineer looks at the placement of beams)," is this an opinion? My use of the word bad, in both examples, connect to something objectively true, and is not based on some internal opinion.

But where is the moral judgment? I get that the suffering is occurring in the world as an objectively identifiable event, but where is the badness of it except in your opinion? — Hanover

The "badness" IS the suffering. Not all suffering is bad, but when it comes to moral right and wrong, it's the objective harm done that gives it it's reality. This is true apart from any religious appeal.

I have no quarrel with the above post.

There is no way to resolve the many interpretations of Wittgenstein, because the interpretations are as varied as language itself. Even people who have studied Wittgenstein all their life can't agree on how to interpret some of Wittgenstein's passages, and especially their implications. It seems the more we explicate what this or that passage means, the further apart we get. This is not to say that there aren't important points to be made about meaning within social contexts for example, but it is to say that we still have much to learn when it comes to thought, language, and the world. It would be wrong to try and pigeon hole Wittgenstein into this or that interpretation. Only Wittgenstein could clear up some of these mischaracterizations of what he's saying.

Language and thinking, by its very nature is a bewitching thing. Hence, Wittgenstein's warning, "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language (PI 109)." For myself, I hope that I've learned a methodology from Wittgenstein that will help provide some clarity, but definitely not complete clarity. Complete clarity may be a phantasm. It seems that any thought or theory can be pushed to the breaking point using language. This breaking point can be seen in the changing nature of language and knowledge. Language in some sense is a kind of fog that is more or less dense given this or that understanding. This isn't to promote a kind of skepticism, although there are things to be skeptical about, but only to point out that language traps us into a kind of mire from which we cannot escape. There is a kind of mysticism to my point, and I think to Wittgenstein's thinking.

I gave you my response, now you're going to lecture me. If you don't like the way I respond move to a different thread.

Basic courtesy dictates that you respond to someone you has replied to your topic and in fact in length ... — Alkis Piskas

I don't always have the time to respond to every post. Life just has a way of getting in the way of my responses. Sometimes I can put more effort into these threads than other times. I would like to respond to every post, but sometimes I just don't have the energy. There are a lot of things that can get into the way of responses, like an illness for example. So, it's not always that someone is being discourteous. When I'm distracted I tend to make mistakes, so I try not to force myself. So, don't take it personally.

Sorry, I read that rather quickly, and didn't read it all. When I get a chance I'll read more closely. Life is getting in the way right now. I'm a bit busy with something else.

I haven't really considered this before, I'll have to give it more thought. Thanks for the reply.