Realism is not the view that X exists regardless of what we say about it. It's the view that something exists regardless of what we say about it. — khaled

If Descartes' thought experiment were true and the world we see is an illusion created by some evil demon then even though something exists regardless of what we say about it (the evil demon), it would be wrong to be a realist about the world we see.

Evan if all we see is the way things seem to be to us, there may still be the way things are.

Changing this to a linguistic argument, realism entails that there are still true statements; while an anti-realist would say not make that commitment.

So a realist says the ball has a mass of 1kg; the anti-realist might say that saying that it has a mass of 1kg is useful, or fits their perceptions, but will not commit to it being true. — Banno

If we commit to something like Wittgenstein's theory of language – that meaning is use – then predicating truth of a statement is just another practice like any other speech act, with "correct" use being determined by public activity. The anti-realist can commit to statements being true well enough.

Sure. But you’d be a realist about at least yourself or your thoughts.

Who is a realist about the world we see anyways? No one has been like that since electromagnetic waves or even sound waves were discovered. We can’t see either.

But you’d be a realist about at least yourself or your thoughts. — khaled

That appears to be a contradiction. A common understanding of realism is that things are independent of one's perceptions, thoughts, etc. How can my thoughts be independent of my thoughts?

Your existence is independent of your thoughts. You can think you exist. You can think you don’t exist. Either way you exist. That’s what I meant.

Same with the existence of your thoughts. Whether or not you think you think, you think :wink:.

If symmetry or balance, or the lack of, then measurement. — tim wood

I am not sure of your meaning, but we are programmed to see symmetry and patterns as beautiful. I think many think of math with dread, but math lovers are having an emotional experience when they discover the patterns or struggle to discover them. We all have that tendency but it is more awake in some. Unfortunately, the way we educate children can be very damaging to our natural curiosity and enjoyment of math.

I think my spiritual experiences are the same natural response to stimuli, and oddly most of us feel better when we do good things for others. This comes with being a social animal.

Our emotions are not material and I think there is more to life than matter.

Your existence is independent of your thoughts. You can think you exist. You can think you don’t exist. Either way you exist. That’s what I meant. — khaled

Not if you are a ghost.

I am not sure of your meaning, — Athena

Only that abstract terms and concepts often - always? - decompose into something real. Beauty to balance and symmetry, for example. But sometimes the lack of it. Jeanne Moreau and Bette Davis two examples of that (imo), or the other way, Jean Paul Belmondo. The French seem to have an eye beauty in the unpretty.

With the material I hold the mental, ideas and feelings, to be altogether real. But real as they are, and not as they are not.

Realism is not the view that X exists regardless of what we say about it. It's the view that something exists regardless of what we say about it. — khaled

This seems to be the tree @Isaac is barking up too. I would find that a strange sort of realism. "I believe in somethings" -- but absolutely nothing you propose ever goes on the list of things I believe in, that is, things I'm a "realist about".

Here, look at the word "about", the word I'm tacking onto "realism". "About" takes an object. I quoted two sentences of yours, both ending with "what we say about it".

In the first, the antecedent of "it" is X, and the sentence could be rewritten: "Realism is not the view that X exists regardless of what we say about X."

What about the second? "It's the view that something exists regardless of what we say about ___." What on earth do we fill in the blank with? Were we talking about the something? Surely not, because then we'd be endorsing the first sentence's version of realism. Then what? "X"? "Realism is the view that something exists regardless of what we say about X." That's just non sequitur.

The only option I can see is to chop off the "about" phrase, but then the "regardless" clause has nothing to do. All you can really say is "Realism is the view that something exists." Is that realism? Realism about what? Something? That's not a view about anything.

I don't think we get to make this switch of "X" for "something". I think that's a misunderstanding of what "X" -- as a name or a label -- is doing in the first place. @Isaac and I went around and around about this before: it's no use saying "tables are only part of my model" as a way of saying "tables aren't real"; that's a category mistake. The whole point of modelling is that within the model, tables quite specifically count as real. Real is theory-relative.

(I think I'm saying exactly what Quine said, you know, "To be is to be a value of a bound variable." If you quantify over it, it's a posit of your theory, whether you like it or not.)

((I made exactly the same "argument" -- having forgotten about my old argument with Isaac -- in the "What is a fact?" thread. (That whether a statement is factual depends on the framework within which the statement is made.) It's starting to look like something I say out of habit, which bothers me.))

With the material I hold the mental, ideas and feelings, to be altogether real. But real as they are, and not as they are not. — tim wood

:grin: I am not sure I follow your reasoning but it is intriguing. It is kind of like are unicorns real? Who does not know what a unicorn is? We would not mistake a unicorn for a whale. On some level the unicorn is real but I don't expect to see one except in pictures. If I enter a haunted house and have an eerie feeling that triggers my imagination, I may think I have experienced a ghost but I am still not sure ghosts exist.

On some level the unicorn is real — Athena

As Idea, yes, as unicorn, no. And so with seven, justice, God. I do not mean anything at all complicated here. It's been argued that forces are real but themselves neither material nor idea. I hold they're material, but would not care to argue it.

"It's the view that something exists regardless of what we say about ___." What on earth do we fill in the blank with? — Srap Tasmaner

The “raw perceptual data” Isaac was talking about. It’s the view the raw perceptual data exists regardless of what we say about it.

Point is just this: We don’t determine ____. There is something external to us that determines it. That’s realism.

The blank could be for example: “the taste of apples”. Or “the color of the sky”. Or “ethics”. And that would make you a realist about blank.

The whole point of modelling is that within the model, tables quite specifically count as real. Real is theory-relative. — Srap Tasmaner

And a realist about tables would say that tables are “really real”. No models. The existence of tables is a direct reflection of reality. Our model is a perfect map of reality in this case. A non realist about tables would say that tables are purely constructed by us, they’re nothing more than the model. There is no independent existence to tables.

I don’t care too much. If the model is useful, I’ll use it. I don’t care if it is a “true reflection of reality” or a social construct or whatever. What difference does that make?

What about the second? "It's the view that something exists regardless of what we say about ___." What on earth do we fill in the blank with? — Srap Tasmaner

"...the cause of our representation of that something". Processes and objects are two different things, we can conceive of objects as being representations caused by hidden factors. We don't need to assign object status to those causes any more than gravity is an object, or my preferring vanilla is. There's a cause of my modelling the table as a table, reaching for the word "table", feeling inclined to put my cup on it...etc, I'm not giving that cause the status of an object, like a billiard ball in classical physics, I haven't gone that far yet, I've only gone so far as to say there's a cause, external to me.

I think that's a misunderstanding of what "X" -- as a name or a label -- is doing in the first place. Isaac and I went around and around about this before: it's no use saying "tables are only part of my model" as a way of saying "tables aren't real"; that's a category mistake. The whole point of modelling is that within the model, tables quite specifically count as real. Real is theory-relative. — Srap Tasmaner

I have a lot of sympathy for the linguistic problem here (as I hope we established last time), but it cuts both ways. So often in these conversations (mostly with @Banno, it seems) the use of common terms such as 'real' and, in the previous thread, 'pain', are cloistered for use in philosophy of language where they are used to manage these communal practices like talking about pain, and discussing tables. All very well and good, but the model I described (a few posts up) is nonetheless as good a fit for how things are as we've yet found. So what words are left to me to use when I want to talk about it? If the representations are 'real' because that's the way "table" is used normally, then what am I to use when I want to study the way those representations can be manipulated by altering the way the brain responds to exterior stimuli. If "table" is real by definition, then what are the hidden external causes relative to it? They can't just be more stuff that's also real, that doesn't say anything about their unique relation as the cause of the representation outside of the Markov Blanket (afterall, we just determined that only things inside the Markov Blanket are 'real').

I don't object to a natural language approach, but cognitive scientists are language users too, we want to talk (and talk to ordinary folk too sometimes), we can't be struck mute by an insistence that only matters of folk psychology can have common words attached to them.

Last ditch argument that I'll probably regret, but... When I say "Tables aren't real they're only representations caused by an external reality", do you have trouble understanding what I'm saying? I mean I talk this way to colleagues, friends...strangers in the pub sometimes too. In all it seems to bring to mind pretty much the exact relation to our external stimuli that I intended the expression to bring to mind - "Oh, so we just make up that it's a table, but what really causes that idea is something we can't know..." or something like that. People don't seem to be confused by the use. So, in a Wittgensteinean sense, I'm left wondering who's doing the philosophical muddle-making here and who's doing the banishing of it. 'Real' does seem to have a perfectly ordinary use which can be quite easily seconded to describe exactly the kind of active inference relationship to our external world that I'm looking to use it for.

As Idea, yes, as unicorn, no. And so with seven, justice, God. I do not mean anything at all complicated here. It's been argued that forces are real but themselves neither material nor idea. I hold they're material, but would not care to argue it. — tim wood

Why seven, justice, God?

Seven is Heptad.

"The number seven occupies a critical place within the Dekad, where it acts as both a link and chasm. As a link between the first six and the last three terms, 1x2x3x5x6x7 equals 7x8x9x10 (equals 5040). As a chasm, with seven absent, 1x2x3x5x6 equals 8x9x10 (equals 720). Whether the value of seven is present or absent, its location serves as a pivot balancing ten. No other number or position within the Dekad does this."

"Whether the cosmos is represented as a musical scale in ancient times or as the modern sonic and electromagnetic spectrum, they both depict a universe based on vibration."

"Mythology, religion, science, mathematics, and art were once part of an integrated system of philosophy." Athena is associated with the number seven. My purpose is to express there is more than what appears. What started the vibration, what forms it into matter? I am not a materialist because without energy and forum there would be nothing. With math, we can see what is not visible to the eye.

Quotes are from "A Beginner's Guide to Constructing the Universe" by Michael S Schneider.

Here, and wherever some one/thing suffers. — 180 Proof

But where is the moral judgment? I get that the suffering is occurring in the world as an objectively identifiable event, but where is the badness of it except in your opinion?

Well, there's subjective, and then there's subjectivity. Perhaps we might look for something more than your intuitions. I had assumed you would adopt an anti-realist approach, given you think
"the false can be true"
— Hanover — Banno

The apparent contradiction is clarified by pointing out that the literal proposition may be false but the principle elucidated true. If I spin a tale to teach a moral lesson, it doesn't make the moral lesson untrue just because the tale is. I see this as a literary device especially prevalent in religious, spiritual, moral, and wisdom writings, but not as a comment on whether morals exist separate from us. My point in other threads was that if you read those writings literally, you will reach absurd results of otherwise foundational writings and will see nonsense where others find wisdom.

As to whether there is an objectively dechiperable moral truth, I say there is, which entails there be a referent beyond intra-subjective agreement as to the metaphysical existence of "good" when I say it is good to care for others. This embodiment of the good is the god element. There is no other way around it, which is why those who contend objective moral truths without reference to any divine being ultimately are unable to support their position.

science is discovers, ethics created? And we can work our way on from there. — Banno

The fact that we can even ask the question "what if our ethical creation is unethical?" sensically proves this wrong. The ethical exists as it is regardless of what we wish to think might be ethical.

But where is the moral judgment? I get that the suffering is occurring in the world as an objectively identifiable event, but where is the badness of it except in your opinion? — Hanover

The "badness" IS the suffering. Not all suffering is bad, but when it comes to moral right and wrong, it's the objective harm done that gives it it's reality. This is true apart from any religious appeal.

It's the view that something exists regardless of what we say about ___." What on earth do we fill in the blank with?
— Srap Tasmaner

The “raw perceptual data” Isaac was talking about. It’s the view the raw perceptual data exists regardless of what we say about it. — khaled

But apples are not the raw perceptual data they cause us to have. And I don't see the point in preferring a locution like "whatever causes the raw perceptual data my model of the world identifies as a so-called 'apple'" rather than "apple".

@Isaac adds "cause" but withholds "object":

"...the cause of our representation of that something". Processes and objects are two different things, we can conceive of objects as being representations caused by hidden factors. We don't need to assign object status to those causes any more than gravity is an object, or my preferring vanilla is. — Isaac

My inclination here too is to say that my brain's model of the world, and I'm guessing everyone's, pretty clearly treats apples as objects, paradigmatic objects, if apples aren't objects then nothing is.

Its not exactly a question of language -- "object" as a noun isn't used that much by normies. It's a matter of accepting that the models in our heads are how we understand the world and knowing that they're models doesn't change that. The theories we work through consciously, we get a bit more say in, including how we theorize the models in our heads. But there's no coherent way to talk as if we're not modeling -- we know we can't but act as if enough caveats and scare quotes are almost like not modeling.

'Real' does seem to have a perfectly ordinary use which can be quite easily seconded to describe exactly the kind of active inference relationship to our external world that I'm looking to use it for. — Isaac

And I actually agree with that. I think in some sense "tables aren't real" and "apples aren't objects" is exactly what you should say. But it doesn't mean that the ordinary way of talking is mistaken; it's a way of making it clear you're using these words in a theory-specific way. (Roughly, "tables are not posits in this theory".)

There's a lot more to talk about there.

The "badness" IS the suffering. — Sam26

No, there are two things (1) badness and (2) suffering. #2 is an emotional state. #1 is a judgment about that emotional state. If I say "you are suffering," that will be true if the event of your suffering is occurring. If I say "your suffering is bad," that will be true if your suffering is bad. What is "bad" here other than an opinion? Your suffering is occurring (or not) regardless of my opinion. Why doesn't this apply to "bad"?

I can't dictate whether your pain is real, but can I dictate whether your pain is morally bad? If I can't, how do I know?

's Markov blankets seem to be a more formal version of ' Dependency.

No, there are two things (1) badness and (2) suffering. #2 is an emotional state. #1 is a judgment about that emotional state. If I say "you are suffering," that will be true if the event of your suffering is occurring. If I say "your suffering is bad," that will be true if your suffering is bad. What is "bad" here other than an opinion? Your suffering is occurring (or not) regardless of my opinion. Why doesn't this apply to "bad"?

I can't dictate whether your pain is real, but can I dictate whether your pain is morally bad? If I can't, how do I know? — Hanover

It's not my opinion that the suffering is bad, my use of the word bad or immoral is directly connected to the objective truth of the statement that, "Bill is suffering," if he is indeed suffering. Are you trying to tell me that bad has no objective meaning in relation to what Bill is experiencing? What about my use of the word bad in relation to "That building is poorly built (as an engineer looks at the placement of beams)," is this an opinion? My use of the word bad, in both examples, connect to something objectively true, and is not based on some internal opinion.

Sure. But it can't enter the conversation, and it can't be found out. Maybe the way things seem to us IS the way they are, but that just means we got lucky. We don't know when this is the case. So what difference does it make? — khaled

And yet the stuff "out there" does enter into the conversation.

We (note the plural) talk in terms of mass and balls and so on. The direction of fit here is reversed, in that we intend these words to be about whatever it is that is "out there". And when we do this we find that we can construct coherent and useful accounts of what happens. It's not luck, it's a process of eradicating versions that are dysfunctional.

Yep.

There's a mission to Mercury by the ESA and JAXA. Part of the mission is to decide if there is water at the poles - something hinted at by previous observations.

Both the realist and the anti-realist will agree that we do not know that there is water at the poles of Mercury.

A realist will say that either there is water at the poles, or there isn't - that either the statement or its negation is true.

An anti-realist may say that the statement "There is water at Mercury's poles" is neither true nor not true, until the observation is made.

Which is the better approach?

A language community in part imposes its language on the world. We talk in terms of balls and stuff that is not balls. Like Anscombe's shopping list, we use the words to pick out things in the world, or we use it to to list the things we have. Both are equally legitimate, and each relies on the other.

If a poorly constructed building fails to meet certain criteria, we call it bad. We decide for ourselves what those criteria are depending upon the utility we seek from the building. There are no objectively good or bad buildings. It's just a matter of preference. On the other hand, the building itself exists regardless of my preference or opinion.

As to morality, are you claiming that bad buildings are akin to bad acts, and saying that rape (for example) is bad if it meets our criteria for badness based upon whatever social objectives we might have,? Or, do you subscribe to the position that rape is bad regardless of what I think, much like the building exists regardless of my opinion?

You seem to be confusing modality and temporality; not everything that is possible occurs in the future, but that is what is implied by your post. So I don't see what you propose hee as clarifying, so much as misleading.

A realist will say that either there is water at the poles, or there isn't - that either the statement or its negation is true.

An anti-realist may say that the statement "There is water at Mercury's poles" is neither true not not true, until the observation is made.

Which is the better approach? — Banno

The anti-realist could say that the situation is such that if we were to observe Mercury's poles we would either find water there or not. The idea would be that water is a relational thing; it only exists when whatever is out there interacts with us such as to produce a perception of water. So water is not "out there" absent our perceptions, but whatever is out there is in either a condition such that a perception of water would be produced or not.The question then becomes: must the anti-realist non-committedly say there is no truth or falsity about there being water out there, or must she commit to saying that it is false that there is water out there since water is only relationally real? This seems to be a conceptual problem for the anti-realist.

On the other hand. if the realist says there is either water out there or not, she is not thereby committed to claiming that water, as such, has anything more than a relational reality, so I would say the realist locution is the less problematic.

...whether a statement is factual depends on the framework within which the statement is made... — Srap Tasmaner

Seems to me that the framework is both imposed and observed.

And a realist about tables would say that tables are “really real”. No models. The existence of tables is a direct reflection of reality. — khaled

...and reality is such that it can be divided up into tables and not-tables.

As Davidson suggested, the world is always, already interpreted. I would add that the interpretation is put in place by our use of language.

...which is to say that a realist requires only a binary logic, while an anti-realist must reject the law of excluded middle.