Maybe this is part of our problem. I do not think I have once in this thread attempted to argue against idealism. I am more asking, "why idealism?" "what does it explain?" (I get that these questions could be seen as an argument against idealism, but that takes an extra step) Similarly, before I engage in an argument against god, I will want someone to show me something that god does. Until then, I will remain agnostic. — ZhouBoTong

I just listed the argument for the sake of completeness. I understand your position. As to your question: Idealism tells us what we can know about physics and how we can know it. In this sense, it is relevant for our formulation of the scientific method. Enpirical Knowledge is based on subjective observation, and not some other "direct" access to objective reality. There are also rules for constructing a theory (simplicity and parsimony, for example, often called Ockham's razor) that will change slightly based on what you think you are doing when you construct a theory.

I agree that rocks in the past does not refute idealism (as you mentioned some idealist could easily say we don't "know" there were rocks in the past - I suppose the king idealist would say we don't "know" there are rocks now, even this one I am holding in my hand), but I just view this as one of those extraordinary claims need extraordinary evidence. Surely to say "there is a rock", is far more ordinary (far less extraordinary) than "you know there might not even be such a thing as those entities we erroneously label as rocks". So not evidence, but decent reasoning...no? — ZhouBoTong

Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence is one of the colloquial sayings that are really hard to apply consistently. Who defines what an extraordinary claim is, and how? Either way metaphysical questions are not decided by evidence in the way physical questions are. How would you even apply evidence to the question of what evidence actually represents?

If S admitted that it is possible we are all in the Matirx (he did so in this thread), then I think that places him more in line with me (sure idealism is possible, but it is meaningless whether it exists or not). I also think the varying degrees of idealism also vary in how coherent they are, and so you may have noticed S vehemently attacking a particular interpretation of idealism. — ZhouBoTong

I wasn't able to extract much information about S' post at all. But that is somewhat beside the point, I don't want to talk above someone else's head.

"It must be emphasized that measurement does not mean only a process in which a physicist-observer takes part, but rather any interaction between classical and quantum objects regardless of any observer." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncertainty_principle

This line can be found at the end of the second paragraph (attached to reference #10).

By mentioning that "measurement" exists outside of any observer, it seems the author is worried about what idealists will do with his ideas...right? (I really am wondering if I am right or not here, not just driving my point home) — ZhouBoTong

I don't know if they thought about idealism as philosophy or the consciousness interpretation of QM. In any event I don't think that the author is worried about a misinterpretation is the same as sqauring the theory with idealism. That'd be actively advocating a theory of QM that references the mind of the observer. But other interpretations, such as many worlds, seem to be essentially realist metaphysics.

And if I am reading that correctly, I think it addresses an important distinction in how idealism can be interpreted. If this is a definition of idealism (I tried to find a simple general one, please correct me if it is wrong or incomplete): Idealism is the group of metaphysical philosophies that assert that reality, or reality as humans can know it, is fundamentally mental, mentally constructed, or otherwise immaterial. This could be interpreted as "we can not know reality except through the mind" which I would say is fine and I think S would agree (how else would we know anything?), but so what? It changes nothing, and explains nothing. However, if the above definition is interpreted as "nothing exists outside the mind" then we have a problem (and I think this is where S starts saying things that imply idealism is incoherent). I am not even saying I know it is false. But if it is true, it implies (directly states?) that we have NO IDEA WHAT REALITY IS. I am fine with being agnostic toward a claim like that. However, how SHOULD one live if they have no idea what reality is? Do you see the question itself becomes meaningless. Again, I am not arguing against idealism, just saying "why should I care?" — ZhouBoTong

Well why does anyone care about philosophy? For the love of wisdom, no?

I also don't think either realism or idealism can tell you what you should do. Both are speculative, not normative. That the world really is what it looks like doesn't tell you what to do, either.

That nothing exists outside the mind is the position of solipsism, which is a very specific version of idealism. I haven't seen anyone here argue for metaphysical solipism.

But apart from that, why is it a problem if we don't know what reality "is"? Isn't it sufficient to know how our reality works, what observations to expect, or rather not to expect?

Rocks are rocks. They are as defined in English. It's not the rocks that change, it's just the status of our existence that changes: as in, we do or we don't. — S

Rocks, as defined by the English language, are a bunch of human observations. So the status of the observer is relevant. But I know you disagree with that.

We know that there are rocks in space that we've never even seen, or felt, or tasted, and suchlike. There were rocks before us, there are rocks now, and there would be rocks after us. — S

All of these are conclusion we have drawn based on observations. So it's true that, in the world we observe, rocks exist independently of any specific observer. It just doesn't follow that they exist independently of observation, period.

You view me as someone who is trying to burst your bubble. — S

My view of you is not that charitable any more, but that's beside the point.

I don't think that this is the first time in this discussion that someone has falsely claimed that of me. That is, if you mean something like logically possible. I don't like the term "coherent". It's ambiguous. — S

I do like the term "coherent" though. Since your position is that idealism is absurd on the face of it and a deviation from ordinary language, I think "coregent" with it's connotation of something being incomprehensible as language, is apt. But I know you refuse to let anyone summarize your position.

It's absurd to deny that present rocks are real. It's either genuinely absurd, in the logical sense, or absurd as a deviation from ordinary language use. — S

Didn't you just say it's logically possible? Anyways I don't accept that "absurd as a deviation from ordinary language use" is a relevant criticism.

No, it's definitely not. You can come up with clever arguments, sure. You can make it all internally consistent, sure. But if you have a false premise, then your argument is fucked from the start! — S

You could show us how the premise is false. But you won't, will you?

Wow. That's a gross oversimplification which misrepresents my argument, otherwise known as a straw man.

This is always a massive problem in a debate. If someone sees my argument like that, then it is much more understandable why they reject it, or at least they think they do. Of course, it's not actually my argument that they're rejecting. — S

One wonders why everyone misunderstands you.

Until I have access to new evidence, I will just assume that "post-human" is rather similar to "pre-human". That's what happens when I actually think about it. I can also invent all sorts of hypothetical possibilities (like "maybe this is all just in my mind"), but actually "thinking" leads me to be agnostic toward those claims. — ZhouBoTong

Agnosticism is a perfectly acceptable position. I agree that we cannot actually know about the objective reality of rocks. I agree with Kantian metaphysics in this regard. But this means that, unlike S, I accept that idealism is at least coherent.

That there were rocks in the past is not an effective argument against idealism, because we only conclude that rocks existed in the past based on observing them in the present. But if we don't know whether present rocks are real, our conclusion about the past isn't warranted, either.

Quantum physics has led to stuff. It has some predictive and explanatory power. Can you give concrete examples of the "gains" of Idealism? See, I would not say quantum physics "fails" because it has "succeeded" in some areas. Aside from sounding good (or bad) in our minds, what has Idealism contributed? By the way, if you can point to hard gains of Idealism, you will be going a long way toward convincing me your position has merit. — ZhouBoTong

Well idealism precedes the scientific method, and certainly influenced it's formulation, so in this sense it has part in it's discoveries. Of course, idealism is not directly concerned with producing predictive models. It'd be unreasonable to expect all philosophy to have predictive power. Nevertheless, a proper understanding of the idealist position is necessary for a proper understanding of the scientific method. This is especially true with regards to Quantum mechanics, which has given rise to a bunch of bad metaphysics trying to square it's findings with a naive realism.

I had to think about this quite a while, as I am sure I am somewhat ignorant of idealism. I think if you can explain how it is (an argument from ignorance), then that will help. What information do I not know? Like I said, I know of NO "gains" of Idealism. I certainly CANNOT disprove Idealism, but I can't disprove god either. Is there a hypothesis that would allow us to test whether idealism is real? Maybe that pixelated universe thing is a related experiment (although that seems FAR more specific than general idealism)? — ZhouBoTong

I was specifically responding to S' post, in which he maintained that idealism wasn't intuitive to him and therefore wrong. That isn't a textbook argument from ignorance, but it's the same kind of thinking.

Idealism cannot be proven or disproven the way that an empirical hypothesis can. It can be argued against. The core of idealism is that at the core of everything we know are our thoughts. Mental phenomena. This includes what we know about things outside of us. The world is a picture in our minds. This much I think, is hard to argue with.

If not spontaneity, what did you have in mind? — Mww

Well let's take the example of the computer screen: you can have a sequence of pictures that are not in a causal relation to each other, but instead are all effects of causes within the computer itself. So, events can be distinct in time without being in a cause-effect relationship. But at the same time every event is part of a cause-effect relationship.

If a person was sat in front of a computer monitor and watched random shapes flash up on the screen one after the other, they would perceive time, wouldn't they? Although there doesn't at first glance appear to be any perception of cause and effect. — wax

An interesting thought experiment. Someone that knows they are sitting in a room in front of a screen, wouldn't necessarily see causes and effects in the sequence of shapes. They'd assume the cause for all shapes is a computer running a certain program.

But what if all you knew were the shapes? I don't think a human would assume the shapes are uncaused. But since no other visible causes are available, wouldn't one get the impression that the shapes are caused by the preceding shapes?

I want to note that this kind of thought experiment does not necessarily represent how cause and effect would work as a principle of human perception. The cause-effect relationship is already established before we ever see shapes. Not every temporal sequence is one of causes and effects, so there is a specific relation that is expressed by our human perception.

this seems a bit like circular logic to me, ie:

the arrow of time is based upon the assumption that cause coming before effect, ie a non-zero time delay.

if cause and effect is an event with no time-dimension, then our definition of time is wrong; but the argument isn't presented as the definition of time being wrong, it is presented as there would be no time at all, and no change. — wax

I can see why it would seem circular. But I am not trying to make an argument about the objective reality of time or it's attributes. I am positing that time, as a human experience, is structured by our human concept of cause and effect.

As such, the way I exit the circle is by pointing out that humans do actually experience time. We experience this time as a sequence of events, and the proper order of the events is defined by cause and effect.

It follows that within the concept of cause and effect, events have a temporal extension and are discrete. Whether this perception has anything at all to do with objective reality is a different question.

that argument seems contradictory..

how could an event that had no time dimension be divided up into time segments? — wax

If events had no time dimension, there would be no time and no change. That was the point of the thought experiment. Since that is not how we see the world, events must have a time dimension.

Let me know where my logic is screwed. — Coeus

Basically, everywhere. But let's take it from the top:

We know we are actually experiencing the past i.e. the now is a past experience. This has been shown by Benjamin Libet in his experiments.

So if we live or experience the past and this is known as the NOW then all nows are actually pasts. — Coeus

This is a contradiction in terms. Of course my now is now. My internal perspective clearly has a present. Whether or not the information that reaches me in my present comes from the past for some hypothetical outside observer doesn't turn my present into my past.

If we look to our pasts and see that all paths to each other are in a direct line i.e. a cause and effect then we know that to be a truth, that is to say we can verify one and only one direct resulting effect came about due to one particular cause. We can imagine that there were an infinite number of possible effects from that one cause but in the end there was one and only one cause per effect. — Coeus

I disagree. I can see multiple causes contributing to single effects. We cannot verify that an effect has only a single cause.

So we say there has only been one path and not a multitude of possible paths that got us to here and now.

So if we accept this as true then it also has to be true in all futures. — Coeus

This does not follow. That we perceive our past as a single path doesn't mean the future is determined.

Now if we actually live or experience a now that is actually past, we know that light travels at the speed of light so all information we receive comes to us at the speed of light and enters our eyes but then goes through the rods and cones and then gets converted into electromechanical signals which are transmitted by sodium atoms and this is slower than light speed. — Coeus

Not all information we receive is transmitted by light. You do have ears, don't you?

So light comes in and is slowed down for processing in the brain.

Now we know there are billions if not trillions of neurons in the brain. So this information that is slowed down and transmitted throughout the brain is in effect slowed still more.

So the question remains, how can something slow down the speed of light? — Coeus

Neither is the light hitting our eyes slowed down, nor is the speed of light slowed down. The photons that hit your eyes merely create an electrical impulse.

Einstein stated that as you approach the speed of light rulers contract, time slows but oddly mass increases?

So is the information coming into our eyes since it is under the control of light, contracted? — Coeus

No. And I have no idea what you mean by "information being under the control of light"

In effect if we are truly experiencing the past as a now, then we are never in control of our future.

How can we being and existing in a past or rather experiencing it have any control on what is taking place out there up ahead? — Coeus

By triggering events?

The question arises how the hell are you there in the future while you can only experience the past or what has happened? — Coeus

Why would I have to be in the future?

If you analyze it, like if I am going to the supermarket, I will not end up in New York or end up at some sammich shop or find myself in Florida etc. So many things are ruled out even to the extent of putting sugar or pepper or bleach in my tea. — Coeus

Quantum physics disagrees. All these are technically possible.

but why wouldn't cause and effect happen at the same time?
Why would there be any kind of delay in the process? — wax

If there was not a delay, we'd have a situation reminiscent of Zeno's paradoxes. Every event could be infinitely divided into smaller and smaller constituent events, all effects would have to happen simultaneously with all causes, and there would be no change at all. Obviously, this is not how human perception actually works.

Causes and effect are discrete to us, which means that when we identify a cause and and effect, we also identify some element parting one from the other. Usually, these are the events in the causal chain that we deem not important enough to be individual causes or effects, but are instead merely the mechanics unfolding the cause.

but if 'cause' happens at time1, and 'effect' happens at time2, what is happening between those times?
if time1=time2 then how can you say which came first and so how can it represent an arrow of time? — wax

Other events are happening in between time 1 and time 2 (thoughts included). You perceive a bunch of sensory information, and your brain structures this by grouping these into "things" and "events". The events are then ordered according to cause-effect relationships, and thus seem to follow another in time.

That's one way to describe it, anyways.

Causal chains are infinite, they cannot be completed without arbitrarily defining starting points. Which is why the human minds always ultimately attributes events to a subject.

Causation is a logical phenomena that encompasses physical and hence biological phenomena, which is what happens and that’s all very good. — unforeseen

What is a "logical phenomenon"?

A switch is either off or on, so the word 'off' implies the concept of 'on', but off and on are two different states, so they do need two different words, but if cause is synonymous with effect, maybe they really represent the same concept...not sure what word could be used..'event'? A single thing. — wax

The concept cause and effect represent is time.

No, it's not just my personal opinion based on whim and fancy. It has a solid basis, and that's why it is shared by most other people. You're just trying to trivialise this. How very superficial. — S

I am just going to point out how funny it is that you criticise me for being "superficial" while your position is that anything beyond the superficial is nonsense.

It is, given where it leads. The known world started with the Big Bang, not at our birth. And direct idealism is far from agreeable, again, given where it leads.

But I grant that it has some degree of deceptive appeal. — S

Well, it was worth a shot.

It makes sense in proper context with the further explanation I gave. If it still doesn't make sense to you, then do something about it. But if I have to needlessly repeat an explanation I've already given, then you'll face my wrath. — S

And if idealism still doesn't make sense to you, then you do something about that. Wow, winning arguments is so easy!

That's fine. Lawyers aren't philosophy enthusiasts — S

They aren't? How do you know I'm not a lawyer?

What I've explained. The language barrier. — S

So, let me put that into your previous sentence:

Yes, and the philosophy-type can be oblivious to the problems that come with not properly considering and appreciating how the guy on the street talks. They have a tendency to think that it's all simply a matter of sophistication or knowledge, thereby missing the language barrier. — S

Which I think means that if you know something, but don't use the words that S approves of, you don't know something, because you "missed the language barrier". Or something. I am sure this means something, since meaning is objective. I just have to find the atlas of meaning somewhere...

The key phrase I used was, "on the face of it". And that matters because it has to do with intuitiveness, common sense, our common language, what makes sense to us without assuming something bizarre like idealism, without having to come up with a convoluted explanation or an explanation which causes more problems than it solves. — S

But that Idealism is "bizarre" is entirely your opinion. Perhaps it's worth pointing out the reason a lot of philosophy starting from the Renaissance has idealist tendencies? What we experience most directly is our thoughts. These are, in a sense, the most "real" thing to us. Hence, Descartes started with cogito. That our world starts with our thoughts is hardly bizarre, or unintuitive, is it?

Because it's not just simply about the truth of the matter, it's also - as it almost always is - about the language we use. — S

That sentence doesn't even begin to make sense to me.

That's part of what I meant earlier when I said something along the lines that I accept the science, but reject your related philosophical conclusions about it. You lack conformity with how a normal person normally talks. In that language, it sounds insane to say something like, "There are no rocks". Again, to me, that just indicates that you're doing something wrong. — S

Technical language is required to talk about complex topics. Do you think lawyers are "doing something wrong" because they use words in a very peculiar and sometime highly unintuitive way?

Yes, and the philosophy-type can be oblivious to the problems that come with not properly considering and appreciating how the guy on the street talks. They have a tendency to think that it's all simply a matter of sophistication or knowledge, thereby missing something important. — S

And that something is?

I am also a philosophy-type, but I'm the type who talks more sense. — S

Your humility is staggering.

But a strength of my argument is that I'm not saying anything controversial on the face of it. — S

Yeah, well, more than 15 pages of debate are indicative of how uncontroversial your position is.

If the idealist can't even handle a hypothetical scenario of a rock (as defined by the dictionary) after we've died, then that's a big failing for idealism. I'm not suggesting that they can't bite the bullet, I'm suggesting that it's wrong to. It's a failing if you have to go to such lengths in order to explain away something as simple and easily understandable as post-human rocks. — S

But post-human rocks are not simple and easily understandable if you actually think about it. This is a bit like saying quantum physics "fails" because it goes to great lengths to explain away such simple and easily understandable concepts as discrete objects, or measurements that don't affect that which is measured.

Expain to me how this is not just an argument from ignorance?

Again, what would the guy on the street think? He'd get it straight away, wonder why you were making such a fuss, and think you peculiar. — S

The guy on the street doesn't understand a great many things outside of their personal expertise.

So idealism has to invent a whole new way of interpreting language just to account for it's wacky premise? Why should we speak their peculiar language? These problems stem back to the wacky idealist premise, do they not? Isn't that the real problem? — S

I find your language wacky as well.

"If we imagine a scenario where there is a rock that a definition conforms to, we are already in realist territory, and so any conclusions from that are irrelevant to an idealist."

That means that if you were an idealist, then you couldn't even reasonably imagine a scenario where there is a rock that a definition conforms to, because, if what you say is true, that's realist territory.

But if an idealist can't even do that, then that's a big problem. I can. Lots of other people can. It seems to make sense. The idealist is abnormal, and this requires an explanation. I think that the best explanation is that they're doing something wrong. — S

I did not mean to imply that an idealist cannot imagine realist scenarios.

What I wanted to point out is this: you're constructing thought experiments to serve as arguments against idealism. If you begin those thought experiments with the phrase "let's say rocks are what most people think rocks are" then your thought experiment starts with a realist assumption.

So if, in the course of your thought experiment, you come across a contradiction or an absurdity, you have constructed an argument against realism. Which, presumably, is not what you intended.

So, how do you explain what seems like an illusion? When for example, evidence suggests that I see red as blue? That I see visible light with a dominant wavelength of approximately 625–740 nanometres, but it looks like blue to me? If I didn't know any better, I'd think it was blue? Is it blue or isn't it? :brow: — S

Illusions such as optical illusions are theories about the world that conflict with other observations, and are therefore inconsistent (have poor predictive power). If you observe that something is blue, but also observe that other people tell you they observe it as red, your theory now has to account for these observations. One way to do that is to form the theory that your perception of colors is different from that of other people.

Then I didn't mean you, personally, did I? :roll:

I meant them. Those of the position we're talking about. — S

I don't understand what you are trying to tell me.

Even if it's down to bare assertion vs. bare assertion, it doesn't have to end there. One can consider what makes the most sense, what better conforms with our common language use, what has greater explanatory power, etc. Are you interested in that or not? — S

You are describing different arguments, are you not (argument from language, argument from predictive power etc.)? If you think the question can be solved with arguments, then we ought to argue. If it can not then arguing is pointless.

Can there be an illusion? Yes or no? — S

No.

Yes, I know that. I'm making the case that that makes very little sense for anyone outside of their crazy little world. — S

You are making, to use your own words, bare assertions.

There are things like rocks, cats, and microwaves. The real things, that is, not mere appearance, which is something else entirely. My finger pointing at the moon is not the moon. — S

And I say there aren't. What now? Are we done?

As can be seen, we were talking about your definition there. You keep changing the subject. Don't do that. I like to stay on point. — S

Sigh. If rocks are what you think rocks are, and you die, the nature of rocks doesn't change. They still have the same attributes which, were you alive, would conform to your thoughts about rocks.

That would be a massive problem if you claim that you can't even imagine a scenario where there is a rock that a definition conforms to. — S

I did not say that I can't imagine it.

Hold on a minute. Don't you think that it's absurd that illusions are impossible? — S

No.

I don't even really understand the idea of that. Why would you need a criterion to judge the objectivity of an experience? That sounds like we're starting from an assumption of idealism. — Terrapin Station

For a statement to have a truth value, there needs to be a criterion to determine truth from falsehood, correct? It follows that we can only make true statements about objective reality if we have a criterion that gives different answers for statements that refer to objective reality vs statements that do not.

Since statements can refer to subjective realities, objectivity must be one of the things this criterion establishes.

It's a will phenomenon--we're talking about a conscious phenomenon, and it's free because we're not forced to go with one thing or the other.

It's a decision because we're picking one of two or more options. — Terrapin Station

You have smuggled a subject into these statements. In the first sentence you're talking about us, the two people who write in a forum.

In your following sentence, you're now introducing a subject "we" that is picking options and is or is not forced. But in order to have a subject that is doing these things, you need to be able to attribute them to that subject. You need an immanent connection between the subject and the process that results in a phenomenal decision. What could provide that immanent connection?

That's a great argument you've got there. How long did it take you to come up with? Hours, I'm guessing. — S

The argument has already been made. Until you put in some effort to actually understand it, you'll get nothing else from me.

But they can't be mistaken by your own definition of what a rock is, because the definition would fit. It can't be both. That's the problem. To avoid contradition, you would be forced into to either rejecting your ill-considered definition, or the far greater absurdity of accepting that such an illusory scenario would be impossible. — S

Or maybe the problem is that you are using a term - "illusion" - that's already predetermining the answer. It only makes sense to speak of illusions if you consider rocks to have a definition independent of the observations in question. It's a form of begging the question.

Your definition here would be that a rock is what looks, feels, etc., like a rock to these people. — S

Again this is a realist position. An idealist would say that a rock is the looks, feelings etc.

We have what looks, feels, etc., like a rock to these people. So that would be a rock by your definition. The problem with that, is that, really, it could be anything. You might be imagining an actual rock when you do this, but really, it could be a glass of water, a cat, or a microwave, that looks, feels, etc., like a rock. — S

You're still assuming there are things like rocks, cats and microwaves that are things in and of themselves, and then someone comes along and looks at the things and sees a rock. But to an idealist, there are no cats or microwaves either. These words refer to collections of subjective observations. The sentence "I observe a rock, but it really is a cat" makes no sense from that position.

No, you're fallaciously moving the goalposts by switching from present-tense to past-tense. You can't do that. You need to be consistent. If a rock is what looks like a rock to me, then a rock is what looks like a rock to me, not what looked like a rock to me. If I died, then nothing would look like a rock to me. Therefore, there wouldn't be a rock, by your own definition. — S

My point above applies here. The way you phrase your example presupposes that rocks are things in and of themselves, and that your observations conform to these objects.

I'm trying to make the point in a way that will get you to see sense. Your definition allows for a situation with "rocks" (in your sense), that aren't actually rocks (in my sense, which is the normal sense). So, we could take the dictionary definition I gave, and imagine a scenario where there's a rock by that definition, but so long as it doesn't look, feel, etc., like a rock, then it's not one by your definition. — S

If we imagine a scenario where there is a rock that a definition conforms to, we are already in realist territory, and so any conclusions from that are irrelevant to an idealist.

I think that that's a problem. And I'm guessing that I'm not the only one. It removes the requirement that reality matches up with our language, and instead goes by a model whereby language matches up with mere appearance, which of course can be illusory, which causes problems for the model, as I've shown. — S

For appearance to be illusory, we'd need to be able to compare it to something, and conclude the two don't match. What are we comparing appearances to?

I can deal with this with a copy-and-paste: you're just reading that into it. That's not the same as me failing to provide one without that. That's a very important difference. — S

You're just wrong, full stop.

Can, road, kicking. Imagine the majority of observers are under an illusion. — S

Then, by definition, the majority of observers are mistaken about rocks, because that's what the word "illusion" means.

No, you don't seem have properly read what I said. I began "if a rock is what it looks like (etc.) to me..."

Either a rock is what it looks like to me or it isn't. If it is, then what a rock looks like to other people is beside the point. — S

If a rock is what it looks like to you, and you die, a rock is still what it looked like to you. This is just running in circles with words.

You could say that a rock is what it looks like (etc.) to most people, or even to everyone, but that would still lead to absurdity through a thought experiment. — S

Saying a rock is what it looks like to X is not an idealist position, it's a realist position. To an idealist, the rock is nothing in and of itself.

If we were all under an illusion, or we all developed some sort of genetic mutation where we no longer saw rocks as rocks, then it follows that there would be no rocks. — S

If we no longer see rocks as rock, there must still be rocks, because by the terms of that very sentence, rocks both are a thing in and of themselves and something that people see.

You're entangling yourself in your own word salad.

But a) that's strongly counterintuitive, and b) that's illogical if you go by a sensible definition of rocks, where rocks are rocks, not what they look like (etc.). — S

Of course it's counterintuitive if you say things that are contradictory. Your definition is not a definition, but a tautology.

I already have, you're just reading that into it. That's not the same as me failing to provide one without that. That's a very important difference. — S

No, you have not. Solid, mineral, Earth. All terms that refer to observations.

Now, to reduce your suggestion to absurdity. When, if ever, is a rock not a rock? — S

A rock is never not a rock.

What about when something fits the definition of a rock, but doesn't look to me like a rock, or feel to me like a rock, or sound to me like a rock? Imagine I'm under an illusion. In this case, a rock is not a rock? — S

No, in that case you are under an illusion. Your observations no longer conform to the observations of the majority of other observers, and so other observers will, by and large, conclude you are wrong.

If a rock is what looks, feels, etc., to me like a rock, then there won't be a rock if I die. But there will be, meaning that the way we use language in that context, it makes sense to say that there will be. So that's a bad definition to use in this context. — S

There won't be any rocks for you, since you'll be dead. Presumably, there will still be rocks for other people. Unless you're crazy, and everyone is playing along and agreeing with you that sure, rocks exist, so as to not disturb you.

Since there isn't a subject, there is no "who", and there is nobody for anything to "look like" or "sound like" to. It's a completely pointless road to go down to direct that stuff at me. — S

Given that a "rock" is defined by the way it looks like, feels like, sounds like etc. how is anyone supposed to talk about rocks? Can you provide us with a definition of a rock that doesn't consist of subjective impressions?

I don't believe that any of those work. I'm a direct/naive realist. Which ones do you find convincing? — Terrapin Station

Isn't it sufficient to observe (heh) that we have no criterion to judge the objectivity of an experience? Any such criterion would run into the problem of an infinite regress (the objectivity of the criterion itself, and so forth).

Sure it is. It's not someone else making the random decision. That would be like saying, if we were talking about a random number generator, that it's not the random number generator producing the random numbers. I don't know how that would make sense. What would you think is producing the random numbers in that case (and could we then say that it's that thing that's producing the random numbers, or would we have to say that something else is)? — Terrapin Station

It's not someone else making a decision, there just isn't a decision. It's not a case of asking "which entity did this result originate from". That question does not allow us to differentiate between results of a free will and results of e.g. an algorithm. What you call a "random decision" might phenomenally originate from me, but it's not indicative of my will. It doesn't get us any closer to explaining how indeterminism leads to a meaningful concept of free will.

Because you give up the responsibility of handling authority over yourself, to that of an external thing/person. (you can read more in the longer post above) — Christoffer

But this decision is always reversible. There is no enforcement of the authority that you don't do yourself.

Memory is very lucid, it's why witnesses can never be taken as factual in court cases, especially over a longer period of time. If you have two things to do the coming week, sure, but if you have 10 things per day to do at specific times, good luck, would you want that responsibility of keeping track or give that responsibility to something else that can have authority over your week? — Christoffer

This doesn't seem to change the fact that written down schedules are memory aids and what actually determines my actions is my decision to follow the schedule in my head.

Even if it's your decisions you write down I'm speaking of the mechanics of why you feel freedom in giving up the responsibility of what to do. — Christoffer

That's seems a rather odd approach to the topic, considering this is a philosophy forum.

Think about this: You schedule your coming three months, but then experience an accident that gives you amnesia. You cannot remember anything of what you were supposed to do or why and in order not to fall behind you try and stay on schedule. You are unsure of why you do some of the stuff, but you trust it and it gives you comfort over trying to figure out what to do. Who's the authority here? What if the things on the schedule were things you didn't agree with after amnesia set in? But you still know there are reasons for them and you need to do them. — Christoffer

Amnesia is a special case because it raises the question whether or not the person making the schedule and the person following it are actually the same person.

I don't see how you could conclude that a work is evil/inappropriate based solely on the source of that work without committing what amounts to a genetic fallacy.

When you have created an external authority, do you have will over it? If you create an AI that rules over you, it is not you who rules over you, it's your creation. — Christoffer

A schedule is not an external authority though. But even if we go with the AI example: if the AI functions like you programmed it to do, how is that result not in accordance with your will?

If you write down rules that you must follow, that list of rules has authority over you. — Christoffer

Try to hold on to the same thing without externalize it, you wouldn't be able to, since you include the schedule within the thoughts evaluating them. — Christoffer

Are you saying I cannot keep mental track of an exact schedule? That seems absurd. Writing it down might help my memory, but would not change the fact that when I act in accordance with the schedule, it's the mental representation of that schedule, not the piece of paper, that generates those thoughts.

Freedom would be to choose whatever you want outside of that list. — Christoffer

But what I want is to follow the list. That is, after all, why I made it. If I am tempted to stray from it's tasks, it's my will that keeps me on it.

Hmm, why would you believe that? — Terrapin Station

The standard arguments on how we do not have any way to establish the objectivity of our experience.

That depends on whether you're thinking of your decisions as constitutive of yourself. In other words, if you on a complete whim choose rye bread over whole wheat, does that mean you've changed yourself merely because of that fact? — Terrapin Station

But the choice of bread is either based on reasons, or it random. If it's based on reason, those reasons cannot change without something about the person having those reasons changing with them. If it's random it's not attributable to the person making the (apparent) decisions, so it doesn't serve as an example of their will.

A schedule is like an authority that you invent. You (unintentionally) form its rule over you and when you are (unintentionally) ruled under it you feel that sense of tranquility with not having the pressure of freedom. — Christoffer

But since the authority is derived from your own authority, doesn't that mean that it's your will that has authority? And if it's your will that has authority, doesn't that make you free?

If you crave ice cream but have a rule against eating ice cream, is freedom following your craving or resisting it? I would say being able to resist makes you more free, not less.

Everyone who thinks that there wouldn't be a rock an hour after we died, or who doesn't think that there would be, or who thinks that we don't know enough to justifiably make that claim, should stop whatever line of argument they're pursuing and explain how it is that there were rocks before we existed, for hundreds and thousands of years, or how it is that we know that.

If you fail this test, then your position is untenable. — S

There aren't any rocks, and there have never been any rocks, outside of human minds. The history of rocks exists only in human minds, as a useful tool to predict the future.

If present rocks are human constructions, then certainly so are past rocks as well. This question does not strengthen your argument. That history is a construction of our minds seems far less controversial than the claim that the present is, as well.

We are part of the causal chain but the human mind is different than an inanimate object. Causality has influence over our thoughts but the mind has the power to cause things itself. Agent causation takes a massive amount of effort and will so most of the time we don't bother with it, but there are times when people do actually exercise true free will. — Jamesk

And what are the required circumstances for that to happen?

You can be free to do certain things and not others, intellectually you might see that as freedom but you don't feel free because the things you want to do are the things you can't do or vice versa. Many things to consider... In any case, it's clear there are differences. — Judaka

Is freedom to do things an actual, a potential or merely a theoretical ability? And do all abilities count equally towards freedom, like the ability to climb stairs?

There is a difference between what appears to me as my free will and an outside state of the world that allows that will to be effective. A theory of freedom must deal with both parts.

So, I recently begun adhering to a daily schedule. At first I felt very restricted and trapped. But as time went on, I begun to felt fulfilled, happy, and "free" in a way. Like, I had no stresses and problems to face since I didn't hold off in doing them. Does being free actually make people feel free? Or are they two separate things? — adamhakeemiforv

Good question. There are varying forms of freedom. There is the core impression of being an actor. There is the feeling of being free in practice. Is there an outside state of freedom that could correspond with that feeling? And what is defined by?

So who is going to shoot them if no one else is carrying a gun? And please don't answer the cops, because everyone knows there are hundreds of illegal guns for each cop. — Sir2u

And how does that prevent the police from targeting people wielding these guns?

Right. But, re your opinion, so you just don't feel that that issue is worth bothering with? — Terrapin Station

I think the issue is very interesting, but the specific questions asked are impossible to answer. First of all it's not possible to know the configuration of objective reality and secondly it's not clear to me how either ontological determinism or indeterminism answers the question.

Let's say the entire universe is a dream of me, and my will is actually the only thing that changes it. How can I change my decisions without also changing myself?

I'm not asking your opinion. I'm asking what it is that you think that people are doing in the debate, from their perspective? No one is wondering whether there's the psychological phenomenon of making choices, decisions, etc. — Terrapin Station

I think they're trying to figure out whether freedom of will is an illusion, that really they could not have choosen any other option.

Basically the same question I asked above--what do you think the issue is, then, if we parse the "free" part of "free will" as simply the psychological phenomenon? — Terrapin Station

The issue is that making the question of the ontological reality of free will one of determinism vs. Indeterminism seems ill conceived to me. I am a compatibilist in the sense that I don't think indeterminism is a necessary basis for freedom of will.

Yes, indeterminateness or randomness, as opposed to determinism.

I think it's worth bringing up, because we should know what we're even talking about if we're formulating positions featuring the term, no?

It's kind of hard to debate one side or the other with respect to a term like that if we don't even know what we're referring to. — Terrapin Station

Well, I know perfectly well what freedom of will is as a psychological fact. What I don't know is how to go from the experience of being a free actor to ontological freedom. I can make sense of the words "ontological indeterminateness", and I can see why it seems relevant to the question "is freedom of will an illusion". But I cannot see how, exactly, the connection between an ontologically indeterminate reality and the experience of a free will works.

Are you putting "free" in quotation marks there because it's not really ontological freedom? — Terrapin Station

Mostly just to avoid a semantic debate on the definition of ontological freedom. What is ontological freedom, really? Is it ontological indeterminateness? Is the concept even coherent?

Sure. I'd just say that some part of the process--somewhere from the deliberation (when that's present) to the decision has to involve some ontological indeterminateness to some extent* otherwise I don't know what "free" would be referring to ontologically (which is kind of another way of saying that I don't agree that compatibilism makes sense).

*"to some extent"=it wouldn't have to be complete, it could just be something like a probability bias. — Terrapin Station

I don't know how ontological indeterminateness is supposed to get us to a meaningful concept of freedom. How does such indeterminateness make the brainstates we experience as decisions more meaningful? I know meaning is a vague term here, I am getting at the "why should I care" question. My decisions are my decisions because they are connected to my larger self and my reasons. I can make them "free" by basing them on nothing else other than internal states I have.

Why are you mentioning an RNG?

I said "I make a lot of decisions that are phenomenally 'random.'"

That's all I said. Forget the earlier post. — Terrapin Station

Ok, had a bit of tunnel vision there, sorry.

I was arguing specifically against the notion that a free will requires "uncaused decisions". I am fine with accepting phenomenally random decisions as a possibility, I just don't think they are more "free" in some sense than phenomenally reasoned decisions.