hence, instantiations of awareness in the form of ego) can only hold presence (i.e., exist, but not necessarily “stand out” … a subtle but metaphysically important clarification of semantics for some) given the presence of change, hence motion—this irrespective of whether the change/motion is physical or mental. That being a given, when impartially appraised, a world of full causal determinism does not logically allow for the possibility of change/motion—this since all relations of efficient causation are within this model perfectly immutable by definition, and because everything is deemed to consist of these perfectly immutable causal relations. Here, then, our experience of being directly contradicts with our theory of a fully casually deterministic being—for our experience entails the presence of change whereas the model of reality entails a perfect changelessness of being. I fully grant that the summation of this argument many be emotively lacking; yet I would challenge anyone to find rational fault with it. — javra
I would've voted for Hillary. — S
That you "throw away your vote". This idea is the problem. — ssu
But it won't do anything except weaken the chances of the better alternative. — S
so I don't have a vote that I could waste. — S
you guys — S
There is a coherent conceptual distinction between natural and artificial. The latter is usually taken to refer to phenomena which are produced by human artifice.
Human society could be seen to be the interactive elaboration of human artifice, and might be considered to be an artificial phenomenon on that account. — Janus
I would say that not only can the the individual human being not be "isolated" from the "collective", but the collective cannot be isolated from nature; although it can obviously be useful for developing certain lines of thought to make the distinction between what we think of as natural and what we think of as artificial. Although, such a distinction tells us more about ourselves than about anything ontological, I would say. — Janus
So whether choice has any causal efficacy in relation to the corresponding state of affairs is, I believe, the crux of the freewill debate. Causal determinists presume it doesn't. Those who uphold freewill presume it does. And resolving this via empirical data has at least so far proven futile. — javra
Each and every moment of our being we are different, thought the same person, and will have been in part predetermined by our former choices in life. Yet at each juncture of choice—part, present, and future—we again engage in being the agency for effects as decisions, or commitments, to future realities, this given two or more alternative means toward the end of resolving our want(s). — javra
On the other hand, aesthetics can be powerful in delivering meaningful stories or stories with moral messages. — praxis
Is this a trick? You make a valid point, but if my choice is democrats or Trump? Doesn't seem too difficult. But don't worry, I won't give the democrats any money (if that is what you mean by support). — ZhouBoTong
The democrats have too many factions that strongly disagree on different issues. A black woman who is accepting of certain democratic-socialist policies and environmentalism seems to be the only chance of uniting them. — ZhouBoTong
Party, but they are the only viably electable party to vote in progressive candidate to enact real change. — Maw
The political clusterfuck is on display above ground. The permanent government cleverly avoids publicity by staying below ground and out of sight. — Bitter Crank
I don't know what these means when you abstract "the state" outside of the representatives who are elected who form part of it, but I also don't know what that has to do with your original comment below: — Maw
Although, such a distinction tells us more about ourselves than about anything ontological, I would say. — Janus