I was going to pull just that aspect out from your dissertation there! :wink: — NKBJ

:yikes: :cool:

I agree that is a "want" that pushes us towards certain decisions, in fact, a whole host of them, sometimes contradictory ones pulling us in opposite directions.

The distinction if that want is determined or not is the crux of the matter. I would say that these wants are products of both our experiences and our biology, and that they are fully determined. In fact, if they were not determined, they would not be trustworthy. — NKBJ

As I so far see things, want is of course determined: by biology, by experience, as well as by our previous choices in life. I'll even go so far as to suggest that some form of meta-want is even a metaphysically predetermined facet of any awareness, or sentience--devoid of which no such thing as ego can be.

My contention is, again, in that the actual choice of which of two or more alternatives to choose (so as to approach and obtain the want's resolution) will itself not be an immutable link in infinite causal chains/webs. Rather, the act of making the specific choice will stem from the momentary form of the agent as an originating efficient cause, such that its effect is the choice taken.

My contention is, again, in that the actual choice of which of two or more alternatives to choose (so as to approach and obtain the want's resolution) will itself not be an immutable link in infinite causal chains/webs. Rather, the act of making the specific choice will stem from the momentary form of the agent as an originating efficient cause, such that its effect is the choice taken. — javra

I will agree that every choice is in itself another cause of a long line of events, so it is the efficient cause in that sense. I do not see how it is the "originating" cause if it itself is also caused.

My contention is, again, in that the actual choice of which of two or more alternatives to choose (so as to approach and obtain the want's resolution) will itself not be an immutable link in infinite causal chains/webs. Rather, the act of making the specific choice will stem from the momentary form of the agent as an originating efficient cause, such that its effect is the choice taken. — javra

Would you say this is true regardless of whether the choice can be shown to have any causal relation to the corresponding state of affairs?

Perhaps it's in the possibility that the choice can reconfigure the causal chain, in effect resetting its succession to a new origin.

Perhaps it's in the possibility that the choice can reconfigure the causal chain, in effect resetting its succession to a new origin. — Merkwurdichliebe

How would that work?

Even if the choice has no causal relation to the state of affairs, it marks a resolution for the deciding agent so that the landscape of possibility becomes altered.

prior to that post I didn't see the origin or any word Epicurus but i'm not going to argue about that at this point.

Oh but you should, indeed, you should argue it

Even if the choice has no causal relation to the state of affairs, it marks a resolution for the deciding agent so that the landscape of possibility becomes altered. — Merkwurdichliebe

Right, it's an efficient cause. But that's not enough to claim it itself is uncaused.

I will agree that every choice is in itself another cause of a long line of events, so it is the efficient cause in that sense. I do not see how it is the "originating" cause if it itself is also caused. — NKBJ

These are indeed the hard to depict nuances that, all the same, distinguish causal determinism (including those forms that claim compatibilism) from any position affirming any type of metaphysical freewill (including those forms that also claim compatibilism).

We typically say that lightning causes thunder. In fact, lightning is fully determined by antecedent efficient causal factors; the thunder is then causes not by the lightning but by the set of these antecedent causal factors. Between these factors and the thunder, lightning is just an immutable link and is thereby fully non-efficacious. In other words, given the verity to these antecedent causal factors, lightning in truth holds no causal agency of its own. Hence, logically, it is not the lightning which causes the thunder but its antecedent causal factors.

In a system of causal determinism, then, there is no causal agency to speak of. All appraisals of causal agency become chimerical. Everything is causally predetermined in full by antecedent causal effects ad infinitum, such that causal agency as we “naively” conceive of it is an impossibility.

When it comes to choice between alternatives, what I’m saying is that despite its determinacy by motives (and other non-causal determinants), we agents in fact cause the effect. In effect, our commonsense notions of causal agency are in fact accurate representations of one underlying metaphysical form of causality, one that applies to freewill.

Each and every moment of our being we are different, thought the same person, and will have been in part predetermined by our former choices in life. Yet at each juncture of choice—part, present, and future—we again engage in being the agency for effects as decisions, or commitments, to future realities, this given two or more alternative means toward the end of resolving our want(s).

As causal agencies—and unlike the lightning bolt—we of our own constituency of being originate the effect of our particular decisions. … Whereas the lightning bolt does not causally originate the thunder of its own being (again, this since the thunder is causally predetermined by causal factors antecedent to the lightning).

If there’s a need, I’ll have to reply later on.

Would you say this is true regardless of whether the choice can be shown to have any causal relation to the corresponding state of affairs? — Merkwurdichliebe

From my vantage, it easy to forget or overlook that causation (of any variant) cannot be shown (empirically demonstrated) to be factual. The philosophy of causation is metaphysical in full. From the ontology of Aristotle, to the works of Hume, to those who have affirmed that reality is fully non-causal (e.g., instead being fully mathematical), the "showing" part can only pertain to reasoning and logic. I think for most of us, ideally a reasoning that is accordant to empirical world we experience.

Correlation does not entail causation. Yet causation is always co-relational. Given a sufficient quantity of uniform correlations between some given and its antecedent, one simply presumes causation.

So whether choice has any causal efficacy in relation to the corresponding state of affairs is, I believe, the crux of the freewill debate. Causal determinists presume it doesn't. Those who uphold freewill presume it does. And resolving this via empirical data has at least so far proven futile.

Thank you. You have a nice way of framing it all.

So whether choice has any causal efficacy in relation to the corresponding state of affairs is, I believe, the crux of the freewill debate. Causal determinists presume it doesn't. Those who uphold freewill presume it does. And resolving this via empirical data has at least so far proven futile. — javra

I would add there is also the important debate of whether predetermined factors allow for the existence of the will, and to what degree it is free in relation to those factors.

Each and every moment of our being we are different, thought the same person, and will have been in part predetermined by our former choices in life. Yet at each juncture of choice—part, present, and future—we again engage in being the agency for effects as decisions, or commitments, to future realities, this given two or more alternative means toward the end of resolving our want(s). — javra

The eternal decision. I think this is what makes the willing agent relevent, whether or not its decision manifests into reality. In fact, I would say that when the will does not correspond to any existing state of affairs, it takes on even more importance.

hence, instantiations of awareness in the form of ego) can only hold presence (i.e., exist, but not necessarily “stand out” … a subtle but metaphysically important clarification of semantics for some) given the presence of change, hence motion—this irrespective of whether the change/motion is physical or mental. That being a given, when impartially appraised, a world of full causal determinism does not logically allow for the possibility of change/motion—this since all relations of efficient causation are within this model perfectly immutable by definition, and because everything is deemed to consist of these perfectly immutable causal relations. Here, then, our experience of being directly contradicts with our theory of a fully casually deterministic being—for our experience entails the presence of change whereas the model of reality entails a perfect changelessness of being. I fully grant that the summation of this argument many be emotively lacking; yet I would challenge anyone to find rational fault with it. — javra

It take it from your terminology, you hold to a few Aristotilean presuppositions.

In layman terms, causality is nullified by immutability, qua. the deterministic model.

The important distinction is, as you say: existing, versus standing out. But I might argue that this standing out is existing, as such. And, if the deterministic model does essentially negate the deciding agent, then, then thing that exists is gone, and what are we left with: the model and irrelevant spectators.

But those choices aren't "free" or untethered to determined causes. — NKBJ

That is the extra claim you make, that I do not. And you keep making it and not justifying it. I'm unsurprised, because I have never heard any justification in many years of such discussion.

Perhaps it is impossible to justify since the one making the claim has to disavow his own existence. It is a contradiction in the sense that the will is being negated through an act of the will

Yes. I think this what the op is getting at. I suppose one could psychologise at this point as to why such a negation is so important. A terror of responsibility perhaps? I might do something, post something, at any moment that will change the world, and I don't have to, so I am responsible. It seems like a refusal to live, almost... But this is an illicit move in the philosophy game, so my opponents are entitled call 'ad hom'. I'm just amusing myself at their expense, while I wait for that justification.

I suppose one could psychologise at this point as to why such a negation is so important. A terror of responsibility perhaps? . . . It seems like a refusal to live, almost — unenlightened

That is most likely the case. But on days we're feeling generous, we can attribute it to being lost in speculation.

I'm just amusing myself at their expense, while I wait for that justification. — unenlightened

I totally get it. So let's not agree too much, lest it become a bore

Freewill is usually contrasted with determinism which is the belief that the any state of affairs is causally specified by what comes before it. — TheMadFool

Right. But the opposite of that wouldn't be decisions that are not influenced by anything. The opposite would simply be some departure from strict causality.

See what javra has recently posted.

What would you say that has to do with my post?

He is addressing what you are talking about, i thought you might be interested.

He is addressing what you are talking about, i thought you might be interested. — Merkwurdichliebe

Ah, okay. I was just trying to simply clarify something about the distinction for TheMadFool (and for anyone who might have agreed), contra a misunderstanding that he had.

But the opposite of that wouldn't be decisions that are not influenced by anything. The opposite would simply be some departure from strict causality. — Terrapin Station

Why?

Because saying that the opposite is that we're not influenced by anything ignores other alternatives. So it's a false dichotomy.

Please elaborate.

Ask a more specific question if you don't understand something I said.

I want to know exactly what you think that "opposite" is.

I was just giving you a chance to build your position

I was just giving you a chance to build your position — Merkwurdichliebe

I'm not interested in typing some long, very generalized thing. I think it's rather a problem on this board that people tend to do that. There's usually no focus. People ramble on. They'll bring up 15-20 different topics in a long post without really addressing any of them, without having any clear logical connection or flow to their "argument," etc. I just wanted to simply correct a conceptual misunderstanding. If you disagree or don't understand what I said that's fine, but ask specific questions, keep things focused, etc.

Ok, then dodge the question.

You asked me and I responded promptly and directly. "I want to know exactly what you think that "opposite" is."

And you answer:

I'm not interested in typing some long, very generalized thing. I think it's rather a problem on this board that people tend to do that. There's usually no focus. People ramble on, bringing up 15-20 different topics in a long post and not really addressing any of them. I just wanted to simply correct a conceptual misunderstanding. If you disagree or don't understand what I said that's fine, but ask specific questions, keep things focused, etc. — Terrapin Station

Great philosophy guy

You posted twice and didn't address me either time. I only noticed the second one: "I was just giving you a chance to build your position "

Re "opposite," in this case it's the complement, or rather what people are (logically if not explicitly) implying when they deny that determinism is the case.