• Concepts and Correctness
    It was your second post that made your point clear.Magnus Anderson

    In my first post I explained clearly the difference between "the correct" and "a correct" and stated that I disagreed with your use of "the correct".

    What was not clear?
  • Concepts and Correctness
    Maybe you'd like to go back and read my initial response to him:Magnus Anderson

    You're quoting your second response to me.

    Your initial response contained no correction and repeated your error. That looks defensive to me.
  • Concepts and Correctness
    Let's say I expressed myself in a way that wasn't the best.Magnus Anderson

    I thought that might be the case but I wasn't sure. My initial response to you gave you the opportunity to correct your mistake but for some reason you decided to go defensive.
  • Concepts and Correctness
    He assumed....Magnus Anderson

    I didn't assume anything. You said your definition was "the correct meaning of the word chair". You repeated this in your follow up reply to me.

    As I'm sure you're aware, there's an important distinction to be made between "the correct meaning" and "a correct meaning".

    I think it a little unfair to accuse me of making assumptions for simply taking you at your word.
  • Concepts and Correctness
    Nowadays, when people use the word "chair" what they mean is "a separate seat for one person, typically with a back and four legs". In the future, the definition might change, but when I say that this is the correct definition of the word, what I mean is that this is how people use the word nowadays.Magnus Anderson

    I think you're mistaken.

    Any good dictionary (essentially a record of existing usages) will give at least 6 different meanings.

    Or are you saying that the one used most frequently is the correct meaning?
  • Concepts and Correctness
    For example, the correct meaning of the word "chair" is "a separate seat for one person, typically with a back and four legs". Hardly disputable.Magnus Anderson

    I'd take issue with your claim that you've given "the correct meaning". It's 'a' meaning but not the only one in current use.

    New usages may even emerge in the future. These new usages, in my view, wouldn't be incorrect.
  • Can we assign truth values to statements in ethics.
    And what if what people want to convey are certain "truths" about how interactions in a society should function?Echarmion

    I'm sure many people do want to convey their beliefs about moral "truths".
  • Can we assign truth values to statements in ethics.
    The question that comes to mind here is, if moral stances are expressions of emotional attitudes to some degree then what else are they?Echarmion

    Whatever else the people making moral claims intend to convey. At the very least, moral judgements (in contrast to non-moral preferences) signify disapproval/approval for the actions of others.
  • Can we assign truth values to statements in ethics.
    My beef with emotivism is that it claims that moral judgments are based solely on one's personal preferences.

    That's not true.
    Magnus Anderson

    You're right but I'm not sure that the claim of emotivism is that moral judgements are solely based on personal preferences (that they're sufficient) - if they were, all personal preferences would be moral preferences and of course they're not.

    My understanding of emotivism (and what I think is the case) is that it is the recognition that personal preferences are necessary components of all sincerely held moral stances. All (sincere) moral judgements are therefore, to some degree or other, expressions of emotional attitudes.
  • Can we assign truth values to statements in ethics.
    My question to Terrapin is an attempt to find a starting point in a discussion, which you may have noticed he flees from.tim wood

    No, he answered you in the only way he could given his beliefs about moral attitudes.

    Because murder,in itself, does not allow of degrees, , and cannot be partly wrong and not wrong, then it must be right.tim wood
    You don't seem to have grasped the fact that you're arguing with someone who believes that things are only morally right/wrong from an individual subjective perspective.

    It's quite pointless insisting "if it is not wrong......it must be right." if the person you're talking to simply does not accept your starting premises.
  • Can we assign truth values to statements in ethics.
    One last try: murder is wrong, yes or no?tim wood

    Asking this of someone who has already stated that they believe moral right/wrong is a matter of subjective opinion and demanding a yes/no answer is like asking "Have you stopped beating your wife, yes or no?".
  • The moralistic and the naturalistic fallacy
    They're certainly not based on something that's not one's preferences.Terrapin Station

    I'm afraid that makes no sense to me.

    If one's preferences must be based on other preferences, then those preferences must be based on other preferences which in turn...
  • The moralistic and the naturalistic fallacy
    What else would it be based on?Terrapin Station

    You see no problem with saying one's preferences are based on one's preferences?
  • The moralistic and the naturalistic fallacy
    His personal feeling/taste is a mental phenomenon, right?Terrapin Station

    Yes but I'm saying it's not based on his personal feeling/taste (it's not common usage subjective)..

    Unless you're saying his personal feeling/taste is based on his personal feeling /taste?
  • The moralistic and the naturalistic fallacy
    It's a synonym for mental phenomena, yes.Terrapin Station

    It's not so confusing when you use it as a synonym for mental phenomena in general - precise details will vary from subject to subject. Confusion arises when you use 'subjective' to describe a single instance ( e.g. Banno's preference for Darjeeling) - it's not based on anyone's personal feelings, tastes, or opinions - it is a personal feeling/taste.
  • The moralistic and the naturalistic fallacy
    The way I use the terms, which is a common way to use them in philosophy contexts, is that "subjective" refers to mental phenomena (which on my view is a subset of brain function) and "objective" refers to the complement--everything other than mental phenomena, or the mind-independent world.Terrapin Station

    Ok but I find your usage confusing (it can be confused with the more commonplace usage I cited earlier). If all mental phenomena are subjective why not just call them mental phenomena - the use of subjective seems to be unnecessary.
  • The moralistic and the naturalistic fallacy
    Taking what you believe to be a "literal" meaning of a dictionary definition, and approaching philosophy as if everyone must be using the dictionary definition you looked at, in what you took to be its "literal" sense, will leave you perpetually confused.Terrapin Station

    A dictionary definition is simply an indication of common usage, That's all.

    I'm just attempting to understand your usage.
  • The moralistic and the naturalistic fallacy

    One definition of subjective is "based on or influenced by personal feelings, tastes, or opinions."

    I'd have thought brain states aren't based on or influenced by personal feelings, tastes, or opinions they are personal feelings, tastes, or opinions .
  • The moralistic and the naturalistic fallacy
    Rising global temperatures are different than beliefs about rising global temperatures.Terrapin Station

    What's the relevant difference? Is it, in your view, simply that one exists as a brain state and the other doesn't?
  • The moralistic and the naturalistic fallacy
    The distinction is that the preference for Darjeeling only occurs in brains, whereas the temperatures occur elsewhere.Terrapin Station

    Beliefs about rising global temperatures only occur in brains. I still don't see the distinction.
  • The moralistic and the naturalistic fallacy
    It makes sense to talk of my preference for Darjeeling as being subjective, and it makes sense to talk of rising global average temperatures as being objective. — Banno

    I dont see the distinction.
    Harry Hindu

    I don't see the distinction either.
  • We're conscious beings. Why?
    I'm not sure what we're referring to re "some of them are not conscious."Terrapin Station

    Why ask me? It was Unseen's claim:

    Some of the most successful creatures on the planet, in terms of survival, are not conscious.Unseen
  • We're conscious beings. Why?
    Do you think it's possible you are actually on the surface of the Moon?Unseen

    No, why do you ask?

    I'm simply saying that your claim to know that some creatures are not conscious with the same certainty that you know you're not on the surface of the moon is an unjustified leap of faith.

    The reasonable approach, given the impossibility of any direct evidence, would be to keep an open mind.
  • We're conscious beings. Why?
    Based on everything we know, it's a reasonable a justifiable assumption that amoeba can't have experience.Unseen
    It's one thing to say your belief that some creatures are not conscious is a reasonable assumption (debatable but not particularly controversial) but quite another to say you know it with certainty as you did earlier:

    I know it with about the same certainty as I know that I'm not writing from the surface of the moon.Unseen

    It's this that I take issue with.
  • We're conscious beings. Why?
    But I just told you the evidence we have. What's the objection to it? (And the evidence had better not amount to it not being certain.)Terrapin Station

    I don't have any objection to it - I just don't think it's "good" evidence.

    I assume that you agree that all our beliefs are supported by varying degrees of evidence (ranging from pretty tenuous to to pretty much cast iron). I just think that the evidence for any belief that "Some of the most successful creatures on the planet, in terms of survival, are not conscious." is more tenuous than cast iron.
  • We're conscious beings. Why?
    If "assumptions" can be things we believe on plenty of good evidence, though that seems like an unusual way to use that term.Terrapin Station

    If you think assumptions about consciousness in other creatures are based on "plenty of good evidence" when no one has any concrete evidence of consciousness in any entity other than ourselves, then we disagree about what constitutes "good" evidence.
  • We're conscious beings. Why?
    I'm telling you what i meant. Nobody else can do that. Not even you. LOLUnseen

    Sure but I'm simply responding to your words. In your first response to my claim that your belief that some creatures are not conscious you replied:

    I know it with about the same certainty as I know that I'm not writing from the surface of the moon. — Unseen

    But you now seem to be saying that this belief is in fact an assumption that, in your mind, is justified:

    Assumptions can be justified.Unseen

    Well of course they can! But this assumption is based on the complete absence of any concrete evidence of consciousness in any entity other than ourselves.

    All I'm objecting to is your introduction of the notion that other (presumably non-human) evolutionarily successful creatures are non-conscious is a given. It's not. It's an assumption.
  • We're conscious beings. Why?
    There's plenty of evidence--behavioral, structural, etc. It just doesn't support a conclusion that's certain (or proved--but that's a truism with empirical evidence period) and people fall back on that completely ignorant "either certainty or it's a stab-in-the-dark guess" dichotomy.Terrapin Station

    "People" may fall back on that simplistic dichotomy but I'm not aware that I've fallen into that trap. I'm simply saying that beliefs about consciousness in any entity other than ourselves are, by necessity, assumptions. It's the Opening Poster who claims that some creatures are not conscious is a certainty and not an assumption.
  • We're conscious beings. Why?
    You're making a category error. I don't assume that I am conscious. I know that directly. I assume others are conscious, but admit that I may be wrong.Unseen

    Ok but you did say you assumed "we" are conscious not that others were conscious.

    So it seems that you assume others are conscious but you are "certain" that some others (creatures) are not conscious. My point is that both these beliefs are assumptions (you have no unassumed evidence of consciousness/lack of consciousness in any human/creature).
  • We're conscious beings. Why?
    I have never said that my belief that I'm conscious is an assumption.Unseen

    I thought you did:

    The OP is a question; WHY are we conscious and the only assumption embodied in it is that we ARE conscious. Of course, maybe we're not.Unseen
  • We're conscious beings. Why?
    Assumptions can be quite logical and rational.Unseen

    Of course, but you don't seem to be consistent.

    You say that your belief that you are conscious is an assumption but you believe with certainty that some creatures are not conscious.

    It seems to me that the first is self-evident whilst the second is, and can only ever be, a pure assumption.
  • We're conscious beings. Why?
    Of course, maybe we're not.Unseen

    You're not certain that you are conscious? You've lost me.
  • We're conscious beings. Why?
    I know it [that some creatures are not conscious] with about the same certainty as I know that I'm not writing from the surface of the moon.Unseen

    You use the term 'certainty' differently to me. I'd say you have a working hypothesis based purely on assumptions.
  • We're conscious beings. Why?
    Some of the most successful creatures on the planet, in terms of survival, are not conscious.Unseen

    This is an assumption. You can't possibly know it with certainty.
  • We're conscious beings. Why?
    I don't take or issue reading assignments, but it sounds like you might be interested in aScientific American article titled There Is No Such Thing As conscious Thought by philosopher Peter Carruthers..Unseen

    Very interesting. Thanks.
  • We're conscious beings. Why?
    since we could operate automatically on the pre-conscious mind without having experiences at all.Unseen

    What's your evidence for this belief?
  • Subject and object
    .
    You are here using "objective" in a way that differs from the one set out in the OP.Banno
    Yes. I don't think your use reflects how the term is commonly used.

    "I prefer vanilla ice" is a subjective statement in accord with the use set out in the OP. It is true only if the speaker does have a certain preference.

    But it is also a statement of fact.
    Banno

    Presumably "I have brown hair" is an objective statement in accord with the use set out in the OP (not a statement of taste, feelings or opinion). It is true only if the speaker does have brown hair.

    You seem to be saying that statements of fact about the physical state of one's brain (one's brain state) are subjective, but statements about the physical state of one's hair (hair colour) are not subjective.

    I just don't follow the rationale for this (what does it achieve?) and it certainly doesn't seem to reflect my experience of common usage.


    .
  • Subject and object
    . If they actually do mean "Shakespeare is a brilliant writer" without any caveats, then they are just plain wrong, not subjectively right.Isaac

    I've always taken the "it's subjective" response as just another way of saying they're plain wrong if they think there's an objective fact of the matter.
  • Subject and object
    But I'm not sure myself how commonly it is used outside of philosophy,Isaac

    In my experience it's quite common ("subjective" not necessarily "subjectively true").
  • Subject and object
    So I'm still not seeing why we need a special category of truth for any of this.Isaac

    I'm not suggesting we do. But it remains the case that the term "subjectively true" is in common use.

    I'm just trying to make sense of what might commonly be meant by the term.