we are impressed by the shape of the grammar, as if it's shape meant something, yet we all know what it means. — Isaac

But language construction does mean something.

When some people say X is immoral they really don't mean that they personally feel that X is immoral.

Similarly some people apparently believe some works of art really are beautiful (i.e. they don't believe beauty is solely in the eye of the beholder).

The problem here is if you assume all such claims have an implied "In my opinion" attached to them then all such claims become objectively true. I think this would be confusing particularly in the case of moral claims.

But the belief that there is no external referent is in the mind of the speaker, — Isaac

All beliefs are in the mind. Whether or not an external referent exists is objectively true or false. So. no, I don't see any difficulty.

"I prefer...", if stated sincerely, is objectively true - its truth is not dependent on anyone's opinion.
— ChrisH

Isn't it dependent on the opinion of the speaker? — Banno

No it's a statement of fact. I suppose you could argue that all statements of fact are "dependent on the opinion of the speaker". I'm not sure how useful that would be.

What would be the subjective truth expressed in the above example "anchovies are disgusting"? Something like 'I find anchovies disgusting'? — Janus

Yes. It's subjectively true for anyone who does find anchovies disgusting.

I think this is a classic example of a philosophical problem which dissolves when one looks closely at the language. — Isaac

I don't think this is true.

If one say "anchovies are disgusting" I don't think they are making a claim about anchovies at all, they're making a claim about their state of mind, it just sounds like they're making a claim about anchovies — Isaac

The language is quite clearly the language of objectivity - the intention may not be to make an objective claim, but the language construction is identical to an objective claim.

So "anchovies are disgusting" is just as much an objective claim as "anchovies are fish" because "anchovies are disgusting" means "I don't like anchovies". — Isaac

Of course, if you take it for granted that it is intended that all such apparently objective claims are qualified by the assumed but unspoken "In my view/opinion" then the problem dissolves. But this is quite an assumption and clearly not warranted in all cases when it comes to moral claims.

it seems to me that it's reasonable to describe ostensibly objective claims for which it is believed there is no external (extramental) objective referent as "subjectively true". This has the benefit of reflecting how the term is commonly used.

I think I would go as far as to say this renders subjective truth meaningless, in that it would only ever refer to a category of truths for which there could not possibly be an objective equivalent and thus the distinction is irrelevant to the truth value. — Isaac

I'm afraid I'm not sure I follow what you're saying here.

It seems to me that it makes sense to say that claims such 'as anchovies are disgusting' and 'abortion is immoral' are subjectively true/false (dependent on individual perspective) because they're not explicitly statements of personal preference and neither do they reference external facts of evaluation (they're not extramental as Terrapin Station would say).

What if a person states that "I don't like vanilla" recalling their last experience, and their friend says "No, you do. Don't you remember that vanilla cake I made you which you liked". A response might be "ah yes, I was mistaken". — Isaac

Sure, that's why added the later edit making it clear that I was talking specifically about a neuroscience lab context.

It matters because you're defining truth with it, and yet you do not know it. Truth is a word we use, if it only refers to that which we cannot know it would be pretty useless. — Isaac

I take your point. I think my use of "sincerely" was unnecessary. The point I was trying to make was that statements of preference refer to objective states of affairs and can, in principle (advanced neuroscience), be evaluated as true or false.

If someone used to dislike vanilla, but now likes it, presumably at some point their situation changed. Unless that change happens exactly contemperaneously with the first direct experience of it, then it is possible for someone to claim not to like vanilla but have a brain state exactly identical to that of liking vanilla. — Isaac

I don't think this represents a mistake. When one reports a food preference, it's understood that this represents their latest experience of that food.How could it be anything else? (EDIT: I should make it clear the the above is specifically in the context of using someone's preferences to calibrate a neuroscientist's preference detection machine)

But how does anyone tell if it is stated sincerely. — Isaac

Why would this matter? There must be any number of things we don't know for which there is an objective fact of the matter?

If a person sincerely thought they did not like vanilla, but these future neuroscientists had a look and confirmed they did indeed like vanilla, would their sincere statement of preference be true still. — Isaac

I'm assuming this person has in fact tasted vanilla before declaring a dislike. In this case one would have to ask how the neuroscientists corroborated their view that that a particular brain state represented a liking for vanilla (when the person sincerely reports a dislike).

In other words, is it possible that a sane and competent English user could sincerely report a dislike of vanilla but be mistaken? I don't see how.

So that I prefer vanilla to chocolate ice-cream is a subjective fact - or if you prefer, it is a subjective truth. It's truth is dependent on my own taste. — Banno

That's not how I've always understood the distinction. My take:

"I prefer...", if stated sincerely, is objectively true - its truth is not dependent on anyone's opinion.

"I prefer..." , if stated insincerely, is objectively untrue - its truth is not dependent on anyone's opinion.

I've no idea if this is an idiosyncratic use, but I've certainly seen seen it put this way elsewhere.

If, in theory, we could mri scan somebody and neuroscience had advanced to a level where we can identify likes and dislikes, "I like pizza" might one day become objective. — Isaac

Which makes it, in principle, objective.

Hear, hear.

If moral stances are merely personal emotional responses then they would have no need of inter-subjective justification — Janus

Why? (the logic may seem obvious to you but it's not to me)

if your emotional responses are all that is required to justify your moral beliefs, why do you need to give reasons for them at all? — Janus

I don't understand what you're getting at here. I'd have thought a moral stance requires explanation (reasons) regardless of what they're based on.

Why would my moral stance on something not require explanation if it were based on an emotional response?

The problem I have is that I have no idea how anything qualifies as 'wrong in itself' (i.e. wrong even if no one believed it was wrong)?
— ChrisH

Reason, following Kant's dynamic in his categorical imperative... — tim wood

Sorry, but nothing in your response appears, to me, to address my concern.

According to the philosophy of Terrapin, et al, the 20th century murders by Hitler, Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot, Idi Amin, and a host of imitators are nothing whatsoever wrong in themselves. Apparently that's even a nonsensical idea. — tim wood

The problem I have is that I have no idea how anything qualifies as 'wrong in itself' (i.e. wrong even if no one believed it was wrong)?

Anyway, you see an error or have disagreement...im just wondering why this particular error is strange to you? — DingoJones

I think the bemusement stems from the fact that human emotional responses are dismissed so casually ("mere preferences"), in the context of morality, when emotional dispositions must surely be central to any test of 'well being' (or whatever you think is the purpose of morality).

Is that about right? — tim wood

You really should read the responses from the relativists on this thread. If you did, you wouldn't ask such absurd questions.

Why are human emotional responses so frequently characterised as mere preferences? Why can't they be, in the context of morality, profound and heartfelt passionate dispositions?

No where did I say all moral judgments are objective - only some, and maybe only a handful. — Rank Amateur

Yes and I attempted to explain to you that the notion that only some moral judgements are objective (and others may not be) makes no sense.

if you don't think it would matter to the subjective vs objective argument if 99% of the people in the world held the same moral view - You are right there is no need to keep chatting - — Rank Amateur

What do you mean by "same moral view". All you've established is acceptance here that a large majority of people will have similar moral views about one specific issue - 'child torture'. There are very many contentious moral issues facing us today which are far less clear cut and in my view it would be profoundly unhelpful for either side of these disputes to claim objective truth for their views.

is there some pragmatic difference between 99% of the world having the same moral view about some action and a high degree of moral objectivity about that action ? — Rank Amateur

The question makes no sense. Either a moral proposition is objectively true (true independent of anybody's "moral view") or it's not. The phrase "high degree of moral objectivity" makes no sense.

Other than the label you apply to it, is there some pragmatic difference between universal subjectivity and objectivity? — Rank Amateur

A proposition is subjective if its truth value is is dependent on personal feelings, tastes or opinions (i.e. existing in someone's mind rather than the external world)

A proposition is objective if it's truth value is independent of the person uttering it.

In other words if it's subjective it reflects how people feel rather than any mind independent reality. This was essentially what the OP and the ensuing exchanges have been about.

↪Isaac wondering your thought on this as well. Can you imagine, except for some incredibly minute exceptions, that any human being could actually be honest with their conscience, and say it would be moral to needlessly torture innocent children? — Rank Amateur

I can but even if we accept for the sake of argument that no such people exist, then all you have then is universal intersubjectivity. It doesn't get you an objective morality.

And if that is the case than there is no real truth statement we can make about slavery. — Rank Amateur

Yes!

↪ChrisH not sure I can. It is very evident i have no ability at all to communicate effectively. And it is not important to the point I started this with. It was an aside. — Rank Amateur

But it is important! Your comment ("it would mean...") suggests a profound misunderstanding of the position you have been taking issue with throughout this discussion.

i can't actually see how your caveat above is even possible - it would mean an individual would say the abolitionist and the slave holder have equal valid views according to his judgement - — Rank Amateur

Sorry but could you explain the logic of how you get from what I said to "it would mean an individual would say..."

if the morality of slavery is an individual moral judgement, than the judgem noent of the slave owner and the abolitionist are in no way superior, better, more correct ( fill in a word you like) — Rank Amateur

If you mean there's no non-subjective standard by which to assess disparate moral judgements, then yes, you're right. But it does not follow from this that disparate moral judgements are all seen, in any sense, as 'equally valid' by any single individual.

Answering this for myself: valid in the sense of being valid, and from the "perspective" of what being valid is and entails, i.e., the rules and their consequences. — tim wood

Sorry, but I'm struggling to make sense of this.

each as true, real, meaningful, correct, right. — Rank Amateur

But this is begging the question (it assumes as fact the very thing that's in dispute).

That "individual [moral] judgements" are the kinds of things that can be "true" or "correct" is what, I thought, was in question here.

4. The morality or immorality of slavery is an individual judgement.

All of us just make our own judgement - each as valid as the other. — Rank Amateur

"Valid" in what sense, and from whose perspective?

'Universal' doesn't necessarliy mean 'objective'.
— ChrisH

I undersatand that, but it does not answer how we as human beings have near universal moral judgments on many things, if — Rank Amateur

You've lost me. What does "it" refer to above?

In any event, there's not much 'universal' about attitudes to abortion, homosexuality, animal rights, social welfare, health provision etc, etc. Doesn't seem to me to be any evidence of an objectively correct solution to these thorny moral issues.

What is the difference then between near universal agreement and nearly objective? — Rank Amateur

'Universal' doesn't necessarliy mean 'objective'.

Yes, so it is an empirical question. For one interesting piece of empirical research on what people believe, see https://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/on-the-human/2010/12/objective-moral-truths/ . Also see Brian Leiter's comment which brings up relevant issues. — Andrew M

Thanks. That was interesting.

Tim Maudlin's comment reflected my concerns about this 'experiment':

What the philosophical debate is about is whether moral claims have objective truth conditions. What “the folk” think about the matter is neither here nor there. If one is interested in that sociological question, that’s fine, but presenting this issue as pertinent to the “long and complex philosophical debate” obscures the nature of the research being done. — Tim Maudlin

Do you think people ordinarily intend objectivity when making moral claims? — Andrew M

Some may, Some may not. Do most people have a clear idea of 'philosophical' objectivity (whatever that is)?

It seems to me that people use moral language in many different ways and senses. As you pointed out earlier "people use language in more nuanced ways than they're often given credit for"..

People use moral terms as if morality were objective. — Andrew M

People use gustatory language as if gustatory properties were objective ("the pizza is delicious").

People use language inconsistently.

Because your usage simply does not reflect how words such as like and dislike are commonly used. — ChrisH
Oh? How is that determined? — Moliere

From observing common usage.

…..sometimes that's not what we mean or have -- we have different emotions towards the same person or aspect. — Moliere

That we have mixed emotions about a person is not surprising. There are many aspects to a person, some of which give rise to negative emotional responses others positive but never both simultaneously. Do you have a simple counterexample?

Why? — Moliere

Because your usage simply does not reflect how words such as like and dislike are commonly used.

I asked you earlier for an example of an indivisible aspect of an object of evalutaion which resulted in both a 'like' and 'dislike' response. Can you come up with anything?

ChrisH -- this is still farily general, but more specific. Does this help? — Moliere

I think I understand what you're saying but I disagree (I don't think you accurately account for what's going on in a "love-hate" relationship).

The term "love-hate" is fine as a high level, poetic description of a particular relationship but I'm pretty sure that if you were to analyse what's going on you'd find that certain aspects are 'loved' and other, quite different aspects, were 'hated'. I know you don't accept this explanation and believe that the same, indivisible, aspect can be both 'loved' and 'hated'. In my view this is implausible.

I'd say it is possible to desire X, and to desire the abolition of X. — Moliere

Can you give an example?

What's the difference? I'd say that this is exactly what temptation looks like -- to object to something yet want it. — Moliere

They're different competing desires. It's simply not possible to simultaneously desire X and not desire X.

Though, one must ask, what is even the point of judging others? — Tzeentch

That's what moral discourse is all about - to encourage/influence the behaviour of others (eg peer pressure).

I'd say it serves no other purpose than masturbation of the ego. — Tzeentch

I'd say you misunderstand morality and moral discourse.