Consciousness simply can't be explained. — GraveItty
It's obvious to everyone, but it's an object for no-one. — Wayfarer
Spatiotemporal analysis (with evidence):
Say, my supper is locatable, left-to-right, movable, breakable (i.e. object-like), my experiences thereof occur, come and go, are interruptible (i.e. process-like).
• Suppose
x is defined as non-spatial, "outside of space". Well, then obviously
x is nowhere to be found, no place. Cannot have any extent, volume/area/length, not even zero-dimensional (like a mathematical singularity).
· A demarcation: objects are spatial, left to right, front to back, top to bottom, locatable, movable, breakable (under conservation).
• Suppose
x is defined as atemporal, "outside of time". Well, then
x was/is nowhen, no simultaneity. No duration involved, cannot change, can't be subject to causation, can't interact, inert and lifeless (at most).
· A demarcation: processes are temporal, come and go, occur, interruptible (interaction/event-causation).
The closest to non-spatiotemporal in the literature seems to be
abstracts, like sterile inhabitants of Platonia.
Minds partake in the world, interact,
both ways, are active, are in fact parts of the world. It's a hallmark that minds are temporal, process-like; experiences come and go, occur, are interruptible.
Some entertain the notion that consciousness is a container (e.g. of experiences) that can be empty, yet the only evident container is the body.
Note, though, there is a sort of space-time duality here (distinct from substance dualism). Mind isn't object-like, that'd be a category mistake, rather mind is more clearly process-like.
We do know
some things, but we don't know
exactly what it all is, and, perhaps more pertinently, we don't know what it can all do together. Mystifying isn't a particularly good response as such.