A "necessary fact" is only true in (all) impossible worlds. — 180 Proof

Unless you include the abstracs that were presupposed by the logic itself in the first place (like consistency), I guess.
But who the heck ever worshiped, assigned mind to, personified, chatted with, wrote religious scriptures about "the law of consistency"?

There are various entities which, if they exist, would be candidates for necessary beings: God, propositions, relations, properties, states of affairs, possible worlds, and numbers, among others. Note that the first entity in this list is a concrete entity, while the rest are abstract entities. — God and Other Necessary Beings (SEP)

FYI, there are all kinds of (lengthy) docs about modal logic out there.

Modal Logic (SEP)
Modal logic (Wikipedia)
Modal Logic: A Contemporary View (IEP)
Modal logic (Britannica)
The impact of modal logic (Routledge)

We typically uphold self-identity and consistency in general (or meaning is forfeit). Modal logic introduces possible and necessary. Possible worlds are self-consistent. For something to be possible it holds in a possible world (∃ quantifier), and for something to be necessary it holds in all possible worlds (∀ quantifier).

Can anyone come up with a shorter description? :)

(As an aside, possible things might lend themselves to verification, and necessary things lend themselves moreso to falsification.)

We may also speak of p being necessary or sufficient for q, but that's a different matter.

, Anselm's God was a self-identical intervening/interacting intelligence. Most are.

Tillich and Eagleton, on the other hand, have abstracted all life out of God.

God does not exist. He is being-itself beyond essence and existence. Therefore to argue God exists is to deny Him. It is as atheistic to affirm God as it is to deny Him. God is being-itself, not a being. — Tillich

God is not a person in the sense that Al Gore arguably is. Nor is he a principle, an entity, or ‘existent’: in one sense of that word it would be perfectly coherent for religious types to claim that God does not in fact exist. He is, rather, the condition of possibility of any entity whatsoever, including ourselves. He is the answer to why there is something rather than nothing. — Eagleton (link updated)

I'm not quite sure this qualifies as theism. Here God is an abstract idea, relegated out of it all, something else that's a prerequisite for existence (except the word "something" is invalid). We might call this referent-free idea anything, doesn't have to be related to theism in particular. What can coherently be said thereof, that's of relevance to religious adherents (or to anyone for that matter)? Some parts of this stuff read more like plays on words, or an expression giving an exercise that might be interesting to ponder for a bit.

(As an aside, compare with the Olympians. Once they weren't found on Mount Olympus, they were reassigned to "otherworldly realms". Compare with Sagan's garage dragon.)

Anyway, the original idea isn't that hard to follow. Someone declares G a necessary being, which is in fact a definition by way of the modal terminology. This allows us to reason about G, and that shows G doesn't exist as declared. If we toss logic, then we toss the modal logic. Is that really needed in order to maintain gods/God?

All explanation consists in trying to find something simple and ultimate on which everything else depends. And I think that by rational inference what we can get to that’s simple and ultimate is God. But it’s not logically necessary that there should be a God. The supposition ‘there is no God’ contains no contradiction. — British (Christian) theologian Richard Swinburne (2009)

Well, these aren't proof, just some musings of English poet Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792-1822):

If he is infinitely good, what reason should we have to fear him?
If he is infinitely wise, why should we have doubts concerning our future?
If he knows all, why warn him of our needs and fatigue him with our prayers?
If he is everywhere, why erect temples to him?
If he is just, why fear that he will punish the creatures that he has filled with weaknesses?
If grace does everything for them, what reason would he have for recompensing them?
If he is all-powerful, how offend him, how resist him?
If he is reasonable, how can he be angry at the blind, to whom he has given the liberty of being unreasonable?
If he is immovable, by what right do we pretend to make him change his decrees?
If he is inconceivable, why occupy ourselves with him?
If he has spoken, why is the universe not convinced?
If the knowledge of a God is the most necessary, why is it not the most evident and the clearest? — The Necessity of Atheism (1811)

, I'd suggest digging around out there for various commentaries on the things you list.

, is it worthwhile mentioning that people do jump ship? Be it between faiths or to/from nontheism?
What you mention exemplifies doxastic involuntarism because, well, someone else (parents) chose for them. (I'll just call it directed indoctrination, though it shares something with enculturation.)
Anyway, formation (and revision) of beliefs aren't trivial matters I guess, but surely incorrigibility isn't a virtue.

, yeah, the apologist gap.

Two categories of deities:

• Stories: Here gods/God are various narrated characters, found in all kinds of (diverse, mutually inconsistent, lush, sumptuous) religious texts and such. Elaborate. Divine intervention. Adherents go by rituals, commands/rules, impositions, fate designations, they have public aspects (and advertising), etc.
• Definitions: Here gods/God are defined by apologists (or theologians), and definitions may vary. Idealized abstractions, or otherwise vague and nebulous. Some are results of apologetic arguments. They usually don't differentiate, say, theism and deism, and some are more panpsychist or Spinozist (or whatever) than others.

The former cannot be derived from the latter - the apologist gap.

The former is by far the most common in terms of professed faiths - people worship in temples, churches, mosques, synagogues, by altars, etc - preachers indoctrinate and proselytize. This category is also politically active, and so warrants some attention due to that alone.

The latter may be more philosophical if you will.

While looking around, I've come across a few people that lean towards straight atheism on the former category, the story characters, and lean towards agnosticism (or indifference) regarding unassuming deism and such. Unassuming deism is sort of in a category with simulation hypotheses, The Matrix, brain in a vat thought experiments, or whatever. Anyway, this then introduces an ambiguity: persons with two different attitudes, depending on what we're talking about. If this isn't pointed out where applicable, then confuzzlement follows, perhaps mobile goalposts.

People who believe in God typically don't do so on the grunds grounds of some philosophical arguments. Instead, they were born and raised to believe in God, and everything else follows from there. — baker

Right. So indoctrination works. (y) And, taken as a methodology, indoctrination doesn't differentiate the target faiths, any will do, and it works just the same. Whether Jesus is divine, or whether Sathya Sai Baba was a Shiva avatar, doesn't matter as far as indoctrination is concerned, it'll work just fine either way. Directed indoctrination, therefore, isn't a reliable means to discover the truth of the matter. (n) But I think this should be fairly clear.

problems with the notion of a necessary being — Banno

(necessary and possible are terms in modal logic, like the possible worlds formulation thereof)

The bare necessities:

Is R³ (or Q³, doesn't matter) self-consistent? Sure. It's a mathematical thing, so, in a sense, it shares a category with (modal) logic.

Anyway, so, R³ is a possible world, a boring, barren, inert, lifeless world. No minds here, nothing worthy of worship, nothing resembling any deities or what-have-you. For G to be necessary, G would have to hold up or be present in R³, all possible worlds actually. It follows, then, that any such G can't be a mind, isn't worthy of worship, is rather inert and lifeless, which does not seem like any gods/God preached by the theists out there.

Assuming that the theists would like their gods/God to show up, defining/asserting gods/God as necessary is a bad move. (Not that wishing makes it so anyway.)

Well this is what’s interesting about it our predecessor, God, who existed before we did. We sure as hell did not pop into existence by accident some God had a hand in all of this can assure you of that. — Deus

I thought that us suddenly popping into existence :sparkle: was your sort of thing?
Well, who says we did anyway?

1. we already know that more complex can come about from simpler
(implicit here is some notion of ours of simple and complex)
2. complex coming about from more complex leads to an infinite regress, apparently a vicious rather than benign one
3. say, life from non-life, for example, is rational enough

People might have different attitudes towards, say, Sunnism and unassuming deism:

There's a worthwhile distinction to make here.

Stories: Here gods/God are various narrated characters, found in religious texts and such. These are more elaborate (and often include divine intervention), and adherents go by rituals, commands/rules, impositions, fate designations, they have public aspects (and advertising), etc.

Definitions: Here gods/God are defined by apologists, and definitions may vary. Some are results of apologetic arguments. Some do not differentiate, say, theism and deism, and some are more panpsychist or Spinozist (or whatever) than others.

The distinction matters because people have different attitudes towards the two.
Additionally, the former category is typically where we see social impacts, be it in politics or interfering in people's lives or some such, so these warrant more attention.
Also, you cannot derive the former from the latter.

I'd suggest setting out what's meant so as to anchor goalposts and minimize ambiguities. — https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/554551

Yeah, the real world sucks because people don't know what real freedom is.
I've lost my faith in government, especially after COVID. The government passes laws, in other words, restrictions. Restrictions take away freedom. People need freedom to be happy and flourish. Really basic concept. — Kasperanza

So take SARS-CoV-2 to court.

Who goes to shit where their kids eat?
Or their kids' kids?
Climate impact, pollution, increasing extinctions, ...
Perhaps now is a good time to consider the longer term.
At least try to avoid some future suffering?
There's an ethical thing going on here.
But of course anyone is free to have no such considerations, to not care.

not a Christian source — Apollodorus

The Westminster thing is better, though.
Seems like political correctness is ethics, or moral philosophy, oughts, pre/proscriptive.

Religion should inform ethics? No. Divine command theory, theological voluntarism, ...? No. Accountability to an imaginary friend rather than your fellow humans? No.

(..., 2013, 2016, 2019, 2020, ...)

About ethics, what is right and what is wrong. — Apollodorus

Religion should inform ethics? No. Divine command theory, theological voluntarism, ...? No. Accountability to an imaginary friend rather than your fellow humans? No.

(..., 2013, 2016, 2019, 2020, ...)

[religion and morality] are to be defined differently and have no definitional connections with each other. Conceptually and in principle, morality and a religious value system are two distinct kinds of value systems or action guides. — The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics

Well, to be quite honest, I think to make Bible interpretation subject to political correctness would amount to knowingly sabotaging your own effort. Religion and philosophy should inform politics, not the other way round. — Apollodorus

I thought political correctness was over in ethics.
After all, that's what it's about, regardless of what the wording may suggest.

Religion should inform politics? About what?
(..., 2013, 2016, 2019, 2020, ...)

, so G is a simpleton, simpler than a raindrop. :)
Well, minds are at least complex enough to express things like ...

If the human brain were so simple that we could understand it, we would be so simple that we couldn't. — George E Pugh (1977), accredited to Emerson M Pugh (1938)

I have a feeling that various worshipers aren't on board with their ehh friend being so simple.
Then again, it seems these G-ideas are free for the taking, contradictions included, and regardless that G never shows and isn't shown.

, you're free to believe whatever (ir/rational alike).
If you want others to believe the same, or take you seriously, then they may ask you for justification.
They'd be equally free to not take your word for it.

_{Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy » The Analysis of Knowledge » 1. Knowledge as Justified True Belief}

But I am inclined to agree with Berkeley, and predict that many of the objections to such ideas will be lapidiary, although we'll have to wait and see. — Wayfarer

But why? (agree, predict, ...)
Minds are parts of the world, there are things that depend thereupon, but (literally) everything? :brow:



@Nelson E Garcia, not really seeing any (good) responses to inquiries.

What would then happen if we "actualized" the Moon (or each other) differently?
What about new discoveries? Are they somehow actualized unconsciously...?
If only I could actualize covid-19 immunity for my mum. What's with the constraints? [...]

Oh, keep in mind that what you don't know can still kill you. ;)
Anyway, I'm certainly not going to universalize self-dependence.
Kind of haphazard, unwarranted, questionable, ...

the substratum is independent of mind but it does not amount to existence, it pre-exists — Nelson E Garcia

I take my previous statement back, the plot is now diluting.

What would then happen if we "actualized" the Moon (or each other) differently?
What about new discoveries? Are they somehow actualized unconsciously...?
If only I could actualize covid-19 immunity for my mum. What's with the constraints? [...]

If things were wholly of my own making, actualized, then I couldn't really misunderstand or get something wrong about them. I'd know already. Something's amiss, @Nelson E Garcia.

Very good — Wayfarer

Not really. (I guess there are reasons only 4.3% of academic philosophers go down this rabbit hole; dead end.)

there is no existence without mind actualizing it — Nelson E Garcia

What would then happen if we "actualized" the Moon (or each other) differently?
What about new discoveries? Are they somehow actualized unconsciously...?
If only I could actualize covid-19 immunity for my mum. What's with the constraints? Oh yes, I'd like a word with whoever actualized the virus. Maybe they could just go ahead and uhh unactualize.

Apollodorus, the external objects are a synthesis of the external substratum (which lacks any details) and mind. Mind is not an “observer” (since there are not traits that can be observed) it attributes details to the substratum and then identifies the attribution (at the external location of the substratum targeted). — Nelson E Garcia

The plot thickens. :)
Well, is this "substratum" then existentially mind-independent?

they have to have some explanation for how brains produce consciousness — RogueAI

I guess so?
Presently, "don't know" seems to be the honest response, the only honest response, at least as far as any comprehensive understanding goes.
(And that makes for some dishonesty out there, doesn't it?)
There are reasons to associate minds and bodies, though, pretty good reasons.

Yet, theism doesn't explain this sort of thing either.
Typically, the response is a bit like that of idealism: mind is instead just assumed to be irreducibly basic, and so not explainable in terms of anything else in the first place.
With theism, there's that vague "supernatural" or "magical" type undertone as well, which could be raised to explain anything, and thus explains nothing.

Levine's explanatory gap / Chalmers' consciousness conundrum seems to stuff a wedge in between either explaining the other (which isn't a contradiction, but rather a gap), yet that's not related to theism in particular.

Just asserting that we can't acquire more understanding (say, in some sort of "physicalistic" terms), even in principle, won't do.

There's a worthwhile distinction to make here.

Stories: Here gods/God are various narrated characters, found in religious texts and such. These are more elaborate (and often include divine intervention), and adherents go by rituals, commands/rules, impositions, fate designations, they have public aspects (and advertising), etc.

Definitions: Here gods/God are defined by apologists, and definitions may vary. Some are results of apologetic arguments. Some do not differentiate, say, theism and deism, and some are more panpsychist or Spinozist (or whatever) than others.

The distinction matters because people have different attitudes towards the two.
Additionally, the former category is typically where we see social impacts, be it in politics or interfering in people's lives or some such, so these warrant more attention.
Also, you cannot derive the former from the latter.

I'd suggest setting out what's meant so as to anchor goalposts and minimize ambiguities.

@Benkei, I'm wondering if lessons from other campaigns could be re-used.
Maybe, say, child labor, or something? Don't really know enough about it though. (NCLC, UNICEF, UN, AI)

Morals are subjective in the sense that they're existentially mind-dependent.
Morals are objective in the sense that they're not random (ad hoc, arbitrary, discretionary, mere matter of opinion).
So I just voted subjective. Not convinced that subjective-versus-objective is all that relevant, though.

By and large, we (humans) have two legs. Exceptions are rare, and we might explain them in some way. Does that mean "two-legged-ness" itself exists wholly and independently of all else...? Not really, at least not in any discernible way, and it's not necessary anyway. Similarly, morals can be existentially mind-dependent and shared among such minds, without existing independently thereof.

Does it make sense to speak of morals for ...
• a person torturing a rock? No (bit creepy though)
• a rock torturing a person? No
• a rock torturing another rock? No
• a person torturing another person? Yes
Which suggests that morals are of and applicable to persons, to experiencing social minds.

Maybe not the best examples, but, anyway, ...

Contrive a possible world in which a contradiction occurs: in which both P and ~P are the case, in some direct fashion. then in that world, since (P & ~P) ⊃ Q, anything goes. That is, any and every assertion is both true and false.

That is, in a world containing a contradiction, reason becomes impossible. — Banno

Not just that, identity (p ⇔ p) is gone, and meaning (whatever is said could mean anything and the contrary). Seems rather meaningless. Or more pertinently here, God is meaningless.

What you need to "get" is that believers don't see you (or any critical person, whether theist or atheist) as someone with whom to discuss their beliefs. It seems that to them, it's a bit like discussing one's underwear with strangers in the street. Not something a decent person would do. — baker

Don't know about @tim wood specifically, but otherwise I beg to differ.
There are preachers, proselytizers, priests, imams, pujas (and indoctrinators) just about everywhere doing their thing. Often enough they refuse to carry their onus probandi, heck, at times they insist what your epistemic standards have to be. Then they have their faiths interfere in other people's lives, politics, etc.
But, never mind this comment if you're having a 1-1 chat with @tim wood, nothing to see here. :)

not accidental or coincidental but intrinsic — Wayfarer

Right, yet that doesn't really answer the inquiry in this context.

(Seems a bit like kicking the can down the road.) — jorndoe

Is it by coincidence/accident that goodness is intrinsic to God?
There aren't any particular conceptual barriers otherwise or to the contrary; we just end up back at the Euthyphro.
Anyway, maybe (this incarnation of) God has no particular say.
Incidentally, the Manichaeists had their own take, which is somewhat better, in some ways at least.

By the way, Rahner's idea and similar could, in principle, be grabbed by anyone, and has.
The Muslims say that everyone's born Muslim (Noah, Jesus, you, I, aliens?).
We might say that anyone is just born neutral, good, bad, and anything in between, and then may become Catholic, Sunni, whatever, or not, and do deeds that are good and bad (anyone can concoct/hijack a narrative).
If something is surmised to have been installed by God, then why not just drop the extras (God) and say that the "something" is intrinsic to (our experiencing) minds, analogous to most of us having two legs?
This one at least has evidence going for it, but what's it mean for the take that Craig expresses (if anything)?

Anyway, I don't see a particular way out of the Euthyphro yet.

, anyone, does Craig's response mean that God's goodness is coincidental/accidental? (Seems a bit like kicking the can down the road.)
On another note, what does Craig's identity (God himself = the paradigm of goodness) mean for people doing the right thing (irrespective of their beliefs)? Coincidental/accidental? Say, do they somehow become part of God or something (un/wittingly)? Surely Aboriginal Australians did some good things before being polluted with ideas of Craig's God, err before the European invasions.

I suppose, if you don't reinvent the wheel, but build it as taught, then you're both a builder and also in a great position to find flaws. And you'll have saved time, too. Might even have time to build wagons. And carts. :)

The sky is the limit

:D Just a couple of observations:

Yes. Morality is not a human construct. Some things are. My house, my trousers, my money. And some things aren't. Morality being one. — Bartricks

No argument, no justification, bare assertion.

Jeez, why oh why don't they teach philosophy in schools?? You probably know another language and some algebra, but no philosophy, right? Unbelievable. Ethics is, by its very nature, the most important topic possible, yet they don't teach it in schools, with the result that it is only a tiny philosophical elite who know that morality is not a human construct (and we've known it for thousands of years). The rest of you are fated by your ghastly over-confidence and ignorance to spend the rest of your lives convinced - utterly convinced - that morality is a human construct on the basis of incompetent reasoning. I'd feel sorry for you if ignorance wasn't such a cozy blanket.

Now I will enlighten you if you want, for I have gobs and gobs of expertise and I can assure you you're wrong about pretty much everything where morality is concerned. But it will be very unpleasant for you - you do realize this? — Bartricks

"You dumb, me smart, I know" takes up 87% of the post, still nothing shown, topically content-free (184 wasted words).

Anyway, carry on, never mind me, nothing to see here.

none of this seems to upset you or your God — praxis

And children suffer and die from cancer, without having had a chance to live. :(
Doesn't seem like reality is where people see their gods.
What about yours, @Apollodorus?

During Nazi times, some 94% of Germans were Christian.
Not quite equal numbers of Protestants and Catholics, but close enough.
That's about 19 on a street with 20 people.
Think about that for a moment.

• Religion in Nazi Germany (Wikipedia)
• Antisemitism in Christianity (Wikipedia)

45% think it is necessary to have faith in a God in order to be moral — Banno

They're wrong.
Moral awareness, and becoming an autonomous moral agent, isn't particularly related to theism.

Depends on the hobbies music science poetry gardening philosophy. If they have a materialist content, which they tend to do, then yes. — Apollodorus

You mean a guitar to play, flower seeds and a garden, a book to read, ...?

I think we have paid attention.

However, if countries with higher GDP per capita are less likely to tie belief in God to morality, this would appear to confirm the position of theists, viz., that the wealthier people are, the more they are inclined to believe in material possessions and less in God.

Otherwise put, man cannot have two masters, it’s either God or Mammon (Matthew 6:24). And the rich often go for the latter. The article seems to support this. — Apollodorus

Do interests in hobbies music science poetry gardening philosophy count as belief in material possessions?

, and more or less denied by the theists that Hick speaks on behalf of (and Craig, Chaturvedi, ...).
Apropos salvation, you're not going to find many Christians accepting Quran 4:157.
What does Hick have to say about salvation?
Remaking "the elephant" needs coherence, which means a good lot of vacuuming.
You're not going to accept contradictions, are you?

, I concede some of my comments; much too hasty.
The two researchers brought quantumatics in to amend the blockverse with blurry causation, in order to make better room for Christian/Biblical salvation — becoming saved by volition.

It's a stretched exercise in Christian/Biblical apologetics (with good benefits (y) ).

Anyway

What about the truth of the matter? (Isn't that what we're going for?)

Pretty bummed. I got the stupid shot and have not noticed any increase in my 5G signal. — Count Timothy von Icarus

:D Sure the damn conspiracy theorists

Let's try something else then, though still applicable to salvation (by Krishna, Jesus, Allah, or some such).

Doxastic involuntarism is easy enough to exemplify, i.e. a belief is not particularly "freely" chosen as such. That's typically belief formation from (convincing) evidence/reasoning, though faith may also have been chosen for you (indoctrination). It's the most common formation of beliefs, and seems to be the default/fallback position these days.

Doxastic voluntarism, i.e. to "freely" choose a belief, is more questionable, and examples seem more conditional. If taken as a methodology, more or less any belief is up for the taking; the methodology itself appears like a truth-maker instead. If there were (sufficient) reasons/evidence, then we'd move towards involuntarism, so voluntarism does not differentiate as such. This position was more common back in history.

What does it mean for salvation?
If faith is chosen for the person involuntarily (by indoctrination or something), then they can't really be accredited or blamed; they were assimilated, and belief revision may take more evidence/reasoning than in other cases. ^(†)
If by doxastic voluntarism, then more or less anything goes; belief is just chosen.
I don't think doxastic in/voluntarism is a strict exclusive-or, though I do think involuntarism would have to be involved here.
Any number of diverse (mutually inconsistent) religious faiths have equally diverse devout adherents, apparently with equal conviction and dedication.
So, anyway, going by the usual salvation schemes, some (supposed) "ultimate" arbiter would have to set the record straight for all to see?
What about the truth of the matter? (Isn't that what we're going for?)



^(†) There appears to be some sort of proportionality between incorrigibility and fundamentalism:

more radical participants displayed less insight into the correctness of their choices and reduced updating of their confidence when presented with post-decision evidence — Metacognitive Failure as a Feature of Those Holding Radical Beliefs (2018)

our findings highlight a generic resistance to recognizing and revising incorrect beliefs as a potential driver of radicalization — Metacognitive Failure as a Feature of Those Holding Radical Beliefs (2018)

• W L Craig's uniquely Christian explanation contra pluralism (or one of them): How Can Jesus Be the Only Way? (5m:19s) (there's a bit more variety than suggested, e.g. not all Buddhists believe the exact same, but no matter)

• Philosophical Implications of Religious Pluralism (2016)

It's a thesis in theology — Wayfarer

It's a stretched exercise in Christian/Biblical apologetics (with good benefits (y) ).
Which is fine I suppose.
Tags apart from Tales‘R’Us: #quantummechanics #time #salvation #jesus #bible

we suggest ways in which Indefinite Causal Order may facilitate developments in the metaphysics of time, all the while remaining cognizant of the fact that any such conclusions inevitably require some form of hedging one's bets

If the B-theory is true, this has significant repercussions for both morality and soteriology.

(1) Conclude that salvific change is impossible on a B-theory, and that therefore the doctrine of salvation must be rejected altogether.
(2) Try and reconceptualize the mechanism of salvific change so that it is coherent within a block universe.

, looks like you copy/pasted from the bottom of their paper?
Cited papers via ‪Google Scholar‬ are linked at their names above, check'em out.

Anyway, I'm not sure this quite counts as philosophy, definitely not science.
The McTaggart stuff, sure, philosophy, the rest is Christian/Biblical apologetics.

On an infinite past, time is complete at any moment if complete means that nothing's missing.
If complete means finite, then we've just shown what we assumed.

It's not difficult to derive counterintuitives.
Deriving a contradiction (p ∧ ¬p) is the task, though, at least it is if an infinite past is claimed impossible.

, I'm sort of thinking that perception itself is temporal or process-like (comes and goes, interruptible), and what we perceive (along with locations/distances, the located/distant) is change moreso than time.
I might be thinking wrong, though.
_{(I guess Hume, Kant, Russell left some imprints decades after reading and mostly forgotten.)}