Ah, the old telos debate. Surprised it took this long.

Out of curiosity, though, do you believe that there is a mind separate from the physical brain? You've been arguing as though you do, but I know you could just be playing Devil's Advocate. — JustSomeGuy

I dunno, I thought that was off topic and not related to your argument. :P

The humanities are suppose to point the direction of desirable cultural change. — apokrisis

How are they “supposed” to do anything? The role the humanities have played in history isn’t static.

I was bringing up an assumption in your argument, that’s all. I agree with the result at least. :-d

It’s not an issue of whether we have a belief within every possible, ridiculous hypothetical scenario, it’s an issue of whether belief is foundational to knowledge.

The whole hardware/software comparison is just one idea about the relationship between an immaterial mind or soul and the physical brain, it isn't the only way of looking at it. — JustSomeGuy

So?

You're making a lot of assumptions about both what the relationship between "mind" and brain would be, as well as the very nature of the immaterial mind or soul itself. — JustSomeGuy

No, I made one, that consciousness would be the software.

. If you want to make an argument for a specific version of an immaterial consciousness that influences belief, you are free to do so, and sure, that kind of consciousness would be incompatible with what I'm saying. — JustSomeGuy

My issue is that if belief is only situated in the physical brain, it’s essentially instinct; your example of the ape is essentially a discription of instinct. Human belief is more complex. I can, for instance hold two conflicting beliefs at the same time; my beliefs are effected by reasoning, emotion, intuition, experience, all the while being the basis upon which all of thos faculties act.

But my argument assumes the entire process taking place in the physical brain, which I think is a fair assumption since it agrees with the evidence we have. — JustSomeGuy

What kind of evidence?

But this argument has nothing to do with whether there is a "consciousness" apart from your physical brain--it works either way and makes no comment on that issue. — JustSomeGuy

It’s an assumption in your argument, and it influences your argument. For instance, if conciousness exists outside of the brain, then the brain is just the hardware, while conciousness is the software, so assigning belief purely to the brain would be wrong in that case.

The point here is that you did not choose to believe that there was or was not a predator, your brain made the call — JustSomeGuy

Who exactly is the “you” who has a brain here? The way you’re wording your argument sounds more like an argument against the idea that it’s not possible to lack belief, rather than an argument for it. If belief is just responses in the brain, and yet, a “you” exists outside this brain, then why does the “you” not have a role in belief?

But I agree that belief is innate; belief is the foundation on which knowledge of any kind is built. Belief underpins rationality itself; belief and intuition, for instance, are linked. Any rational argument has a basis in intuitive belief.

Have you read Berdyaev yet? I really think you'd find him interesting.

-Daniel C. Matt - The Essential Kabbalah
-The most recent edit of my brother's forthcoming sci-fi novel

Anyway, on a more serious note, I'm resolving to start taking care of myself this year; physically, spiritually, emotionally, etc. Can't kill yourself forever.

Ah; are you catching on to me? Are you, BC, finding a pattern; are you finding something oh so characteristic in my writing that, as a reader, as an interpreter of what I say, you find that you're finally finding a final feeling about the sorts of philosophical findings that I finalize? True; my writing here is verbose; yes; but is it? What, exactly, do you find oh so non-canonical that you find the need to use such a paltry phrase as "or nothing at all" when responding to the resplendent aura of the light of the phrases that I use in order to intimate such specific linguistic phenomena as the sorts of meanings which I'm trying to instigate?

Kramer approves. I also like short sentences. Semicolon use is an all-or-nothing affair. I say either go all the way, or don't go at all. Brevity is often best. I can go on and on. But when I do, I like to go at a short clip. I like to either go fast, or go slow. But, it ultimately doesn't matter. What matters is what is expressed. And if what's expressed is expressed succinctly or laboriously is, I think, inconsequential. There are many, many ways of saying the same thing.

I'm the opposite of you; I resolve to use less semicolons; I'm someone who often has multiple thoughts firing in the brain at the same time, and because this experience can be overwhelming, I tend to write long sentences in which semicolons become necessary; and indeed, the sensation of writing a sentence that ends, and yet continues on in spite of itself can be addicting indeed; being able to connect disparate thoughts without officially ending a sentence via a period (while also being required to fulfill all of the grammatical rules that create a proper sentence) is the true hallmark of the semicolon use; in other words, true semicolon use is demarcated by complete thoughts which are inextricably linked; they're linked in a such a way that a full stop period conveys something vaguely lacking; what's lacking, indeed, is a sense of flow; what's lacking is a sense of continuity.

*Thumbs up*

And on top of that, helping mentally homeless and emotionally destitute people, spiritually poor people, is even more difficult, and even less glamorous. The results of helping the physically needy are physical and easy to measure; the results of helping the mentally/emotionally/spiritually needy are way less easy to measure.

And so, the assertion that "we are evil" only describes one half of the human dichotomy.

That's a fine distinction but something tells me it all boils down to good vs evil. You uphold the law because you're good and you break it because you're bad. You do good because you're good and you don't do good because you're bad. — TheMadFool

The problem is that everyone is both; you do good, and you do bad. I do good, and I do bad. It's not a dichotomy of "bad vs. good", of "us vs. them". The only dichotomy is the dichotomy that exists within you, within me. The dichotomy is subjective, in the sense that it's within the subject. Each individual is both "good" and "bad", so if the problem does indeed "boil down to good vs. evil", then the battlefield where this dichotomy is played out is actually the individual person, not society.

Judicial systems don't impose positive rules of society like they do negative rules. — TheMadFool

Right; religions traditionally did that (impose positive rules).

Yet, we see so many people engaging in criminal activities and so few involved in practicing the positive rules of society. — TheMadFool

The dichotomy isn't "criminal activity vs. upholding positive values (love each other, etc)." The dichotomy is breaking the law vs. keeping it, on the one hand, and upholding positive values (love one another) vs. not upholding those values. I can hate someone without breaking the law, and I can engage in criminal activity with love in my heart.

We could say that:
1. Even in the presence of encouragement to do good and the law not barring such activities we find so few good people.
2. Even in the presence of laws preventing bad actions and the discouraging of evil we find so many bad people.

So, doesn't that mean that people are inherently bad? — TheMadFool

Doing good is not attractive; it's not flashy and it doesn't grab attention, generally. To truly do good, to truly look out for the well being of those around you, is something that is done without notice, by very nature of the activity. So it's natural that we don't often notice the good that is being done around us.

Here is where the philosophy comes in: I am supposed to believe that it is all just, fair, part of "progress", etc. Prove that it is! — WISDOMfromPO-MO

No, it's not fair, and it never has been, for anyone. Fairness has nothing to do with happiness, let alone spiritual or psychological well-being. Your sensitivity to injustice is a gift, and also a thorn in your side that adds additional suffering unto the load of base-line suffering that you're already experiencing.

What I do know is that all I have wanted for the past 23 years is to be able to use my resources to give and do good. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

You say you have wanted "to be able to use" your resources. What is stopping you from being able to use those resources, resources you appear to already possess?

I can't see how our ability to imagine things that we already know about, like babies, could be an argument for God's existence. What would be way more compelling would be to make an argument for God's existence based on pure creativity in-itself.

I almost agree; before asking "what am I", I need to just acknowledge "I am me". I'm writing this post, I'm responding to your question, I'm tired from a long day of travel, etc. "I am me". If I begin philosophical enquiry with the self-conscious knowledge of beginning exactly there (at the me-point), then I'm off to a good start. The question "What am I" will naturally fall into place in good time if I begin with "I am me". So metaphysically, it's wrong to begin with "What am I", as that's an abstraction; but it's right to begin with "I am me", which is experience itself. Metaphysics has to begin experientially. A metaphysic that begins abstractly misses "me"; it misses "the I" in "what am I".

His picture is my avatar. How is this possible for me to have feelings over an inanimate and distant object such as a volleyball inscribed with a hand on it? — Posty McPostface

Because your feelings are feelings about the aesthetic of the film itself. The film created the context in which the feelings about Wilson evolved. That's an aesthetic experience. The aesthetic is only activated when it touches your personal experience; when it touches you.

So, my question is how is meaning ascribed to inanimate objects — Posty McPostface

One way, then, is through the aesthetic.

how do we agree on whatever meanings are formed in our head shared collectively by a common name? — Posty McPostface

Not sure what you mean here.

Keep questioning; keep being the bee buzzing in their ear.

>:O

What makes intellectual dishonesty a subjective moral?

No; what makes torturing children not objectively wrong?

*applause*

We're talking past one another at this point, so I'll leave it for another time.

I understand what you're saying. I re-evaluate my position. In the absence of any argument that rationally demonstrates that there is an objective morality, let alone how that morality would judge actions, it is not being intellectually honest to say that any action is objectively morally good or bad. I'm open to objective morality, but still haven't seen a good argument for it. — SonJnana

Pretty much covered it in his response to your paragraph which was essentially the same as what you wrote to me here. But I wanted to point out one more thing. "Intellectual honesty" is an objective moral. And no, it's not a "subjective preference", because this suggests "intellectual dishonesty" would be an equally valid subjective preference. And to assert that such preferences are equally valid is to assert an objective morality: "these two preferences are equally valid". Honesty, by it's nature, is objective. Honesty is anti-dishonesty. It looks like one moral objective for you is intellectual honesty, which is an admirable one, but you don't seem aware of it.

What I think is worse are insulting jokes amongst friends or co-workers; I’ve never been partial to those. They seem to reveal insecurity.

Do you know that I typed out this response?

Maybe I haven't been clear. What I am arguing is that individuals' and societies' moralities are based on subjective preferences. — SonJnana

That's very clear; that's the assertion I've been critiquing.

When our laws and moral codes change over time, we can only say that they are changing. — SonJnana

A self-fulfilling prophecy, which presumably is your reasoning for your previous statement:

And that there is no rational way to say that any moral code is objectively better than another. — SonJnana

There is no objective standard to judge them off of to say that they are improving. — SonJnana

Meaningless, given the above.

We can say our society has changed it's rules so that now it is in a better position to survive, but that doesn't make any individual action any more or less intrinsically good. — SonJnana

So is survival the goal, in your view?

Again, I can't see any argument so far.

[delete]

No, my view of scripture is a literal one, to conclude that it is a caricature requires there to be some objective reason why scripture is not to be taken literally, if so where did this objective knowledge come from. Have I got a missing page in my King James' that says "Oh and by the way, don't take all of this literally"? — Inter Alia

You have a lot of research ahead of you.

It's funny how one can mention on this forum that the word of a book that talks about seven-headed dragons and an angry god striking people down with thunderbolts might not actually be true and be met with concern that one might be being a bit harsh, but suggest that there might be some truth in the work of several leading primatologists, neuroscientists and ethicists, with hundreds of years of combined expertise in the field might actually be right and you get met with incredulity. — Inter Alia

The issue is simple; literal interpretations of scripture. Your view of scripture is a literal caricature.

And alternatively, if the issue is "hundreds of years of combined expertise", then reference some intro theology texts, like Tillich's "A History of Christian Thought", which spans more like 2,000 years.

To reiterate, T Clark said:

"Do you really believe that discussions of value have no place in philosophy?"

To which you said:

Obviously yes. — charleton

drop the trinity (maybe keep God the Father); keep Jesus and skip Paul; avoid thinking in literal terms about God; keep the Crucifixion, drop the Resurrection; keep the Bible; drop large chunks of theology. — Bitter Crank

Not to derail, but I'd be fascinated to hear more about your reasoning here. As I read that sentence, I keep going "Yes! Wait, no! what? yes! No!"

If someone kills someone, what do you do? One might say you shouldn't kill them back because that will destabilize society and hurt biological survival. Someone else might say you should kill the person because they deserve to die because that is fairness. How can you objectively say biological survival is a better code than fairness? It just comes down to one person wants to see a world that is more fair, whereas one person wants to see biological survival. These are conflicting moralities and there is no objective way, as far as I know, to say one is better than the other.

When I say morality being subjective preferences, I am saying that any person's moral code is to suit their preferences of how they want to see the world. They want to see a stable society so they say killing is wrong. That doesn't mean killing is wrong because it's intrinsically bad. It just means that its immoral to someone because not beneficial. And that is based off their preferences because in this case they prefer what is beneficial to them - a stable society in this case. — SonJnana

Again, none of this is an actual argument for your position. I'm not trying to be smart or trite; it really isn't.

You've yet to show why or how or to what extent morality is a subjective preference; all you've done is describe morality as a subjective preference.

A few beliefs of mine:

-The existence of a deity can't be proved or disproved via reasoning at all.

-Any knowledge of God has to be direct, experiential knowledge in the same way that other inner knowledge is direct; the experience of the aesthetic, for instance. So any reasoning about God that isn't predicated upon experiential knowledge is useless, in the same way that any reasoning about the aesthetic without direct experience of the aesthetic is also useless.

Ok; in that case I see no actual argument for morality being subjective preferences.