If something is real, does it not need to have existant properties in some way? How can something be real and not exist? — intrapersona

It depends on what you mean by "exist." Platonists might talk about forms that exist independently in a separate realm that is real, but non-material. Aristotelians see forms as composite with matter, such that they only strictly exist in their instantiations, but are still real apart from them. I prefer Peirce's terminology myself, where "real" means having identifiable properties independent of human thought, and "exist" means reacting with other things. Thus possibilities (qualities, feeling, spontaneity) and necessities (habits, laws, continuity) are real, but only actualities (things, facts, haecceity) exist.

Where does this infinitum continuum of potential exist? — intrapersona

"Where" is the wrong question. It presupposes that spatio-temporal existence, having a "here and now" aspect, is the only real mode of being.

Don't potential states of affairs need to depend on spacetime in order for them to be "potential"? — intrapersona

No, they only depend on spacetime in order for them to be actualized. If a potential state of affairs is real at all, then it must have a different mode of being than existence; otherwise, it would not be distinguishable from an actual state of affairs.

We could only ever say that I "may" have characteristic properties and we might not ever know what they are, incase out of the infinite amount of possibilities, I end up turning in to a pineapple in 3.5 minutes. — intrapersona

Why are we able to be confident that you will not turn into a pineapple in 3.5 minutes? Because that is not a real possibility, any more than a triangle turning into a rectangle while remaining within the infinite continuum of real triangles.

Surely it would be that universals like "the perfect triangle" or "perfect body proportion" are just an ideas within our minds and hold no physical existence outside of our thinking of them. — intrapersona

No one argues that universals have physical existence. As I understand it, the issue is whether universals are nevertheless real - i.e., whether there are modes of being other than individual, particular actuality. Setting aside the notion of "perfect," the idea is that a triangle is a universal - there is an infinite continuum of potential triangles, with different combinations of angles and side lengths. They are all real because they possess certain characteristic properties, regardless of whether anyone thinks that they do.

Just to confirm, physicalism and universals are non-compatible right? — intrapersona

I think so, because physicalism entails that the only mode of being is physical existence.

You might take a look at the ongoing thread on "Does existence precede essence?" and the recent one on "Inescapable universals," since they have both touched on this subject.

The final cause of the hammer is your intent to drive nails. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it is the driving of nails - something that is in the future when the hammer is made, not the present or the past. That is why we call it the final cause, or the end. It is the result; it comes last in the temporal sequence.

I agree that there is final cause, intent behind the creation of teeth, that they were created for this purpose ... — Metaphysician Undercover

That is not what I said. The final cause of teeth is biting and chewing food, period. It makes no difference whether they were created intentionally for that purpose or evolved naturally with that function.

Do you now agree that force simultaneously causes acceleration?

It should have been clear that I was referring to your own previous statement.

I mean to say that we give intellectual assent only to things we can confirm by observation or that we think we have good reasons to believe are confirmed by the observations of those whose expertise we trust, or to things that are intuitively self-evident. — John

This assertion is not something that I can confirm by observation, I have no good reasons to believe that it is confirmed by the observations of those whose expertise I trust, and it is not intuitively self-evident to me. That is why I said that it fails its own test.

Your assertion fails its own test. It is not something that I can confirm by observation, I have no good reasons to believe that it is confirmed by the observations of those whose expertise I trust, and it is not intuitively self-evident to me.

People give intellectual assent to all kinds of things, for all kinds of reasons. I still do not see what point you are trying to make regarding Pascal's Wager.

I don't understand what you mean by the intent is not realized until later ... — Metaphysician Undercover

I intend to drive some nails. I make a hammer accordingly. The final cause of the hammer is not achieved until I actually drive the nails with it - after I have made it.

Could you give me an example of final cause which is not human intent? — Metaphysician Undercover

The final cause of teeth is biting and chewing food.

F=ma is not an expression of causation though. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is an expression of the relation between force, mass, and acceleration. If you apply a certain force to a certain mass, a certain acceleration will simultaneously occur.

I do not understand your reply. Are you claiming that "intellectual matters" are somehow limited to "empirical objects"? Why would my assent to the existence/reality of God entail having no idea of what I was believing?

It seems to me that, on your view, there would have to be some minimum amount of change (or motion) associated with a minimum interval of time; otherwise, nothing would ever change (or move), and there would be no time. Hence space and time must be discrete. If they were truly continuous, then "adjacent" states would be indistinguishable.

"Intellectual assent" means sincerely believing that God exists or is real, not just mouthing the words. Again, I question the assumption that this, by itself, is sufficient to satisfy God and gain whatever benefits God has to offer, in this life and/or the next. What do you see as the requirements for a successful wager, according to Pascal?

"Final cause" refers to the intent which brings about the existence of the object. — Metaphysician Undercover

But that intent is not realized until the object exists and is employed for that purpose. In that sense, the final cause is subsequent to the event. Besides, human purposes are not the only kind of final cause.

The acceleration is subsequent to the application of force ... — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the (instantaneous) acceleration is simultaneous with the application of the force; F=ma at any given time.

I see them as consistent with each other, not dependent on each other. — Terrapin Station

Fair enough, thanks.

The smallest possible change is just the slightest motion or change of position (of at least a part or a relation to another object then). Time "passing" simply is these changes. — Terrapin Station

Does this entail that space and time are discrete, rather than continuous? If not, why not?

God's forgiveness is predicated on a true act of contrition, at least based on my background. — Cavacava

Of course, this is controversial within Christian theology; as a Lutheran, I would disagree. God's forgiveness is predicated only on the death of Christ for the sins of the whole world, and an individual person's reconciliation to God is predicated only on the gift of faith that He gives us by grace. The prodigal son's father accepted him - saw him while he was still a long way off, felt compassion, ran to meet him, embraced him, and kissed him - before he demonstrated any sort of contrition.

Indeed, but presumably not just because the thief gave mere intellectual assent to the existence/reality of God.

Pascal's Wager is also flawed in assuming that mere intellectual assent to the existence/reality of God is sufficient to satisfy God and gain whatever benefits God has to offer, in this life and/or the next.

Peirce's main point is that we cannot "manufacture" genuine doubt.

"We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy. These prejudices are not to be dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur to us can be questioned. Hence this initial skepticism will be a mere self-deception, and not real doubt ... A person may, it is true, in the course of his studies, find reason to doubt what he began by believing; but in that case he doubts because he has a positive reason for it, and not on account of the Cartesian maxim."

We do not need a reason to believe that we are not dreaming, that our cognitive faculties are reliable, that we are truly morally responsible for our actions, that the people around us are conscious, and that the walls of our rooms continue to exist when we are not experiencing them. Our common-sense instincts justify these beliefs, such that we would need a compelling reason in order to doubt any of them.

I wouldn't personal use the phrase "most fundamental," but it's definitely one of my core views. — Terrapin Station

I guess what I meant to ask is this: Do you reject the reality of universals because you embrace physicalism, or do you embrace physicalism because you reject the reality of universals?

Ideas, and all mental phenomena, are specific brain states. — Terrapin Station

In that case, how is it that multiple brains can instantiate the same idea, or that a single brain can maintain the same idea over time? Or is it your view that no two ideas (brain states) are truly the same?

An object changing or in motion is what time is in my ontology. — Terrapin Station

As a thought experiment, what if one object changes, but another does not (at all)? Has time passed for the second object, simply because the first object changed, no matter how spatially distant the two objects are?

So whatever the smallest change would be, including the smallest relational change with respect to other objects. — Terrapin Station

That was my basic question - what is the smallest possible change, and how much time does it take for it to happen? Said another way, how many changes occur to an object in one second of time - i.e., how many different objects come into and out of existence during that interval?

Thanks for the helpful clarification. A few quick follow-up questions ...

1. Is it fair to say that physicalism is your most fundamental view here, since it seems to be the primary basis for your rejection of universals?

2. If ideas are not properly characterized as nonphysical existents, then what exactly are they?

3. What minimum interval of time is required for an object to become a different object - i.e., something with different properties?

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My definition of a philosopher: Someone who would rather ask the right question, and not be able to answer it, than give the right answer to the wrong question.

Cause is a temporal concept, the cause is necessarily prior (temporally) to the effect. If you don't agree, then maybe you could describe a type of causation which is not like that. — Metaphysician Undercover

What about final causation, which is often subsequent (temporally) to the effect? Even most efficient causation is really simultaneous with the effect, rather than prior to it; e.g., application of force to a mass causes acceleration, which ceases when the force is removed.

Identity obtains when we're dealing about the same thing, at the same time, in the same respect (that is, from the same perspective for example). — Terrapin Station

I take it that this is why you disagree with my comment about space being what enables different objects to have the same properties (in different locations) and time being what enables the same object to have different properties (at different moments). For you, no object shares any properties with any other object, not even "itself" at another instant. Right?

I will let Charles Sanders Peirce do the talking for me here.

Um... those five items are of vital importance. — lambda

"We must act in such [vital] matters; and the principle upon which we are willing to act is a belief ... matters of vital importance must be left to sentiment, that is, to instinct."

If you don't know ... then you are in a state of total intellectual paralysis. — lambda

"Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts."

I don't believe that different objects can have identical properties. — Terrapin Station

Not even as a thought experiment? It seems possible to me, at least in principle, for there to be two objects that are identical in every way, except for their spatial locations and the particular particles that comprise them. All of their qualities would be the same.

Well, the properties at T1 can contradict properties at T2 ... — Terrapin Station

Right, that is what I meant; it is still the same object at T1 and T2, despite having different properties that would be contradictory if possessed simultaneously.

That's a good question. I don't think I've ever considered it before. — Metaphysician Undercover

Thanks, but I was mainly asking Terrapin Station, in response to his statement that "space is simply the extension of matter and the extensional relation between matter, and time is simply the changing/in-motion relations of matter."

But if there are non-physical existents, which I claim, then there are likely to be non-physical relations as well. — Metaphysician Undercover

Aside from my preference against using the term "existents" for anything non-actual, I am inclined to agree.

Are spatial and temporal relations the only relations that you consider to be real?

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I am curious to know what both of you think of this statement that I offered earlier: Space is that which makes it possible for different objects to have identical properties, while time is that which makes it possible for a single object to have contradictory properties.

Okay, my mistake. It sounded like nominalism to me in the sense that "space" and "time" are just names that people give to concepts. I would not describe them as "substances," either. Rather, everything that exists (in my narrow sense) does so within space and time; together they serve as the theater in which all actual reactions occur. They are thus real, not merely conceptual. Space is that which makes it possible for different objects to have identical properties, while time is that which makes it possible for a single object to have contradictory properties.

But space and time are completely conceptual ... — Metaphysician Undercover

Are they? That seems more like nominalism than realism. I lean toward the latter, as I believe you do, and was merely suggesting that there is a distinction between haecceity and essence. It may be just another Peircean terminological preference on my part, like limiting "existence" to actuality.

... and then you give your opposing views, but do so gently/with humility. — Terrapin Station

This is excellent advice ... for all of us participating in this forum, as well! 8-)

Properties and qualities are synonyms in my view. — Terrapin Station

Agreed, I was just suggesting an example that is more familiar to most people than haecceity; especially since I tend to think of the latter as the distinct property that only actual things have, so that I am not inclined to equate it with essence myself. Instead, it is the brute "here and now" aspect of any individual thing that reacts with other individual things.

Remember that I'm a nominalist, including that I'm a nominalist in the sense of rejecting realism for abstract existents in general. — Terrapin Station

I remember; again, just hoping for clarification.

Also, in general, I don't buy that anything exists if it's not actualized. — Terrapin Station

I know; again, I agree with you, given my terminological preference for limiting "existence" to actuality.

That's not to say that I reject possibilities (that is, more than one option for future states), although I'll refrain from explaining what I think possibilities amount to so as to not derail the conversation to a big discussion about that instead. — Terrapin Station

Fair enough. Maybe start a new thread on that topic? Or have you already discussed it at length previously?

Rather than "properties," consider a quality, such as the color red - not a red thing, like a stop sign, but the color red itself, apart from any instantiation of it; not the particular range of electromagnetic wavelengths that correspond to it, or how we perceive it, or even how we imagine it, but what it is in itself. Is the color red, in this sense, real? Does it have being? Does it (in some sense) exist, even when not actualized? I think that I know how you both will answer, but I am hoping that this might help further clarify your disagreement.

As I stated previously, Peirce did not confine logic to deduction, or even deduction and induction; he also included retroduction, which is precisely where intuition (or instinct) and creativity come into play. Logic is the normative science of reasoning - how we should formulate, explicate, and evaluate hypotheses if our goal is to adopt true beliefs and reject false ones.

So if Pierce means that logic is the only gate for perception to first go through in order to arrive at purposive action ... — Noble Dust

Please read the quote again, carefully. Peirce did not say that logic is the gate, at all; he said that perception is the only gate at which concepts enter logical thought, and purposive action is the only gate at which concepts exit logical thought. In other words, logic has nothing upon which to operate (no premisses) without perception, and no outward manifestation (no conclusions) other than purposive action.

If you agree with Pierce that "nothing is in the intellect which was not previously in the senses", then do you understand what I'm trying to say about experience being primary? Do you agree, or no? — Noble Dust

If what you are trying to say is nothing more than what Peirce said, then I understand and agree. To quote him again, "The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason." If you are saying something else, then I am still not sure what you mean.

But what did Pierce mean when he said he was first and foremost a logician, then? — Noble Dust

That he spent most of his time and energy studying the normative science of thinking - the kinds of habits that tend to help us adopt true beliefs and reject false ones. Logic is not a source of knowledge; it is the set of methods by which we obtain, organize, and communicate knowledge. If your critique is actually aimed at scientism, then your target is not logic, but a certain set of assumptions that are taken as the starting point. A perfectly valid logical argument with false premises produces a false conclusion.

OK, so how did we manage to "observe our own ideal constructions" of phenomena that took 50 years to observe after their discovery? — tom

I have no idea what this means, or how it relates to anything that I have said here.

You need to extricate yourself from abstract analysis to grasp the primacy of experience. — Noble Dust

I am still trying to figure out what you mean by "the primacy of experience."

You're playing with a limited set of rules when everything has to be subjected to abstraction. — Noble Dust

Well, we cannot think about everything in the universe all at once; so in that sense, we have no choice but to engage in abstraction - neglecting some aspects of reality in order to focus on others.

We can't talk about it first; we have to experience first, and then talk about it. Actually, things always happen in this order, we just don't acknowledge it if we insist on the primacy of logic. — Noble Dust

Again, what do you mean here by "the primacy of logic"? Charles Sanders Peirce considered himself to be first and foremost a logician, yet he acknowledged that "our perceptual judgments are the first premisses of all our reasonings," and agreed with Aristotle and the scholastics that "nothing is in the intellect which was not previously in the senses."

Why would you expect me to explain something that I never claimed? I have not said anything at all about quantum entanglement.

An appeal to defining terms in an attempt to invalidate this argument just distracts from the simple, self-evident truth of the primacy of experience. — Noble Dust

I asked you to define your terms in an effort to understand better what you were saying. Why would I bother trying to invalidate an "argument" being offered by someone who rejects logic? In what "simple" and "self-evident" sense do you believe that experience is primary? What happens when different people have different experiences?

I'm not sure what you mean; I don't understand the sentence. — Noble Dust

Why would we use a fundamentally different method to study "the inner" than what we use to study "the outer"? How exactly would the two methods differ?

We were talking about discoveries in (pure) mathematics, not physics.

... future constructions can be unpredictable, one can come to realizations about present constructions that weren't apparent at first, etc." — Terrapin Station

Right, and my point was that this happens because mathematics is observational - manipulating and then reexamining a diagram can reveal new information. The difference, of course, is that we are observing our own (ideal) constructions, rather than something "out there" in the (actual) universe.

Science studies the outer, philosophy should study the inner. — Noble Dust

How exactly do you distinguish "outer" from "inner"? How and why would the best method of study - the one most likely to lead to the truth - be different between the two?

What would philosophy be without it? 8-)

It is fascinating (if somewhat tedious) to watch the centuries-old debate between realism () and nominalism () hashed out all over again.