Obviously, I included the conclusion of the earlier argument, which demonstrated that the haecceity of the object is prior to the physical presence of the object, as a premise. Your claimed non-sequitur is because you conveniently forgot this conclusion, and didn't include that premise. — Metaphysician Undercover
I suggested that "the haecceity" and "the object" refer to one and the same thing, and you claimed to accept this. But I can see now that you do not really accept this. You have not released the idea that the object is necessarily a physical thing. Haecceitty refers to what the object is, and there is no necessity that what the object is physical. This is an unwarranted assumption if you agree to that proposal. — Metaphysician Undercover
If you say that the haecceity is necessarily physical, then we have no agreement.
Remember that the argument demonstrates that there is something prior to the physical object, which determines that the physical object will exist as the particular physical object which it is, when that physical object comes into existence. So by inductive reasoning we can say that there is a "determining factor", or "determining factors" which are prior to each and every physical object, and therefore prior to all physical objects. — Metaphysician Undercover
which assumes that a physical object cannot be anything other than the physical object which it is, and therefore there must be a determining factor, or determining factors which are prior to that object, — Metaphysician Undercover
You say that properties are what dynamic structures and relations of matter are "like". So "properties" aren't the very same thing as dynamic structures and relations of matter, they are some form of similitude. — Metaphysician Undercover
You observe that the human mind creates these similitudes, as ideas, descriptions of the real dynamic structures and relations of matter. — Metaphysician Undercover
However, you do not take the necessary steps to advance your understanding, — Metaphysician Undercover
The world is the way that it is. We notice the contingency of objects, and because of this we can change the world to an extent, to make it be more the way we want it to be. Due to the nature of contingency we can see that it was not necessary that the world came to be in the way that it did. — Metaphysician Undercover
But space and time are completely conceptual, — Metaphysician Undercover
But space and time are completely conceptual ... — Metaphysician Undercover
Are they? That seems more like nominalism than realism. — aletheist
Are they? That seems more like nominalism than realism. I lean toward the latter, as I believe you do, and was merely suggesting that there is a distinction between haecceity and essence. It may be just another Peircean terminological preference on my part, like limiting "existence" to actuality. — aletheist
You'd have to copy and paste the argument you're referring to. — Terrapin Station
The argument from Aristotle is that all objects are particulars. Each and every object exists as the particular object which it is, and nothing else. When a particular object comes into existence, it necessarily comes into existence as the particular object which it is. It is impossible that it is other than what it is. Therefore what it is, or the object's essence, must precede the object's existence. If it did not, it would be possible for the object to come into existence as an object other than the object which it is, and this is contradictory. — Metaphysician Undercover
There's a problem with this argument.
"All objects are particulars."
I agree with that.
"Each and every object exists as the particular object which it is, and nothing else."
I agree with that.
"When a particular object comes into existence, it necessarily comes into existence as the particular object which it is. It is impossible that it is other than what it is."
I agree with that, too.
"Therefore what it is, or the object's essence, must precede the object's existence."
I disagree with that however. First off I disagree with saying that what the object is has anything to do with "essence." You could, however, be saying that you're just defining "essence" as "what an object is," without any of the other typical associations that "essence" has, and that would be fine, but in that case, saying that what an object is must precede the object's existence makes no sense. The object can't be whatever it is prior to it being something (existing) in the first place.
"If it did not, it would be possible for the object to come into existence as an object other than the object which it is, and this is contradictory."
This seems to me like it's probably buying that substances separate from properties can make sense (which is something I disagree with). — Terrapin Station
But I don't at all buy that the fact that a particular is the particular it is implies that there's some prior determining factor for that. I don't think that's been established at all. — Terrapin Station
C'mon, man Don't start to get patronizing. I could easily be patronizing to you, but that's not something I'd do unprovoked. — Terrapin Station
This is all fine, but it has nothing to do with the idea that an object could somehow be something other than the object it is. You'd need to support that particular idea (that it could even make sense). A suggestion as to how you might support it is by giving an example of it (that hopefully makes some sense). — Terrapin Station
Are spatial and temporal relations the only relations that you consider to be real? — aletheist
That's a good question. I don't think I've ever considered it before. — Metaphysician Undercover
But if there are non-physical existents, which I claim, then there are likely to be non-physical relations as well. — Metaphysician Undercover
Are spatial and temporal relations the only relations that you consider to be real? — aletheist
Space is that which makes it possible for different objects to have identical properties, — aletheist
time is that which makes it possible for a single object to have contradictory properties. — aletheist
So, your primary objection had to do with the word "essence", — Metaphysician Undercover
Your second objection is that it makes no sense to you, that the properties of an object can exist prior to the physical object itself. But you have not backed this up with any logic. — Metaphysician Undercover
And, despite the fact that I've given you numerous examples now, of how it is so, that the properties of an object exist prior to the physical object, you keep whining like a little child, claiming "it doesn't make sense", "it doesn't make sense". But I see through your childish attitude, and what you are really saying is "I don't want it to be like that, therefore I refuse to accept the reality of this". You know, when a child can't accept that things are not the way that it wants them to be, it gets whiney. — Metaphysician Undercover
But now you go back to your whining, saying that anything non-physical existing doesn't make sense. — Metaphysician Undercover
See, it states that when an object comes into existence it necessarily comes into existence as the object which it is, and not something else. — Metaphysician Undercover
That word "necessarily" implies a cause. — Metaphysician Undercover
If there were no cause, then the object wouldn't necessarily be the object which it is, it could be absolutely anything. — Metaphysician Undercover
OK, now I've compared you to a whiney child, does that provoke you? Or is it impossible to provoke you? — Metaphysician Undercover
That's the whole point, an object cannot be other than what it is. We totally agree. So we have a premise which we both agree upon, now let's proceed. I ask, why is this the case, — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't believe that different objects can have identical properties. — Terrapin Station
Well, the properties at T1 can contradict properties at T2 ... — Terrapin Station
And another problem is that "it would be possible for the object to come into existence as an object other than the object which it is," doesn't make any sense in my opinion. I wouldn't say that was possible. As I noted, it might at least appear to make some sense on a view that substances are some sort of mysterious, amorphous somethings that are later bestowed with properties, but I don't really think that view makes a lot of sense in the first place, and there's definitely no reason to believe it in my opinion. — Terrapin Station
That part I don't agree with at all, however. I'd have no idea where you're getting a notion from that "necessarily" implies a cause. For example, if necessarily A = A, presumably then you'd think that there must be a cause for that. I just don't know why you'd think that. I suppose you see modal logic as significantly resting on causes then? That would be an unusual view. — Terrapin Station
One option for you is to try to explain how the idea of nonphysical existents makes sense. — Terrapin Station
Don't you see that things like identity and non-contradiction must have a cause? If there was no reason why A = A, or why contradiction was unacceptable, then we wouldn't accept these as fundamental principles. It is because these are reasonable, i.e. there is a reason why they are acceptable, that we do accept them as fundamental principles. It is not because we accept them, and agree on them that they become fundamental principles, it is because they are acceptable. Therefore there is a reason for identity, and non-contradiction, and that is that they state something real and true about the world, and this is why we accept them. So these principles have a real cause of existence, the cause is the way that the world is. The way that the world is causes the existence of these principles. If the world were otherwise, such that it were not describable by these principles, we would not have developed these principles.I'd say that it's simply a matter of identity (that is, A=A) and non-contradiction (that is ~(P&~P)). I wouldn't say that has any cause. — Terrapin Station
You don't agree that if A = A there must be a cause of that? I would say that on both the right side, and the left side of the =, there is the same symbol, A, and the = sign represents some form of sameness. That is "why" A=A, or the cause of that necessity. When something is necessarily the case, this means that it is impossible to be otherwise. This is the exact opposite of a random or chance occurrence, which is said to be an uncaused occurrence, so there must be a cause of what is necessarily the case. If it were uncaused, it would be a random or chance occurrence, and not something which is necessarily the case. So do you agree, that when something is necessarily the case, such as "when an object comes into existence it is necessarily the object which it is, and not something else", it is very reasonable to ask why this is the case? It is reasonable to ask why because the necessity of the occurrence implies that there is a cause of it. — Metaphysician Undercover
To me, ideas as non-physical existents makes sense. That's the most simple and straight forward way to understand the existence of ideas, i.e., as non-physical existents. — Metaphysician Undercover
Don't you see that things like identity and non-contradiction must have a cause? — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore there is a reason for identity, and non-contradiction, and that is that they state something real and true about the world, and this is why we accept them. — Metaphysician Undercover
So these principles have a real cause of existence, the cause is the way that the world is. The way that the world is causes the existence of these principles. — Metaphysician Undercover
Can you seperate what is said from what it is about in this way? I think not. — Banno
as if "existence before essence" was suggesting something existed before the use of its meaning-- an obvious contradiction. — TheWillowOfDarkness
Since Banno is a state of the world, it takes an existential quantification ( "Banno is a waiter" ) to make it so. — TheWillowOfDarkness
No, I don't agree with that at all. For one, you're committing a category error by trying to read it temporally--you're talking about cause in a temporal sense, in the sense that we talk about causality in physics. — Terrapin Station
Aside from that, you seem to be imagining that there's some default state of randomness where nonsense could obtain so that something might not be itself if there isn't something to prevent that possibility. I have no idea why you'd believe this, though. What evidence, empirical or logical, would suggest such a default to you? (And re logical, I'm talking about entailment/validity, not loose heuristics that seem intuitively right to you.) — Terrapin Station
Perhaps you simply believe that "everything must have a cause," or "everything must have a reason that isn't itself," but I don't believe either, both obviously lead to infinite regresses, and neither has any empirical or logical support. — Terrapin Station
I read it as "understanding ideas as <<I haven't the faintest idea what the hell we might be referring to>> is the most simple and straightforward way to understand ideas." — Terrapin Station
What I'm looking for is some explanatory clue with respect to "what the hell we might be referring to." — Terrapin Station
As far as I know, there is no type of cause other than temporal. Cause is a temporal concept, the cause is necessarily prior (temporally) to the effect. If you don't agree, then maybe you could describe a type of causation which is not like that. — Metaphysician Undercover
The way that people use the terms "chance", "random", and "stochastic" suggests this to me. Referring to scientific theories, people talk about chance, or random mutations of living beings, and stochastic systems. — Metaphysician Undercover
If the entire universe went to a complete state of randomness, where it was impossible to predict what would be, from one moment to the next, — Metaphysician Undercover
there could be no objects here because the existence of an object requires a temporally extended stability (sameness for a period of time). — Metaphysician Undercover
In that universe it would be impossible for a thing to be itself because being itself requires that temporal extension. — Metaphysician Undercover
So this idea, "where nonsense could obtain" is science based, empirically based, — Metaphysician Undercover
I believe that if things exist in an orderly fashion, there must be a reason, or cause for this. — Metaphysician Undercover
order cannot come from disorder, without a cause. — Metaphysician Undercover
Consider randomly placed objects strewn about in a disorderly way. — Metaphysician Undercover
If they are going to take on some sort of order, they must be moved, and this movement requires a cause.
I observe that things exist according to order, — Metaphysician Undercover
You're really self-contradictory here Terrapin. You use the word "idea", saying "I haven't the faintest idea", of what you mean by "idea". — Metaphysician Undercover
Wow, I can't believe you are saying this, when my entire discourse with you for the last few days has been exactly that explanation. — Metaphysician Undercover
Cause is a temporal concept, the cause is necessarily prior (temporally) to the effect. If you don't agree, then maybe you could describe a type of causation which is not like that. — Metaphysician Undercover
Identity obtains when we're dealing about the same thing, at the same time, in the same respect (that is, from the same perspective for example). — Terrapin Station
I take it that this is why you disagree with my comment about space being what enables different objects to have the same properties (in different locations) and time being what enables the same object to have different properties (at different moments). For you, no object shares any properties with any other object, not even "itself" at another instant. Right? — aletheist
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