When I asked you about the paradox of time zones viz placing a phone call and/or simple time travel from west to east ... — 3017amen

There is no paradox here. The phone call does not really take place three hours later on the east coast than on the west coast. Traveling from west to east is not "time travel" any more that staying in one place; if it takes you five hours to make the trip, then five hours will also have elapsed back where you started.

And that is because we cannot relive the hours that we lost and vise versa. — 3017amen

How many times do I have to repeat that there are no "lost" or "relived" hours? No matter where you travel on earth, your age in hours is exactly the same as it would be if you stayed where you were born.

1. Change in nature came first, then human's figured out how to measure it using sun dials, analog clocks, digital clocks, etc.
2. Clocks and said measuring devices came first, then change in nature.
Now if I'm mistaken please provide correction. You have been arguing that #2 is that correct? — 3017amen

Good grief, of course not! As I said before:

You seem to be suggesting that we invented time in order to mark and measure change. I obviously disagree; in my view, we invented calendars and clocks in order to mark and measure time, which is real independently of them. — aletheist

Again, in my view time is more fundamental than change in nature; if there were no time, then there could be no change.

Just to one-o-one it, here are the common definitions for your convenience:
1. Time: the indefinite continued progress of existence and events in the past, present, and future regarded as a whole.
2. Change: the act or instance of making or becoming different. — 3017amen

I would not necessarily define time that way, but even if I did, it would be perfectly consistent with what I just said--if there were no progress of existence and events from past to present to future, then there could be no acts or instances of making or becoming different.

The point is that if a moment of time is composed of an event, then within that event there is both S is P, and S is not-P because change occurs within the event ... the law of non-contradiction is violated. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, a moment of time is not composed of an event, an event is realized at a lapse of time. During that lapse, neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true, so the principle of excluded middle is false; but there is never a moment at which both "S is P" and "S is not-P" are true, so the principle of contradiction is preserved. Please stop claiming otherwise.

If you proceed, as you do, by saying that there is a time period in which neither is true, then we have a time period, what you call an "event-lapse", which cannot be related to S is P. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but only from the standpoint that neither P nor its negation not-P can be truly predicated of the existential subject S during that lapse of time. S continues to exist, it just has a lower mode of being in the sense that it is not determinately P or not-P when it is in the real and continuous process of changing from one to the other.

Furthermore, since all time would consist of such event-lapses, S is P would not refer to anything real. This is evident also from the fact that S is P refers to a static state, so it requires an instant in time, when nothing is changing, to be true. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, this indicates a misunderstanding. Recall that a fact as signified by a true proposition is only an abstract constituent part of reality; the existential subject S is always changing with respect to some of its qualities and relations, but not all of them. When "S is P" is true, it signifies a real prolonged state of things with respect to that individual existential subject and that general character or relation; likewise for "S is not-P."

So what you are saying is that S is P, and S is not-P, along with terms like true and false, are not sound ways of describing the world, because the world consists of passing time, and it has no instants when such propositions could be true or false. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, that is not what I am saying.

To give soundness to S is P, we need to assume a duration, time-lapse, in which something is not changing, that something which remains the same over a period of time, constitutes S is P. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, "S is P" or "S is not-P" is indeed a sound way of describing the world in most cases, because they signify prolonged states of things that are realized at any instant that we arbitrarily designate within a lapse of time during which the existential subject S is not in an indefinitely gradual state of change from P to not-P, or vice-versa. In other words, it is only during certain events that the principle of excluded middle is false of the relevant proposition; between those events, it remains true. Again, any existential subject is always changing in some respects, but unchanging in others.

These expressions, "before" and "after" the event-lapse, are not valid in this model. They require an instant, a boundary, to separate the event-lapse from the rest of time. But no such instant is allowed. Therefore the time period which is designated as the event-lapse is completely arbitrary. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it is not completely arbitrary. You make a valid point about the need for an instant to serve as the limit between any two adjacent lapses, but it is not the case that "no such instant is allowed"; just that no such instant is a determination of time at which any state of things is realized to the exclusion of all other instants. Instead, for any instant whatsoever that we actualize by designating it, there are potential instants beyond all multitude within its immediate neighborhood--the surrounding indefinite moment--at which the same state of things is realized. With that in mind, there is some leeway for marking two particular instants as the commencement and completion of an event-lapse. Again, the main idea is that the earlier prolonged state of things is realized at one and the later (incompatible) prolonged state of things is realized at the other, so that the principle of contradiction is not violated; and there is an indefinitely gradual (i.e., continuous) state of change between those two instants.

But this common-sense notion of time implies that every state of things that does not endure through a lapse of time is absolutely definite, that is, that two states, one the negation of the other, cannot exist at the same instant ... Accepting the common-sense notion, then, I say that it conflicts with that to suppose that there is ever any discontinuity in change. That is to say, between any two instantaneous states there must be a lapse of time during which the change is continuous, not merely in that false continuity which the calculus recognizes but in a much stricter sense. — Peirce, 1908

The human body has senses and a brain. Observations are made by the brain. Empirical information is received by the senses. It requires time for the brain to process empirical information. Therefore empirical observation is always of things in the past, not of things happening at the present. By the time the information is received by the brain, to make the observation, the thing being observed is in the past. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, this is another point with some validity. However, I deny that phenomenological observations are made by the brain; instead, they are made by the mind, which is not reducible to the brain. That is why I define the present as not only the indefinite lapse of time between the past and the future, but also the indefinite lapse of time at which anything is present to the mind; again, in my view these are one and the same.

The past is that part of time with which memory is concerned ... The future is that part of time with which the will is concerned ... We immediately know only the present moment, which alone immediately exists. The future we only conjecture; the past we remember, or think we remember. What do we remember? Our own experienced thoughts and feelings ... Thus, all we know is memory. We cannot go behind it: Its dicta must be accepted, except where self-refuted. But one of the things memory most enjoins upon our faith is that it reports a direct and immediate knowledge which existed in the past. Our memory is that we remember nothing except such things as have been present to us ... Events past are recalled by memory supposing they acted on our sense; events to come are anticipated supposing they are subject to our will. — Peirce, 1895

Do you not understand, that a "portion" requires that the piece which is portioned be separated from the rest of the thing which is portioned? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I understand that this is required by your peculiar definitions; but as has happened before in other threads, I disagree with them. The portions of whatever is continuous are also continuous, both internally and with each other, including lapses of time.

So, I say that the present consists of one boundary which separates future from past. You say that the present consists of two boundaries, which separate out a "portion of time". You have introduced a complication by demanding two boundaries instead of one, to create a "portion" which is the present. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but two boundaries are necessary because events are constantly being realized at the present, which is why we directly perceive the flow of time and the motion of physical bodies. If the present were itself a single boundary--i.e., an instant--then whenever something changed, two incompatible states of things would be realized at that same instant, violating the principle of contradiction.

Look, in the first sentence you claim to have never said that reality consists of events, and in the second sentence you say instead, reality consists of events and other things. See the contradiction? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, in the first sentence I denied saying that reality consists of individual events, which would have to be realized at individual determinations of time; i.e., instants. I just explained why that is impossible, and I affirm instead that events are only realized at general determinations of time; i.e., lapses.

Zeno said “by the time Achilles reaches the tortoise it would have crawled to a new place, again and again”, where do you see an assumption? — Zelebg

The false assumption is that Achilles must make an infinite series of discrete moves, in each case advancing only to the tortoise's position at the beginning of that move, rather than simply running faster than the tortoise and overtaking it accordingly. Again:

... we should have to admit that Achilles could never overtake the tortoise if he had to resolve to run to where the tortoise then was, and having arrived there, to form a new resolution to run to the point at which the tortoise had then attained. This would involve the assumption that Achilles could not run unless he saw the tortoise ahead of him. — Peirce, 1902

Suppose instead that Achilles and the tortoise are riding in trains on parallel tracks. The tortoise is initially 100 feet ahead and proceeding at 20 feet per second, while Achilles is going 40 feet per second. After 2.5 seconds, Achilles is where the tortoise started, while the tortoise is now 50 feet farther along. Nevertheless, after another 2.5 seconds, Achilles overtakes the tortoise.

And how is the question of infinite divisibility of time different from the thread topic? — Zelebg

The thread topic is not the infinite divisibility of time, or even the continuity of time, but the reality of time.

You are still not explaining how any of that has anything to do with infinite divisibility or Zeno's paradox. — Zelebg

I already did, but I guess you forgot that, too. May we please get back to the thread topic now?

Will you ever tell us about that special one true continuity and the secret of the missing ingredient? — Zelebg

I guess you forgot that I defined five properties that are jointly necessary and sufficient here.

The line is not composed of parts and thus potentially infinitely divisible, but that by itself is not sufficient to make something truly continuous. What part is confusing you?

Numbers have nothing to do with this, especially not the way you look at them. — Zelebg

The rational numbers are infinitely divisible--e.g., 1, 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, etc.--yet obviously not continuous. Therefore, continuity is not reducible to infinite divisibility. Got it?

I find it impossible to conceive of real change without real time. It would require contradictory states of things to be realized simultaneously. — aletheist

I think that's a bit absurd. That's like saying mathematic's came before the Giza pyramids. Or music theory came before the sounds of music. — 3017amen

No, your examples are more like saying that the philosophy of time came before anyone's experience of time, which would indeed be absurd. But that is not what I am saying. Please explain how there could be any change in a timeless reality without violating the principle of contradiction.

If you're unable to see that the phenomenon of change relates to why we figured out how to measure it, then it would make any arguments about the concept of time irrelevant. Time relates to change in nature. — 3017amen

You seem to be suggesting that we invented time in order to mark and measure change. I obviously disagree; in my view, we invented calendars and clocks in order to mark and measure time, which is real independently of them. Maybe we should indeed just recognize the impasse and move on.

You agree it’s false, produces paradox, therefore you agree time is not infinitely divisible, you agree time is not continuous, and instead you are convinced that time advances at certain discrete intervals, or refresh rate, just like the universe of Pacman and Donkey Kong, or any video game. — Zelebg

No, that is exactly backwards. Zeno's false assumption is that continuous motion requires an infinite series of discrete steps, which is precisely what I deny--there is no need to divide space or time infinitely in order to traverse a finite distance during a finite lapse.

One second of time is either infinitely divisible or not, there is no third option, so whatever you are trying to say must be just an awkward way to say one of those two things. — Zelebg

I addressed this already:

Is one second of time infinitely divisible or not? — Zelebg

Sure, but when you mark an instant to divide one second, you get two half-second lapses; and when you mark two more instants to divide those, you get four quarter-second lapses; and so on ad infinitum. In other words, we artificially insert discrete instants to create the parts, which are always continuous lapses. — aletheist

Continuity is the subject of the paradox, it can not be the solution to its own paradoxicality just like a question is not an answer to itself. — Zelebg

Again, the paradox is based on an incorrect concept of continuity as merely infinite divisibility. Time is not isomorphic to the rational numbers, or even the real numbers in my view.

You were saying on the one hand change is subordinate to time, yet on the other hand you are saying time is an arbitrary construct. — 3017amen

Why do you keep putting words in my mouth? I said that time seems more fundamental than change, and how we mark and measure time is an arbitrary construct--not time itself. Do you see the difference? Likewise, how we mark and measure space is an arbitrary construct--not space itself--which is why we can use different systems of units (e.g., inch/foot/mile vs. mm/m/km).

And I'm saying time is subordinate to change. Meaning, change occurs naturally in the phenomenal world we just arbitrarily project the human construct of time measurement to it. — 3017amen

I find it impossible to conceive of real change without real time. It would require contradictory states of things to be realized simultaneously.

Did you see the example, how does that not prove that discrete positions in space are not a reality? — christian2017

Sorry, I do not see how it does prove this. As I said, we artificially mark discrete positions for a particular purpose, such as measurement.

Conveniently, Peirce specifically addressed the Achilles paradox:

... we should have to admit that Achilles could never overtake the tortoise if he had to resolve to run to where the tortoise then was, and having arrived there, to form a new resolution to run to the point at which the tortoise had then attained. This would involve the assumption that Achilles could not run unless he saw the tortoise ahead of him. — Peirce, 1902

Put another way, Zeno's assumption is that Achilles must complete an infinite series of discrete steps, each of which consists of traversing a smaller and smaller distance in a smaller and smaller interval of time, in order to overtake the tortoise--which is obviously false. Recognizing continuous motion as the fundamental reality, rather than discrete and sequential positions and instants, dissolves the paradox because Achilles merely has to achieve an average speed that is greater than the tortoise's average speed.

Is one second of time infinitely divisible or not? — Zelebg

Sure, but when you mark an instant to divide one second, you get two half-second lapses; and when you mark two more instants to divide those, you get four quarter-second lapses; and so on ad infinitum. In other words, we artificially insert discrete instants to create the parts, which are always continuous lapses.

Kant squarely hit the nail on the head when he said that every part of a lapse of time was a lapse of time. But here as in many parts of his philosophy, Kant did not quite understand himself, and imagined that in saying that every part of a time is a time he had only said that time was infinitely divisible. He spoke wiser than he knew. To say that every part of time is a time is to say that time contains no absolute instant, no exact date; for such instant, or date, would be an ultimate part of time. — Peirce, 1903

https://www.iep.utm.edu/zeno-par/ — Zelebg

Thanks, but that article discusses at least ten different paradoxes. Please stipulate which one you believe is most relevant to the thread topic and supposedly involves no assumptions whatsoever.

"Because many of the arguments turn crucially on the notion that space and time are infinitely divisible, Zeno was the first person to show that the concept of infinity is problematical." — Zelebg

I suspect that much will hinge on how "infinitely divisible" is defined in the selected paradox; i.e., what assumptions are involved in how it treats continuous time.

Well, that would contradict your statement earlier when you said that placing a phone call through different time zones was an arbitrary use of time. No? — 3017amen

No, I never made any such statement. Here is what I actually said (in another thread):

The fact that an east coast clock reads three hours later than a west coast clock is an arbitrary convention of how we mark and measure time, and reflects nothing about the real nature of time itself. — aletheist

Nonsense, time zones are arbitrary human constructs for marking and measuring time. The east coast is not three hours in the future relative to the west coast. — aletheist

Frankly, I do not understand why you keep bringing up this particular example as if it were relevant to the thread topic. Why exactly do you think that it contradicts my suggestion that time is more fundamental than change?

Which one of his [Zeno's] paradoxes would you specifically like to discuss as relevant to the thread topic? — aletheist

Any, and that you do not "see” that makes me think you are a robot — Zelebg

You claimed that Zeno makes no assumptions in any of his paradoxes. I am inviting you to choose one of them that you believe is most relevant to the thread topic, and then demonstrate that it requires no assumptions.

When talking about continuity of time and space, the aspect of continuity that is important is ‘infinite divisibility’, which is more than obvious from Zeno’s paradoxes. — Zelebg

I disagree, all five properties that I identified are important--jointly necessary and sufficient, as I said before.

There can either be a finite number of successive points in time between now and then, or the number is infinite. That is all, pick one: — Zelebg

Positing points already presupposes discreteness, even if there were infinitely many of them. Again, the rational numbers are infinite but not continuous, and I would say the same even of the real numbers, although most mathematicians since Cantor would disagree. If something is truly continuous, then it is not composed of points, although the number of points that we could theoretically mark on it is not just infinite, but exceeds all multitude.

Those paradoxes are still very relevant in the deepest metaphysical sense, they are exactly the test you need to apply on your conclusions, so it's something you really need to consider far more extensively as you seem to not be aware of them at all. — Zelebg

Okay, please educate me. Show me how one of Zeno's paradoxes applies to what I have presented in this thread so far. I am actually well aware of them, but it is always possible that I have missed something.

It's not a logical fallacy. Instead, it's an Existential question about Time and change. — 3017amen

You completely missed my pedantic point. You said "begs the question" when you meant "raises the question" or "prompts the question."

In other words, if change is an ongoing part of existence, and time and space are continuous, does that not render static phenomena non-existent? — 3017amen

Yes, in my view any instantaneous state of things is an artificial creation of thought for the purpose of describing reality, not a constituent of reality itself.

If there is any truth to that, then perhaps change itself, is paramount over the human construct of time. — 3017amen

Again, I deny that time is merely a human construct.

So, the question is, which came first, change or time? — 3017amen

"Coming first" already implies temporal precedence, so it presupposes time, but my guess is that what you have in mind is logical priority. It might help to rephrase the question another way: Which is more plausible, change without time or time without change? I lean toward the latter; if there were no time, how could there be any change? We can imagine an unchanging state of things persisting through time--in fact, we routinely identify prolonged states of things by attributing properties to substances that persist through time--which suggests that time is more fundamental than change.

All we do know for sure is, that change exists. — 3017amen

Yes, but time is precisely the aspect of reality that makes this possible. — aletheist

That's an interesting statement! That begs at least one question, does change precede time? — 3017amen

Since this is The Philosophy Forum, I feel the need to be pedantic and point out that begging a question is a logical fallacy, a form of circular reasoning; it involves assuming that which one is trying to prove. What I take you to mean is that this raises or prompts at least one question, and the answer depends on how we define the terms. What do you mean by "change"? by "precede"? by "time"?

The present is not a thing that affects other things or is affected by them, it is a general determination of time, which is a real law that governs the changing of things. — aletheist

It doesn't seem to be correct, we just discussed that time is arbitrary viz time zones, etc. No? — 3017amen

Again, how we mark and measure the passage of time is arbitrary, but time itself is real (in my view).

By contrast, I tend to look for ways to resolve paradoxes, but I try to acknowledge and accept them when this is unsuccessful. — aletheist

Indeed, but unresolved paradox or otherwise brute mystery tells us something. — 3017amen

Paradoxes are one thing, but I agree with Peirce that we should be very reluctant to accept anything as a "brute mystery" and give up on finding a rational explanation for it. As he put it:

Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in order to learn you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be satisfied with what you already incline to think, there follows one corollary which itself deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of the city of philosophy,
Do not block the way of inquiry. — Peirce, 1898

P.S. Is there a reason why you keep splitting up your replies into multiple posts? If you do not mind, I would appreciate it if you could group them together instead, as I have been doing.

Imagine a series of instantaneous photographs to be taken. Then, no matter how closely they follow one another, there is no more motion visible in any one of them than if they were taken at intervals of centuries. — Peirce, 1895

Apparently not true, as explained in my previous post. — Zelebg

The key words here are "imagine," "instantaneous," and "one." This is a thought experiment, since no real camera can take an instantaneous photograph; and even though a real photograph of something moving can have blurs in it due to the duration of exposure, there is still no motion visible in that one image. The same is true of any one frame of a video.

I repeat, Zeno did not make any assumptions, and if you again disagree without actually saying what assumption do you think he made I will conclude you are a robot programmed to waste time. — Zelebg

Which one of his paradoxes would you specifically like to discuss as relevant to the thread topic?

Please, what is your definition of “continuous”, and where did you find it? — Zelebg

Google says "forming an unbroken whole; without interruption," so nothing about being infinitely divisible. Again, the rational numbers are infinitely divisible, yet not continuous. For me, infinite divisibility is just one of five properties that are jointly necessary and sufficient for true continuity; here is how I am presenting them in a forthcoming journal paper:

• Rationality - every portion conforms to one general law or Idea, which is the final cause by which the ontologically prior whole calls out its parts.
• Divisibility - every portion is an indefinite material part, unless and until it is deliberately marked off with a limit to become a distinct actual part.
• Homogeneity - every portion has the same dimensionality as the whole, while every limit between portions is a topical singularity of lower dimensionality.
• Contiguity - every portion has a limit in common with each adjacent portion, and thus the same mode of immediate connection with others as every other has.
• Inexhaustibility - limits of any multitude, or even exceeding all multitude, may always be marked off to create additional actual parts within any previously uninterrupted portion.

The application to time is that the portions are lapses, the limits are instants, and the one general law or Idea to which every lapse conforms is an indefinitely gradual state of change.

I am using the Block-universe illustration as a metaphor in trying to describe Mc Taggart's view that present tense of Time is an illusion, and paradoxical. And as such, thinking of how small that interval of time actually is (Planck time if you like), when looking at it graphically from the Block-universe illustration. — 3017amen

As should be abundantly clear by now after my various responses to @Metaphysician Undercover, I believe that any conception of the present as a discrete instant, or even a definite interval, is false. In other word's McTaggart's model of time as a series of individual positions is indeed unreal, because time itself is not like that.

All we do know for sure is, that change exists. — 3017amen

Yes, but time is precisely the aspect of reality that makes this possible.

But the distinctions of Time (past, present, future), is what we are trying to reconcile, with change. — 3017amen

In my view, the past does not change, while the present is always a state of change.

I think that change has effects on the present; the present doesn't effect change. — 3017amen

I would suggest saying instead that the present is when all change is happening. The present is not a thing that affects other things or is affected by them, it is a general determination of time, which is a real law that governs the changing of things.

What if the flow stops? What happens to the present tense of existence then? Does it cease to exist? — 3017amen

That would indeed correspond to the hypothetical completion of all time, when everything is in the past and therefore absolutely determinate, such that no further change is possible. In other words, not only would there be no future as the growing block theory posits, but also no present.

Again, the subject matter is very intriguing, however, my philosophy is to look for paradox. When I find paradox, I know truth exists. — 3017amen

By contrast, I tend to look for ways to resolve paradoxes, but I try to acknowledge and accept them when this is unsuccessful.

No, I think there is evidence from quantum physics which indicates that time is likely composed of discrete units. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the Planck time is the duration required for light to travel the Planck length in a vacuum, and the Planck length is the distance below which our current physics equations are no longer valid. In other words, I understand them to be mathematical limitations on marking and measuring time and space, not real properties of continuous spacetime.

If "S is P", and "S is not-P", are real applicable descriptions of the world and they may be true or false, then within any lapse of time both of these may be true. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the principle of contradiction is that they cannot both be true at the same determination of time. However, each can be true at different determinations of time, as long as there is a determination of time in between--what I have been calling an event-lapse--at which neither is true.

At the beginning of the time lapse one is true, and at the end of the time lapse the other is true. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, before the event-lapse one is true, and after the event-lapse the other is true. Again, during the event-lapse neither is true.

If time is truly continuous, and any determination of "now", "this time", or "that time", necessarily designates a duration of time, then within that time period the law of non-contradiction will be violated because there will be change within that time lapse. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, continuous change during a lapse of time does not violate the principle of contradiction; it only violates the principle of excluded middle, which is true only of absolutely determinate--i.e., unchanging--states of things.

But now we have a division between our descriptions and logical assessments of the world (the world can be described by true and false propositions), and what we truly believe the world is like (such descriptions cannot describe the world). — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, we must conclude that classical logic is not universally valid, because the principle of excluded middle is not strictly true:

The principle of contradiction is more elementary than that of excluded middle, so that we may begin by considering the consequences of the former while leaving the latter out of account. — Peirce, 1881

The two principles of contradiction and excluded middle do not stand at all upon the same plane ... what concerns us now is that certain rudimentary forms of reasoning, embracing all those that the traditional logic has handed down to us, depend only upon the impossibility of a fact's being both true and false, and remain equally sound arguments, if we suppose that some things are neither true nor false. — Peirce, 1881

To speak of the actual state of things implies a great assumption, namely that there is a perfectly definite body of propositions which, if we could only find them out, are the truth, and that everything is really either true or in positive conflict with the truth. This assumption, called the principle of excluded middle, I consider utterly unwarranted, and do not believe it. Still, I hold that there is reason for thinking it to be very nearly true. — Peirce, 1893

No doubt there is an assumption involved in speaking of the actual state of things ... namely, the assumption that reality is so determinate as to verify or falsify every possible proposition. This is called the principle of excluded middle ... I do not believe it is strictly true ... It is convenient, not only in a practical but in a philosophical sense, to commence with the study of arguments which assume such an absolutely determinate state of things, without ourselves asserting that such a state is quite realized. — Peirce, 1893

Triadic Logic is that logic which, though not rejecting entirely the Principle of Excluded Middle, nevertheless recognizes that every proposition, S is P, is either true, or false, or else S has a lower mode of being such that it can neither be determinately P, nor determinately not-P, but is at the limit between P and not P ... Thus the Triadic Logic does not conflict with Dyadic Logic; only, it recognizes, what the latter does not ... Triadic Logic is universally true. But Dyadic Logic is not absolutely false ... — Peirce, 1909

As these quotes indicate, Peirce rather remarkably anticipated what we now call intuitionistic logic, which omits both excluded middle and double negation elimination, as well as three-valued logic. In fact, he developed a rudimentary truth table for the latter more than a decade before Lukasiewicz and Post. The "lower mode of being" in the last quote corresponds to an existential subject in a state of change, rather than a prolonged state of things.

Therefore we need an objective, scientific definition, supported by empirical observation. Since we notice that the past is substantially different from the future, we can produce a much more objective definition by defining the present as the division between past and future. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but all empirical observation is ultimately phenomenological observation that is always and only happening at the present. We cannot observe the past or the future; we can only remember the past and anticipate the future, which is how we tell them apart. It is perfectly consistent, then, to define the present as both the determination of time at which anything is present to the mind and the indefinite lapse that is later than the determinate past and earlier than the indeterminate future.

However, once we assume a real objective boundary between future and past, then we have real division within time, and we can no longer assume time as continuous. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I hold that the "real objective boundary between future and past" is a continuous portion of time (lapse), rather than a discrete limit in time (instant). The past is indeed distinct from the future, but the present moment--at which an indefinitely gradual state of change is always being realized--is not sharply distinguishable from the immediately past and future moments.

If reality consists of "events", then there is necessarily separation between the individual events, and it is impossible that time is continuous. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but I never claimed that reality consists of individual events; that is essentially McTaggart's view, contributing to his assessment that time is unreal. Instead, reality consists of states of things--both facts and events realized at continuous lapses of time--which we abstract from it when we signify them with propositions:

A state of things is an abstract constituent part of reality, of such a nature that a proposition is needed to represent it. There is but one individual, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the all of reality. A fact is so highly a prescissively abstract state of things, that it can be wholly represented in a simple proposition, and the term "simple," here, has no absolute meaning, but is merely a comparative expression. — Peirce, 1906

The only absolutely determinate--i.e., unchanging--state of things is the totality of what has been realized in the past, and even that is always growing in the present as new states of things are continuously realized.

Here is Peter Lynds' paper in which he postulates that there are no instants of time. — jgill

Thanks, I read it a couple of months ago and found it relatively unremarkable since Peirce had that insight a century earlier.

When you say continuous motion, who would argue with you on that? — christian2017

People who insist that space and time are composed of discrete positions and instants, rather than truly continuous.

As for discrete positions in space, if there was two galaxies or two asteroids roughly (roughly) in line with each other (hypothethical situation) and at at same time they were moving in opposite directions (roughly parallel to the original line that they form with each other), the speed with which they are moving and the distance traveled would be proof that discrete positions in space are not artificial creations. — christian2017

The motion is real, but speed and distance are measurements facilitated by marking positions and instants, and then comparing them with arbitrary unit intervals.

As for instants in time, well Calculus would teach that for calculation purposes, the concept of instances in time are real in the extent that they are used by engineers and physicists. — christian2017

Usefulness does not entail reality; positions and instants are paradigmatic examples of "useful fictions."

If you want to elaborate on why you think instances in time is a ridicoulous concept i would be more than happy to hear what you say. — christian2017

I never suggested that it is a ridiculous concept, just that time is not composed of discrete instants, contra McTaggart.

Thanks for your comments, but I am honestly not sure whether or how they bear on the thread topic. The fact that the speed of light in a vacuum is constant strikes me as consistent with my contention that continuous motion is the fundamental physical reality, while discrete positions in space and instants in time are artificial creations of thought to facilitate describing such motion.

OK, let's assume "time is continuous" is a conclusion. It is a conclusion which forces us to accept violation of the law of non-contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it does not. Again, there is never an instant or lapse of time at which incompatible states of things are realized such that both "S is P" and "S is not-P" are true, which would violate the principle of contradiction. Initially there is a lapse at which a state of things is realized such that "S is P" is true. Then there is a lapse at which a state of change is realized such that neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true; i.e., the principle of excluded middle is false. Finally there is a lapse at which a state of things is realized such that "S is not-P" is true.

Motion requires a period of time, so if we are consciously aware of motion, then consciousness must span a period of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, and that is precisely why the present cannot be an instant, but instead must be a lapse of time.

Since any period of time has an earlier part, and a later part, and "the present" is used to divide past from future in this way, then the opening phrase above, "we are conscious only of the present time", is a false statement, and that's where the problem lies. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, from a phenomenological standpoint the present is defined as that part of time of which we are conscious. Another way of putting it is that the temporal present corresponds directly to whatever is present to the mind.

Therefore we must reject the idea that consciousness represents "the present", because we are conscious of a period of time which contains both a past, and a future. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, we must simply recognize that the present is an indefinite lapse of time--a moment--such that it cannot be sharply distinguished from the immediately past moment nor the immediately future moment:

The present moment will be a lapse of time, highly confrontitial, when looked at as a whole, seeming absolutely so, but when regarded closely, seen not to be absolutely so, its earlier parts being somewhat of the nature of memory, a little vague, and its later parts somewhat of the nature of anticipation, a little generalized. It contains a central part which is still more present, still more confrontitial, but which presents the same features. There is nothing at all that is absolutely confrontitial; although it is quite true that the confrontitial is continually flowing in upon us ... Another plain deliverance of the percipuum is that moment melts into moment. That is to say, moments may be so related as not to be entirely separate and yet not be the same. — Peirce, 1903

A proper definition of "the present" would be the separation of the future from the past, the division, or boundary between them. This allows us to uphold the law of noncontradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but there is no inconsistency between this additional definition and what I have stated above.

The consciousness of the present, as the boundary between past and future, involves them both. — Peirce, 1899

In fact, boundaries are precisely the sort of thing for which the principle of excluded middle is false.

Thus, a point of a surface may be in a region of that surface, or out of it, or on its boundary. This gives us an indirect and vague conception of an intermediacy between affirmation and denial in general, and consequently of an intermediate, or nascent state, between determination and indetermination ... [The Present] is plainly that Nascent State between the Determinate and the Indeterminate that was noticed above. — Peirce, 1905

The present is when the indeterminate future becomes the determinate past, and as with any other event, this is realized at a lapse of time rather than an instant.

In general, the arguments presented do not include the premise required for the conclusion that time is continuous. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the required premise is quite simply that we directly perceive the continuous flow of time.

No more than the present moment directly confronts us. The future, however little future it may be, is known only by generalization. The past, however little past it may be, lacks the explicitness of the present. Nevertheless, in the present moment we are directly aware of the flow of time, or in other words that things can change. — Peirce, 1903

As you pointed out, we are directly aware of motion; so we can go one step farther than Peirce did, and say that in the present moment we are directly aware that things are changing. That is what I mean when I say that the state of things in the present is an indefinitely gradual state of change--it is always the case that innumerable events throughout the universe are currently in progress.

All this does is render the "event lapse" as unintelligible in relation to the two states of P and not-P. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, what I frankly find unintelligible is your entire paragraph that begins with this sentence.

If individual events exist within a continuity, then they must be separated, individuated from that continuity, by means of "instants". Without such instants as divisors, there are no separate events. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, this is self-contradictory; if events were "separated" and "individuated," then they would necessarily be discontinuous. Besides, I explained already--more than once--that an event is realized at a lapse of time between two other lapses of time at which incompatible states of things are realized.

Therefore, Peirce is forced to apprehend events, as well as instants as artificial. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, events are undeniably real in the sense that contradictory states of things are realized at different determinations of time, which entails that there must be another determination of time at which the change from one state to the other is realized. The only alternative to an indefinitely gradual state of change at a lapse of time is an instantaneous event, which is impossible since there can be no change whatsoever at an instant.

Imagine a series of instantaneous photographs to be taken. Then, no matter how closely they follow one another, there is no more motion visible in any one of them than if they were taken at intervals of centuries. — Peirce, c. 1895

That is the theory of time known as eternalism. It is sometimes called "block universe" because it posits that the past, the present, and the future all exist. By comparison, my view is sometimes called "growing block universe" because it posits that only the past and the present exist, and that the past is constantly getting "larger" as the present advances into the nonexistent future--much like how space is widely thought to be expanding, even though there is presumably nothing beyond its boundary.

It seems like you are suggesting that the present and/or the flow of time is an illusion in a block universe, but I am not sure that is accurate. Again, the present does exist as a time-slice that is advancing through the block from the growing past toward the shrinking future. What I suppose would be an illusion is the indeterminacy of the future; i.e., eternalism seems to entail determinism, such that every state of things that is actually realized is necessarily realized. I invite correction if I am wrong about that.

Employing Peirce's definition of "real" as that which is as it is regardless of what any individual mind or finite group of minds thinks about it:

• All past states of things are real as determinate actualities.
• Some future states of things are real as either indeterminate possibilities or conditional necessities.
• The present state of things is real as an indefinitely gradual state of change, during which some future possibilities/necessities are becoming past actualities.

Again, please provide your definition of "illusion" in this context.

I am not ignoring you, it will just take more time than I have right now to compose a response.

So if I travel from west to east, how can I live the lost hours (or in the opposite east to west, you get to re-live them)? — 3017amen

Again, there are no "lost hours." Your age in hours is always exactly the same as it would be if you stayed where you were born for your entire life. We simply adjust our patterns of behavior in accordance with when the sun rises and sets at each location where we find ourselves.

The way we measure time cannot be arbitrary can it? — 3017amen

The unit by which we measure time is arbitrary. A second is now defined as a certain number of vibrations of a cesium atom, although historically it was intended to be 1/86,400th of the time required for the earth to complete one rotation about its axis. We had leap day last week because the time required for the earth to complete one revolution around the sun is not an integer multiple of its rotations.

Moreover, how we set our clocks is to some extent arbitrary. It is now standardized around the world, although historically it was intended to be such that noon would always correspond to when the sun is directly overhead each day. We will turn our clocks forward an hour this weekend because people generally prefer having extra daylight in the evening, rather than in the morning.

If so, then is all of time an illusion I wonder? How can we escape from that illusion; hypothetically, is there a way to do that? — 3017amen

I am still not sure what exactly you mean by calling time an illusion. As the thread title indicates, my view is that time itself is real, although our perception of it (and everything else) is certainly fallible.

I said Zeno did not make any assumptions ... — Zelebg

Of course he made assumptions, as all of us do.

... and time is either analog or digital, where analog, continuous, and infinitely divisible is all one and the same concept. — Zelebg

If they were "all one and the same concept," then we would not have three different terms for them. I acknowledge that analog and digital loosely correspond to continuous and discrete, respectively; but again, infinitely divisible is not synonymous with continuous.

Do you even know what you just said or why, are you a robot? — Zelebg

Wait, are you suggesting that the rational numbers are continuous? Even the analysts (Cantor etc.) deny that, claiming instead--also wrongly, in Peirce's view (and mine)--that the real numbers are continuous.

Zeno is not making any assumptions, and his arguments are indeed about infinite divisibility, i.e time / space continuity. — Zelebg

Everyone is always making some assumptions, and again, infinite divisibility is necessary but not sufficient for true continuity. The rational numbers are infinitely divisible, yet no one seriously claims that they are continuous.

That time is continuous is an unsupported assumption ... — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it is the conclusion of various arguments based on our phenomenal experience. I already provided a couple of them above, and here is another succinct example:

We are conscious only of the present time, which is an instant, if there be any such thing as an instant. But in the present we are conscious of the flow of time. There is no flow in an instant. Hence, the present is not an instant. — Peirce, c. 1893-5

It follows from the first sentence that there is no such thing as an instant at all.

This is exactly what the following paragraph says, the existence of an "event" is a violation of the law of non-contradiction: — Metaphysician Undercover

That is not even remotely what the quoted paragraph says. Surely it is not in the least bit controversial to recognize that incompossible facts are realized at different times. An event simply corresponds to the transition from one state to the other.

Instead of saying that one state exists, followed in time by a distinctly different state, Peirce assumes the two incompatible states exist together, at the same time, as an "event". — Metaphysician Undercover

Peirce assumes no such thing, and that is not how I described an event. I respectfully suggest carefully rereading the entire OP, but here is the most pertinent portion:

An event is not itself an existential subject, it is the state of things that is realized at a lapse of time when a definite change occurs--an existential subject initially has one determination, such that a certain fact is realized; but then it receives a contradictory determination, such that a negation of that fact is realized. — aletheist

Let me try to spell it out more thoroughly. Before the commencement of the lapse of time at which the event is realized, an earlier state of things is realized, which is a fact as signified by the true proposition "S is P." After the completion of the event-lapse, a later state of things is realized, which is an incompossible fact as signified by the true proposition "S is not-P." The two incompatible states do not exist together, at the same time, because they are separated by the whole event-lapse; so the principle of contradiction is not violated. However, during the event-lapse itself, an indefinitely gradual state of change is realized, such that neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true; so the principle of excluded middle is false while the event is in progress. It can be successfully maintained in classical logic because we are almost always reasoning about prolonged states of things, rather than states of change.

In reality, the "event" is what is artificial, a mere description, completely dependent on perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, I instead hold with Peirce that instants are artificial creations of thought for the purpose of describing states of things, including facts and events. Besides, if time were really composed of discrete instants at finite intervals, how would we get from one to the "next"? How could there be any continuity in our experience at all? In Peirce's words:

It is logically impossible for a state of things to be realized in the present instant and not to be at all so in the past and future. Were the instants independently actual, as they are in the Time of the analysts, memory would be a perpetual miracle. — Peirce, c. 1904

The argument which seems to me to prove, not only that there is such a conception of continuity as I contend for, but that it is realized in the universe, is that if it were not so, nobody could have any memory. If time, as many have thought, consists of discrete instants, all but the feeling of the present instant would be utterly non-existent. — Peirce, 1908

As it relates to time, if you could enumerate for me which is considered an illusion, and which is considered real, I would greatly appreciate it. — 3017amen

I am sorry, I honestly do not understand what you are requesting here. All I can say (again) is that the reality of time has nothing to do with how we arbitrarily mark and measure it. Changing one's location on earth does not actually add or subtract hours from time itself.

The video presents discourse over past, present and future perception of time, hence ..."every moment is present". — 3017amen

As I said before in the other thread, every moment is present when it is present, but no longer present when it is past and not yet present when it is future. The only moment that is present now is the present moment, when the indeterminate future is becoming the determinate past.

Notwithstanding the Aristotle/Cantor distinctions, how does eternity relate to Time? — 3017amen

What specific Aristotle/Cantor distinctions do you have in mind? What exactly do you mean by "eternity" in this context?

Peirce is talking gibberish ... continuous, i.e. infinitely divisible ... You either do not understand what “continuity” means or your logic circuit is broken ... Ultimate parts? It's gibberish. — Zelebg

Considering Peirce's remarks on this topic in general and about ultimate parts in particular to be gibberish, along with suggesting that being continuous is synonymous with being infinitely divisible, demonstrates quite conclusively which one of us does not understand what "continuity" means.

Why quoting a guy from the 19th century? Actually, why quote anyone ... — Zelebg

Why invoke a guy from the 5th century BC? I tend to quote Peirce and other noteworthy philosophers when I believe that their own words are more perspicuous than any rephrasing that I might attempt, but YMMV.

I think it’s self evident if you consider it in terms of what is “primary” or “more basic”, so I say time and space are actual, while velocity is abstract or virtual property, i.e. “relation”. — Zelebg

On the contrary, it is continuous motion that is the reality, while discrete positions in space and discrete instants in time are both abstractions that we invented in order to describe motion.

... nobody is ever in an exact Position (except instantaneously, and an Instant is a fiction, or ens rationis), but Positions are either vaguely described states of motion of small range, or else (what is the better view), are entia rationis (i.e. fictions recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions) invented for the purposes of closer descriptions of states of motion ... — Peirce, 1906

Motion / change is the only way to perceive time, it is thus essential to be the focus of any time related argument, and also, just because we perceive time only indirectly should not fool us to think it is illusory. — Zelebg

On the contrary, we directly perceive the continuous flow of time.

To imagine time, time is required. Hence, if we do not directly perceive the flow of time, we cannot imagine time. Yet the sense of time is something forced upon common-sense. So that, if common-sense denies that the flow [of] time is directly perceived, it is hopelessly entangled in contradictions and cannot be identified with any distinct and intelligible conception.
But to me it seems clear that our natural common-sense belief is that the flow of time is directly perceived. — Peirce, c. 1895

In fact, if we did not directly perceive the continuity of time, then we would have no concept of continuity at all.

One opinion which has been put forward and which seems, at any rate, to be tenable and to harmonize with the modern logico-mathematical conceptions, is that our image of the flow of events receives, in a strictly continuous time, strictly continual accessions on the side of the future, while fading in a gradual manner on the side of the past, and that thus the absolutely immediate present is gradually transformed by an immediately given change into a continuum of the reality of which we are thus assured. The argument is that in this way, and apparently in this way only, our having the idea of a true continuum can be accounted for. — Peirce, c. 1902

Additionally, either time or space have to be discrete to avoid Zeno’s paradoxes. Or both have to be discrete, I forgot and can’t remember how I concluded that, but I insist it is true. — Zelebg

On the contrary, Zeno's paradoxes are only dissolved by recognizing the continuity of both space and time.

All the arguments of Zeno depend on supposing that a continuum has ultimate parts. But a continuum is precisely that, every part of which has parts, in the same sense. Hence, he makes out his contradictions only by making a self-contradictory supposition. In ordinary and mathematical language, we allow ourselves to speak of such parts--points--and whenever we are led into contradiction thereby, we have simply to express ourselves more accurately to resolve the difficulty. — Peirce, 1868

For instance when traveling from west to east, another paradox presents itself by virtue of one being unable to live the lost hours (or in the opposite you get to relive them). — 3017amen

No, there are no "lost" or "relived" hours. That is an illusion created by our arbitrary manner of marking and measuring time.

Nonetheless, the synopsis of that video could be summed up in the simple statement: Eternity is Time. Time, eternity. — 3017amen

Where are you getting that from the video? For one thing, the word "eternity" is never mentioned.

Is that true or false? — 3017amen

I cannot answer until you elaborate on what you mean by it. In any case, I have just started a new thread on "The Reality of Time" and suggest that we continue this conversation over there.

It is stated especially in the Westminster confession that some people are by God predestined to be saved while others not.However i have come up across some precepts that are mandatory for salvation in Calvinism like true faith repentance etc. — rhudehssolf

Wikipedia has a pretty good article on Calvinism that addresses this, including an explanation of the acronym TULIP that is often used to summarize it:

• Total depravity
• Unconditional election
• Limited atonement
• Irresistible grace
• Perseverance of the saints

St. Augustine wrote about predestination. Following Augustine, Luther adopted the idea, and Calvin followed Luther. (At least, that's the way I understand the doctrine came about.) — Bitter Crank

Extremely oversimplified, but that is the gist.

It apparently was the case that the idea of God decreeing who would be saved and who would be damned for all time, was unacceptable. — Bitter Crank

Not to Calvinists, who still maintain it: God grants faith only to those whom He has predestined to be saved, but there is no way to know in this life who is and is not in that category. God is 100% responsible for both salvation and damnation.

So, God grants grace to those who desire to be saved so that they can fulfill the demands of faith. — Bitter Crank

That is a rough description of the Roman Catholic and Arminian approaches: God in His foreknowledge predestines those who will freely choose to believe. God and the human share responsibility for salvation, while the human is 100% responsible for damnation.

There is a third view, held by Lutherans: God predestines those who are saved, but not those who are damned. God is 100% responsible for salvation, while the human is 100% responsible for damnation.

If you care to continue the discussion, let's start with this basic understanding regarding time as an illusion, and you tell me what is wrong with this paradox(s): — 3017amen

Since I do value the conversation, I went ahead and watched the video more carefully, this time typing up a transcription so that I could study what was said and provide my own summary.

The first alleged paradox (attributed to Aristotle) is that the past does not exist (although it did exist), the future does not exist (although it will exist), and the present is just a limit between them; "so time seems to be a nothing dividing something nonexistent from something nonexistent." As I have already explained, my view (and Peirce's) is that the past does exist, and the present--as the determination of time at which the nonexistent (possible/necessary) future becomes the existent (actual) past--is an indefinite lapse, rather than a durationless instant.

The second alleged paradox (attributed to McTaggart) is not as clearly identified. One candidate is that "every event must be one or the other [of past/present/future], but no event can be more than one." My view (and Peirce's) is that every event is realized at a lapse of time such that it is future before the commencement of the lapse, when the initial state of things is realized; present during the lapse itself, when a gradual state of change is realized; and past after the completion of the lapse, when the new state of things is realized.

The other candidate is that "this moment is the only present moment; on the other hand, every moment is present." This is straightforwardly false, or at best equivocal. Every moment is present when it is present, but no longer present when it is past and not yet present when it is future. Moreover, the continuity of time is such that being present rather than past or future is a matter of degree, not a sharp distinction. In Peirce's words, "The events of a day are less mediately present to the mind than the events of a year; the events of a second less mediately present than the events of a day."

Hence I continue to disagree with you (and McTaggart) that time is an unreal illusion.

Sorry, I hate watching videos and strongly prefer reading, so I will ask one more time: Please provide a succinct summary of the specific paradox that you have in mind.

@Relativist and myself are confused with your philosophy regarding what is natural and an illusion. — 3017amen

Where have I ever said anything about "what is natural and an illusion"? I have consistently been discussing the distinction between existence and reality.

You are contradicting yourself when you say Pierce recognizes the laws of nature but when we talk about physics you are denying such phenomena. — 3017amen

Where have I ever denied laws of nature? On the contrary, I have explicitly affirmed them, but suggested that they are not strictly exceptionless due to the reality of absolute chance.

You also seem to be denying the paradox between what's reality and illusion — 3017amen

I keep asking you to provide a succinct summary of the specific paradox that you have in mind, and you keep failing to do so.

The reality of time is just an illusion. And therein lies your paradox. — 3017amen

No, either time is a reality or time is an illusion. I hold that time is a reality, and you apparently hold that time is an illusion; so there is no paradox, we simply disagree.

That seems to suggest he did not believe there are laws of nature, because these entail necessitation. — Relativist

On the contrary, Peirce consistently affirmed the reality of laws of nature, although he held that they have evolved and are still evolving; and again, due to the reality of absolute chance, they are not strictly exceptionless.

Ah, this is where Peirce is wrong. In theoretical physics, determinism/indeterminism relates to causation, not time or infinity, as in our case. — 3017amen

No, this is a category mistake. We are talking about philosophy--specifically, logic and metaphysics--not theoretical physics.

Well, if that were true, then in reality, one would not be able to call anyone in any other time zone. But since we are capable of such, Peirce's philosophy appears flawed. — 3017amen

Nonsense, time zones are arbitrary human constructs for marking and measuring time. The east coast is not three hours in the future relative to the west coast.

And so, all you can say there is that the past and future are, once again, abstract illusions. But the paradox presents itself when one tries, like apparently Pierce has tried, to deny any one of them. He's trying to make the reality of time and its tenses mutually exclusive. — 3017amen

I have no idea what you mean by any of this. If all past actualities exist, and some future possibilities and necessities are real, then neither past nor future is an abstract illusion. Again, what specific paradox do you have in mind? How is Peirce denying the past or the future? On the contrary, he is simply recognizing how they are different. If you want to insist that they are exactly the same, then we obviously disagree about that.

In other words, he should accept reality of future tense, but can relegate it to an abstract illusion. — 3017amen

If something is an abstract illusion, then by definition it is not a reality.