It would infer the likelihood that time is more arbitrary than not, no?
Put another way, Zeno's assumption is that Achilles must complete an infinite series of discrete steps, each of which consists of traversing a smaller and smaller distance in a smaller and smaller interval of time, in order to overtake the tortoise--which is obviously false. Recognizing continuous motion as the fundamental reality, rather than discrete and sequential positions and instants, dissolves the paradox because Achilles merely has to achieve an average speed that is greater than the tortoise's average speed.... we should have to admit that Achilles could never overtake the tortoise if he had to resolve to run to where the tortoise then was, and having arrived there, to form a new resolution to run to the point at which the tortoise had then attained. This would involve the assumption that Achilles could not run unless he saw the tortoise ahead of him. — Peirce, 1902
Sorry, I do not see how it does prove this. As I said, we artificially mark discrete positions for a particular purpose, such as measurement.Did you see the example, how does that not prove that discrete positions in space are not a reality? — christian2017
Why do you keep putting words in my mouth? I said that time seems more fundamental than change, and how we mark and measure time is an arbitrary construct--not time itself. Do you see the difference? Likewise, how we mark and measure space is an arbitrary construct--not space itself--which is why we can use different systems of units (e.g., inch/foot/mile vs. mm/m/km).You were saying on the one hand change is subordinate to time, yet on the other hand you are saying time is an arbitrary construct. — 3017amen
I find it impossible to conceive of real change without real time. It would require contradictory states of things to be realized simultaneously.And I'm saying time is subordinate to change. Meaning, change occurs naturally in the phenomenal world we just arbitrarily project the human construct of time measurement to it. — 3017amen
Put another way, Zeno's assumption is that Achilles must complete an infinite series of discrete steps, each of which consists of traversing a smaller and smaller distance in a smaller and smaller interval of time, in order to overtake the tortoise--which is obviously false.
Recognizing continuous motion as the fundamental reality, rather than discrete and sequential positions and instants, dissolves the paradox because Achilles merely has to achieve an average speed that is greater than the tortoise's average speed.
Do you see the difference? — aletheist
I find it impossible to conceive of real change without real time. It would require contradictory states of things to be realized simultaneously. — aletheist
No, that is exactly backwards. Zeno's false assumption is that continuous motion requires an infinite series of discrete steps, which is precisely what I deny--there is no need to divide space or time infinitely in order to traverse a finite distance during a finite lapse.You agree it’s false, produces paradox, therefore you agree time is not infinitely divisible, you agree time is not continuous, and instead you are convinced that time advances at certain discrete intervals, or refresh rate, just like the universe of Pacman and Donkey Kong, or any video game. — Zelebg
I addressed this already:One second of time is either infinitely divisible or not, there is no third option, so whatever you are trying to say must be just an awkward way to say one of those two things. — Zelebg
Is one second of time infinitely divisible or not? — Zelebg
Sure, but when you mark an instant to divide one second, you get two half-second lapses; and when you mark two more instants to divide those, you get four quarter-second lapses; and so on ad infinitum. In other words, we artificially insert discrete instants to create the parts, which are always continuous lapses. — aletheist
Again, the paradox is based on an incorrect concept of continuity as merely infinite divisibility. Time is not isomorphic to the rational numbers, or even the real numbers in my view.Continuity is the subject of the paradox, it can not be the solution to its own paradoxicality just like a question is not an answer to itself. — Zelebg
I find it impossible to conceive of real change without real time. It would require contradictory states of things to be realized simultaneously. — aletheist
No, your examples are more like saying that the philosophy of time came before anyone's experience of time, which would indeed be absurd. But that is not what I am saying. Please explain how there could be any change in a timeless reality without violating the principle of contradiction.I think that's a bit absurd. That's like saying mathematic's came before the Giza pyramids. Or music theory came before the sounds of music. — 3017amen
You seem to be suggesting that we invented time in order to mark and measure change. I obviously disagree; in my view, we invented calendars and clocks in order to mark and measure time, which is real independently of them. Maybe we should indeed just recognize the impasse and move on.If you're unable to see that the phenomenon of change relates to why we figured out how to measure it, then it would make any arguments about the concept of time irrelevant. Time relates to change in nature. — 3017amen
Sure, but when you mark an instant to divide one second, you get two half-second lapses; and when you mark two more instants to divide those, you get four quarter-second lapses; and so on ad infinitum. In other words, we artificially insert discrete instants to create the parts, which are always continuous lapses.
Again, the paradox is based on an incorrect concept of continuity as merely infinite divisibility. Time is not isomorphic to the rational numbers, or even the real numbers in my view.
The line is not composed of parts and thus potentially infinitely divisible, but that by itself is not sufficient to make something truly continuous. What part is confusing you?
I guess you forgot that I defined five properties that are jointly necessary and sufficient here.
The false assumption is that Achilles must make an infinite series of discrete moves, in each case advancing only to the tortoise's position at the beginning of that move, rather than simply running faster than the tortoise and overtaking it accordingly. Again:Zeno said “by the time Achilles reaches the tortoise it would have crawled to a new place, again and again”, where do you see an assumption? — Zelebg
Suppose instead that Achilles and the tortoise are riding in trains on parallel tracks. The tortoise is initially 100 feet ahead and proceeding at 20 feet per second, while Achilles is going 40 feet per second. After 2.5 seconds, Achilles is where the tortoise started, while the tortoise is now 50 feet farther along. Nevertheless, after another 2.5 seconds, Achilles overtakes the tortoise.... we should have to admit that Achilles could never overtake the tortoise if he had to resolve to run to where the tortoise then was, and having arrived there, to form a new resolution to run to the point at which the tortoise had then attained. This would involve the assumption that Achilles could not run unless he saw the tortoise ahead of him. — Peirce, 1902
The thread topic is not the infinite divisibility of time, or even the continuity of time, but the reality of time.And how is the question of infinite divisibility of time different from the thread topic? — Zelebg
Zeno's false assumption is that continuous motion requires an infinite series of discrete steps, which is precisely what I deny--there is no need to divide space or time infinitely in order to traverse a finite distance during a finite lapse.
Suppose instead that Achilles and the tortoise are riding in trains on parallel tracks. The tortoise is initially 100 feet ahead and proceeding at 20 feet per second, while Achilles is going 40 feet per second. After 2.5 seconds, Achilles is where the tortoise started, while the tortoise is now 50 feet farther along. Nevertheless, after another 2.5 seconds, Achilles overtakes the tortoise.
The thread topic is not the infinite divisibility of time, or even the continuity of time, but the reality of time
Did you see the example, how does that not prove that discrete positions in space are not a reality?
— christian2017
Sorry, I do not see how it does prove this. As I said, we artificially mark discrete positions for a particular purpose, such as measurement. — aletheist
Imagine a single photograph represents your conscious instant of visual perception. You put your finger in front and left of your nose and move it to the right. Say, during that motion you were conscious 5 times, so there are 5 of those photographs or frames, but you are only ever aware of a single one at any of those conscious instants, so how do you perceive motion / time?
First frame shows the finger on the left. Time passes until the next frame and this first picture fades, say 50%. Second frame then shows the finger a bit to the right, but “underneath” is still visible that first frame. Time passes, picture fades, third frame shows three fingers, and so on... — Zelebg
No, the principle of contradiction is that they cannot both be true at the same determination of time. However, each can be true at different determinations of time, as long as there is a determination of time in between--what I have been calling an event-lapse--at which neither is true. — aletheist
No, before the event-lapse one is true, and after the event-lapse the other is true. Again, during the event-lapse neither is true. — aletheist
Yes, but all empirical observation is ultimately phenomenological observation that is always and only happening at the present. — aletheist
No, I hold that the "real objective boundary between future and past" is a continuous portion of time (lapse), rather than a discrete limit in time (instant). — aletheist
Yes, but I never claimed that reality consists of individual events; that is essentially McTaggart's view, contributing to his assessment that time is unreal. Instead, reality consists of states of things--both facts and events realized at continuous lapses of time--which we abstract from it when we signify them with propositions: — aletheist
No, your examples are more like saying that the philosophy of time came before anyone's experience of time, which would indeed be absurd. But that is not what I am saying. Please explain how there could be any change in a timeless reality without violating the principle of contradiction. — aletheist
I find it impossible to conceive of real change without real time. It would require contradictory states of things to be realized simultaneously. — aletheist
Your description is not really consistent. If the first instant only fades to 50% by the time the conscious person is aware of the second instant, then you can't really say that "a single photograph represents your conscious instant", because the person is conscious of part of the first, and the second, at one conscious instant.
That a single image can hold multiple scenes using transparency... — Zelebg
No, a moment of time is not composed of an event, an event is realized at a lapse of time. During that lapse, neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true, so the principle of excluded middle is false; but there is never a moment at which both "S is P" and "S is not-P" are true, so the principle of contradiction is preserved. Please stop claiming otherwise.The point is that if a moment of time is composed of an event, then within that event there is both S is P, and S is not-P because change occurs within the event ... the law of non-contradiction is violated. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, but only from the standpoint that neither P nor its negation not-P can be truly predicated of the existential subject S during that lapse of time. S continues to exist, it just has a lower mode of being in the sense that it is not determinately P or not-P when it is in the real and continuous process of changing from one to the other.If you proceed, as you do, by saying that there is a time period in which neither is true, then we have a time period, what you call an "event-lapse", which cannot be related to S is P. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, this indicates a misunderstanding. Recall that a fact as signified by a true proposition is only an abstract constituent part of reality; the existential subject S is always changing with respect to some of its qualities and relations, but not all of them. When "S is P" is true, it signifies a real prolonged state of things with respect to that individual existential subject and that general character or relation; likewise for "S is not-P."Furthermore, since all time would consist of such event-lapses, S is P would not refer to anything real. This is evident also from the fact that S is P refers to a static state, so it requires an instant in time, when nothing is changing, to be true. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, that is not what I am saying.So what you are saying is that S is P, and S is not-P, along with terms like true and false, are not sound ways of describing the world, because the world consists of passing time, and it has no instants when such propositions could be true or false. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, "S is P" or "S is not-P" is indeed a sound way of describing the world in most cases, because they signify prolonged states of things that are realized at any instant that we arbitrarily designate within a lapse of time during which the existential subject S is not in an indefinitely gradual state of change from P to not-P, or vice-versa. In other words, it is only during certain events that the principle of excluded middle is false of the relevant proposition; between those events, it remains true. Again, any existential subject is always changing in some respects, but unchanging in others.To give soundness to S is P, we need to assume a duration, time-lapse, in which something is not changing, that something which remains the same over a period of time, constitutes S is P. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, it is not completely arbitrary. You make a valid point about the need for an instant to serve as the limit between any two adjacent lapses, but it is not the case that "no such instant is allowed"; just that no such instant is a determination of time at which any state of things is realized to the exclusion of all other instants. Instead, for any instant whatsoever that we actualize by designating it, there are potential instants beyond all multitude within its immediate neighborhood--the surrounding indefinite moment--at which the same state of things is realized. With that in mind, there is some leeway for marking two particular instants as the commencement and completion of an event-lapse. Again, the main idea is that the earlier prolonged state of things is realized at one and the later (incompatible) prolonged state of things is realized at the other, so that the principle of contradiction is not violated; and there is an indefinitely gradual (i.e., continuous) state of change between those two instants.These expressions, "before" and "after" the event-lapse, are not valid in this model. They require an instant, a boundary, to separate the event-lapse from the rest of time. But no such instant is allowed. Therefore the time period which is designated as the event-lapse is completely arbitrary. — Metaphysician Undercover
But this common-sense notion of time implies that every state of things that does not endure through a lapse of time is absolutely definite, that is, that two states, one the negation of the other, cannot exist at the same instant ... Accepting the common-sense notion, then, I say that it conflicts with that to suppose that there is ever any discontinuity in change. That is to say, between any two instantaneous states there must be a lapse of time during which the change is continuous, not merely in that false continuity which the calculus recognizes but in a much stricter sense. — Peirce, 1908
Yes, this is another point with some validity. However, I deny that phenomenological observations are made by the brain; instead, they are made by the mind, which is not reducible to the brain. That is why I define the present as not only the indefinite lapse of time between the past and the future, but also the indefinite lapse of time at which anything is present to the mind; again, in my view these are one and the same.The human body has senses and a brain. Observations are made by the brain. Empirical information is received by the senses. It requires time for the brain to process empirical information. Therefore empirical observation is always of things in the past, not of things happening at the present. By the time the information is received by the brain, to make the observation, the thing being observed is in the past. — Metaphysician Undercover
The past is that part of time with which memory is concerned ... The future is that part of time with which the will is concerned ... We immediately know only the present moment, which alone immediately exists. The future we only conjecture; the past we remember, or think we remember. What do we remember? Our own experienced thoughts and feelings ... Thus, all we know is memory. We cannot go behind it: Its dicta must be accepted, except where self-refuted. But one of the things memory most enjoins upon our faith is that it reports a direct and immediate knowledge which existed in the past. Our memory is that we remember nothing except such things as have been present to us ... Events past are recalled by memory supposing they acted on our sense; events to come are anticipated supposing they are subject to our will. — Peirce, 1895
Yes, I understand that this is required by your peculiar definitions; but as has happened before in other threads, I disagree with them. The portions of whatever is continuous are also continuous, both internally and with each other, including lapses of time.Do you not understand, that a "portion" requires that the piece which is portioned be separated from the rest of the thing which is portioned? — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, but two boundaries are necessary because events are constantly being realized at the present, which is why we directly perceive the flow of time and the motion of physical bodies. If the present were itself a single boundary--i.e., an instant--then whenever something changed, two incompatible states of things would be realized at that same instant, violating the principle of contradiction.So, I say that the present consists of one boundary which separates future from past. You say that the present consists of two boundaries, which separate out a "portion of time". You have introduced a complication by demanding two boundaries instead of one, to create a "portion" which is the present. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, in the first sentence I denied saying that reality consists of individual events, which would have to be realized at individual determinations of time; i.e., instants. I just explained why that is impossible, and I affirm instead that events are only realized at general determinations of time; i.e., lapses.Look, in the first sentence you claim to have never said that reality consists of events, and in the second sentence you say instead, reality consists of events and other things. See the contradiction? — Metaphysician Undercover
Good grief, of course not! As I said before:1. Change in nature came first, then human's figured out how to measure it using sun dials, analog clocks, digital clocks, etc.
2. Clocks and said measuring devices came first, then change in nature.
Now if I'm mistaken please provide correction. You have been arguing that #2 is that correct? — 3017amen
Again, in my view time is more fundamental than change in nature; if there were no time, then there could be no change.You seem to be suggesting that we invented time in order to mark and measure change. I obviously disagree; in my view, we invented calendars and clocks in order to mark and measure time, which is real independently of them. — aletheist
I would not necessarily define time that way, but even if I did, it would be perfectly consistent with what I just said--if there were no progress of existence and events from past to present to future, then there could be no acts or instances of making or becoming different.Just to one-o-one it, here are the common definitions for your convenience:
1. Time: the indefinite continued progress of existence and events in the past, present, and future regarded as a whole.
2. Change: the act or instance of making or becoming different. — 3017amen
There is no paradox here. The phone call does not really take place three hours later on the east coast than on the west coast. Traveling from west to east is not "time travel" any more that staying in one place; if it takes you five hours to make the trip, then five hours will also have elapsed back where you started.When I asked you about the paradox of time zones viz placing a phone call and/or simple time travel from west to east ... — 3017amen
How many times do I have to repeat that there are no "lost" or "relived" hours? No matter where you travel on earth, your age in hours is exactly the same as it would be if you stayed where you were born.And that is because we cannot relive the hours that we lost and vise versa. — 3017amen
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