• aletheist
    1.5k
    In a 1908 paper that established the parameters for many of the debates within the philosophy of time ever since its publication, John Ellis McTaggart argues for "The Unreality of Time." His basic claim is that time cannot be real because it is contradictory to predicate past, present, and future of the same moment or event; and he alleges that the obvious rejoinder--that a moment or event is past, present, and future only at different times--is viciously circular. McTaggart's implicit assumption is that time is a series of discrete positions, which are what he calls moments, and an event is the discrete content of a particular moment. In other words, he treats any single moment or event as an existential subject, which is why it is precluded from having incompatible determinations.

    By contrast, Charles Sanders Peirce held that time is real and continuous. Positions in time are instants that we artificially mark for some purpose, such as measurement, while moments are indefinite lapses of time that we can only distinguish arbitrarily. An event is "an existential junction of incompossible facts":

    The event is the existential junction of states (that is, of that which in existence corresponds to a statement about a given subject in representation) whose combination in one subject would violate the logical law of contradiction. The event, therefore, considered as a junction, is not a subject and does not inhere in a subject. What is it, then? Its mode of being is existential quasi-existence, or that approach to existence where contraries can be united in one subject. Time is that diversity of existence whereby that which is existentially a subject is enabled to receive contrary determinations in existence. — Peirce, c. 1896

    in logic, existential subjects (i.e., concrete things) and their abstract qualities are denoted by terms, while states of things are signified by propositions (statements). A fact is the state of things signified by a true proposition. An event is not itself an existential subject, it is the state of things that is realized at a lapse of time when a definite change occurs--an existential subject initially has one determination, such that a certain fact is realized; but then it receives a contradictory determination, such that a negation of that fact is realized. The continuous flow of time is what facilitates this:

    Time is a certain general respect relative to different determinations of which states of things otherwise impossible may be realized. Namely, if P and Q are two logically possible states of things, (abstraction being made of time) but are logically incompossible, they may be realized in respect to different determinations of time. — Peirce, c. 1905

    Hence time is also not itself an existential subject, and past/present/future are not abstract qualities that inhere in instants/moments or events as existential subjects. Instead, time is a real law that governs existential subjects, and past/present/future are the three general determinations of time itself--lapses at which different states of things are realized, not individual determinations of the same instant/moment or event. In short, the two authors agree that time does not exist, but McTaggert wrongly concludes from this that time cannot be real, while Peirce maintains that existence is not coextensive with reality:

    Existence, then, is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other characteristics it possesses, has that of being absolutely determinate. Reality, in its turn, is a special mode of being, the characteristic of which is that things that are real are whatever they really are, independently of any assertion about them. — Peirce, 1902

    He also recognizes a third mode of being in accordance with his conviction that "Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of being":

    Just as the logical verb with its signification reappears in metaphysics as a Quality, an ens having a Nature as its mode of being, and as a logical individual subject reappears in metaphysics as a Thing, an ens having Existence as its mode of being, so the logical reason, or premise, reappears in metaphysics as a Reason, an ens having a Reality, consisting in a ruling both of the outward and of the inward world, as its mode of being. The being of the quality lies wholly in itself, the being of the thing lies in opposition to other things, the being of the reason lies in its bringing qualities and things together. — Peirce, c. 1896

    The state of things in the present is always one of indefinitely gradual change, as ongoing events bring different abstract qualities and concrete things together, such that the indeterminate possibilities and conditional necessities of the future become the determinate actualities of the past. Time is real because this process and its results are as they are regardless of what any individual mind or finite group of minds thinks about them.
  • Zelebg
    626
    In a 1908 paper that established the parameters for many of the debates within the philosophy of time ever since its publication, John Ellis McTaggart argues for "The Unreality of Time." His basic claim is that time cannot be real because it is contradictory to predicate past, present, and future of the same moment or event; and he alleges that the obvious rejoinder--that a moment or event is past, present, and future only at different times--is viciously circular. McTaggart's implicit assumption is that time is a series of discrete positions, which are what he calls moments, and an event is the discrete content of a particular moment. In other words, he treats any single moment or event as an existential subject, which is why it is precluded from having incompatible determinations.

    Does any of those guys ever consider the applicability of their concepts of time? He is still talking about the same thing, just awkwardly, and at the end the concept must produce equations of motion as we know them, or it’s false, so what is his comment on:

    speed = distance / time

    Two of those three have to be actual properties and only one abstract relation between them. Which one is fake? I think it’s self evident if you consider it in terms of what is “primary” or “more basic”, so I say time and space are actual, while velocity is abstract or virtual property, i.e. “relation”.

    My point here is that I don’t see how any argument considering time can be sensible if it does not consider equations of motion. Motion / change is the only way to perceive time, it is thus essential to be the focus of any time related argument, and also, just because we perceive time only indirectly should not fool us to think it is illusory.

    Additionally, either time or space have to be discrete to avoid Zeno’s paradoxes. Or both have to be discrete, I forgot and can’t remember how I concluded that, but I insist it is true.
  • aletheist
    1.5k
    I think it’s self evident if you consider it in terms of what is “primary” or “more basic”, so I say time and space are actual, while velocity is abstract or virtual property, i.e. “relation”.Zelebg
    On the contrary, it is continuous motion that is the reality, while discrete positions in space and discrete instants in time are both abstractions that we invented in order to describe motion.
    ... nobody is ever in an exact Position (except instantaneously, and an Instant is a fiction, or ens rationis), but Positions are either vaguely described states of motion of small range, or else (what is the better view), are entia rationis (i.e. fictions recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions) invented for the purposes of closer descriptions of states of motion ... — Peirce, 1906

    Motion / change is the only way to perceive time, it is thus essential to be the focus of any time related argument, and also, just because we perceive time only indirectly should not fool us to think it is illusory.Zelebg
    On the contrary, we directly perceive the continuous flow of time.
    To imagine time, time is required. Hence, if we do not directly perceive the flow of time, we cannot imagine time. Yet the sense of time is something forced upon common-sense. So that, if common-sense denies that the flow [of] time is directly perceived, it is hopelessly entangled in contradictions and cannot be identified with any distinct and intelligible conception.
    But to me it seems clear that our natural common-sense belief is that the flow of time is directly perceived.
    — Peirce, c. 1895
    In fact, if we did not directly perceive the continuity of time, then we would have no concept of continuity at all.
    One opinion which has been put forward and which seems, at any rate, to be tenable and to harmonize with the modern logico-mathematical conceptions, is that our image of the flow of events receives, in a strictly continuous time, strictly continual accessions on the side of the future, while fading in a gradual manner on the side of the past, and that thus the absolutely immediate present is gradually transformed by an immediately given change into a continuum of the reality of which we are thus assured. The argument is that in this way, and apparently in this way only, our having the idea of a true continuum can be accounted for. — Peirce, c. 1902

    Additionally, either time or space have to be discrete to avoid Zeno’s paradoxes. Or both have to be discrete, I forgot and can’t remember how I concluded that, but I insist it is true.Zelebg
    On the contrary, Zeno's paradoxes are only dissolved by recognizing the continuity of both space and time.
    All the arguments of Zeno depend on supposing that a continuum has ultimate parts. But a continuum is precisely that, every part of which has parts, in the same sense. Hence, he makes out his contradictions only by making a self-contradictory supposition. In ordinary and mathematical language, we allow ourselves to speak of such parts--points--and whenever we are led into contradiction thereby, we have simply to express ourselves more accurately to resolve the difficulty. — Peirce, 1868
  • Zelebg
    626
    On the contrary, we directly perceive the continuous flow of time.

    Peirce is talking gibberish. You only ever directly perceive a physical thing moving from point A to point B, and in no way anything about it suggests time is continuous, i.e. infinitely divisible.


    In fact, if we did not directly perceive the continuity of time, then we would have no concept of continuity at all.

    Can not be a fact as is clearly demonstrated to be false by virtual reality simulation and cases from clinical studies.


    On the contrary, Zeno's paradoxes are only dissolved by recognizing the continuity of both space and time.

    What? You either do not understand what “continuity” means or your logic circuit is broken. This is not even supposed to be controversial, no one makes that claim.


    All the arguments of Zeno depend on supposing that a continuum has ultimate parts. But a continuum is precisely that, every part of which has parts, in the same sense. Hence, he makes out his contradictions only by making a self-contradictory supposition. In ordinary and mathematical language, we allow ourselves to speak of such parts--points--and whenever we are led into contradiction thereby, we have simply to express ourselves more accurately to resolve the difficulty.
    — Peirce, 1868

    Ultimate parts? It's gibberish. Why quoting a guy from the 19th century? Actually, why quote anyone, it’s unclear if you understand what is being said or whether your interpretation is the one intended.
  • 3017amen
    3.1k


    For instance when traveling from west to east, another paradox presents itself by virtue of one being unable to live the lost hours (or in the opposite you get to relive them).
    — 3017amen
    No, there are no "lost" or "relived" hours. That is an illusion created by our arbitrary manner of marking and measuring time.

    As it relates to time, if you could enumerate for me which is considered an illusion, and which is considered real, I would greatly appreciate it.
  • aletheist
    1.5k
    Peirce is talking gibberish ... continuous, i.e. infinitely divisible ... You either do not understand what “continuity” means or your logic circuit is broken ... Ultimate parts? It's gibberish.Zelebg
    Considering Peirce's remarks on this topic in general and about ultimate parts in particular to be gibberish, along with suggesting that being continuous is synonymous with being infinitely divisible, demonstrates quite conclusively which one of us does not understand what "continuity" means.

    Why quoting a guy from the 19th century? Actually, why quote anyone ...Zelebg
    Why invoke a guy from the 5th century BC? I tend to quote Peirce and other noteworthy philosophers when I believe that their own words are more perspicuous than any rephrasing that I might attempt, but YMMV.
  • 3017amen
    3.1k


    Nonetheless, the synopsis of that video could be summed up in the simple statement: Eternity is Time. Time, eternity.
    — 3017amen
    Where are you getting that from the video? For one thing, the word "eternity" is never mentioned.

    The video presents discourse over past, present and future perception of time, hence ..."every moment is present". Notwithstanding the Aristotle/Cantor distinctions, how does eternity relate to Time?

    And by the way thank you very much for taking the time to posit both arguments. I will be reading McTaggart's paper shortly...
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    13.2k
    By contrast, Charles Sanders Peirce held that time is real and continuous.aletheist

    This is problematic, as Zelebg points out . That time is continuous is an unsupported assumption which forces us into violation of the law of non-contradiction. This is exactly what the following paragraph says, the existence of an "event" is a violation of the law of non-contradiction:

    The event, therefore, considered as a junction, is not a subject and does not inhere in a subject. What is it, then? Its mode of being is existential quasi-existence, or that approach to existence where contraries can be united in one subject. Time is that diversity of existence whereby that which is existentially a subject is enabled to receive contrary determinations in existence. — Peirce, c. 1896

    An event is "an existential junction of incompossible facts":aletheist

    This is an example of the gibberish. Instead of saying that one state exists, followed in time by a distinctly different state, Peirce assumes the two incompatible states exist together, at the same time, as an "event". In reality, the "event" is what is artificial, a mere description, completely dependent on perspective.
  • aletheist
    1.5k
    As it relates to time, if you could enumerate for me which is considered an illusion, and which is considered real, I would greatly appreciate it.3017amen
    I am sorry, I honestly do not understand what you are requesting here. All I can say (again) is that the reality of time has nothing to do with how we arbitrarily mark and measure it. Changing one's location on earth does not actually add or subtract hours from time itself.

    The video presents discourse over past, present and future perception of time, hence ..."every moment is present".3017amen
    As I said before in the other thread, every moment is present when it is present, but no longer present when it is past and not yet present when it is future. The only moment that is present now is the present moment, when the indeterminate future is becoming the determinate past.

    Notwithstanding the Aristotle/Cantor distinctions, how does eternity relate to Time?3017amen
    What specific Aristotle/Cantor distinctions do you have in mind? What exactly do you mean by "eternity" in this context?
  • Zelebg
    626
    Considering Peirce's remarks on this topic in general and about ultimate parts in particular to be gibberish, along with suggesting that being continuous is synonymous with being infinitely divisible, demonstrates quite conclusively which one of us does not understand what "continuity" means.

    You failed to mention any reason behind your statement. Zeno is not making any assumptions, and his arguments are indeed about infinite divisibility, i.e time / space continuity. Google it!
  • aletheist
    1.5k
    That time is continuous is an unsupported assumption ...Metaphysician Undercover
    No, it is the conclusion of various arguments based on our phenomenal experience. I already provided a couple of them above, and here is another succinct example:
    We are conscious only of the present time, which is an instant, if there be any such thing as an instant. But in the present we are conscious of the flow of time. There is no flow in an instant. Hence, the present is not an instant. — Peirce, c. 1893-5
    It follows from the first sentence that there is no such thing as an instant at all.

    This is exactly what the following paragraph says, the existence of an "event" is a violation of the law of non-contradiction:Metaphysician Undercover
    That is not even remotely what the quoted paragraph says. Surely it is not in the least bit controversial to recognize that incompossible facts are realized at different times. An event simply corresponds to the transition from one state to the other.

    Instead of saying that one state exists, followed in time by a distinctly different state, Peirce assumes the two incompatible states exist together, at the same time, as an "event".Metaphysician Undercover
    Peirce assumes no such thing, and that is not how I described an event. I respectfully suggest carefully rereading the entire OP, but here is the most pertinent portion:
    An event is not itself an existential subject, it is the state of things that is realized at a lapse of time when a definite change occurs--an existential subject initially has one determination, such that a certain fact is realized; but then it receives a contradictory determination, such that a negation of that fact is realized.aletheist
    Let me try to spell it out more thoroughly. Before the commencement of the lapse of time at which the event is realized, an earlier state of things is realized, which is a fact as signified by the true proposition "S is P." After the completion of the event-lapse, a later state of things is realized, which is an incompossible fact as signified by the true proposition "S is not-P." The two incompatible states do not exist together, at the same time, because they are separated by the whole event-lapse; so the principle of contradiction is not violated. However, during the event-lapse itself, an indefinitely gradual state of change is realized, such that neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true; so the principle of excluded middle is false while the event is in progress. It can be successfully maintained in classical logic because we are almost always reasoning about prolonged states of things, rather than states of change.

    In reality, the "event" is what is artificial, a mere description, completely dependent on perspective.Metaphysician Undercover
    Again, I instead hold with Peirce that instants are artificial creations of thought for the purpose of describing states of things, including facts and events. Besides, if time were really composed of discrete instants at finite intervals, how would we get from one to the "next"? How could there be any continuity in our experience at all? In Peirce's words:
    It is logically impossible for a state of things to be realized in the present instant and not to be at all so in the past and future. Were the instants independently actual, as they are in the Time of the analysts, memory would be a perpetual miracle. — Peirce, c. 1904
    The argument which seems to me to prove, not only that there is such a conception of continuity as I contend for, but that it is realized in the universe, is that if it were not so, nobody could have any memory. If time, as many have thought, consists of discrete instants, all but the feeling of the present instant would be utterly non-existent. — Peirce, 1908
  • aletheist
    1.5k
    Zeno is not making any assumptions, and his arguments are indeed about infinite divisibility, i.e time / space continuity.Zelebg
    Everyone is always making some assumptions, and again, infinite divisibility is necessary but not sufficient for true continuity. The rational numbers are infinitely divisible, yet no one seriously claims that they are continuous.
  • Zelebg
    626
    Everyone is always making some assumptions, and again, infinite divisibility is necessary but not sufficient for true continuity.

    I said Zeno did not make any assumptions, and time is either analog or digital, where analog, continuous, and infinitely divisible is all one and the same concept.


    The rational numbers are infinitely divisible, yet no one seriously claims that they are continuous.

    Do you even know what you just said or why, are you a robot?
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    13.2k
    No, it is the conclusion of various arguments based on our phenomenal experience. I already provided a couple of them above, and here is another succinct example:aletheist

    OK, let's assume "time is continuous" is a conclusion. It is a conclusion which forces us to accept violation of the law of non-contradiction. Therefore we ought to address those arguments directly, which lead to that conclusion, to determine their deficiencies.

    We are conscious only of the present time, which is an instant, if there be any such thing as an instant. But in the present we are conscious of the flow of time. There is no flow in an instant. Hence, the present is not an instant. — Peirce, c. 1893-5

    "The present is not an instant" is a valid conclusion if "the present" is defined by what we are conscious of, as stated in the first phrase. This is evident from the fact that we are consciously aware of motion. Motion requires a period of time, so if we are consciously aware of motion, then consciousness must span a period of time. Since any period of time has an earlier part, and a later part, and "the present" is used to divide past from future in this way, then the opening phrase above, "we are conscious only of the present time", is a false statement, and that's where the problem lies.

    We are actually conscious of the past and the future, at the same time, so the first sentence is a falsity, we are not conscious of the present. The phrase I used, "at the same time" is the deficient phrase here, as demonstrated by relativity theory, and rejection of this phrase is what renders the law of non-contradiction impotent. Therefore we must reject the idea that consciousness represents "the present", because we are conscious of a period of time which contains both a past, and a future. That we are consciously aware of a present is an illusion. We are not aware of any such thing.

    So, what we have here is a situation where "the present" is defined by what we are conscious of, but we are conscious of the future and past together, not the present. so this definition of "the present" is incorrect. Here, "the present" is defined as a combination of future and past (what we are conscious of), and this leads to the problem of contradiction, as the present is now inherently contradictory. A proper definition of "the present" would be the separation of the future from the past, the division, or boundary between them. This allows us to uphold the law of noncontradiction.

    In general, the arguments presented do not include the premise required for the conclusion that time is continuous. Failure of the human consciousness to determine the precise boundary between future and past does not provide the premise necessary to conclude that there is no such boundary. The fact that the human determination of "an instant" is an arbitrary determination, is insufficient for the conclusion that there is no such "instant" in reality. This would require the assumption that if the human being cannot produce that determination, it cannot be done, but that implies the human being is omniscient, or omnipotent.

    Peirce assumes no such thing, and that is not how I described an event.aletheist

    It's clear as day. I suggest you reread what you printed:
    An event is "an existential junction of incompossible facts":aletheist

    Its mode of being is existential quasi-existence, or that approach to existence where contraries can be united in one subject. — Peirce, c. 1896

    Notice, that the "event" is completely artificial, constructed, it is an "approach" to existence. But since it is an approach "where contraries can be united in one subject", it is an approach which ought to be rejected as deficient.

    Let me try to spell it out more thoroughly. Before the commencement of the lapse of time at which the event is realized, an earlier state of things is realized, which is a fact as signified by the true proposition "S is P." After the completion of the event-lapse, a later state of things is realized, which is an incompossible fact as signified by the true proposition "S is not-P." The two incompatible states do not exist together, at the same time, because they are separated by the whole event-lapse; so the principle of contradiction is not violated. However, during the event-lapse itself, an indefinitely gradual state of change is realized, such that neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true; so the principle of excluded middle is false while the event is in progress. It can be successfully maintained in classical logic because we are almost always reasoning about prolonged states of things, rather than states of change.aletheist

    All this does is render the "event lapse" as unintelligible in relation to the two states of P and not-P. It is neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P", therefore it must be described in terms other than "P". Now we have no way to relate the event lapse, which is the change between P and not-P, to the determinations of "P and not-P". It is something categorically distinct from "P and not-P". This produces a discontinuity between the supposed continuous time where P becomes not-P, and necessitates the conclusion that time is not continuous.

    Alternatively, we could say that the "event lapse" is a combination of both "P" and "not-P", and this would allow for continuity. But that violates the law of non-contradiction. So it appears like either time is discontinuous, or time is continuous in violation of the law of non-contradiction.

    Again, I instead hold with Peirce that instants are artificial creations of thought for the purpose of describing states of things, including facts and events. Besides, if time were really composed of discrete instants at finite intervals, how would we get from one to the "next"? How could there be any continuity in our experience at all?aletheist

    The problem which I've explained to you before, and you didn't seem to grasp, is that "an event" requires instants. If individual events exist within a continuity, then they must be separated, individuated from that continuity, by means of "instants". Without such instants as divisors, there are no separate events. Therefore, Peirce is forced to apprehend events, as well as instants as artificial. This I believe he does, as indicated by my quoted passage above, but you do not. Grasping this is essential to understanding Peirce's approach to boundaries and the vagueness we find in boundaries. A "boundary", like an "instant" is an artificial construction, therefore the things created by these applications, whether it be an object, or an event, are also artificial constructions. The boundaries are vague due to the subjectivity of such constructions.
  • 3017amen
    3.1k
    We are actually conscious of the past and the future, at the same time, so the first sentence is a falsity, we are not conscious of the present. The phrase I used, "at the same time" is the deficient phrase here, as demonstrated by relativity theory, and rejection of this phrase is what renders the law of non-contradiction impotent. Therefore we must reject the idea that consciousness represents "the present", because we are conscious of a period of time which contains both a past, and a future. That we are consciously aware of a present is an illusion. We are not aware of any such thing.

    So, what we have here is a situation where "the present" is defined by what we are conscious of, but we are conscious of the future and past together, not the present. so this definition of "the present" is incorrect. Here, "the present" is defined as a combination of future and past (what we are conscious of), and this leads to the problem of contradiction, as the present is now inherently contradictory. A proper definition of "the present" would be the separation of the future from the past, the division, or boundary between them. This allows us to uphold the law of noncontradiction.
    Metaphysician Undercover

    Thank you MU, you've articulated one of my concerns, better than I could have.

    Just a couple thoughts/observations/questions if you don't mind:

    1. Do you think then, that the reality of time is continuous (which would preclude/deny the law of noncontradiction) in nature?
    2. If the answer to #1 is yes, could the reality of time and eternity also be, essentially, an illusionary abstract that exists in a phenomenological way (considering we are unable to consciously separate past, present and future during everydayness/cognition; the cognitive process of subconscious and consciousness working together)?

    An example, albeit not the best, combines the two notions: If someone asks me to run a calculation to size-up a structural beam, I proceed to run the math as requested. During that time, there is a slice of time in which it took me to run the calculation. And during that period of time, I experienced past, present and future.

    And so when completed, I say: " Here, I just finished the calculation." That process of computation spanned or bridged the past, present and future. Does that in anyway, violate the law of noncontradiction?

    I want to say yes, because using formal logic, the end result was just one thing that combined all three of those phenomenal elements in a simultaneous fashion (during cognition). On the other hand, my thinking of creating the formula itself, the subsequent mental computation, and producing the resulting written formula, was a clear increment in time that required a distinct mental process. Is that a bad example?

    Keep in mind, I'm also trying to define time and eternity as one continuum (such as the eternal laws of physics), but I know more has to be worked out there.

    This is an awesome thread because there are so many take-away's from same... ! ( I can think of many more questions.)

    Thanks OP and everyone...
  • 3017amen
    3.1k
    I am sorry, I honestly do not understand what you are requesting here. All I can say (again) is that the reality of time has nothing to do with how we arbitrarily mark and measure it. Changing one's location on earth does not actually add or subtract hours from time itself.aletheist

    Hi aletheist!

    Ok. So if I travel from west to east, how can I live the lost hours (or in the opposite east to west, you get to re-live them)?

    The way we measure time cannot be arbitrary can it? If so, then is all of time an illusion I wonder? How can we escape from that illusion; hypothetically, is there a way to do that?
  • aletheist
    1.5k
    I said Zeno did not make any assumptions ...Zelebg
    Of course he made assumptions, as all of us do.

    ... and time is either analog or digital, where analog, continuous, and infinitely divisible is all one and the same concept.Zelebg
    If they were "all one and the same concept," then we would not have three different terms for them. I acknowledge that analog and digital loosely correspond to continuous and discrete, respectively; but again, infinitely divisible is not synonymous with continuous.

    Do you even know what you just said or why, are you a robot?Zelebg
    Wait, are you suggesting that the rational numbers are continuous? Even the analysts (Cantor etc.) deny that, claiming instead--also wrongly, in Peirce's view (and mine)--that the real numbers are continuous.
  • aletheist
    1.5k

    I am not ignoring you, it will just take more time than I have right now to compose a response.

    So if I travel from west to east, how can I live the lost hours (or in the opposite east to west, you get to re-live them)?3017amen
    Again, there are no "lost hours." Your age in hours is always exactly the same as it would be if you stayed where you were born for your entire life. We simply adjust our patterns of behavior in accordance with when the sun rises and sets at each location where we find ourselves.

    The way we measure time cannot be arbitrary can it?3017amen
    The unit by which we measure time is arbitrary. A second is now defined as a certain number of vibrations of a cesium atom, although historically it was intended to be 1/86,400th of the time required for the earth to complete one rotation about its axis. We had leap day last week because the time required for the earth to complete one revolution around the sun is not an integer multiple of its rotations.

    Moreover, how we set our clocks is to some extent arbitrary. It is now standardized around the world, although historically it was intended to be such that noon would always correspond to when the sun is directly overhead each day. We will turn our clocks forward an hour this weekend because people generally prefer having extra daylight in the evening, rather than in the morning.

    If so, then is all of time an illusion I wonder? How can we escape from that illusion; hypothetically, is there a way to do that?3017amen
    I am still not sure what exactly you mean by calling time an illusion. As the thread title indicates, my view is that time itself is real, although our perception of it (and everything else) is certainly fallible.
  • Zelebg
    626
    This is evident from the fact that we are consciously aware of motion. Motion requires a period of time, so if we are consciously aware of motion, then consciousness must span a period of time.

    This has no impact on the argument, I think, but it is quite possible we are only aware as a sequence of conscious instants in time. Motion can then be perceived via motion blur effect.

    This would mean, I suppose, that “subjective experience” of visual perception is an effect immediately connected with the refresh rate of updates / impressions onto the video memory buffer, and sound with updates to audio buffer… just like in video games.

    But this can happen only after information is already processed, so we are only aware not of the present time, but some milliseconds after that. We are only ever aware of the past.
  • 3017amen
    3.1k


    Can we summarize for one second, ha:

    Past= real or allusion or... ?
    Present=real or allusion or... ?
    Future=real or allusion or... ?

    ( And eternity= real or illusion?)
  • aletheist
    1.5k

    Employing Peirce's definition of "real" as that which is as it is regardless of what any individual mind or finite group of minds thinks about it:

    • All past states of things are real as determinate actualities.
    • Some future states of things are real as either indeterminate possibilities or conditional necessities.
    • The present state of things is real as an indefinitely gradual state of change, during which some future possibilities/necessities are becoming past actualities.

    Again, please provide your definition of "illusion" in this context.
  • 3017amen
    3.1k
    Again, please provide your definition of "illusion" in this context.aletheist

    Basically, Einstein's' block universe is where there is really no present; only one static-flow of time (my interpretation). Meaning, if you were to stand outside the universe—outside both space and time—and look at your life, you would see your birth, your death and every moment in between laid out as distinct points. From this angle, time does not flow, but is static and fixed (which ties with McTaggart's view/the previous video).

    the-illusion-of-time-block-universe.jpg?resize=720%2C540&ssl=1
  • aletheist
    1.5k

    That is the theory of time known as eternalism. It is sometimes called "block universe" because it posits that the past, the present, and the future all exist. By comparison, my view is sometimes called "growing block universe" because it posits that only the past and the present exist, and that the past is constantly getting "larger" as the present advances into the nonexistent future--much like how space is widely thought to be expanding, even though there is presumably nothing beyond its boundary.

    It seems like you are suggesting that the present and/or the flow of time is an illusion in a block universe, but I am not sure that is accurate. Again, the present does exist as a time-slice that is advancing through the block from the growing past toward the shrinking future. What I suppose would be an illusion is the indeterminacy of the future; i.e., eternalism seems to entail determinism, such that every state of things that is actually realized is necessarily realized. I invite correction if I am wrong about that.
  • christian2017
    1.4k


    One of the things Einstein argued with the theory of special relativity is that time is hard to measure accurately unless the measurement is done to a very small subset of the universe (such as inside a car or on an airplane). This has been proven with tests in P-3 airplanes flying over the chesapeake bay (P-3 can stay in the air for a very long time). The clocks on the plane were much slower than the clock on the ground in maryland. As a clock is thrown through space over a long period of time at a high speed or simply if it approaches the threshold of the speed of light (C) its components that are in the clock slow down and thus the clock slows down. Time is really just an iteration of events such that particles collide with each other and move around. Time can be said to not be relative only in a very small subset of the universe.

    I would argue part of this is due to the fact that the vectors of a particles motion (vector X, vector Y, and vector Z) when combined can never exceed C (speed of light). So when you increase the particles velocity in vector Z, vector X and vector Y in many cases will have to slow down (only true when velocities approach the threshold of C).
  • aletheist
    1.5k
    OK, let's assume "time is continuous" is a conclusion. It is a conclusion which forces us to accept violation of the law of non-contradiction.Metaphysician Undercover
    No, it does not. Again, there is never an instant or lapse of time at which incompatible states of things are realized such that both "S is P" and "S is not-P" are true, which would violate the principle of contradiction. Initially there is a lapse at which a state of things is realized such that "S is P" is true. Then there is a lapse at which a state of change is realized such that neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true; i.e., the principle of excluded middle is false. Finally there is a lapse at which a state of things is realized such that "S is not-P" is true.

    Motion requires a period of time, so if we are consciously aware of motion, then consciousness must span a period of time.Metaphysician Undercover
    Yes, and that is precisely why the present cannot be an instant, but instead must be a lapse of time.

    Since any period of time has an earlier part, and a later part, and "the present" is used to divide past from future in this way, then the opening phrase above, "we are conscious only of the present time", is a false statement, and that's where the problem lies.Metaphysician Undercover
    No, from a phenomenological standpoint the present is defined as that part of time of which we are conscious. Another way of putting it is that the temporal present corresponds directly to whatever is present to the mind.

    Therefore we must reject the idea that consciousness represents "the present", because we are conscious of a period of time which contains both a past, and a future.Metaphysician Undercover
    No, we must simply recognize that the present is an indefinite lapse of time--a moment--such that it cannot be sharply distinguished from the immediately past moment nor the immediately future moment:
    The present moment will be a lapse of time, highly confrontitial, when looked at as a whole, seeming absolutely so, but when regarded closely, seen not to be absolutely so, its earlier parts being somewhat of the nature of memory, a little vague, and its later parts somewhat of the nature of anticipation, a little generalized. It contains a central part which is still more present, still more confrontitial, but which presents the same features. There is nothing at all that is absolutely confrontitial; although it is quite true that the confrontitial is continually flowing in upon us ... Another plain deliverance of the percipuum is that moment melts into moment. That is to say, moments may be so related as not to be entirely separate and yet not be the same. — Peirce, 1903

    A proper definition of "the present" would be the separation of the future from the past, the division, or boundary between them. This allows us to uphold the law of noncontradiction.Metaphysician Undercover
    Yes, but there is no inconsistency between this additional definition and what I have stated above.
    The consciousness of the present, as the boundary between past and future, involves them both. — Peirce, 1899
    In fact, boundaries are precisely the sort of thing for which the principle of excluded middle is false.
    Thus, a point of a surface may be in a region of that surface, or out of it, or on its boundary. This gives us an indirect and vague conception of an intermediacy between affirmation and denial in general, and consequently of an intermediate, or nascent state, between determination and indetermination ... [The Present] is plainly that Nascent State between the Determinate and the Indeterminate that was noticed above. — Peirce, 1905
    The present is when the indeterminate future becomes the determinate past, and as with any other event, this is realized at a lapse of time rather than an instant.

    In general, the arguments presented do not include the premise required for the conclusion that time is continuous.Metaphysician Undercover
    No, the required premise is quite simply that we directly perceive the continuous flow of time.
    No more than the present moment directly confronts us. The future, however little future it may be, is known only by generalization. The past, however little past it may be, lacks the explicitness of the present. Nevertheless, in the present moment we are directly aware of the flow of time, or in other words that things can change. — Peirce, 1903
    As you pointed out, we are directly aware of motion; so we can go one step farther than Peirce did, and say that in the present moment we are directly aware that things are changing. That is what I mean when I say that the state of things in the present is an indefinitely gradual state of change--it is always the case that innumerable events throughout the universe are currently in progress.

    All this does is render the "event lapse" as unintelligible in relation to the two states of P and not-P.Metaphysician Undercover
    No, what I frankly find unintelligible is your entire paragraph that begins with this sentence.

    If individual events exist within a continuity, then they must be separated, individuated from that continuity, by means of "instants". Without such instants as divisors, there are no separate events.Metaphysician Undercover
    No, this is self-contradictory; if events were "separated" and "individuated," then they would necessarily be discontinuous. Besides, I explained already--more than once--that an event is realized at a lapse of time between two other lapses of time at which incompatible states of things are realized.

    Therefore, Peirce is forced to apprehend events, as well as instants as artificial.Metaphysician Undercover
    No, events are undeniably real in the sense that contradictory states of things are realized at different determinations of time, which entails that there must be another determination of time at which the change from one state to the other is realized. The only alternative to an indefinitely gradual state of change at a lapse of time is an instantaneous event, which is impossible since there can be no change whatsoever at an instant.
    Imagine a series of instantaneous photographs to be taken. Then, no matter how closely they follow one another, there is no more motion visible in any one of them than if they were taken at intervals of centuries. — Peirce, c. 1895
  • aletheist
    1.5k

    Thanks for your comments, but I am honestly not sure whether or how they bear on the thread topic. The fact that the speed of light in a vacuum is constant strikes me as consistent with my contention that continuous motion is the fundamental physical reality, while discrete positions in space and instants in time are artificial creations of thought to facilitate describing such motion.
  • jgill
    3.9k
    consistent with my contention that continuous motion is the fundamental physical reality, while discrete positions in space and instants in time are artificial creations of thought to facilitate describing such motionaletheist

    Here is Peter Lynds' paper in which he postulates that there are no instants of time. This was published in Foundations of Physics and generated heated arguments, with a strong contingent of physicists declaring it nonsense. But who knows? Lynds is or was a college dropout.

    https://arxiv.org/ftp/physics/papers/0310/0310055.pdf
  • christian2017
    1.4k
    Thanks for your comments, but I am honestly not sure whether or how they bear on the thread topic. The fact that the speed of light in a vacuum is constant strikes me as consistent with my contention that continuous motion is the fundamental physical reality, while discrete positions in space and instants in time are artificial creations of thought to facilitate describing such motion.aletheist

    When you say continuous motion, who would argue with you on that? Perhaps i just don't know what you meant by that. I did read the OP carefully. As for discrete positions in space, if there was two galaxies or two asteroids roughly (roughly) in line with each other (hypothethical situation) and at at same time they were moving in opposite directions (roughly parallel to the original line that they form with each other), the speed with which they are moving and the distance traveled would be proof that discrete positions in space are not artificial creations. I understand that all objects form a line with each other (until you have 3 or more), but what i meant by that is if two objects have an original vector to their motion, I meant the original line formed prior to the vectors of the two objects changing. This is assuming the vectors of the objects change anytime soon anyway.

    As for instants in time, well Calculus would teach that for calculation purposes, the concept of instances in time are real in the extent that they are used by engineers and physicists. If you want to elaborate on why you think instances in time is a ridicoulous concept i would be more than happy to hear what you say.
  • aletheist
    1.5k
    Here is Peter Lynds' paper in which he postulates that there are no instants of time.jgill
    Thanks, I read it a couple of months ago and found it relatively unremarkable since Peirce had that insight a century earlier.

    When you say continuous motion, who would argue with you on that?christian2017
    People who insist that space and time are composed of discrete positions and instants, rather than truly continuous.

    As for discrete positions in space, if there was two galaxies or two asteroids roughly (roughly) in line with each other (hypothethical situation) and at at same time they were moving in opposite directions (roughly parallel to the original line that they form with each other), the speed with which they are moving and the distance traveled would be proof that discrete positions in space are not artificial creations.christian2017
    The motion is real, but speed and distance are measurements facilitated by marking positions and instants, and then comparing them with arbitrary unit intervals.

    As for instants in time, well Calculus would teach that for calculation purposes, the concept of instances in time are real in the extent that they are used by engineers and physicists.christian2017
    Usefulness does not entail reality; positions and instants are paradigmatic examples of "useful fictions."

    If you want to elaborate on why you think instances in time is a ridicoulous concept i would be more than happy to hear what you say.christian2017
    I never suggested that it is a ridiculous concept, just that time is not composed of discrete instants, contra McTaggart.
  • alcontali
    1.3k
    ... John Ellis McTaggart argues for "The Unreality of Time." His basic claim is that time cannot be real because it is contradictory ...aletheist

    A remark that I need to make on McTaggart's work, is very similar to what Karl Popper wrote in his seminal publication, Science as falsification:

    With Einstein's theory the situation was strikingly different. Take one typical instance— Einstein's prediction, just then confirmed by the finding of Eddington's expedition.

    Now the impressive thing about this case is the risk involved in a prediction of this kind. If observation shows that the predicted effect is definitely absent, then the theory is simply refuted. The theory is incompatible with certain possible results of observation—in fact with results which everybody before Einstein would have expected.[1] This is quite different from the situation I have previously described,when it turned out that the theories in question were compatible with the most divergent human behavior, so that it was practically impossible to describe any human behavior that might not be claimed to be a verification of these theories.
    Karl Popper in 'Science as falsification' on the requirement to take a risk

    Einstein's characterization of time is indeed risky:

    Albert Einstein's 1905 special relativity challenged the notion of absolute time, and could only formulate a definition of synchronization for clocks that mark a linear flow of time. Einstein's equations predict that time should be altered by the presence of gravitational fields (see the Schwarzschild metric). That is, the stronger the gravitational field (and, thus, the larger the acceleration), the more slowly time runs. The predictions of time dilation are confirmed by particle acceleration experiments and cosmic ray evidence, where moving particles decay more slowly than their less energetic counterparts. Einstein's theory was motivated by the assumption that every point in the universe can be treated as a 'center', and that correspondingly, physics must act the same in all reference frames. There is no 'universal clock'. An act of synchronization must be performed between two systems, at the least.Wikipedia on time in physics

    As you can see from the quote mentioned above, Einstein took a real risk in his theory of time, as he predicted the gravitational slowdown of time. It can be tested. It could have turned out to be wrong, but it didn't.

    I do not see where McTaggart would be taking any risk at all in his theory of time.

    Therefore, McTaggart's theory must be considered too easy. In line with what Karl Popper wrote, McTaggart's work is irrelevant in a sense that you cannot do anything with it. It simply does not matter whether time is discrete or continuous until it can actually be tested.
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    13.2k
    1. Do you think then, that the reality of time is continuous (which would preclude/deny the law of noncontradiction) in nature?3017amen

    No, I think there is evidence from quantum physics which indicates that time is likely composed of discrete units.

    And so when completed, I say: " Here, I just finished the calculation." That process of computation spanned or bridged the past, present and future. Does that in anyway, violate the law of noncontradiction?3017amen

    There is no violation of the law of non-contradiction if the different described states are at different times. The problem occurs when we consider what occurs between the states, what the ancients called "becoming", and Aristotle addressed as "change". The "becoming" which is the event of change between one describable state and another, is neither the one nor the other state. So like aletheist explains, we are inclined to say it violates the law of excluded middle. But once we make this separation between the described states of being, and the activity of becoming, we need to establish a relationship between them such that they can both be real. The modern inclination is to affirm that activity is real, states are artificial descriptions, and assume a continuous reality of activity. However, then there is nothing to validate the law of non-contradiction, and it may be precluded from epistemology as an unrealistic way of looking at the world.

    This has no impact on the argument, I think, but it is quite possible we are only aware as a sequence of conscious instants in time. Motion can then be perceived via motion blur effect.Zelebg

    If this is the case, it does have an effect on the argument, because it would indicate that the perspective of the conscious human being spans numerous instants of time. If consciousness were restricted to one instant, the present instant, then we would observe a succession of instants. To get the "blur effect", the conscious being must be observing numerous instants in what appears (from the perspective of the consciousness) as "at the same time". The consciousness is observing numerous instants "at the same time", and is incapable of detecting the division between them.

    Notice that "at the same time" here is an artificial determination made by the consciousness, and does not necessarily mean simultaneous. The problem is that any determination of "a time", in the sense of "what time it is", consists of a period of duration. There is no such thing as determining a point in time, when we say "now" this consists of the duration of time required to say "now". So "at the same time" here does not imply instants which are simultaneous, it implies the succession of instants which exist within that determination of "now". "The time it is" is determined by the ability of the consciousness to determine the shortest period of time, but within that short period, there is still numerous distinct instants, which from the perspective of the consciousness, exist at the same time, because it has not the capacity to individuate them. This is why the consciousness is inclined to violate the law of non-contradiction.

    No, it does not. Again, there is never an instant or lapse of time at which incompatible states of things are realized such that both "S is P" and "S is not-P" are true, which would violate the principle of contradiction.aletheist

    You are not understanding the issue. If "S is P", and "S is not-P", are real applicable descriptions of the world and they may be true or false, then within any lapse of time both of these may be true. At the beginning of the time lapse one is true, and at the end of the time lapse the other is true. Depending on what S and P signify we can extend this to any lapse of time. That is the problem. If time is truly continuous, and any determination of "now", "this time", or "that time", necessarily designates a duration of time, then within that time period the law of non-contradiction will be violated because there will be change within that time lapse.

    So if we assume that time is continuous, then we need to face the reality that descriptions such as "S is P", and "S is not-P", have no real bearing on reality, because they become incoherent with the loss of the law of non-contradiction. Therefore we proceed to the conclusion that a true description of reality would not include such descriptions, we opt to violate the law of excluded middle, and assume that reality is neither, the terms are not really applicable. But now we have a division between our descriptions and logical assessments of the world (the world can be described by true and false propositions), and what we truly believe the world is like (such descriptions cannot describe the world).

    No, from a phenomenological standpoint the present is defined as that part of time of which we are conscious. Another way of putting it is that the temporal present corresponds directly to whatever is present to the mind.aletheist

    As I explained, this is a false description. This is very evident from the fact that we are conscious of memories of the past, and conscious of future occurrences. Defining the present as "that part of time which we are conscious" is completely subjective, unscientific, and misleading. Therefore we need an objective, scientific definition, supported by empirical observation. Since we notice that the past is substantially different from the future, we can produce a much more objective definition by defining the present as the division between past and future.

    Yes, but there is no inconsistency between this additional definition and what I have stated above.aletheist

    That's right, there is no real inconsistency between my definition and your definition, but your definition includes ambiguity inherent within, due to the subjective nature of consciousness. You say the present is determined by consciousness. But each individual consciousness might determine "the present" in its own way. Therefore there is ambiguity as to what "the present" really is. I say the present is the division between past and future, and each consciousness may determine this division in its own way. So I remove the ambiguity from "the present", with a clear and precise definition of what the present is, and assign the appearance of ambiguity to a deficiency in the human capacity to determine the present.

    Here's an analogy. Your way of defining would define "sugar" as whatever the conscious being perceived as sweet (the present is what the conscious being perceives as present). So there would be some ambiguity and variance as to which foods exactly have sugar, because of a variance in human tastes. I would define "sugar" according to some principles of chemical constitution (the present is the objective division between past and future), then the ambiguity as to which foods have sugar is a function of the variance in conscious experience, not an ambiguity in nature (the ambiguity in "the present" is a feature of human deficiency, not a feature of nature).

    The present is when the indeterminate future becomes the determinate past, and as with any other event, this is realized at a lapse of time rather than an instant.aletheist

    This is the debatable principle, and the difference between our two perspectives can be clarified in reference to discussion of this principle. Let's assume that your description of the future as indeterminate, and your description of the past, as determinate, is a real, true description, supported by reality. There must be a separation, division, or boundary between these two, which is a real objective boundary, supported in reality. That is my definition of "the present", this real, objective boundary between past and future. Your definition of "the present" states that the present is "that part of time which we are conscious". Therefore in your definition "the present", is stated as something dependent on the conscious experience, with its subjectivities, and determined with the deficiencies of the human capacity. My definition looks beyond the deficiencies of human experience to define "the present" in relation to something within the objective world which is responsible for that experience of the present.

    However, once we assume a real objective boundary between future and past, then we have real division within time, and we can no longer assume time as continuous. Recognition that the future is indeterminate, and the past is determinate is sufficient for the conclusion that continuity is not an aspect of time, because that part of time which is past must be distinct from that part of time which is future.

    if events were "separated" and "individuated," then they would necessarily be discontinuous.aletheist

    Right, this is the point which you do not seem to be able to grasp. If reality consists of "events", then there is necessarily separation between the individual events, and it is impossible that time is continuous. You speak as if you believe that reality consists of events, and time is continuous. That is impossible.
bold
italic
underline
strike
code
quote
ulist
image
url
mention
reveal
youtube
tweet
Add a Comment

Welcome to The Philosophy Forum!

Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.