I long for death, — Darkneos
I have a friend who has no minds eye. She does not see visual mental images. — T Clark
Sorry but can you dumb that down just a tiny bit? — GLEN willows
REFERENCES. Since the choice of an autopsychological basis amounts merely to an application of the form and method of solipsism, but not to an acknowledgment of its central thesis, we may describe our position as methodological solipsism. This viewpoint has been maintained and expounded in detail, especially by Driesch, as the necessary starting point of epistemology ([Ordnungsl.] esp. 23). I mention here some further adherents of this theory, some of whom apply the solipsistic method only in the initial stages of their systems and eventually make an abrupt jump to the heteropsychological. Since they do not, for the most part, employ any precise forms of construction, it is not always clear whether this transition amounts to a construction on the solipsistic basis, as is the case in our constructional system, or whether it is a desertion of that basis — Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World, p102
Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses — Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 2 a. 3 arg. 19.
Why can't this happen in the dark
— bert1
But as I pointed out, the modelling relation approach to neural information processing says the brain’s aim is to turn the lights out. It targets a level of reality prediction where it’s forward model can cancel the arriving sensory input. — apokrisis
How is idealism different from solipsism? — GLEN willows
Dictionary: Phenomenalism, the doctrine that human knowledge is confined to or founded on the realities or appearances presented to the senses. — Art48
Then you completely side step the epistemological problem of perception — Michael
and ignore the actual, substantive disagreement between direct and indirect realists. — Michael
Arguing over the grammatically correct way to talk about perception is meaningless. — Michael
Is there a Cartesian theatre [implied] when we say that we feel pain... — Michael
...and that pain is a sensation? — Michael
There's no philosophical difference between feeling a sensation and hearing a sensation or seeing a sensation. The nouns simply signify a different modality of perception. — Michael
It might not be the ordinary way of speaking — Michael
but that's just an arbitrary fact about the English language — Michael
The "language trap" is arguing over which of "I hear the drill" and "I hear the sounds made by the drill" — Michael
The "language trap" is arguing over which of [the above] and "I hear auditory sensations" is correct, — Michael
whereas we should be arguing over whether or not drills have the auditory features that we hear them to have. — Michael
Whether sights or sounds, smells or tastes, it's all just sense data brought about by sensory stimulation and brain activity. — Michael
Words are organic things, and have fuzzy boundaries, and our minds are well constituted to deal with them as such. We happily use the word sandwich, — hypericin
never mistakenly using the word with hotdogs. — hypericin
There is no trans-linguistic reality, no platonic essence of sandwiches which you can consult. — hypericin
Our tables, steam yachts, and potatoes are events of comparatively small spatial and large temporal dimensions. The eye of a potato is an event temporally coextensive with the whole, but spatially smaller. The steam-yacht-during-an-hour is an event spatially as large as the yacht but temporally smaller. But the steam-yacht-during-an-hour is an element in a larger whole as is the eye of the potato. — Goodman, Structure of Appearance, 1951
See red things. — Michael
The point is they don't need language. — Michael
And that's how seeing colours is seeing an external material world. It's recognising classes of objects. (Or classes of illumination events.) — bongo fury
A dog can recognise his owner. — Michael
I have no idea what you're talking about. A hermit with no language can recognise when he feels pain. A hermit with no language can recognise when he feels pleasure. A hermit with no language can recognise the difference between feeling pain and feeling pleasure. — Michael
Nothing about this depends on there being some observer who can make, and justify, these claims. — Michael
Without that wider association you couldn't say they discriminated (or equated) according to colour. Only that they discriminated.
— bongo fury
You confuse me being able to know that that he recognises colours with him being able to recognise colours. He either can or he can't, irrespective of what I think. — Michael
It's everything to do with comparing and classifying, whether or not using word-pointing so to do.
— bongo fury
No it doesn't. I don't need to have words for pleasure and pain to recognise the difference between me feeling pleasure and me feeling pain. Qualitative experiences differ, and that they do has nothing to do with being able to make and make sense of my own and another person's vocalisations or ink impressions. — Michael
It's nothing to do with language. — Michael
A hermit with no language could look at two objects and see them to be the same colour (or different colours). — Michael
Plato is not only warning us about misusing language in the sense of bad grammar or syntax. Speaking badly also includes saying untruths, telling lies, creating a conflict between speech and reality - between what is said and what is. — Harry Hindu
Which will you choose then? Let us see... Your reason is no more shocked in choosing one rather than the other since you must of necessity choose. This is one point settled. But your self-respect? Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that we live again. If you gain, you gain nothing, an eternity of smug self-satisfaction, in the company of equally repellent souls; if you lose, you lose everything, as you wasted your chance to live authentically and perceive reality. Wager, then, without hesitation, that we don't. — Pascal's Other Wager
If I had been mentioning "aRb" I would have put it in quotes. I am surprised that was not apparent from the context. — Banno
Insofar as some true relation aRb pictures the world... — Banno
Insofar as some relation aRb, which is itself the fact pictured by the proposition "aRb", is true in virtue of itself picturing a fact in the world... — Banno
Insofar as some true proposition "aRb" (and/or some spatial relation within its sign) pictures a fact, — bongo fury
As far as I can see, 3.14 and what follows concerns the structure of propositions rather than how they might picture the world. — Banno
You asked how a relation pictures the world, — Banno
Insofar as some true relation aRb pictures the world, — Banno
So you want to put into words how a relation pictures the world. — Banno
3.1431 The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs. Then the spatial arrangement of these things wil express the sense of the proposition.
3.1432 Instead of, ‘The complex sign “aRb” says that a stands to b in the relation R’, we ought to put, ‘That “a” stands to “b” in a certain relation says that aRb.’
How to parse it? — Banno
Is "aRb" being used or mentioned (in your sentence)? — bongo fury
No. — Banno
Insofar as some true relation aRb pictures the world, — Banno
Nor are "proposition" and "relation" interchangeable. — Banno
A proposition, for W, is any such [relation] which... — bongo fury
Further, propositional signs are distinct from propositions (3.12) — Banno
3.12 — And a proposition is a propositional
sign in its projective relation to the world.
And what does it mean to "see something differently"? — Michael
It means to classify the same thing differently. — bongo fury
It means that we experience different sense-data. — Michael
I experience white and gold, you experience black and blue. — Michael
and is it a fact that the relation shows the state of affairs, and as such is part of the world and not distinct from it? — Harry Hindu
Insofar as some true relation aRb pictures the world, — Banno
Insofar as some true proposition "aRb" (and/or some spatial relation within its sign) pictures a fact,
Sure, the relation shows the state of affairs, — Banno
the visual and auditory imagery is causally covariant with
— Michael
Yes that's much better than
the thing that we hear is causally covariant with
— Michael
But then what's indirect about it? — bongo fury
this visual and auditory imagery is isomorphic with — Michael
the thing that we hear is isomorphic with — Michael
Someone contesting indirect realism doesn't necessarily want to claim that knowledge about the rock flows specifically from the rock to the person. It might result rather from the vast network of interactions and interpretations in the background.
Someone contesting direct realism doesn't necessarily want to claim that knowledge about the rock flows specifically from rock to TV screen to person. It might result rather from the vast network of interactions and interpretations in the background. — bongo fury
Why? — Isaac
That's just playing word games. — Michael
They don't see a picture. They see an apple. — Michael
It's like saying that Frodo carried the One Ring to Mordor, that the One Ring is a fiction, and so that Frodo carried a fiction to Mordor. — Michael
I didn’t say it’s not a mental image. — Michael
it’s bad grammar to then describe this as “hearing mental imagery.” — Michael
When a schizophrenic hears voices those voices [that you just said this person hears] are just “mental imagery” — Michael
do you accept that schizophrenics see and hear things that aren’t there? — Michael
Does the schizophrenic who sees people who aren’t there see a picture of people? — Michael
the kind of thing that we hear in the case of a veridical perception is the same kind of thing that we hear in the case of an hallucinatory perception (e.g. the schizophrenic who hears voices). — Michael
Reading a history textbox doesn't give us direct access to history. — Michael