And what does it mean to "see something differently"? — Michael

It means to classify the same thing differently. — bongo fury

It means that we experience different sense-data. — Michael

It means that we reach for different pictures and exemplars.

I experience white and gold, you experience black and blue. — Michael

You reach for uncontroversially white and gold pictures and exemplars, I reach for uncontroversially black and blue.

We have different sense-data, and this sense-data is the immediate object of perception. — Michael

As I mentioned before, the duck/rabbit image is the same sense data, yet we can report out there is an image of a duck or there is an image of a rabbit.

“And what does it mean to "see something differently"? It means that we experience different sense-data. I experience white and gold, you experience black and blue. The colours we experience are the medium by which we indirectly see the photo of a dress.”

Based on your logic because two people can report out two different sets of colors, we conclude that they must experience different sense data. But in this case the sense data is the same but they report out two different images. Do we give up the sense datum theory as immediate? Then what, we are immediately aware of the idea of a duck and the sense data is indirect? Are we back to idealism?

That’s right. We experience light, air, glasses, apples, heat, gravity, pressure, the tree, the leaves and so on. We directly perceive the environment. There is no mediating factor between the environment you experience, and you the experiencer. I’ve said this a few times now.

That’s right. We experience light, air, glasses, apples, heat, gravity, pressure, the tree, the leaves and so on. We directly perceive the environment. There is no mediating factor between the environment you experience, and you the experiencer. I’ve said this a few times now. — NOS4A2

You're not addressing the question. According to your account we don't directly see apples because air, light, and glasses are a mediating factor between the apple and you. Deflecting by saying that we directly experience the light doesn't say anything about whether or not we directly see the apple.

Deflecting by saying that we directly experience the light doesn't say anything about whether or not we directly see the apple. — Michael

One could instead argue that we directly see the environment, of which the apple is part of, and environments have lighting conditions. It's a mistake to just focus on the apple, as if it had independent existence from everything else. Of course there has to be physical relation between the object and the perceiver.

One could instead argue that we directly see the environment, of which the apple is part of, and environments have lighting conditions. It's a mistake to just focus on the apple, as if it had independent existence from everything else. Of course there has to be physical relation between the object and the perceiver. — Marchesk

If you're not considering air, light, or glasses to be a mediating factor between the apple and one's sense receptors then I don't understand that is meant by "mediating factor". This just seems like special pleading.

Another question: is there a fundamental difference between sight and echolocation? Obviously sight involves light and a visual experience whereas echolocation involves sound and an auditory experience, but in both cases it is just a case of some "foreign" force (light or sound) interacting with and being changed by some other object (a wall) and then this affected force stimulating some organism's sense receptors and producing the associated experience.

Does echolocation involve the "direct" perception of a wall? Are the features of the auditory experience mind-independent features of the wall? Presumably echolocation involves the experience of such things as pitch and tone and pace? Does the wall have a pitch, a tone, and a pace? I don't think this at all sensible. So why would sight be any different?

As I said in the other thread, I think people are just bewitched by the complexity of visual experiences. It confuses them into adopting the naive view of perception which modern science has shown to be wrong.

how can we experience a tree? — Art48

Look at it. Get hit by it. Climb it.

You figure we're looking at, getting hit by, and climbing green bundles of texture???

:wink:

Does the wall have a pitch, a tone, and a pace? I don't think this at all sensible. — Michael

modern science has shown to be wrong. — Michael

How does modern science tell us walls don't have a pitch? This is about language use, not science.

If we were bats we might well describe walls as having a pitch. We don't because it's not part of our form of life.

If we were bats we might well describe walls as having a pitch. — Isaac

That we might say this isn't that, as a mind-independent fact, walls have a pitch. As I mentioned in the other thread, I think you're conflating our model of the external world with the external world. That's a mistake.

That we might say this isn't that, as a mind-independent fact, walls have a pitch. — Michael

We wouldn't, no. Because we are humans and the word 'pitch' in human language doesn't describe a property of a wall reflecting sound.

The word 'colour' does describe the property of an object reflecting light of particular wavelengths.

I think you're conflating our model of the external world with the external world. — Michael

How could I possibly be doing that? All we have is our model(s) of the external world. I have no direct access to the external world to conflate it with anything. I can't talk about it, can't even mention it without all I'm saying actually deriving only from a model of it.

You can't say the only access we have to the real world is our models, and then go about apparently comparing our models to the real world and finding them to differ. We have no non-modelled access to the external world, so how is it featuring in your comparison?

I have no direct access to the external world to conflate it with anything. I can't talk about it, can't even mention it without all I'm saying actually deriving only from a model of it. — Isaac

Then what the hell have you been saying for the last few days when you talk about the external cause of one's perception being a red apple?

Are you just saying that we think of the external cause of one's perception as being a red apple? Because that's the point I've been trying to make all along. Contrary to the direct realist who says that the external cause of one's perception being a red apple isn't just something we think to be the case but also mind-independently is the case.

You can't say the only access we have to the real world is our models, and then go about apparently comparing our models to the real world and finding them to differ. We have no non-modelled access to the external world, so how is it featuring in your comparison? — Isaac

Ordinary perception doesn't provide us access to the external world (outside our models), but assuming scientific realism the Standard Model does. Given that direct realists tend to be scientific realists the arguments I have been making show that their direct realism is incompatible with scientific realism. I'm not particularly wedded to scientific realism and am willing to accept scientific instrumentalism, but that's not relevant to the argument I'm making, which is just that assuming scientific realism and the Standard Model, indirect realism follows.

Are you just saying that we think of the external cause of one's perception as being a red apple? — Michael

I'm saying that the term 'red apple' refers to the hidden state we model as a red apple. And additionally that this is consistent with our best model of how our brains work (also hidden states).

I'm saying that the term 'red apple' does not normally refer to the actual model, and, more importantly, to the extent it might be used that way by some subset of philosophers, it is not consistent with our best model of how our brains work.

assuming scientific realism the Standard Model does. — Michael

It's literally called a model.

It's literally called a model. — Isaac

Yes, and assuming scientific realism, the nature of the external world "matches" the model. It's not just an instrumental tool.

I'm saying that the term 'red apple' refers to the hidden state we model as a red apple. — Isaac

Which means what, exactly? That the hidden state resembles our model of a red apple, such that it is as a red apple appears to us?

I'm saying that the term 'red apple' refers to the hidden state we model as a red apple. — Isaac

But you just said above "I can't talk about [the external cause], can't even mention it."

So which is it?

assuming scientific realism, the nature of the external world "matches" the model. — Michael

What does it mean to 'match' a model? Are you saying that scientific realism says we've got our models right?

Which means what, exactly? That the hidden state resembles our model of a red apple, such that it is as a red apple appears to us? — Michael

I don't see why resemblance even enters into reference. If I say "Jack, come over here!" when the man's name is John, I'm still referencing the man, I just got his name wrong. If I say "bring me that green cup", pointing to a red cup, I'm still referencing the cup, I just got its colour wrong.

We don't have to be right about something's properties in order to reference it.

But you just said above "I can't talk about [the external cause], can't even mention it."

So which is it? — Michael

I was following the conclusion of the state of affairs you describe (where nothing refers to our external world, hence we cannot talk about it).

I don't see why resembles even enters into reference. If I say "Jack, come over here!" when the man's name is John, I'm still referencing the man, I just got his name wrong. If I say "bring me that green cup", pointing to a red cup, I'm still referencing the cup, I just got its colour wrong.

We don't have to be right about something's properties in order to reference it. — Isaac

The existence of M-theory doesn't entail that the things it models – strings, branes, the ninth spatial dimension, etc. – exist outside the model. It attempts to explain observable phenomena, but it would be wrong to say that its terms – "strings", "branes", "the ninth spatial dimension" – refer to whatever "hidden states" explain observable phenomena. If these hidden states don't "match" the models then these hidden states aren't strings, branes, or the ninth spatial dimension – they're something else. And if these hidden states aren't strings, branes, or the ninth spatial dimension then it isn't that "strings", "branes", and "the ninth spatial dimension" are non-referring terms, it's that they refer only to the models.

And the same is true of everyday perception. If the hidden states don't "match" our model (or sense-data) of the colour red then they are not the colour red, they're something else, and colour terms like "red" refer only to the model (or sense-data).

It attempts to explain observable phenomena, but it would be wrong to say that its terms – "strings", "branes", "the ninth spatial dimension" – refer to whatever "hidden states" explain observable phenomena. — Michael

Begging the question. That's the matter we're disagreeing on.

If these hidden states don't "match" the models then these hidden states aren't strings, branes, or the ninth spatial dimension – they're something else. — Michael

So when you said...

Ordinary perception doesn't provide us access to the external world (outside our models), but assuming scientific realism the Standard Model does. — Michael

...what did you mean? The Standard Model might (as you admit above) not match the external world, so it doesn't provide access to it any more than our perception does. I'm sure scientific realists aren't claiming our current models are all right.

if these hidden states aren't strings, branes, or the ninth spatial dimension then it isn't that "strings", "branes", and "the ninth spatial dimension" are non-referring terms, it's that they refer only to the models. — Michael

Again, a re-statement of the very proposition we're disagreeing on.

If the hidden states don't "match" our model (or sense-data) of the colour red then they are not the colour red, they're something else, and colour terms like "red" refer only to the model (or sense-data). — Michael

You've not explained what you mean by 'match'.

You're not addressing the question. According to your account we don't directly see apples because air, light, and glasses are a mediating factor between the apple and you. Deflecting by saying that we directly experience the light doesn't say anything about whether or not we directly see the apple.

I’ve answered the question already. We directly perceive apples through light. I don’t think we’re viewing sense-data, representations, or images of apples in the light, like we would on indirect mediums like photos and televisions.

How is this relevant to direct or indirect realism and phenomenalism?

We directly perceive apples through light. — NOS4A2

This is as meaningless as saying that we directly perceive distant events through a camera feed.

Do you think we directly perceive the light but indirectly perceive apples?

Do you think we directly perceive the light but indirectly perceive apples? — NOS4A2

No, I think something like the Sense-Datum Theory of perception is correct.

What I'm saying here is that your account of perception – that A directly perceives B if there is no "mediating factor" between B and A – entails that we directly perceive light and indirectly perceive apples, given that light is a mediating factor between us and the apple but that there (presumably) is no mediating factor between us and the light. And I'm saying that your rephrasing of your account to say that we directly perceive apples "through light" is as meaningless as saying that we directly perceive distant events "through a camera feed". It's just special pleading.

Another question: is there a fundamental difference between sight and echolocation? Obviously sight involves light and a visual experience whereas echolocation involves sound and an auditory experience, but in both cases it is just a case of some "foreign" force (light or sound) interacting with and being changed by some other object (a wall) and then this affected force stimulating some organism's sense receptors and producing the associated experience.

Does echolocation involve the "direct" perception of a wall? Are the features of the auditory experience mind-independent features of the wall? Presumably echolocation involves the experience of such things as pitch and tone and pace? Does the wall have a pitch, a tone, and a pace? I don't think this at all sensible. So why would sight be any different?

As I said in the other thread, I think people are just bewitched by the complexity of visual experiences. It confuses them into adopting the naive view of perception which modern science has shown to be wrong. — Michael

But that's the thing - how did scientists show it to be wrong if they can only indirectly experience the environment? If you can show something to be wrong regardless of whether or not you have direct or indirect access, then what is the problem? It seems to me that you must directly experience something and by that direct experience you logically work your way back to the original cause which is an object reflecting light. What is missing with indirect access because either way you have access to accurate information? And if you can show what you're missing with indirect access when you only have indirect access, then again you are still able to show what is the case without anything missing.

I addressed your concerns here.

Scientific realism and direct realism are incompatible, therefore one (or both) is wrong.

and in which I responded here.

What does scientific realism and [in]direct realism say about the [visual or auditory] experience itself and access to it?

The distinction between direct vs. direct realism is non-sensical when you include the experience as part of the world your experiencing, and understand that effects carry information about their causes. — Harry Hindu

We're directly aware of the effects and through that indirectly aware of their cause.

Do you not have direct access to your experience and isn't your experience part of the world as much as what your experience is of? — Harry Hindu

Yes. But it doesn't follow from this that I am directly aware of the cause of my experience. The part of the world that is my experience isn't the part of the world that is the apple. I'm directly aware of the former, and through that indirectly aware of the latter.

Consciousness doesn't extend beyond the body.

We're directly aware of the effects and through that indirectly aware of their cause. — Michael

Then both direct and indirect realism are the case?

I would need to know what "we" is and it's relation with an experience. Is access to the we, or the I, direct or indirect?

Yes. But it doesn't follow from this that I am directly aware of the cause of my experience. The part of the world that is my experience isn't the part of the world that is the apple. I'm directly aware of the former, and through that indirectly aware of the latter. — Michael

The part of the world that is the table is not the part of the world that is the apple. When the apple sits on top of the table, is it directly or indirectly accessing the table?

Is the "we" a different part of the world than the experience? If so, then "we" indirectly access our experience, but then what would the medium be by which the "we" access the experience to say that it is indirect? If not, then is the "we" and "experience" the same thing and it wouldn't make sense to say that we are directly aware of the effects (experience). We are the experience. Then we must ask, how does the experience access the body? If the experience is not the body, then by what medium does the experience access the body? Indirect realism seems to create an infinite regress where there must always be a medium between the perceiver and the perceived and in turn requires another medium for the perceiver to access the medium, the medium of the medium, etc. which ends up creating an infinite chasm between the perceiver and what is perceived.

What does it mean to be "aware"? Is the apple aware of the table in sitting on it? What does it mean for the "we", or "I", to directly be aware of the effects? Isn't the "effects" awareness of their causes? Does it make sense to say that "we", or "I", is directly aware of the awareness of the causes?

It seems to me that both direct and indirect realism are nonsensical.

Hmmmm... Atman = Brahman?

I said there is no mediating factor between experienced and experiencer, between man and the rest of his environment, between A and B. Light is of A which is directly perceived by B, man.

If sense data is of A it is of the rest of the environment. If it is of B it is of man. And if it is of either world or man, it is identifiable, detectable, and measurable. If it does not lie in either, but is a mediating factor between both, where is the evidence for this?

No, I think something like the Sense-Datum Theory of perception is correct. — Michael

"Common Kind Claim: veridical, illusory, and hallucinatory experiences (as) of an F are fundamentally the same; they form a common kind.
Thus, a veridical, illusory, and hallucinatory experience, all alike in being experiences (as) of a churchyard covered in white snow, are not merely superficially similar, they are fundamentally the same: these experiences have the same nature, fundamentally the same kind of experiential event is occurring in each case. Any differences between them are external to their nature as experiences (e.g., to do with how they are caused)."

There are significantly problems with what is stated concerning the Common Kind Claim.

(1) The Common Kind Claim is un-verifiable in principle. The non-veridical experiences are private to the subject having them. Thus, there is nothing to verify whether the claim is true or not. Also, that is how we learn that certain experiences are non-veridical because we come to understand that there is nothing to verify when one makes reports on a non-veridical experience.
(2) What is in common to both experiences, veridical and non-veridical. They have the same kind of churchyard and the same kind of white snow. But this is the subject of the experience, not what makes these experiences fundamentally the same. For example, let’s say we take a picture of this churchyard with a camera, a mobile phone, and have an artist create a super realistic painting. Would we say the churchyard makes them fundamentally the same. True, the subject, the churchyard, could be said to be what is common in each picture. But fundamentally? If there was a different subject in each picture, what would be in common fundamentally? The subject should not matter, but what is fundamental between the pictures or the experiences excluding the subject?
(3) Lastly,Is it true that any differences between veridical and non-veridical are external to their nature (e.g. to do with how they are caused)? I do not think so. I could report that I had a hallucinatory experience, and we determine this because it made no sense. The report was of flying rocks and people with four heads. You may have no idea what the external causes might be but the report of the experience is so absurd you can likely draw the conclusion it was a hallucination.