A thing is a higher level construction. — Joshs

Are information processors, generators and experiencers also myths? — Marchesk

1. How does matter relate to information? — hypericin

2. How does information relate to mind? — hypericin

Translation of talk about nothing into talk about something often takes some trouble... — Nelson Goodman: Sights Unseen

an answer, which is "overcoming differences of perspective". So it's useful, because it succinctly forestalls the unnecessary baggage of "subjective" and "objective". — bongo fury

We don't study ghosts, Gods or angels... — Manuel

property dualism [...] substance dualism — Manuel

I think one of the problems we tend to have when trying to understand experience, is that our intuition tells us that most things are non-experiential. We see rocks, rivers, land, the sky, tables and so forth and even (some) planets to be solid objects.

It's a powerful intuition.

Then we have this thing, this simultaneously abstract and concrete aspect to us, experience, which appears to be completely different from "solid" rocks and rivers. But... — Manuel

Are some circular arguments reasonable? — forrest-sounds

and is this an example of one? — forrest-sounds

Here is a consciousness.

habit/custom — bongo fury

Also, please make no mention of deductive arguments — forrest-sounds

If not, what form does a good inductive argument take. — forrest-sounds

Water and H2O are two different things... — RogueAI

There is no possible world in which H₂O is not water. — Banno

There is no possible world in which XYZ is not water. — TwinBanno

But if the judge says you will be killed tomorrow, then how can he not know he's going to get killed, the judge said so now. — Manuel

It is notable that K acquiesces in the conclusion (wrong, according to the fable of the [eventual] hanging) that the decree will not be fulfilled. If this is a conclusion which he is prepared to accept (though wrongly) in the end as a certainty, it is an alternative which he should have been prepared to take into consideration from the beginning as a possibility. — Quine - On a so-called paradox

we only had a one day week and a two one day weekend. — Manuel

The judge tells K on Sunday afternoon that he, K, will be hanged the following noon and will remain ignorant of the fact till the intervening morning. It would be like K to protest at this point that the judge was contradicting himself. And it would be like the hangman to intrude upon K's complacency at 11.55 next morning, thus showing that the judge had said nothing more self-contradictory than the simple truth. If K had reasoned correctly, Sunday afternoon, he would have reasoned as follows. "We must distinguish four cases: first, that I shall be hanged tomorrow noon and I know it now (but I do not); second, that I shall be unhanged tomorrow noon and know it now (but I do not); third, that I shall be unhanged tomorrow noon and do not know it now; and fourth, that I shall be hanged tomorrow noon and do not know it now. The latter two alternatives are the open possibilities, and the last of all would fulfil the decree. Rather than charging the judge with self-contradiction, therefore, let me suspend judgment and hope for the best." — Quine - On a so-called paradox

if he hasn't been hanged by Thursday, there is only one day left - and so it won't be a surprise [he'll know it already] if he's hanged on Friday. — Manuel/Wiki

to confuse two things; (i) a hypothesis, by K at t, that the decree will be fulfilled, and (ii) a hypothesis, by K at t, that K will know at t + n - 1 that the decree will be fulfilled. Actually hypothesis (i), even as a hypothesis made by K, admits of two sub-cases: K's hypothetical ignorance and K's hypothetical awareness of the hypothetical fact. — Quine - On a so-called paradox

Consciousness is a feature of an entity capable of — Pantagruel

may — Banno

And which is more hell: you’ll be a Man, my son! — Manuel

And hell: — BigThoughtDropper

It is worth noting that ‘sound-space’ is, in certain respects at least, much simpler than ‘colour-space’. It seems that even if there were insoluble problems in the case of colour, two people a and b could agree in all their judgements about the pitch of sounds although a heard everything five tones higher than b (that is, intuitively, if a could per impossibile hear middle C ‘through b’s ears’, a would call it ‘G above middle C’). Notice that this could be so even if both a and b had perfect pitch—the ability, that is, to state the pitch of any note just on hearing it. — Galen Strawson

that it could just be a simple unknowable fact that a’s and b’s overall experiences of sounds were five tones apart — Galen Strawson

You may decry some of these scruples, and protest that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in my philosophy. I am concerned, rather, that there should not be more things dreamt of in my philosophy than there are in heaven and earth. — Goodman, Fact Fiction and Forecast

You hear people say things like "is my red the same as your red?" but you don't so often hear someone asking if their sense of the smell of a banana is the same as your sense of it. Or if you hear the sound the same way. — Razorback kitten

that "red" is an objective reality, experienced similarly by physiologically similar individuals. — counterpunch

This presupposes a problematic representational theory of perception. I do not see two things - the thing in front of me and the thing in my mind — Fooloso4

Although I see it differently than you do, there is no way for either of us to know that. — Fooloso4

the same problem of what can be said? — magritte

On the other hand, that may have been what magritte meant, too. "Innate" as in, our agreement as to the external extension happening to result from a corresponding agreement as to the internal extension. — bongo fury

unless my inner-feelings, mementos and dimension differs from yours. If so and I differ, the red I see may be your green.
... The blue I see reminds me of waves and birds; if you were to describe your blue using mementos, how would you? — ghostlycutter

I would however suggest that the colours you see aren't different but are in different order. — ghostlycutter

There is no necessary relationship between signifier and signified. The word for the thing, is not the thing itself. — counterpunch

Red is a thing; a particular wavelength of light that excites particular cone shaped nerve endings in the eye. — counterpunch

Experience of the thing that we call red, is the same for you and for me - unless you're colour blind, — counterpunch

Clearly, I'm on the universalist side of the debate - and my joke was intended to mock the Worfian cultural relativists. — counterpunch

Innately. If you and I are looking at a chair, are there two chairs? One for each of us? — frank

They can't see red, apparently — Manuel

And prior to that they were friends. — Manuel

What I am seeing, — Fooloso4

what it looks like — Fooloso4

but this is as far as we can get. — Fooloso4

Starmaking — Manuel

Assuming everyone's senses are calibrated the same.. it's one color. — Outlander

I think it's determined innately. — Manuel

I'm saying there is no way to compare. Anything that you show me would be something that I see. — Fooloso4

If I cut both of you, and you bleed, whatever word, phrase, or as it really is "sound" you assign to the color we all see, — Outlander

Physically we can only see light which comes in many shades of grey. — magritte

record three slightly different black and white image frames — magritte

So, external stimuli are only red if we say so, preferably based on universal, if not then cultural agreement. — magritte

would that answer the question? — T Clark

I don't know. Show me your red. — Fooloso4

Boom! — counterpunch