Why doesn't hard content externalism lead to behaviourism? — frank
I think Chomsky avers (somewhere on youtube) that Hume and Heraclitus were privy to the same insight [the inscrutability of reference]. Of course he draws a different lesson from it than Quine. But he doesn't say the doctrine itself is mistaken, or even that it is behaviouristic. And it isn't. It points out that you can't objectively ground reference in behaviour. — bongo fury
It's a game of pretend. There won't be any fact of the matter exactly what anyone was pretending. How could there? — bongo fury
So you're saying externalism does lead to behaviourism? Contrary to your thread title? — bongo fury
I'm looking for a reason to say it doesn't. — frank
It (meaning, mental content, what have you) is a game of pretending that words and pictures refer to things (externally, not in the head). We're just second guessing each other's fantasies about the reference. We can't use observed behaviour to justify any particular fantasy. — bongo fury
We can't use observed behaviour to justify any particular fantasy.
— bongo fury
But the kind of behaviorism I'm thinking of doesn't allow that there is any kind of referencing involved in communication.
— frank
in the sense that we're consciously referencing — frank
Why would you be expecting Quine to be getting into our heads? — bongo fury
If we're planning to do some scientific research on what's in our heads, I think he would say we shouldn't do that due to the unavailability of facts. — frank
That doesn't mean he ruled out subjectivity, though, right? — frank
In our off hours away from the lab, we could say that we might be thinking about the same thing? — frank
Again, why would you be expecting Quine to be internalist (getting into our heads) and determinist (matter of fact) about reference? — bongo fury
I've actually always assumed he did rule out subjectivity, but I'm rethinking it, actually based on what you said. — frank
Why should I take Quine as saying the latter? — frank
that we can't know whether we're thinking of the same thing — frank
Why should I take Quine as saying the latter? — frank
Because the word is carrying too much baggage. — bongo fury
Can't because it's hard to determine :down: , or can't because it's indeterminate :up: ?
And why 'think' when this was about externalism? — bongo fury
You brought him up — frank
and now ditch the effort. — frank
indeterminate for all practical purposes for me with my poor 21st technology. I don't therefore rule out those things. — frank
I think we're done? — frank
Brains might sync as people interact. — frank
Yes, to offer one straight answer to your question. — bongo fury
That's a hard solution to avoid as "strong" content externalism just seems like a version of behaviorism. — Manuel
however, you use content externalism in a much less radical manner, then perhaps it can be articulated a little. — Manuel
What I don't understand is how to make sense of a strong version of behaviorism. Doesn't it rule out sense in communication? — frank
But there really isn't anything newsworthy about weak content externalism, is there? — frank
A human being will react to poem, an amoeba won't. — Isaac
Under strong behaviorism, how would you know that?
Any movement made by the amoeba can be taken as sign that it is reacting to the poem. — Manuel
you need to postulate an innate mechanism that allows human beings to react to poems that amoeba's lack. — Manuel
I think you've misunderstood what behaviourism is. None of its proponents suggest that there is no mechanism, that the brain's just a non-functioning blob. — Isaac
out almost everything. A human being is reduced to a stimulus-reacting nothing. You wouldn't be able to tell a human from an amoeba under strong behaviorism. So it's not even good science, unless it's radically altered. — Manuel
Nope. Not that I can see. Yet I see more papers talking about externalism of all varieties than internalism, which is coherent and looks to me to be scientific. Everybody's internalist when it comes to other animals, we all assume they have an intrinsic nature such that a dog will behave dog-like and not chimp -like, etc.
But when it comes to human beings, internalism becomes this mysterious magic stuff to some. This is strange to me. — Manuel
Which is why I used the term "strong" behaviorism, one which would do away with any innate mechanism. I agree that I doubt any proponent today would hold such a view. — Manuel
I don't agree. Putnam, for example, suggested the thought experiment of a brain-in-vats as an exercise. Nobody literally believes we are brain in vats, though some believe in the simulation hypothesis. It's still useful to look at what extreme ideas would look like. — Manuel
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