I can check the frequency I'm humming. Only I know the sound of internal humming. — frank

But of course you probably wouldn't ever check the frequency of an external sound, as such. You would check that it matched in pitch with another sound, such as that of a tuning fork. Likewise you can check the pitch of an internal humming against another image or an external sound or both.

The physics is a kind of back-story. Indeed, if we are partisan internalists, we might even aspire to "divide through and cancel it out", leaving only the internals (the images both perceptual and merely imagined or recalled); just as Witty suggests we might in certain conditions eliminate the internals, and their questionable solipsistic back-story (the private language).

Numerical identity? — frank

the relation that holds between two relata when they are the selfsame entity, that is, when the terms designating them have the same reference — Collins

As opposed to identity in a particular (known or unknown) respect.

I really don't understand the nature of an internal humming. — frank

Is it different to qualia in general?

Existential quantification can range over things that are not actual — Banno

Only by being (or making the clause) literally false.

They get confused, because they think this implies hobbits must be actual. — Banno

Only if they think the story is literally true.

Uncanny...

There's a genetic anomaly that's associated with perfect pitch. — frank

Interesting theory.

On the other hand, some people are tone deaf. — frank

Likewise. (But a rather antiquated theory.)

So if there is a classification system in play, we each learn it from whom? Ourselves? — frank

Each other.

The social divide is between those who can and those who can't reliably compare tones (whether internal or external) that are in entirely separate musical contexts, so that there is no feasible chain of local and easier intermediate comparisons reaching between them.

Obviously there is huge variation in the skill of relative pitch: of maintaining a chain.

The can't beat them so might as well join them [the absolute pitchers] comes partly from knowing (or failing to remedy) my limitations. Which are, mainly, losing track around modulations, some more than others obviously. — bongo fury

How do you know the early and later internals are the same [pitch]? — frank

In the kind of imagery talk that I think the PLA isn't designed to attack: by comparing them for pitch just like a pair of externals, or like an internal and a corresponding external.

Internals and externals are all part of the same game or classification system.

The internals might (if you like) be memory traces, like computer records. They don't literally match in frequency, but they match in pitch exactly as do all and only (or mostly) sounds that also match in frequency. So they are like a mental image of a time-table that can be tested for correctness. (cf PI 264)

Does Witty elsewhere critique this notion of a public sensation language? (Grateful for leads.) But it clearly isn't the private one.

The private language argument misleads us into thinking that we must recognize two things as being the same thing in order for such a recognition to be useful. But this is not the case, because we only need to recognize similarities, and hence types. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see that. I think it attacks the British empiricist psychology of ideas and impressions: the narrative of a private construction of mind from sense-data. His argument seems to be that identity and similarity of the internals has no basis when asserted in private. I don't see any conflating of numerical identity with similarity.

The problem inherent in the private-language scenario is (I think I gather from Witty) the lack of criteria for identifying and classifying internal entities (sensations, qualia, images), should these be (as folk-psychology often leads them to be) conceived as the sole and sufficient basis for their own classification. Where, on the other hand, such criteria are available, because the entities are conceived instead as part of a larger, pre-existing game (e.g. there is meaningful comparison with blood pressure, or actual train times), no immediate critique is offered.

So I don't think that your returning

back to the same starting frequency — frank

is a problem for Witty, because you are judging the pitch-identity (vs. difference) of the earlier and later 'internals' according to a pre-existing system that (if it recognises them as internal) maps them to externals that are identified or distinguished according to frequency. So he wouldn't see that judgement as a problem. He would doubt that the imagery-talk is true literally, but he wouldn't be sceptical about the viability of pitch comparisons among internal images...

I found I had to practice to even duplicate it with my voice, — frank

...nor between images and actual sounds. And neither would I. So I'm still curious as to the nature of the difficulty you describe.

Far as I can tell, no... or, not so as the ear beetles would matter, or cause an unacceptable philosophical scene, by refusing to 'drop out of the equation', at least in principle, and give way to corresponding external stimulus types.

To be fair, the creatures haven't exactly been (as Witty's figure has it) 'cancelled out' from my 'arithmetic', here. I'm certainly talking the talk of internal sensations (phenomenal qualia, mental images). I guess this is largely because I'm talking about non-perceptual imagery. But Witty doesn't seem to regard either the presence or absence of an external stimulus as characteristic of the problematic scenario critiqued as "private language". The problem inherent in that scenario is (I think I gather) the lack of criteria for identifying and classifying the internal entities, should these be (as folk-psychology often leads them to be) conceived as the sole and sufficient basis for their own classification. Where such criteria are available, because the entities are conceived instead as part of a larger, pre-existing game (e.g. there is meaningful comparison with blood pressure, or actual train times), no immediate critique is offered.

So I don't think that your returning

back to the same starting frequency. — frank

is a problem for Witty, because you are judging the pitch-identity (vs. difference) of the earlier and later 'internals' according to a pre-existing system that (if it recognises them as internal) maps them to externals that are identified or distinguished according to (an ordering correlating roughly with) frequency. So he wouldn't see that judgement as a problem. He would doubt that the imagery-talk is true literally, but he wouldn't be sceptical about the viability of pitch comparisons among internal images...

I found I had to practice to even duplicate it with my voice, — frank

...nor between images and actual sounds. And neither would I. So I'm still curious as to the nature of the difficulty you describe.

@frank's thread.

No worries.

Haha. No? Not a plausible reading of "the whole of math"?

Consistency and provability are always relative to a given axiom system. — fishfry

Sure. I was assuming that by "the whole of math" Boolos meant simply the maximal (consistent) extension or union of all the systems you mention. Thereby saving himself the bother of translating "any system strong enough to satisfy the Hilbert-Bernays provability conditions" into words of one syllable.

By omitting the fact that we are always working in a particular axiomatic system, the essence of the matter is ignored. — fishfry

But on my assumption,

First of all, when I say "proved", what I will mean is "proved with the aid of the whole of math".

is hardly omitting the fact (of the relativity of proof to system).

what he wrote was wrong. — fishfry

How?

My guess is that he means ZFC, — TonesInDeepFreeze

Cool, although it didn't matter what he meant, so long as it was bigger than e.g. Robinson arithmetic, was my point.

Isn't he just ensuring that what 2 + 2 is equal to is being discussed with respect to a system big enough for the second theorem to apply?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hilbert%E2%80%93Bernays_provability_conditions?wprov=sfla1

Will you be able to shed any light, on this matter? — Aryamoy Mitra

No. Sorry.

Have I significantly misapprehended the argument, — Aryamoy Mitra

At (5) and (6), yes.

Interpreting this sentence, is harder than accruing a mastery over all of Mathematics. — Aryamoy Mitra

But you have undertaken to follow the copious and kind advice of @TonesInDeepFreeze, so you may be pleasantly surprised. Good luck.

short translations — Aryamoy Mitra

Godel's second incompleteness theorem explained in words of one syllable

What we see on the screen is the "mind". It is a consequence of all components working together, but we cannot find "where it is", we can only view it as a result of the components working. — Christoffer

And isn't that, in a very real sense, what we find when we look for the holy spirit of our lord Jesus Christ? Please turn now to Psalm 56 in your hymn books. Gladys, the organ.

I mean I doubt if there isn't a lack of inclination. Not that the inclination is a thing, haha.

... You did mean an inclination to avoid/reduce?

Amen to that.

Which readability index is it that penalises abstract nouns? That's what I was looking for... might make it a feature request, if I didn't dream it. Haha, the dreams of a nominalist. — bongo fury

...maybe what you are noticing is how poorly it’s often done rather than a lack of inclination. — DingoJones

Sadly not...

Dreaming is thinking about the real world, just off-line and hence fundamentally confused about physics (the walking in the air).

On-line thought is fundamentally confused about psychology (the pictures in the head).

Well that makes everything perfectly clear.

I found I had to practice to even duplicate it with my voice, — frank

Well this inspires me to actually getting around to browsing empirical research, rather than simply saying, in this case: doesn't everyone experience musical "ear worms"?

...

Ok, the wiki page says yes, everyone (98%) does. So the next question is, do we have, in your case, a syndrome as rare and curious as that of aphantasia, or a simpler misunderstanding? Or, not simpler, but par for the course in phenomenological discussion! ... E.g. I wonder what degree of clarity (reality? hallucination?) of imagery you are supposing is involved in "duplication"?

I do seem to come back to the same starting frequency. — frank

Ok. You checked against a recording? A few times, not too close together? I'm tempted (as already mentioned) to trawl the research for reference to the obvious question of the variance of most people's ear worms (or spontaneous performances) from the usual pitch (e.g. the pitch of a recording where relevant). But there was no mention of this on the ear worms wiki page.

Btw @Metaphysician Undercover would be interested in your involving vocalising in the aiming for the pitch.

Or do you just mean you maintain whatever random starting pitch for the duration of the performance? (Which is a thing, that by no means always happens.)

I think according to the Private language argument, u shouldn't be able to do this. Do you know what I mean? — frank

Haha, is it about ear beetles? ... Not sure. Good question.

It seems clear that you are using a different definition of "object" than the one rigorously employed within the discipline of semeiotic. Again, anything that is denoted by a sign--real or fictional, existent or imaginary--is an object in that technical sense. — aletheist

Didn't Russell rather skewer that approach? (On Denoting.)

And in your example of fictional writing, there are no objects denoted. — Metaphysician Undercover

Speaking literally, yes.

The author simply builds up images of characters — Metaphysician Undercover

This needs clarifying. Produces strings of alphabetic characters? Sure. Conjures mental images of non-existent and hence undenoted people? Well, "mental" is problematic but let's park that. Or skirt it, by assuming the book is a picture book. Goodman's very neat solution is then to read "images of characters" e.g. "picture of Pickwick" not as requiring two separate denotata, a picture and a Pickwick, but as long (if only slightly) for "Pickwick-picture", a one-place predicate applying to a certain sub-class of pictures.

If this were true, then the author could not create those "images of characters" in the first place, and we could not think or talk or write about them afterwards. — aletheist

If what version were true? If my suggested version, then why (could we) not?

The possible objection that we must first understand what a man or a unicorn is to know how to apply "man-picture" or "unicorn-picture" seems to me quite perverted. We can learn to apply "corncob pipe" or "staghorn" without first understanding, or knowing how to apply, "corn" or "cob" or "corncob" or "pipe" or "stag" or "horn" as separate terms. And we can learn, on the basis of samples, to apply "unicorn-picture" not only without ever having seen any unicorns but without ever having seen or heard the word "unicorn" before. Indeed, largely by learning what are unicorn-pictures and unicorn-descriptions do we come to understand the word "unicorn"; and our ability to recognize a staghorn may help us to recognize a stag when we see one. — Goodman, Languages of Art

Of course, if one just decides - as you seem to have - that our minds are not souls, — Bartricks

No, the premise I'm deciding to explicitly deny is that we have things called minds, except in a manner of speaking about our physical constitution and behaviour.

But then you're the fantasist, as you're deciding how things are with reality and then closing your mind to evidence to the contrary. — Bartricks

To be fair, I think I'm maintaining a reasonably coherent worldview and finding I can consistently deny what seems to you an undeniable axiom.

But don't forget I have a mind in a manner of speaking about my physical constitution and behaviour.
— bongo fury

What do you mean? Do you mean you do have a mind or that you don't? — Bartricks

I added this, above:

Incidentally, I think the appropriate manner of speaking (which disqualifies any present-day bot) is to imply skill in the social game of agreeing (or disagreeing) about which words and pictures are being pointed at which objects out in the world. — bongo fury

And thoughts are mental states. — Bartricks

Again, only in a manner of speaking:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/433444

Ah, I see. So because you already know how things are with reality and my arguments contradict your understanding, my arguments must be faulty. — Bartricks

No, I said I suspect your argument is valid.

It seems you think you're God. — Bartricks

It's about beliefs facing the tribunal of experience as a corpus. That's why I might be just as inclined to judge premises from the conclusion of a valid argument as the other way round.

How do you doubt something without a mind? — Bartricks

But don't forget I have a mind in a manner of speaking about my physical constitution and behaviour.

And yes, if there actually are any extended sensible objects then I accept entirely the possibility that a sensible body might evolve without there being any soul inside it. — Bartricks

Cool... an animal body able to compute statements implying it had a mind in more than a manner of speaking?

a typist without a mind....which is a bot — Bartricks

Yes, good definition of a bot: a typist without a mind in a manner of speaking.

Incidentally, I think the appropriate manner of speaking (which disqualifies any present-day bot) is to imply skill in the social game of agreeing (or disagreeing) about which words and pictures are being pointed at which objects out in the world.

An animal.

My arguments have the premises they have. Are you disputing one? Which one — Bartricks

The idea that we each have a mind, except in a manner of speaking about our physical constitution and behaviour.

and why? — Bartricks

Partly because I suspect that arguments like yours would show that this idea leads easily to the fantasies (as they seem to me) of immaterial souls and the like. So I would see your argument, if it works, as a reductio.

I doubt (as also no doubt will you) that I am qualified to offer the kind of stress test of your argument that you seek. I thought I would try instead to see if there was any chance of making you doubt the premise, getting you to appreciate the possibility that animals might evolve without acquiring any non-physical aspect or component, but then also in certain cases be able and inclined to think the opposite.

I thought one reason you might entertain such a scenario could be that mechanical robots are (or soon will be) a clear case of rational-but-mindless-if-not-in-a-manner-of-speaking. So the scenario would merely be that of the evolution of a kind of animal with similar functionality to a machine. And evolution has proved adept at producing biological machinery of almost limitless complexity, so the scenario wouldn't seem implausible.

But you say you take "rational" as already implying possession of a mind (in more than a manner of speaking). And I expect you will feel the same way about "think". So for you (or other dualists) I would probably need to sketch the scenario in terms like "computational" and "compute": an animal able and inclined to compute statements implying that it had a mind (in more than a manner of speaking).

You have as a premise that we each have a "mind" (or "mental events"). Can you imagine a rational animal being like a robot in lacking a such a gift?

it is an all-too-common nominalist mistake to insist that if abstract objects are real, then they must also exist. — aletheist

... An all-too-rarely credited nominalist insight, rather.

Trying to establish a separation between "real" and "existent" just muddies the water by creating ambiguity, and is counterproductive toward understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

ruining the good old word "exist". — Quine, On What There Is

Do those who deny the existence of qualia also deny subjectivity altogether? — noname

If only. Unfortunately they mostly can't resist taunting believers with a more subtle dance, wherein the beetle is supposed irrelevant, but not doubted. [Witness the next two pages...]

And what are the best arguments against the existence of qualia? — noname

Neural networks: learning, but without the internal images.

With pattern-making?

Yep.

It still does not explain why minor chords tend to be heard as more subdued and less assertive than major chords. — Olivier5

Sure it does, to the extent they do, which is grossly overstated.

It's because they have been used successfully to express sadness.

Path dependence.

Contingent on prior adoption of a classification into and of triads, as well.



... How have they been used successfully to express sadness? Good question, but a matter for analysis, which isn't at all obliged to implicate an innate correlation.

Goodman explains "expression" as the metaphorical exemplification of properties. The chord expresses sadness in that it is a sample of metaphorically-sad things in general. Is metaphor illusionary?

That's the other thread, though.

For me too. And it was Goodman's actual point here:

The notion of the structure of a work [or any object] is as specious as the notion of the structure of the world. A work, like the world, has as many different structures as there are ways of organising it, of subsuming it under categorical schemata dependent upon some or other structural affinities with and differences from other works.
— Goodman, Problems and Projects — bongo fury

I might (later) edit in the continuation that explains how emotional analysis of music should lead to structural.

Haha, but is it disappointing that the connection isn't natural? I would be expecting to be accused of wishful thinking on this question. (Of denying the innate programming.)

Happy to dismiss the relevance of any non-artistic/intellectual pleasures to aesthetic analysis or ethical analysis/design. (And preferring to analyse the aesthetic or ethical satisfaction in terms of understanding rather than pleasure.)

Pain a different matter for the ethics, I suppose. Happy to admit the relevance of (any kind of) suffering to ethical analysis. Just not that of pleasure. Agreeing with @Wayfarer there.

listening to music, mastering an intellectual discipline etc
— Wayfarer

I would count the good or bad feelings one gets from those, and emotional states generally, as well within the domain of pleasure/pain/hedonic experience. — Pfhorrest

Prefer the other way around. ("Cognitivism"? Not that the label matters.)

Convention, complicated by path-dependent exploration of the infinite possibilities. Creating the illusion of a natural connection. Yuk, I know. Something like that, though.