Comments

  • Logical proof the universe cannot be infinite
    Not to lower the tone at all, but,

    (900×900)^900fishfry

    You prefer that to mine? How so?

    My reasoning was, the first pixel can be any of 900 distinct (picture-distinguishing) colours, and for each of those (900 mutually exclusive classes of possible picture types) there are 900 choices of colour for the second pixel, so 900 to power 2 is the number, so far, of distinct picture types. Raise the power by one for each of the remainder of the 900 × 900 pixels.

    Perhaps you were concerned with something other than the number of possible picture types?
  • Logical proof the universe cannot be infinite
    what scenes are not included within the total number of all the picturesZelebg

    The question is only, what scenes are not assigned their exclusively own personal picture (type). Some at least will have to share.
  • Logical proof the universe cannot be infinite
    and yet the number of those pictures is not infinite.Zelebg

    The number of picture tokens is (presumably, but it's your rules) equal to the number of pictured scenes.

    But the number of picture types is 900^810000, and therefore eventually less than the number of scenes.

    It's like, the natural numbers are infinite, but modulo 12 they are 12. And modulo 900^810000 they are 900^810000.

    Funny how so much information woo rests on confusing tokens and types; seeing as they were invented by its patron saint.

    No offence, @Zelebg, I always enjoy quoting your last word on panpsychism.
  • How google used Wittgenstein to redefine meaning?
    Searle used the Chinese room to argue that there was more to meaning than could be captured by mere semantics.Banno

    If by "mere" you mean fake.

    I wish I could locate the youtube footage of Searle's wry account of early replies to his vivid demonstration (the chinese room) that so-called "cognitive scripts" mistook syntax for semantics. Something like, "so they said, ok we'll program the semantics into it too, but of course what they came back with was just more syntax".bongo fury

    Never found the clip, but I don't think I badly mis-quote.

    Can Google Translate play the human (and genuinely semantic) game of agreeing which words are (pretended to be) pointed at which objects? (Or even more abstruse pretences about speech acts?) One doubts it, as yet.
  • The cultural climate in the contemporary West - Thoughts?
    I'll put my money on those who read the paper.Banno

    Or, there's my plumbing diagram. 500 days and no blowback :grimace: (what's that sound...)
  • Is Humean Causal Skepticism Self-Refuting and or Unsound?
    What is daft is to claim that Hume needs to justify his habits when he's just said there is no justification for them.unenlightened

    ... the awkward conclusion that the greatest of modern philosophers completely missed the point of his own problem...Goodman: Fact Fiction and Forecast, p61
  • Consciousness: a hallucination of an illusion
    Neither would it carry any Imputation of Falshood to our simple Ideas, if by the different Structure of our Organs, it were so ordered, That the same Object should produce in several Men’s Minds different Ideas at the same time; v.g. if the Idea, that a Violet produced in one Man’s Mind by his Eyes, were the same that a Marigold produces in another Man’s, and vice versâ.Locke: Of True and False Ideas
  • Mental States from Matter but no Matter from Mental States?
    so no, it's [not, Shirley?] a problem for physicalistsKenosha Kid



    Even the mathematical symbols that express these inexorable physical laws seem to be entirely free of these same laws.Howard Pattee

    Woo, Shirley?
  • How to save materialism


    Ok, so being isomorphic with a natural number means being in a system capable of distinguishing at least that specified whole number of different items? I'd be cool with that.

    Then, you are information if you are such an item? Perhaps there is an additional requirement that you and the rest must be symbols?
  • Feature requests
    :wink: :ok:
  • Feature requests


    You are adorable. Is it an act?
  • How to save materialism
    That which is isomorphic with a natural number.hypericin

    Please explain?
  • The Role of Narration
    Are we declaiming on our Cartesian theatre stage, or are we Mike Leigh... or some such improvisational director?

    I know I often encourage my cast to become dark and potentially offensive characters. E.g. when I'm in busy traffic. Of course, there is always a clear moral perspective to the resulting drama. Not.
  • What counts as unacceptable stereotyping? (Or when does stereotyping become prejudice?)


    Why won't it start at 54?

    Why does the devil have all the best tunes?...



    Phew. False alarm...

  • How to save materialism


    So your admirable (for me) nominalism, as embraced in paragraphs one thru five (of eight), depends on grammar? Isn't that a tenuous criterion? Couldn't it easily have happened that we referred to apples as "apple" (with no article) even while only ever accepting a (any) whole one as answering to the name? (cf. Quine in Word and Object, "Divided reference".) Would some version of your "informational" exception then not apply?

    Perhaps you might refuse the exception on the grounds that apples aren't identified digitally? But notice that what impresses about digital reproduction (in particular) isn't the fidelity of one copy from the last, but the feasibility of an endless chain of true copies. That aspect is achieved as well by an atomic digital symbol as by a composite one. Treat an apple as a character in a discrete alphabet (e.g. of fruits) and the analogy is complete. (cf. Goodman in Languages of Art, "Notations".) Digital reproduction is no grounds for Platonism, under any flag.

    your copy is one of 5 million extant in the world, each qualitatively (at least microscopically) and numerically distinct from all the others.hypericin

    Absolutely.

    We are not referring to the physical mediums when speaking of informational objects.hypericin

    Why on earth not?

    We are referring to the information itself.hypericin

    But what is that?

    Confusing the music with the score would be absurd enough. Confusing it with any kind of recording, even more so.

    So, if you watched a copy of the movie dubbed in Spanish, or maybe even a stage production, you might say you watched "A Wizard of Oz".hypericin

    Sure. But not if you merely studied, however carefully, the digital or analog recordings themselves (literally, as opposed to the sound-and-light events produced from them).

    But, there are not as many "Wizard of Oz"es as there are copies of the movie floating around.hypericin

    More to the point, there are not as many of the Hollywood artwork "The Wizard of Oz" as there are of the screenings and plays (sound-and-light events) which collectively constitute said artwork.

    If you accept this, then it logically follows that two copies of the dvd contain the same, numerically identical, information.hypericin

    Nope. Consider the apple. And the numeral.

    This is not some esoteric, woo belief,hypericin

    Sorry. Seems like Platonism to me.
  • How to save materialism


    But the context here was as specific as any of those, so I'm not sure why you say "any", here, but not with those.

    The question about

    the numbers "13, 13" as they appear on your screenhypericin

    isn't any clearer, but let's see if answering it helps.

    Are they two different numbers, both classifed as "13"? Or the same number?hypericin

    They are two different tokens of the single numeral-string "13". They both of them "are" that string in the sense better clarified as "belonging to" or "instantiating" or "exemplifying" or "being classified as" that string. Better at least if we risk misunderstanding each other on questions of numerical identity. The string is a type, which is to say, a class or aggregate of its member tokens. The member tokens are numerically distinct. The type or class or aggregate is singular.

    The distinct tokens might well be interchangeable in the role of referring to a single number (the numeral's referent, however construed), and I wonder whether you are in danger of confusing equivalence with identity for that reason. It might explain the use of the term "information" to refer to a syntactic object, such as a token. (Not saying there is a rule about that.)

    I claim that with information qualitative identity *is* numeric identity. As in the example of "13, 13".hypericin

    So what do you really mean? Are the asterisks scare quotes? Or are you trying to claim that the two numerically distinct (and even physically contrasting, as you rightly say) tokens of "13" are somehow numerically one, as you do indeed keep seeming to say?
  • How to save materialism
    Just consider the numbers "13, 13" as they appear on your screen. Are they two different numbers, both classifed as "13"? Or the same number?hypericin

    Are we talking about tokens of a numeral (or numeral string)? Or are we talking about some abstract number or concrete collection, but either way something (or some things) referred to by such a numeral? Or would that be a pedantic question?bongo fury
  • How to save materialism
    No more "woo" [than] to say that two numbers, i.e. "13, 13", are the same number. Two different things, classified as "13"? Sounds woo to me.hypericin

    I don't quite understand the choice of example, here. Are we talking about tokens of a numeral (or numeral string)? Or are we talking about some abstract number or concrete collection, but either way something (or some things) referred to by such a numeral? Or would that be a pedantic question? *

    And consider that, in binary form, the movie is a single (beyond-cosmically large) number.hypericin

    I'm lost here. Please help.

    Two spatially distinct objects cannot be numerically identical,hypericin

    Good...

    only qualitatively similar (even qualitative identity cannot be established).hypericin

    Hopefully we can at least agree where we disagree, here: for me, qualitative in this context would mean non-numerical, merely. Non-numerical identity would be equivalence, and only distinct from similarity in the formal respect of being transitive. So qualitative identity of distinct physical objects is as I see it perfectly easily established, as in the example of distinct tokens of a digital signal, or of a notational text.

    words [...] do not and cannot point to the true nature of things. Rather they carve the world into sets.hypericin

    Sets such as the reliably mutually exclusive ones that are distinct digital signals; or, equally well, notational texts. Ok. But now,

    Two spatially distinct informational "objects" may be numerically the same object.hypericin

    ... So, numerically distinct but themselves numerically identical??

    my woo claimhypericin

    Sense of fun appreciated, but please clarify if/how tokens of a type (a text or signal) are numerically both distinct and identical?

    Such events of the first sort [plays or screenings] are where information interacts with, and drives, the physical, material world.hypericin

    This is beginning to sound like bio-semiotics? So, likely mystical about information. And you did warn me. Oh well.

    But consider that the light and sound is the same information as that in the reel or disc, just in another physical medium, and spread across time.hypericin

    But this is confusing symbol and object. So my first question (*) was pedantic after all?

    An authentic copy of "the wizard of oz" is the very same "wizard of oz".hypericin

    Not numerically the same: rather, it is a link in some dependably and safely transitive chain of copying, such as the kind of copying known as "digital"; whereby the set of authentic copies is kept reliably separate from the fakes.
  • How to save materialism
    Using my own words against me?hypericin

    The wise ones.

    the information content of the movie on dvd, and on hard disc, is identical, bit by bit, in spite of the total dissimilarity of the physical medium.hypericin

    Only in the same way that a page of text is identical from one print or manuscript to the next. With or without a coding and subsequent decoding in between.

    In a sense, the information is not just the same, but it is the same informational "thing" residing in two places simultaneously.hypericin

    Why the woo? Why not, here are two different things both classified as "apple"; here are two things both classified as "Wizard of Oz file"?

    This is in contrast to physical objects,hypericin

    How?

    where this assertion of identity simply cannot happen. At best you can say that two things are very similar.hypericin

    But you just pointed out that digital identity of symbols isn't affected by their physical diversity, so...

    Incidentally, let's distinguish between The Wizard of Oz the set of its plays or screenings (sound-and-light-events) from The Wizard of Oz the set of its recordings on reel or disk etc. The first set is defined by the second: whether what you saw was actually the film depends on whether it was produced from one of the set of authentic reels or files. But only members of the first set are subjected to aesthetic comparisons, with each other and with other films, etc.

    Also, none of the first set are "residing in" any of the second.

    In order to reconcile mind and brain, one must first reconcile information and matter.hypericin

    I did.

    ...
  • How to save materialism
    Between the non-living and the living there also seems to be an infinite gap. Panpsychism is a modern vitalism.hypericin

    Why should I favor "the physical world is mental, and only appears physical" over "the mental world is physical, and only appears mental"?hypericin

    This misunderstands words, they do not and cannot point to the true nature of things. Rather they carve the world into sets.hypericin

    Everything that can be explained about life can be explained without reference to "elan vital". The same will likely prove true of consciousness.hypericin

    :clap: :strong: :fire:

    Matter/information is the real dualism,hypericin

    Yikes

    "The wizard of Oz" is the same movie, whether it is stored on a film reel, a dvd, a magnetic tape, a hard drive, or an eidetic brain's memory: all completely different physical media.hypericin

    Only because we

    carve [those (or adjacent) bits of the] world into [the same] set[...].hypericin
  • How to save materialism
    it's hard to make sense of the idea of experience arising out of a combination of non-conscious stuff.Manuel

    Or, to put it some other ways,

    it's hard to make sense of the idea of consciousness arising out of a combination of non-experiential stuff.

    it's hard to make sense of the idea of experience arising out of a combination of non-experiential stuff.

    it's hard to make sense of the idea of consciousness arising out of a combination of non-conscious stuff.

    Although it isn't. (See liquidity.)
  • A Question about Consciousness
    Define it or use it.

    Just...

    Don't hypostatise it.
  • A Question about Consciousness
    does consciousness always only occur,charles ferraro

    Yes, just as redness only occurs. As red things.

    or exist,charles ferraro

    Indeed not. Not being, "itself", a thing.
  • At what quantity does water become a fluid?
    the whole is equal to the sum of the parts plus the interaction between these parts - a separate “additive” meta-physical process.Benj96

    Why the meta?
  • Towards solving the mind/body problem
    A thing is a higher level construction.Joshs

    In what respect higher?
  • Towards solving the mind/body problem
    Are information processors, generators and experiencers also myths?Marchesk

    I'm familiar with the first, and happy to grant their existence. "Information generators" and "information experiencers" I've not heard of, but am intrigued, and ready to learn.
  • Towards solving the mind/body problem
    1. How does matter relate to information?hypericin

    Matter is what there is. Things.

    Information is patterns. Facts.

    The relation is that of choosing. Pointing out.

    2. How does information relate to mind?hypericin

    Mind is myth. Non-actual.

    The relation depends on whether or how or which mythical facts are to be interpreted as pointing out actual things.

    Translation of talk about nothing into talk about something often takes some trouble...Nelson Goodman: Sights Unseen
  • Is intersubjectivity a coherent concept?
    an answer, which is "overcoming differences of perspective". So it's useful, because it succinctly forestalls the unnecessary baggage of "subjective" and "objective".bongo fury
  • Does anyone else think ‘is’ is derived from ‘ought’?


    Agree, e.g. we ought to exclude outliers from a distribution of readings from an instrument calibrated to detect signal in a particular range. Thereby we determine what signal there is.
  • What does "consciousness" mean
    We don't study ghosts, Gods or angels...Manuel

    Except by any other name...
  • What does "consciousness" mean
    property dualism [...] substance dualismManuel

    It's moot.
  • What does "consciousness" mean


    Sure. And these particles, waves and fields, what they are, in sum, is tables, chairs and river, about which you have the powerful intuition of non-subjectivity, which seems to want to generalise to apply to fleshy animals, even against the opposing intuition. There is a choice of basis, then, for further investigation. Generalise, or not. Mono or duo.
  • What does "consciousness" mean
    I think one of the problems we tend to have when trying to understand experience, is that our intuition tells us that most things are non-experiential. We see rocks, rivers, land, the sky, tables and so forth and even (some) planets to be solid objects.

    It's a powerful intuition.

    Then we have this thing, this simultaneously abstract and concrete aspect to us, experience, which appears to be completely different from "solid" rocks and rivers. But...
    Manuel

    ... we must be mistaken... so, how?
  • Are some circular arguments reasonable? and is this an example of one?
    Are some circular arguments reasonable?forrest-sounds

    Sure. Just not deductively (formally, syntactically, mechanically, automatically).

    and is this an example of one?forrest-sounds

    So it depends on whether your circle is a tight loop, and has to have been spinning forever (unreasonable) or is more like a broth on a slow boil, added to and stirred, re-fried etc. (a culture).
  • What does "consciousness" mean
    On the other hand...

    Here is a consciousness.

    And yet, it's a certainty :grimace: