Ok, I didn't notice that was a link. I'm extremely conversant with cognitive biases (it was the central theme of some extensive work I did from 1991 to 1993), so I'm interested - if skeptical - to read and interpret these experimental findings.

Hmmm. Exactly how does reflection differ from introspection?

Philosophy is supposed to be logically prior to any empirical investigation, including psychology. I.e. if your philosophy hinges on particular contingent findings about the human mind then it’s not really fully philosophical per se.

Psychology conversely is supposed to be an empirical, scientific investigation, which therefore depends for its justification on the validity of the scientific methods, and arguing about the validity of such methods is a philosophical matter, so to that extent psychology is logically dependent on philosophy. — Pfhorrest

So is introspection philosophical or psychological?

How much terminological precision can rightfully be expected from people? — baker

True. This is more of a personal project for me, with the understanding that some of these (to me) subtle differences may be 'writ large' in other segments of the population, whether they are capable of being aware or no.

That view reminds me of Peirce's view, and I agree. The idea is something like: inquiry swings into action when belief is threatened. Doubt is 'paralysis' (for refitting habits of reaction), while belief is the smooth, habitual 'movement.' — j0e

:up:

Is there something that you feel or think you truly know. Perhaps some universal truth or intuitional feeling? — Thinking

Sure. I've been pondering this recently in conjunction with my thread on belief and posted just such an example there. Max Scheler says : "The mind itself is the self-revelation of the highest sort of being."
This is something that I've "known" since I was a child. Basically, from a scientific perspective, that the ultimate empirical fact is consciousness itself. I know that my own mind is the key to understanding the nature of reality, not only as a tool, but as exemplary object of study. I've never been more certain of anything.

One man, Agrippa. Case closed. If your curiosity still isn't satisfied, then consider people's tendency to swallow veridically-challenged falsehoods (aka flattery) hook, line, and sinker. I surmise the reasons for this are rather simple: — TheMadFool

Can you explain about Agrippa?

As for the willingness to accept flattery, that is a rock-solid example of the desire to believe something, which I think completely conforms to the distinction I am trying to describe.

If one more seriously expects a pleasant afterlife for one's self and one's loved ones, then why cry at funerals? — j0e

Exactly. Fundamental beliefs are deeply embedded. I do believe in or have a deep intuition of the transcendence of consciousness. I had lots of stress and anxiety as my dad declined in health during the last few years, but when he passed away, all negative emotions disappeared, and thinking and talking about him immediately brought me nothing but joy. I shed not a tear, but we were very close. My family has a hard time grasping it.

I think that propositional descriptions may not be so much expressions of beliefs as attempts to arrive at or achieve belief. We only think about what is problematic. I hope that in reading this thread some people will have spent some time pondering the nature of their most deeply held convictions and achieve some insight or clarity. That is what motivated it.

Instead of two groups of people, I'd think instead of two tendencies in all of us. There's stuff that we believe 'authentically' and stuff that we believe in front in the mirror or the ring light, stuff we can almost believe that almost believe. — j0e

:up:

Yes, I mentioned that also, I do think if we excavate deeply enough we come to this point.

I would take issue with that, because knowledge in the sense of technology and science is propositional. You propose an hypothesis or a theory or a formula, and then you test it against the observation, experiment or result. Left-hand is the proposition, right-hand side the result. Just like Popper says in 'conjecture and refutation'. — Wayfarer

I'm a huge believer in the ideas of Popper, but both beliefs and knowledge are fundamental to what it means to be human. When you translate beliefs and knowledge into propositions, you are essentially bringing them to reflexive awareness. And science is a relative latecomer. I'm not saying there is no value in the study of propositional beliefs and knowledge, but it isn't fundamental to the basic nature of beliefs. They are performative. The primitive hunter who throws a stone has a "belief" about the trajectory of an object in a gravitational field.

Interesting. I like the last especially, "risk, and a commitment."

I'd have to concur with not over-emphasizing the importance of propositional knowledge. Fundamentally, beliefs are not propositional, and neither is knowledge. Everyone has beliefs, and everyone has knowledge, even if they can't express them. Risk and commitment. Nice.

Let me give a personal example. We use our mind to observe reality and thereby formulate hypotheses and arguments. But our minds are themselves probably the most complex products of that reality and the access which we have to them (qua consciousness) is itself the the most sophisticated product and result. I just read Max Scheler's version of this intuition last week: "The mind itself is the self-revelation of the highest sort of being."

Now this is one thing that I do believe, strongly, fundamentally, and foundationally. It has been intuitively obvious to me almost since I began to be able to think. And I don't feel that this is wishful thinking on my part. To me, this is what reality reveals. As to the persistence or permanence or transcendence of that mind, that to me is not intuitively obvious in the same degree. I think I believe that the mind is also a transcendental entity, but that may be a reach. I don't quite see why it necessarily follows or is a corollary.

I don't think that's the best question to ask. It seems to me the real issue is the relative strength of epistemic justification. This filters out the lucky guesses, and doesn't depend on the unstated premise that the truth is actually available to judge whether or not the belief is false. — Relativist

Hmmm. I think what we are talking about here orbits around the way that beliefs begin as vaguely intuited and hypothetical and gradually evolve into explicit and eventually validated. So I'm not sure exactly where epistemic justification enters into the picture. At the point of knowledge, epistemic justification is absolutely essential. But I think to what extent beliefs must be epistemically justified isn't clear (as I've said on other threads). Beliefs are more fundamentally psychological than knowledge, and I think authenticity (and bad faith) may be more critical to the validation of beliefs.

But I think we tend to follow thought patterns or traditions that we tend to find attractive or useful or meaningful in some manner or other. In this deep sense, I'm much more skeptical. It's not as if constantly having to change our deepest intuitions, values or traditions is easy or even in some cases desirable. It takes time and commitment to reach one's views in these matters. — Manuel

Yes, just so. I think the biggest battle is the one we fight with our own preconceptions. The fact that background beliefs become pre-judicative makes them very resistant to excavation.

A different question is if someone knows or is aware that they are bamboozling someone on purpose. In these cases you can say it's bad faith. — Manuel

I'd agree that we may have false beliefs, which is why as a good Cartesian, I strive to work from a position of not committing to a belief precipitously. I do realize that on a philosophy forum there may well be fewer people who fall into the category of 'bad faith' with their own beliefs than in the general population. Still, there must be a spectrum of types of belief and I think, if we excavate deeply enough, it may be possible for anyone to reach the point at which we are no longer believing something, but only wishing to believe it. Do I really believe that the essence of my consciousness is a transcendental entity, or do I only wish that to be true?

I think maybe the most accurate way to describe this is that I believe that this should be the case. Most people who are in the position of bad-faith I'm postulating I think mistake believing that something should be true is the same as believing that it is true. Maybe allowing themselves to confuse 'speculative belief' with 'definite belief'?

Hmmm. Excellent example. I had an almost identical experience. A local lawyer, 6 foot 6 and a real prick, did the exact same thing to me a few years ago. He clearly knew that he was in the wrong, however he didn't care.

Just because someone says that they believe something doesn't mean that they actually do believe that, does it? This is the rather subtle question of mental state that I am investigating.

I'd concur with this assessment, but my personal perspective is that philosophy is ultimately validated by its re-integration into the scope of the inclusive human reality. So what is valid for a human being qua human being is the ultimate measure. (I've always believed this, but currently reading Max Scheler who is mainly interested in this, the nature of the human being).

edit: I have run an online training session for the next couple of hours, so I won't be able to reply for a bit to further posts....

In any case, this is a psychological not a philosophical question. As I don’t know much about the field I can’t comment, except with my own experience. — khaled

Everything is ultimately psychological (subjective). I'd say it is a 'psycho-philosophical' question....

Ask them. Though they’re unlikely to answer truthfully. But from my experience talking with people like this, it seems that they do really believe what they say. There is no level at which they think it’s false. — khaled

I don't know. I try to put myself in this position and evaluate my own beliefs based on this proposed methodology, I guess a phenomenological analysis of belief. Personally, I really don't find that I have a lot of "concrete" beliefs. I believe that some ways of acting are right and others wrong. I can't even begin to imagine the psychological and epistemological state of mind of someone who believes the earth is flat. I think that is more of a reaction to an overall state of affairs in which not a lot of things are really understood at all.

Can you truly be said to believe beyond the scope of your understanding? I don't think so. I maintain that a lot of people are in a limbo of bad-faith, and really do not even know what they believe. Hence they fall back on the things that they want to believe, and pretend that those are their beliefs.

Presumably you're talking about one who believes false beliefs which turn out to be true? Otherwise I'd have thought the difference was obvious - the believer in false beliefs will far more frequently find things do not turn out as they expect. — Isaac

Per my 'catalog,' there appears to be quite a variety of conditions of beliefs. What I have in mind is to discover whether there may be a lot of people in the world who, in fact, cannot really be said to believe much at all. Rather, they only have things that they want to believe are true.

I do agree, as you say, that belief is "a tendency to act." That's definitely one of the main directions in which I'm heading. However, regarding things "not turning out" as expected, this is not an absolute measure. People can believe conterfactually and still believe and be willing to act - consider normative beliefs. Ought is, in an important sense, a contradiction of is.

Consider a scenario in which scientists discover a way to reverse the aging process and keep a person young forever, and that this treatment becomes available to the public in the form of a single pill, with no strings attached. It truly is the miracle drug, a fountain of youth, that gives a person immortality.

Would you take it? — darthbarracuda

What about if, as a cost of taking the pill, you could also no longer post on TPF ever again, or discuss philosophy with anyone?

And when questions are definitively answered they cease to be instrumental and influential in our lives and become part of a pre-reflectively shared background. Also, while there may be some kind of ideal realm of abstract knowledge, this isn't it. We live in a world of contingencies, and all of our answers are just ever-improving approximations. 2+2 may be universally and forever 4, but that is only a "limiting case" within which a larger purposive knowledge can be applied. In itself, it says nothing, and it isn't clear that it even has meaning independent of a consciousness which apprehends it.

I think these so-called philosophical mysteries represent directions of inquiry and effort. Each of which in itself has meaning and application within the total scope of human life. The question of the existence of God is not solely about determining an answer, but about establishing rapport, creating dialogue, and ultimately creating shared meanings which can then have actual influences in the lives of individuals and thereby an impact on our collective and shared existence (culture). Likewise for all of the other mysteries you cite.

So, in effect, to pursue these questions is to answer them.

On Feeling, Knowing, and Valuing by Max Scheler

The Complete Stories by Franz Kafka

edit: for a really interesting excursion into the social mechanics of epistemology the short story "The Village Schoolmaster" is a really fun read.

It goes without saying that the winners are happy — baker

This doesn't follow at all. People routinely do things they think will make them happy and end up doing themselves more harm than good. I doubt very much that the majority people who live by the might makes right credo qualify as happy. Are bullies usually happy people?

I think objective knowledge is a valid ideal.

I think that relativism and pluralism are slightly different because pluralism seems to be about competing truths, rather than just seeing them as being just equal. It has some greater sense of constructing a model from the various pictures. — Jack Cummins

See, I'd interpret that more as relativism, while pluralism acknowledges the fundamental plurality of our collective reality. Pluralism seems more descriptive while relativism has more normative connotations.

I think that relativism is a good way of going beyond mere acceptance of what one was taught to believe in childhood, but not a good conclusion to come to in the long term. I see the development of a unique perspective on truth as the goal — Jack Cummins

It's odd that pluralism is readily accepted as a hallmark of a modern or post-modern society, while relativism consistently figures in controversial and pejorative disputes. And yet they essentially are the same thing.

This element is what attracts me to Spinoza. Instead of introducing "God" as something that hurts our brains to even bring up, it is the first thing you think of when reflecting upon your own conscious existence. Aristotle said he didn't know much but that he was pretty sure he didn't dream all this up for himself. — Valentinus

I'm currently reading some of Max Scheler's lesser-known works (as much of his work is). He matter-of-facts God as a correlate or adjunct of higher consciousness constantly, without reading anything else into it.

The Selected Writings of Pierre Hadot: Philosophy As Practice, ed. Keith Ansell Pearson — 180 Proof

Nice.

Nor do religious people or culture at large. Instead, they maintain that people must have some objective, interpersonally verifiable or agreed upon reasons for believing something, in order for those reasons to count as "good reasons". — baker

I think the fact of a belief being validated by its actions is about the apex of intersubjective verifiability, don't you? Unless your are talking about something that is trivially measurable. As soon as value enters the picture, it becomes a matter of what constitutes proof.

I guess my point is, people justify their beliefs by their commitment to them, ultimately.
— Pantagruel
This is not a stance generally held by philosophers or scientists. — baker

That belief is deeply embedded in action is not a generally held position? Thanks for the tip. You might want to enlighten the advocates of embodied/embedded cognition, because I'm pretty sure they are all about enactment in context. I think those guys are mostly philosophers and scientists.

Well, does one have to be epistemologically sophisticated in order to assess
and hence justify the validity of one's own beliefs? If so, I wonder how many people can be said to believe anything at all?

I guess my point is, people justify their beliefs by their commitment to them, ultimately. If a belief can find positive enaction (i.e. you believe in god, so you volunteer, treat your fellow man with dignity, etc.) then that is the best reason there is to hold a belief.

↪Pantagruel No ... not a clue what "special usage" you're referring to. — 180 Proof

I assumed you were distinguishing between necessary and contingent truths, except I never made mention of the word "necessary." So I am not sure what you are referring to there.

It is one which permeates our lives and cannot just be answered by the people who are ranked as the philosophers. — Jack Cummins

Yes. And philosophy shouldn't be just for philosophers, should it?

... metaphysics involves the understanding of "the supreme finite fact"
— Pantagruel
:point: Necessarily 'necessary facts' are impossible; therefore, only contingent facts are possible. — 180 Proof

I think you are inferring the special usage of "necessary," but it wasn't used.

Scheler says that metaphysics involves the understanding of "the supreme finite fact," the most incredible thing which the universe reveals to us, the essence of what it means to be a human being. The essence of philosophy is the essence of humanity. Hence his program of "essential intuition."

If this is philosophy at its deepest roots, the origin of all meaning, then everyone is a philosopher to the extent that they consciously participate in the discovery and creation of this meaning.

However if you accept the theistic claims made by people who argue from personal experience — Tom Storm

This is my own position with respect to that specific approach of his. I (or anyone else) can argue compelling reasons not on his list because they have to be compelling to me and by my standards. If he failed to find them he failed to find them is all that can be said. The fact of his good evidence argument or standard does not itself justify or recommend the conclusion he reaches for anyone else.

↪Pantagruel You're pinning "intentention" on my post as the process of creation of consciousness. That is unfair, although it makes no difference whatsoever. — god must be atheist

Again, it was strictly a hypothetical, "if you believe in strong AI and if you also believe in atheism" then those positions lead to contradictory conclusions. For me personally, the jury is still out.

I didn't expect so much reaction to the logical form of the argument itself - obviously it isn't as self-evident to others as it is to me!