The underlying logic of this metaphysics is that the mind knows the forms immediately through intellecual intuition. — Wayfarer

Collingwood takes Metaphysics to its Aristotelian origin, which literally simply meant "everything in his works which came after the writings on physics". His conception of metaphysics is from the "ground up" and doesn't pertain to this particular Aristotelian tenet. This is a red herring in the context of this thread. Read Chapter 1 of the Essay on Metaphysics.

Let's lay the dispute about what is and isn't said by Collingwood to rest right here.

"the metaphysician discovers what absolute presuppositions have been made in a certain piece of scientific work by using the records of that work as evidence"

Absolute presuppositions are

1. held by individuals
2. have logical, epistemic and practical consequences with respect to specific inferences or actions

To me, this not only clearly belief, I would go so far as to say it exemplifies belief. It describes core or foundational beliefs, which are so fundamental that, by their very nature, they resist excavation. If you don't like my definition of belief, that's another matter. My post is predicated on this position. It represents an "absolute presupposition" of my conceptual framework. :)

I think this shows the difference of what tim wood, Collingwood, and I mean when we say absolute presupposition from what you do. It's not a fact. It's not true, but it's not false either. It has no truth value. If you want to call that a belief, ok, but it's misleading. — T Clark

It's not. Collingwood is quite clear. It's a functional entity. Read the example from the Stanford Encyclopedia (which is from Essays in Metaphysics). Read the section of applicability to different schemas of physics. Whatever "absolute presuppositions" are, they are certainly real components of our psyche. If you don't like the word "beliefs" because of some connotations that you insist on applying to that term, I understand. They are "fundamental orientations" to which we are epistemically and practically committed.

My approach is outside the scope of his inquiry, but not contradictory. I would hope, both complementary and complimentary.

It is in the excerpt from the Standford Encyclopedia I posted, illustrating how absolute presuppositions link to 'performative belief.'

f you cannot nor will not get it into your head that beliefs and presuppositions are not the same thing at all, then you don't get it. — tim wood

The SE interprets Absolute Presuppositions explicitly as being essentially operational beliefs from a very unambiguous example in the Essay on Metaphysics.

The beliefs may not be explicit, but the actions are. People may not know what they believe, but they do act. And when they act, they are "realizing" their fundamental beliefs, whatever those are...

Perhaps you are getting hung up on the terminology? I try to go with the "overall sense" within the context of the work.

And just for good measure, here is from the Stanford Encyclopedia

Collingwood’s denial that absolute presuppositions have truth values informs a commitment to a kind of explanatory pluralism according to which the choice between different kinds of explanation does not depend on whether they capture pure being but on whether they are fit for purpose. He illustrates this explanatory pluralism by imagining a scenario in which a car stops while driving up a steep hill. As the driver stands by the side of the road a passerby, who happens to be a theoretical physicist offers his help. The car, he explains, has stopped because

the top of a hill is farther removed from the earth’s centre than its bottom and … consequently more power is needed to take the car uphill than to take her along the level. (EM 1998: 302)

A second passerby (who happens to be an Automobile Association man) proffers a different explanation: he holds up a loose cable and says “Look here, Sir, you are running on three cylinders” (EM 1998: 303). The first explanation invokes the sense of causation that belongs to the theoretical sciences of nature, sense III. The second explanation invokes the sense of causation that belongs to the practical sciences of nature, sense II. The choice between these explanations, for Collingwood is determined by the nature of the question asked. As he puts it:

If I had been a person who could flatten out hills by stamping on them the passerby would have been right to call my attention to the hill as the cause of the stoppage; not because the hill was a hill but because I was able to flatten it out. (EM 1998: 303)


In other words, the absolute presupposition is distinguished specifically with respect to its possible enaction, which is exactly what my whole OP revolves around.

The letters are black, the page is white, yes, that's black letter.

the idea that "absolute presuppositions are basically beliefs that function in a certain way," is as close to being dead wrong while still breathing as you can get — tim wood

This is dead wrong. Per the critical piece I cited. It is a reasonable line of inquiry within the parameters of Collingwood's writings, which do not extend that far, but certainly don't contradict the position.

There's nothing wrong with being wrong, only in not learning from it.....

My point is, it is a reasonable line of inquiry, and that's all I ever claimed it to be Tim. There is always that which is implicit within the explicit. Background assumptions are vast. I very clearly did demarcate where my reasoning extended out from Collingwood's, so you can appreciate where I would be a little sensitive to the imputation of mischaracterization.

Your "i.e., believed" then is yours and not RGC's. Yours a reading-into as opposed to a reading-out-of, and as such a misrepresentation - and a major misreading - of his thinking. Confusing - conflating - belief and presupposition in RGC's thinking simply a mistake. — tim wood

You speak with such authority.

Here is an excerpt from the Journal "Graduate Studies at Texas Tech University," from "An Emendation of RGC's Doctrine of Absolute Presuppositions" which is completely consistent with my presentation.


My central thesis is that Collingwood's absolute presuppositions are basically beliefs that function in a certain way, and that what he calls metaphysics is actually the study of belief systems....Subsequently I shall offer numerous comments concerning the status of principia within a belief system, but at the moment, it is necessary to say something about the nature of belief in general. A belief is basically a habitual way of acting, not the actions themselves; belief is a habit such that, given a particular situation, one will act in a certain way. Collingwood used phrases suggestive of this doctrine in enough instances to lead one to suspect that he might have been
willing to concur with it had it come explicitly to his attention. For example, in discussing a change from one Absolute Presupposition to another, he stated that "it is the most radical change a man can undergo, and entails the abandonment of all his most firmly established habits and standards for thought and action. "

https://ttu-ir.tdl.org/bitstream/handle/2346/72442/ttu_icasal_000191.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

So, sorry Tim, but you are not quite the authority that you present or believe yourself to be.

Ah, no. R.G. Collingwood's (RGC) ideas on metaphysics are simple and powerful. It is a shame to misunderstand them and get them wrong. — tim wood

Yes, you've recapitulated RGC's arguments. None of which contradicts my interpretation. He says quite clearly, the logical efficacy of a supposition does not derive from its truth, but only on its being supposed, i.e. believed. And absolute presuppositions are fundamental, that is, they are pre-supposed.

So, this is black letter from the "Essay on Metaphysics" and its what I meant and said. I certainly extended it further, built upon Collingwood's framework. That was also made clear.

I do own all three of those books you kindly recommend.

What you refer to here is the act of believing, which is distinct from, and ought not be called "belief". — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree. That's the essence of the whole post. It is in criticism of the whole process of "hypothetical beliefs," which is what you are espousing. Beliefs are much more robust than their empirical "filler". Specifically, with respect to "absolute presuppositions" which are the topic.

That thing is a memory — Metaphysician Undercover

This is speculation. A belief is instantiated in the act of believing To the point, since we are measuring actual believing as a kind of commitment which further manifests the belief in some kind of action.

Everyone (except a few) believe in climate change.
Someone believes in the quality of this belief and then wants to make a difference. — javi2541997

It makes sense. People who really believe can be committed in a way that people who do not really believe cannot.

So from personal experience, it seems that three stages exist: carelessness about knowledge, dabbling accumulation of fact such that a general picture of reality takes shape semiconsciously, and active synthesis for the sake of optimizing one's grasp of truth. The procession from one stage to the next is like a phase change in matter, — Enrique

I like this characterization, especially the analogy of the "phase change"....

I use it as a basis for looking at potential for research and for a reference for thinking through ideas. — Jack Cummins

Yes, it is more of a tool for finding a source than an actual source, at least in any non-trivial sense.

So, probably, the epitome could be: being a believer in beliefs than can bring the power of act inside the world/society I live in. — javi2541997

Exactly. There is a correspondence between the quality of belief and the quality of the presentation (enactment) of the belief. That would be the fundamental (or to use Collingwood's term, absolute) presupposition.

To believe is to have an attitude of confidence toward your memory. Then a belief is the memory subjected to that attitude of confidence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, the belief is the "attitude of confidence" that is what we are discussing. It is not the memory, and it doesn't have to be "about" memory. Belief is always a living, current, fundamental commitment.

All those words which you are applying in reference to your belief, "I am writing this now", require a memory of meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

This would be a vicious circularity. You can't believe something unless you already believed something. Clearly we do begin to believe, which is not an 'historical fact'.

Probably to reach the best goal everyone aspire = happiness — javi2541997

Yes, people don't 'believe' they want to be happy, they just do.

What is a belief, other than a memory? — Metaphysician Undercover

If I believe I am writing this now, how is that a memory? It may become a memory, but only because it was first a belief.

Without specifically answering your questions, I would elaborate further that the actual coherence of one's thought is the measure and the projection of one's fundamental beliefs. And the willingness to explore and publicize one's fundamental beliefs is central to theories of social rationality and communicative action (and deliberative democracy) such as of Jurgen Habermas. Credibility, in other words. I think what you are asking is, do most people fear to take responsibility for their own fundamental beliefs? I'd argue yes.

Think about how people seek out information. You don't read Wikipedia in order to engender belief, only to collect bits of information which potentially can figure in belief. If you want to engender belief, you actually read the source books, because only those are in any way an adequate representation of the totality of underlying absolute presuppositions. As Collingwood says, "the only way to find out if a book is worth reading is to read it."

Our culture has become superficial, and superficiality does not lend itself to producing actual beliefs, only "hypothetical" ones.

Maslow also uses the term genius frequently and equates it with what is most idiographic or unique to the individual. Since we are each completely unique, complete self-actualization is the realization of the unique genius which is you.

The Antiquary by Sir Walter Scott
Essay on Metaphysics by R.G. Collingwood

What struck me most was the notion that the manifestations of our higher motivations, our higher selves, can only emerge from a milieu in which the lower "deficiency" motivations are adequately met. It just fits so well with the concept and practice of stoicism. People can be more or less well-adjusted and, accordingly, they can be more or less trapped by the relative satisfaction of their deficiency needs. That is, based on the relative "healthfulness" of their environment, people will to a certain extent develop (micro)pathologies which keep them in a cycle of deficiency-motivation (catering to lower needs). I think this describes one of the pitfalls of modern culture well - it caters to these lower needs in a cycle of neverending non-satisfaction.

But the whole idea of stoicism is that one consciously trains oneself to learn to master and control exactly what constitutes satisfaction of these lower motivations. So an accomplished stoic can lower the threshold of Being-motivations, overcoming the effects of psychopathologies (whatever they are, the key point is, it is the dominance of d-motivations that constitute the driving problem of the pathologies) and open the door to the maximization of Being-motivations, to self-actualization. It is a practical model. It answers the needs for which we otherwise look to religion.

I've just been reading some Maslow and he presents a really nice theory of the need for the idea of God. Maslow distinguishes between D-motivations and B-motivations, that is, motivations that are powered by deficiencies (hunger, insecurity) and those that are higher and constructive, "being-motivations," growth, creativity, love. B-motivations in turn tie in with his theory of peak experiences, in which cognition of reality is achieved in its most fundamental sense. Everything is perceived "idiographically" as the most perfect exemplar of its own class. Maslow suggests that we have a fundamental desire to be perceived in this way, in our own inherent perfection. And that God is a projection of this need, the being which is able to perceive us as we most truly and perfectly are.

:up:

I think that there are people who are involved with corporate pollution who coincidentally happen to espouse climate-change denial. Look at the saga of leaded gasoline. Environmental lead levels skyrocketed for decades until something was finally done. Corporations are inherently dangerous to the health of humanity and need to be kept on a short leash.

Perhaps, like many, you have dedicated yourself to saving the planet and find my observation not to your liking, but there's not much I can about that. — synthesis

Exactly. I wouldn't mind if you were saying we can't have any effect, and still doing all the things to remediate pollution, etc.

The arrogance of man, thinking that he can be a threat to the planet. — synthesis

Is this your qualified, scientific opinion? Final answer? Sounds like an excuse to piss in the pool to me.

I am sort with George Carlin on this one whereas I don't really believe that man can cause much harm to the planet. Where the climate is no doubt changing, nobody really knows the extent to which we are contributing to such. — synthesis

The current reputable scientific consensus is that it is "Human-caused."

Given the revelation of the complexity and functionality of natural systems (systems theory), one wonders why we do not simply pursue an eco-friendly strategy as a matter of common prudence.

Toward a Psychology of Being by Abraham Maslow

What do you mean by energy spilling back into the biosphere? — synthesis

All of the energy that we currently consume on earth has been stored up on earth almost entirely from the sun. Every time we burn fossil fuels, we release back into the biosphere massive amounts of concentrated, stored solar energy. Every time you utilize energy, it dissipates throughout the system, mostly as heat. That's entropy,

If we suddenly have a new source of energy, like cheap fusion, and our energy utilization rises by, say 1000%, that is ten times more heat being dissipated back into the biosphere. That's going to be a problem. Given that some corporate criminals are still trying to perpetrate the lie that climate change isn't happening, the same would certainly happen in such a case. It would surely lead to an environmental catastrophe.

This entire idea of "free" is one of the greatest ruses of all-time. There is no such thing as "free." Is the air free? No, it just is. Anything that has economic value must be paid for by somebody. — synthesis

With this I definitely agree. Lots of people believe that, if we could only solve the problem of limitless free energy, all the world's problems would be solved. Nothing could be further from the truth. All of that freely-consumed energy would end up spilling back into the biosphere, with devastating consequences.

Ok, from a strictly "energic" standpoint and if you adhere to a labour theory of value. However, you premised the post on the fact that people can and do steal other people's labour. If that's the case, other people can and do give it away.

What is your opinion of a person who takes this idea, if I may call it that, and flips it on its head and is interested in obtaining nothing for something? Altruism is still a thing right?
— TheMadFool

Nothing for something no more exists than does something for nothing. — synthesis

That's not true. People have brought computers to me for such minor fixes I didn't charge them anything. If I can be a big help to someone with almost no effort on my part I'll do it every time. In fact, if everyone operated on this principle, it could easily be a second golden rule. Treat each person the way you would if you could be the answer their problem.

In that case I'm not able to really grasp what it is you are suggesting.

If you are suggesting that there is some kind of holistic-transcendental consciousness from which conceptual consciousness has differentiated itself, no I think you are not wrong. Whether conceptual consciousness is working towards re-integrating itself with holistic consciousness is another question.

The Intellectuals and the Masses by John Carey
An overlooked item from my own library. Elitist orthodox intelligentsia as a contributing factor to the Holocaust.

Yes. Classifying Properties is difficult. The philosopher David Hume defined some of those problems in his writings. Generally, properties is defined as a piece of land - but that's not what we are defining here. — Don Wade

Maybe it is? The notion that something can "be" property only emerges with the subjective viewpoint. One object cannot "own" another object. So maybe the notion that an object can have a property is an anthropomophism. Is the property an aspect of the object, or is the object an instantiation of the property?

In the context Mannheim uses it, "reality transcending" is everything which goes against the current "objectively construed" state of affairs as historically determined and works towards something better (specifically the Utopian ideal). Aspiration to a higher purpose, as I've construed it to apply to this discussion.