How is anything I said emotional?

Like I said, you are never not perceiving the world. If your mind is operating, it is "in touch with the world". The fact that I don't see it when I close my eyes does not surprise me, nor should it. Just because you don't continuously see "exactly the same set of things" doesn't mean that "the world" has in anyway ceased to exist or become dubious. You are just continuing to perceive it in a different way.

Not sure if this poster has read even single book on Philosophy in his whole life. Sounds like just making random statements on nothing. — Corvus

Because I said you are never not perceiving the world?

I agree. We are trying to see the arguments either to prove, disprove or the question is illogical itself. The conclusions will only be evident from good arguments. But still I felt bringing experience to the argument sounded too solipsistic.

And the main topic OP is not to prove the existence of the World. But trying to see the arguments for believing in the existence of the world when not perceiving it. — Corvus

Think about what this says. "Prove that there is a world". Whatever doubts exist with respect to the existence of the world likewise exist with respect to any proofs which you might append to that. As to believing in the world when not perceiving it, you are always perceiving something. So just because you don't continue to see the back of something when you move to the front is no warrant to believe the back disappeared. If you are completely unconscious, having no cognitions of any kind, it is just as likely that you have ceased to exist as has the world. In fact, the former seems more likely.

there aren't any compelling grounds to doubt the existence of world. — 180 Proof

Just so.

Frankly this thread is a manifestation of ↪Ciceronianus's question concerning affectation. — Banno

That's funny. I said the same thing with respect to the thread on empirical normativity. Which goes to show you that consensus forms an integral component of cognition.

If your claim is that here is an implicit ought in (1) then you seem also to be reiterating objection 2 from the article. Yes, you ought to keep your promises - that's a fact about what a promise is - and a mere tautology. — Banno

That is the whole point about promising. It is a voluntary binding of the is and the ought. It isn't trivial. It is the voluntary human enaction which bridges the is-ought gap. Not language. The entire concept of normativity is not just to identify, but to actualize. You can derive completely different oughts from virtually identical is statements just by the addition of one statement.

Tom sees a child about to be hit by a bus.
Tom has only one day left to live.
Tom ought to push the child out of the way, sacrificing himself.

Tom sees a child about to be hit by a bus.
Tom has only one day left to live.
The child just contracted a deadly new form of avian flu that will decimate the population.
Tom ought to let the child die.

The linguistic argument assumes that conditions can be exhaustively elaborated, which is misleading. Even when they can the statements apparently logically entail, it isn't linguistic, it is just a fact of historical consensus about fundamental behaviours. Yes, "promise" implies a binding of behaviour to language. That doesn't mean that language entails behaviour. It doesn't.

I know meditation has been proven to be useful, but nirvana/moksha isn’t that. You can meditate all your life and still never reach nirvana. A lot of people seem to conflate beneficial religious practices with the goals of religions / way of life — Sirius

And this is why it is all about your expectations and your goals. Whether those are conformant or consistent with the goals of the community of practice can only be decided by you. In general, advanced spiritual training usually involves the active setting aside of personal preferences as one inherent aspect of the practice. It doesn't sound like that meshes with your goals.

My point is, are you asking because the tradition appeals to you, but you find it too challenging? Or because you are seeking an alternative? Or is this merely a criticism? You say "what is more terrible". This suggests to me that you have a negative disposition towards the types of practices associated with the pursuit of moksha. In which case, this particular goal isn't for you. It isn't terrible, it simply isn't for you. Why do you feel compelled to defend your choice not to pursue this particular type of goal? For some people it isn't terrible at all. Brain scans of meditating buddhist monks have demonstrated there are remarkable things going on in their minds.

Do you think that the answer to this question is (or should be) the same for everyone?

Even if this is so, the issue is that the fact of the utterance implies the obligation. — Banno

The fact of the obligation implies the obligation, not the utterance. The utterance is secondary. The real statement of facts is:

Jones borrowed five dollars from Smith.
Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.

The verbalizations memorialize the normative force, they don't create it.

Determinism is true. So folk cannot be responsible for their criminal actions. Thus, we ought not punish folk for their criminal actions. — Richard B

We punish people for their actions. Ergo determinism is false.

I think this is mistaken. My hunch is that a satisfactory accounting of intentionality will include an explanation of the way perspective and semiotic elements of reality are "baked in" from the outset. Scott Mueller's "Asymmetry: The Foundation of Information," and Carlo Rovelli's "Helgoland," have some interesting points on this front. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I just grabbed the Kindle of Incomplete Nature, it looks excellent. Unfortunately the Mueller books is $$$! Maybe there is a PDF floating around....

Correct. If I promise to do something it presupposes I have decided already that is the right thing to do. The only way to make it an is would be to disconnect it from the agent. But you can't do that proactively. You can say, Jones owed Smith five dollars. You can say Jones paid smith five dollars. Those are factual statements. Saying "Jones uttered the words" however is just a sneaky way of trying to make an already normative statement "factual".

Doesn't the fact that Jones makes a verbal promise to pay suggest that the normative force precedes the statement, rather than being derived from it?

According to a prominent line of thought, the notion of correctness involved in the seemingly platitudinous claim that meaningful expressions have conditions of correct application is intrinsically normative. — Sirius

Hmm. Saying that a meaningful expression inherently contains its own context of correct application is "normative" is not the same kind of normativity which applies to behaviour, at least not trivially so. A meaningful expression could "rightfully" be interpreted to mean "this man must be executed," but the agent is still free to disregard this claim. The disregarding would be an example of real normativity overriding this "semantic normativity". Which doesn't seem normative to me at all in any kind of significant or "meaningful" way.....

There is another thread on when philosophy becomes affectation. This makes me think of that.

Exactly.

:up:

Language itself is normative — Sirius

Language can be used to make normative statements.. Stating that language is normative is overreaching. Normativity describes a standard of behaviour. To the extent that behaviour and language do not necessarily coincide, language absolutely is not normative.

A poor child comes to you and spreads his hand saying, "I am starving" , you can derive the implication from his statement, "You should give me ( a poor child ) some money" . He is not just stating a fact, "I am starving" , he is begging for help and expecting you to be a kind person. — Sirius

I completely agree that this we can and should contextually interpret such things as requests. One hundred percent. I have made the point myself. But there is a difference between the illocutionary utterance (the declaration) and the interpretation whereby that utterance gains normative force. The request itself does not have that normative force. This is precisely where the "gap" occurs.

Perhaps if you specified exactly what "Ought" you are deriving I might be able to offer a more specific argument. If you are suggesting that "You should kill Tom" is an ought, I would respond that this is nothing more than an example of an illocutionary act (command by the boss) and that the perlocutionary effect consists of the hitman's response to the command. If this is your definition of the meaning of an "ought" then, logically, any time anyone tells us to do something and we accept, the conditions for normativity have been satisfied, which is absurd.

A command is not the same thing as a moral ought. An ought is something that we do "because it is right" not because we are commanded to do it by another person.

How does it follow from your premises that the statements (already) exist? — Echarmion

Yes. You would have to establish some kind of necessary connection between the existence of a necessary truth and the existence of the conditions that make the necessary truth true.

I do agree that necessary truths implicate a cognizer though.

The Call of Cthulhu and Other Weird Stories
H.P. Lovecraft

Mmm. Yes and no. Being-for-others itself can be genuine. Perhaps someone acts bravely, even to the point of self-sacrifice, catalyzed by the gaze of the group. There is an inescapable honesty in solitary thought, but there can also be the revelation of a publicly discovered truth. I think that commitment is the differentiator; and I agree that a lot of gratuitous philosophizing smacks of affectation.

My view is that determinism must be true. — RepThatMerch22

The notion of truth and falsity are inapplicable in a completely deterministic context. The fact that you are able to offer a statement about the truth or falsity of something means that your capacity for making a statement must, at bare minimum, not be subject to determinism.

@Bob Ross Do you believe that ethical reasoning ought to be effective in influencing actual moral behaviour? Or does it simply exist for the purpose of providing post hoc justifications? If actual moral practices are not directly affected by ethical analysis, of what merit is the analysis?

The early Confucian philosopher Hsun Tzu holds that man's original nature is bad or imperfect. Thus man desires improvement in the same way that anyone who lacks something beneficial desires to increase it. So stupidity would be not desiring to correct one's own deficits.

Galactic Patrol
E.E. "Doc" Smith

A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy
Wing-Tsit Chan, Translator

Pre-Confucianism to Neo-Rationalism. Should be...enlightening.

Similarly, even if a super-intelligent alien showed us a page from "The True Nature of Reality", we could never make sense of it. — RussellA

Yes, if man tried to explain the universe to an amoeba it wouldn't translate.

But essentially, the amoeba eventually becomes a man. So maybe it does happen?

As a cat cannot transcend the physical limitations of its brain, neither can a human. — RussellA

But, for the cat's brain to actually register something, that thing has to already fit with its perceptual schema. There is an experiment I keep citing where a meaningless tone that is within the cat's audible hearing range is played, but the cat's brain does not appear to register having heard the tone. Subsequently, after the tone is associated with something meaningful, the cat's brain will display the signature of auditory stimulation.

So it is "mechanically" possible that there are exactly such unregistered events as Corvus is postulating. With what concomitant causes, who is to say?

James has a unique approach to interpreting the connection between beliefs and reality. Materialism, for example, is not so much a fact about the universe as it is a fact about the way a certain type of person lives his life. What is a fact? In the limit, it is an isolable quantum of human experience, "this redness now." As soon as you start to expand that momentary quale, to generalize it, you lose the only true measure of facticity, its givenness. So maybe your fact becomes gravity. Then whether the quale was an apple or the planet mars, what is evidenced is the facticity of gravity. But the momentary expression of gravity in both cases is not a pure or simple thing. The apple falls under the composite influences of gravity, air pressure, coriolis force, etc.. And while the path of the planet seems to be a straightforward exemplification of the law of gravity, that is only an illusion of approximation. The three-body problem has no closed solution.

Materialism relies upon rationality for its facticity. But rationalism and idealism too are also facts insofar as they are embodied by people....

Pragmatism
by William James

The lyrics of "The Boxer" by Paul Simon are often appropriate when discussing beliefs, facts, and reality.

Still, a man hears what he wants to hear
And disregards the rest — Agree-to-Disagree

I prefer the Doobies,

But what a fool believes he sees
No wise man has the power to reason away
What seems to be
Is always better than nothing

In other words the "principle" is really just a recapitulation of the features of the universe that we actually observe?

I agree with Dewey's characterization here. Realistically speaking, pragmatically speaking, consciousness is evoked by problematicity. Functional certainty realizes itself as effective practical action. Functional truths are so fundamental as to be constantly evidenced in ongoing processes. We do not question the "truth" of gravity. However when it comes to abstract expression, doubtfulness arises. Is a principle evidenced in a specific case applicable in a wider or more generalized sense? Or even in a different context? In such cases, truth may stand as an ideal or objective, but the actual representation is better described as a "working hypothesis."

Primordial features of reality, as far as we know, all have a kind of locality to them. They aren't aware of the macroscopic "objects" we would perceive them to be a part of. An iron atom doesn't know if it's part of a hammer or part of a human - it just does things iron atoms do, no matter what it's a part of. That's what I mean when I say panpsychic consciousness implies a kind of locality. If consciousness is fundamental, then you still have all the explanatory work of figuring out how this fundamental consciousness becomes macroscopically aware, macroscopically integrated with a macroscopic brain. — flannel jesus

This is all non-sequitur to me. Laws in the early universe were expressed stochastically. I'd hardly describe that as conforming to locality. The opposite.

panpsychism almost implies a certain kind of extremely local consciousness — flannel jesus

I don't see where panpsychism implies anything specific beyond that consciousness is a primordial feature of reality. I don't think it really coincides with what is traditionally conceived of as soul. Collective consciousness, perhaps.

...and still not enough. A statements is not true if and only if there is a consensus that it is true. — Banno

I don't think that the future state of the universe is trivially, mechanistically computable from the past. So the kind of "truth" that interests me isn't analytic. In a constructivist framework, consensus may well count towards truth.

No doubt, consensus is complex and not simple. :up:

Old Niels seems to have been a bit hyperbolic on that one. Everything we call real cannot be regarded as understood, seems a bit more reasonable to me. — wonderer1

Maybe. On the other hand, he probably had a better grasp of quantum mechanics than most, so his credibility rates pretty high with me.