I agree that what might be classed as metaphysical speculation (abductive reasoning or extrapolating imaginable possibilities) certainly plays a role in science, but I can think of no examples of metaphysics becoming science. — Janus

Metaphysics is the outside borders of science. It's an epistemological distinction. The idea that reality consists of four elements is completely erroneous. But the concept of the four elements was a metaphysical characterization of the nature of being. Just as science itself consists of metaphysical presuppositions. That metaphysical characterization was displaced when scientific understanding revealed the underlying atomic nature of all such physical phenomena. And the boundaries of metaphysics were pushed back further. Paradigm-shifting, as you described. Science more replaces metaphysics or perhaps validates a certain set of metaphysical presuppositions, I guess you would say. Then the metaphysical question gets asked at a higher level of abstraction.

In other words, we're talking either about hypothetical explanations for physical systems¹ or about categorical interpretations² of those explanations, respectively; the latter (metaphysics) says nothing about the objects¹ of the former (physics) but only about how to construct² a 'coherent, presuppositional / systematic synopsis' of the former. — 180 Proof

The object of metaphysics is not to synopsize science. Rather, to link what is unlinked. It is the boundary of knowledge at the current limits of abstraction. Increasing technical and epistemic expertise results in a practical expansion of domains of enacted knowledge. What once was alchemy and religion and folklore becomes organic chemistry and medicine. A grand unified theory would unite the quantum and cosmic domains. It's metaphysics until it isn't.

I think it would be a matter of simplistic thinking to assert either consciousness comes from the whole body, XOR consciousness comes from the brain. The brain plays a central role, but other parts of the body play a role in how the brain is functioning as well. Hormones, blood flow, and the oxygen and glucose content of the blood, are some of the aspects of how parts of the body outside the brain have an impact on consciousness. Then of course there are the sensory and motor nerves, with paths all over the body, which play a big role in how our consciousness develops. — wonderer1

Additionally, the embodied consciousness thesis is often bundled with that of embedded cognition (environmental factors are also integral to cognition). And there is extensive experimental evidence to that effect. If cognition isn't construed narrowly as just thinking, but is understood as a kind of enaction, then the theory of embodied consciousness really isn't that far-fetched. After all, think about how intimately the nature of our thoughts is entwined with the nuances of our physical form, the dexterity of our fingers, the nature of our other senses. Knowledge is the result of a "hunger" which is then satisfied. Imagine how different our thoughts would be if we were instead squid-like creatures who absorbed sunlight through an algae-symbiote living in our skin.

There is also the question of the well-being of the individual versus the well-being of the species. Diseases can also be the product of an interaction between a species population and an environment. In the case of severe overpopulation, diseases can proliferate. Have you considered the possibility that some disease may be instructive from this perspective, not so much to require a cure as a response?

Morality mandates a perspective be taken as one member of a group, with an interest in the group's wellbeing, and any views that fall outside of this context are invalid. In a philosophical context, that "group" is unlikely to be of your choosing, and instead might be the citizens of a nation or just the whole of humanity. Any motivation that would clearly be contrary to the group's cannot be reasonably used as part of an argument for a moral position, without explaining why that is fair or justified within the context of the entire group, or as the best solution to the situation.

The moral perspective forces someone to take an unnatural position to how one would usually. One's thinking factors in one's priorities, values, goals, philosophy, and how one interprets and characterises things and other factors that don't fit into the moral context. Moreover, smaller perspectives might be excluded, as you're to take the position of the group in question. — Judaka

The whole premise is flawed and biased. Morality can equally be seen as an individual rising above a deficient cultural moral code. Kierkegaard's knight of faith. Jung's Answer to Job. Carlyle's study on Heros, Hero-worship, and the Heroic in History.

Some people voluntarily embrace morality out of a sense of empathy or, more to the point, out a sense of duty (Kant). This is a very debased and cynical perspective on the nature and motivation of morality, and certainly not one that is widely embraced (thank goodness).

The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Volume 2: Mythical Thought
by Ernst Cassirer

My takeaway from volume one is that language (and derivatively concept-formation and logic) is inextricable from the historical project of human existence, in all of its regional varieties. Objectivity, as Cassirer puts it, coincides with "an active interest in the world and its configuration."

Oration on the Dignity of Man
by Giovanni Pico della Mirandola
so called "Manifesto of the Renaissance"

The Warlord of Mars
by Edgar Rice Burroughs

None of this has anything to do with destroying capitalism, really — only a psychotic and vicious variation of capitalism, one that’s dedicated to destroying the normal functioning of human life to serve the interests of Exxon. — Mikie

I'm ok with capitalism. But it clearly requires stricter regulation. A socialistically-managed capitalism could work.

The reason indigenous governance and harmonious living with nature won't save us should be clear, we are with 8 billion people living in a globalised high tech world... that is a totally different world from the one in which indigenous people developed their ideas. — ChatteringMonkey

The idea that the environment needs to be safeguarded because it is essential to life scales up just fine as far as I can see.

think if you want something to become real, you have to imagine it. You can't bring about change by wagging an index finger. You know? — frank

One-hundred percent. Presumably there will be an increase in the general level of social awareness, out of which consensus emerges the forms of governance we deem acceptable. In Canada, there is a growing trend where the government sponsors and supports indigenous-led environmental initiatives.
e.g. Natural Climate Solutions
Area-based Conservation

I'd go one better, and get behind indigenous-led governance. Our indigenous groups have always attempted to live in harmony with nature. It's an attitude whose time is long overdue. If you look at the real numbers of politicians involved criminal self-promotion in violation of the public trust, the need for a really new approach seems clear.

If we pivot toward acting to secure the well-being of the global biosphere, what would that look like? What would we have to become in order to do that? — frank

Since the "well-being of the global biosphere" is synonymous with the healthy balanced operation of its component systems, of which we are one, I can only surmise that it would look like an improvement.

Seriously, capitalism functions on the principle "maximize profit." How much worse off can we be if we decide to operate on the principle "maximize ecological harmony"?

see capitalism as a force of good and the planet as a morally neutral entity. — Hanover

There's the rub. Capitalism isn't the defining feature of humanity, it is one feature of human life. Unfortunately, capitalism functions not only to maximize concentration of capital, as Marx describes it, it maximizes concentration on capital. That is, it strives to assimilate everything into an economic viewpoint. However not every value can be effectively understood in economic terms. Attempting to put a price on human dignity, for example, can seem unreasonably expensive, from a capitalistic perspective. In fact, what is unreasonable is reducing human dignity to economic terms. Likewise for the planet. The planet may be morally neutral, but humans are not; and they rely on the planet as part of their ongoing well-being.

An great idea there. You have nicely tied up ontology with epistemology. Which makes perfect sense as you can’t have one without the other, especially to the grander idea of meta verse. — simplyG

Thanks! I just got back from a road trip (to see the iconic Canadian band "Lighthouse - they rocked the roof off) where I found some excellent used books. Michael Polanyi's Personal Knowledge looks relevant to this topic, per the cover notes: "Even in the exact sciences, "knowing" is an art, of which the skill of the knower, guided by his personal commitment and his passionate sense of increasing contact with reality, is a logically necessary part."

This holistic view of knowledge and "increasing contact with reality" exemplifies the metaphysical project; it's also similar to the Cassirer I'm currently reading. I also picked up a book on the metaphysics of R.G. Collingwood (Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics) that I hope will also prove edifying.

"Objective consciousness is the observation and logical conclusion that the other being is observing"

Objective consciousness is logical conclusion. How can it not be conscious? Logical conclusions don't think themselves.

In fact, you even talk explicitly about "an objectively conscious being."

"Isn't this then an example of an objectively conscious being that lacks subjective consciousness?"

It's unsinn. If the objectively conscious being is making observations and logical conclusions then it is conscious. The entire point of a p-zombie is that it is not-conscious. Calling it "objectively conscious" has no meaning.

Correct. Meaning that if you are observing and identifying, that experience you are having of observing and identifying is your subjective consciousness. — Philosophim

Except that you keep saying objective consciousness is not conscious. Ascribing these properties to objective consciousness contradicts this. Your demarcation isn't working.

You agreed with me on this. You cannot know what it is like for another being to be conscious. You cannot know another beings subjective consciousness. You can of course know your own subjective consciousness. But because I can never know your subjective consciousness, I cannot make any claims to the experience of your subjective consciousness objectively. I can't know what its like when you see green. You can't know what its like that I see green. We can objectively know that we both see the wavelength we call green. But we cannot objectively know what the subjective experience of seeing green is like. — Philosophim

And even if I just ignore the self-contradictions of "objective consciousness," there are senses in which we are co-conscious. Mirror-neurons function through identification with the observed cognitive state of others in certain circumstances. Empathy is a co-awareness of the subjective plight of another. And it is a critical developmental stage in conscious development.

Objective consciousness is not subjective consciousness. Objective consciousness is the observation and logical conclusion that the other being is observing a — Philosophim

If it is an observation and a logical conclusion then it is subjective consciousness. These are both elements of subjective consciousness.

So I am not ascribing any inner experience of consciousness when I am describing objective consciousness. — Philosophim

Nevertheless, as I mentioned, you say objective consciousness should not "try to ascertain that it can know." Ascertaining and knowing are also operations of subjective consciousness.

It's a meaningless characterization.

I'm not interested in discussing with someone who is not making good faith efforts to address and understand the OP. — Philosophim

No, I'm going straight from your OP.

"Objective consciousness occurs when we can know that something that is not our subjective consciousness is also observing and identifying. The problem in knowing whether something is objectively conscious is that we cannot experience their subjective consciousness."

and

"On the other end, objective consciousness shouldn't try to ascertain that it can know what subjective consciousness is like."

You clearly say that objective consciousness occurs in the observing subject as a function of the awareness of another conscious being. Which is fine. Except you then also ascribe the property of being "objectively conscious" to theobserved being (see italicized in the above quote). Not only that, you then go on to ascribe an additional intentionality to objective consciousness (which is nothing more or less than specifically awareness of another consciousness by your own definitions) when you suggest that it "shouldn't try to ascertain" that it can know what subjective consciousness is like. Is it a mode of consciousness? Is it a specific instance of consciousness of something?

Ok, yes, when I see something which I believe to be conscious, I am conscious of an object that I deem to be conscious. You are absolutely correct. And I don't experience the contents of other minds. For sure.

As I said, the idea "objective consciousness" yokes together terms which are normally exclusive (consciousness is by definition subjective) in an equivocating fashion. You are describing either an object-consciousness (if it is the consciousness doing the observing of the other consciousness, ie. consciousness of consciousness as an object) or a conscious-object (if you are describing the observed consciousness qua observed by the other).

Isn't this whole idea of "objective consciousness" misleading? Aren't you just describing the external observation of consciousness?

I'm interested to see where this goes. I haven't read Chomsky, but I believe that science ultimately leads to metaphysics.

I. Chat GPT says Chomsky does not believe in the complete reductionism of consciousness to matter. Unfortunately, I have not been able to obtain any quote in this regard. Do you think Chat GPT gave me the right answer? If so, are there any citations? — Eugen

I've done some pretty extensive testing of ChatGPT's ability to analyze complex philosophical texts. I personally would not rely on it at all in this regard. I use it as a speculative foil to reveal any flaws in my own logic.

Ok. And you do note in your OP that one of the problems with the term consciousness is that it is "too generic." I'm not sure whether that is a problem or a feature. If you want to stipulate that when you use the term consciousness you are restricting that to mean "human consciousness" only that's your prerogative.

However, in that case, your statement, that minds emerge from brains " Its just what is considered fact at this time" is really either tautological or out of scope of your assumption. Human minds emerge from human brains. Minds, in general, perhaps do not necessarily.

I'm not really arguing for it. Its just what is considered fact at this time. If you want to prove that minds do not come from the brain feel free, but you'll need to challenge modern day neuroscience, psychology, and medicine. — Philosophim

Microbial colonies exhibit an awareness of and adaptation to their environment (eg. The Global Brain by Howard Bloom). Which demonstrates the most fundamental aspects of consciousness, perception and action. So the requirement isn't so much a "brain" as some form of physical medium. Ascribing consciousness to a brain is just anthropocentric prejudice. In which case, there is literally no limit to what could potentially instantiate a consciousness. Any kind of quantum-coherent system, for example. So if you want to argue for brain-dependence, it should be qualified as "human consciousness." If you are additionally claiming that human consciousness is the only kind of consciousness, I just offered a counter-example.

If there is evidence for anything, it is evident to someone who is conscious. Therefore, all and any evidence is evidence of consciousness. — unenlightened

Absolutely. All thinking is autological in this sense.

To suggest information or entropy are then "the real thing in itself" is to completely misrepresent the scientific enterprise. They are not new terms for substantial being. They are part of the journey away from that kind of naive realism which deals in matter or mind as the essential qualitative categories of nature. — apokrisis

This is where the Cassirer that I am currently reading starts. Being, as the original impetus of philosophical reflection, is actually "consciousness of the unity of being" - i.e. abstraction, what is common to all beings across all modalities of being. The universe is revealed in and through cognition itself.

The Gods of Mars
by Edgar Rice Burroughs

First Lensman
by E.E. "Doc" Smith

Most likely the law of supply and demand will dictate the future of medical research and treatment. Prudence would dictate extreme caution with respect to genetic modifications. But if the desire and dollars are there, research and treatment will probably be leaps and bounds ahead of regulation.

he best recent book on it, is Thomas Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos. — Wayfarer

On the list. Thanks!

All systems have to be in some sense localized. I thought you might be referring to the fact that entropy is conserved universally but then I thought, naw....

"Negentropy" only increases entropy. — 180 Proof

Negentropy decreases entropy.....

:up:

↪Pantagruel Are 'metaphysical statements' experimentally testable? Does any 'metaphysical system' entail predictions about matters of fact? If not, then metaphysics isn't modern science. — 180 Proof

Modern science is a methodology, whose primary result is knowledge. Obviously, knowledge predates modern science. Science has carved out a domain, but it is far from being universal. Indeed, modern science operates by way of abstractions and approximations, which is why its products are 'facts' whose accuracy is fundamentally limited by the physical constraints of instruments, and 'theories' which are only ever a 'currently best description' of something. So the question is really, is it legitimate to pursue knowledge in domains where science, for various reasons, is unable to operate? Where events transpire either too quickly or too slowly to be effectively observed and analyzed, for example. In fact, as I've mentioned elsewhere, the trend is precisely to expand science beyond such limits by means of modeling, a method which has been assimilated by science. At the end of a day, a scientific theory is a model. But so could a metaphysical theory be construed.

So, yes, metaphysics isn't modern science, because it attempts to go beyond some of the limits of modern science. Of which there are many. Certainly the metaphysics of consciousness springs to mind.

I've come to believe that the term metaphysics itself is the problem.

Inasmuch as metaphysics purports to examine the nature of being, and being necessarily exists, then the subject-matter of metaphysics is incontestably real. In which case metaphysics is not different in kind from science, but only degree. Metaphysics must be an attempt to conceptualize the nature of reality insofar as that is not yet well-captured by science. Which certainly covers a lot of ground. However the notion of metaphysics as somehow distinct or separate from physics is misleading, a strawman.

The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Volume 1: Language
Ernst Cassirer

Deleuze provided a concise picture of the various aspects of legislative-creative versus receptive-perceptive thought in Kant. A great preparation for Cassirer's four-volume opus on symbolicity and culture.

Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties
Gilles Deleuze

Triplanetary
E.E. "Doc" Smith

Burroughs was charming, I'll read more. But I'm really liking the meta- nature of Triplanetary.

:roll: Low quality spam.

It's not overlooked, it's taboo to talk about it. — ChatteringMonkey

Yes, which is unfathomable to me. Whatever the contributing factors to ecological damage are, they are magnified by the size of the population. If we can't at some point rise to the level of rational dialogue, I don't suppose we are as a species worthy of survival anyway.

I think the overlooked problem is the relationship between human impact on the ecosystem and population. Global population has tripled in the last 70 years. Anyone who thinks that there isn't a serious eco-crisis - however you want to classify and quantify it - must be living in their own world. Lucky for them.