Yeah, but even if all that Sheldrake claims, eventually turns out to be true, how much would that increase the personal credence level YOU assign to such as panpsychism?
For me, my answer would be, not much! I still have a credence level of around 1%. — universeness

All that would have to be true is that somehow information is affecting reality (which it clearly does) and is capable of being stored in such a way that it is not trivially evident, but is accessible and amenable to neural processing. And this is precisely how neural networks function, by processing inputs in hidden layers, with respect to confirming/disconfirming feedback, they exploit abstract relationships without necessarily even identifying what those are. In which case, social consciousness, hive mind, even panpsychism aren't in any way mysterious or non-scientific.

I am not convinced that such evidence, proves that information can be passed between 'conscious' creatures via morphic resonance and morphic fields. But even if it does, that does not mean consciousness is not 'what the brain does,' it would mean that perhaps information can be passed/correlated via some quantum phenomena such as entanglement (as Sheldrake himself has suggested). — universeness

Yes, and/or that information is a naturalistic feature. If there is an 'information manifold,' however, it would seem to prima facie vastly expand, not contract, the scope of the science of consciousness.

I am toying with the idea of doing a CPR reading group here on TPF. I’ve read it once but feel I didn’t really crack it. — Jamal

I know that feeling. I only really felt like Being and Time started to gel on the fifth reading. I will read the CPR at least once more in my life though.

Consciousness is a phenomenon of the brain, which needs interaction with the environment to awaken its dispositional knowledge, which, if absent, doesn't lead anywhere. — Manuel

Consciousness is the complex product of this organism-environment system indeed. Problems arise when abstracting from this systemic nature, whether as a phenomenon of the brain, as you describe it, or as some kind of subjectively idealized reason. Neuroscience is no more - or less - relevant to consciousness than any other science; it is part of its presentation.

Introductions are great for bringing a lot of material into a very wide focus. I think of Heidegger's Intro to Metaphysics. Adorno is on my list for this year and this seems a great segue back to the CPR which I also want to revisit.

I hear there's a surprise ending. Enjoy!

Rereading Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason by Theodor Adorno, his introductory lecture course given in 1959.

Clear and deep and great fun to read, highly recommended for anyone interested in Kant — Jamal

One for the list.... :up:

À la recherche du temps perdu #5: The Captive / The Fugitive
by Marcel Proust

:100:

I'm not clear what you mean by substantive-performative knowledge. — Ludwig V

As the diagnostician, empirical-situational and implementable in some way. Instrumental knowledge.

↪unenlightened I think the free-and-easy depiction of Zen Buddhism propagated by popular books in the West is nothing like the lived reality. — Wayfarer

I interviewed for admission to the Zen Buddhist monastery on Vaughan Road in Toronto in 1990. I was invited to dinner (vegetarian lasagna) and invited to join in the washing up, then chatted with the teacher. It is certainly a rigorous discipline.

Is there even one standard for "sufficient justification"? Consider a physician who is a diagnostic specialist with forty years of experience. He may be able to diagnose a condition where many others have failed, perhaps without even being able to accurately describe all of the contributing evidence. There is an experiential-expertise element to knowledge as well. Especially knowledge that is substantive-performative.

This is an interesting paper - thanks! — SophistiCat

:up:

I think Popper subscribed to identity theorism; and he had a "three-worlds" theory that seemed to describe a privileged and real status to psychologistic entities. But I was referring specifically to his view on the criterion of falsifiability, which he formalized.

That emergence and consciousness are related? It seems to line up nicely both factually and coherently. That it is impossible to concoct a plausible counter-theory? Well, to be scientifically legitimate, an hypothesis must be falsifiable, if you take Popper's view, so I'm sure there is some plausible theory of non-emergent consciousness.

Actually, I can, in principle, agree with that. Still... I personally don't see how this affects emergence. — Eugen

I'm not sure about "affecting" emergence. But systems theory is all about the reality and nature of processes, and one concept of central concern is emergence. So there's that.

For the last time, no, it is not! I am not embracing or dismissing emergence. — Eugen

Which makes it very strange that you are concerned whether or not there are theories of consciousness which "manage to bypass emergence" then.

Oh, and things are processes. "Thinghood" is just an artefact of the spatio-temporal limitations of cognitive processing. Acorns are trees and trees acorns. That's the beauty of thought: it allows for the overlay of present awareness with systematized protentions and retentions that enable us to "see" things that are otherwise only processes.

Whitehead is a great process metaphysician.

it seems to me you don't understand that reduction entails emergence. You cannot reduce something that wasn't priorly emergent. — Eugen

In which case you have reduced the concept of emergence to simple analyticity. That is discussed in the article regarding the weaking of the concept of weak emergence.

Can you just clarify why you feel that emergence is a problem of some kind?

https://www.hindawi.com/journals/complexity/2022/9956885/

1. The point is, weak vs. strong is a conceptual distinction, not an objective "fact" about reality. If you treat it as something which can't be further elaborated and debated, you have completely denuded the value of the meaning of "emergence."

2. The typical philosophical interpretation of materialism is that consciousness is an epiphenomenon. So it doesn't necessarily avoid emergence, per se, but rather obviates the question. Which was my problem with the topic. It is either question-begging or self-contradictory. If you accept emergence, then consciousness probably is emergent. If you want a non-emergent theory of consciousness, you are left with epiphenomenalism (as a corollary of material reductionism).

There is a clear description for both of them: "Weak emergent properties are said to be properties of a large system that can be predicted or derived by computing the interactions of the system's constituent parts. Strong emergent properties of a system are said to be impossible to predict by computing the interactions of its constituents." — Eugen

Spoken like someone who relies on internet synopses for information. "Impossible to predict" equals "currently unable to predict". Which is what I said.

I don't care what your personal belief is — Eugen

No, it isn't. There's a clear distinction between them. — Eugen

To be clear, there is a clear distinction amongst people who agree that there is a distinction. I don't agree. Strong emergence is characterized by a much greater degree of autonomy between the emergent property and the source domain. This can be attributed to either a greater or lesser degree of understanding. So whatever appears to be a case of strong emergence can be understood in the same way that cases of weak emergence are understood, given a sufficient adequation of knowledge.

Your OP conflates two questions into one, which can be reduced to simple logical truths. Either consciousness is an emergent property or it is not. Either there are emergent properties or there are not.

Emergent properties seem to be trivially empirically evident (the universal phenomenon of evolution, for example). Ergo, it seems highly likely that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon. The alternative, as mentioned, would be reductive materialism.

:up:

My question is that if one could create a model of consciousness starting from non-conscious substance AVOIDING the use of emergence (weak or strong). — Eugen

Sure, it's called reductive materialism.

Are you guys disputing whether it is possible for something to exhibit fundamental features of consciousness without actually being conscious? If so, this seems question-begging to begin with. And the distinction between weak and strong emergence is really just a question of degree, unless you completely trivialize weak emergence. IMO.

I misunderstood this paragraph, mainly due to the last sentence, as saying the assimilation-individuation framework was flawed due to the existence of modern power-structures. But instead, you are saying that you lean more towards the view that we, across time, do not tend more towards assimilation or individuation, but if something is going to break the tie, it would be the modern power-structures. — Ø implies everything

I think that assimilation and individuation both represent natural mechanisms, which modern power structures are subverting.

Just an amplification really. Per my initial comment, I think of it more as an ongoing and cyclical dialectic.

It all comes down to the ideology in-question; some ideologies are beneficial to those in power, and others are not. Whenever you have a group of people assimilating under a problematic ideology, the powerful agents act as a force for individuation by fragmenting the group. However, those same powerful agents act as a force for assimilation when the ideology is beneficial to them. — Ø implies everything

There is a tradition that equates "ideologies" with apologistic-rationalizations of the ruling classes, making them deceptive, more than anything else. Ricouer is a good example of this line of thought. Conversely the governing goals "from below," as it were, tend to be expressed in utopian-idealistic terms.

Your starting point seems to be the autonomous individual
subject, who decides from their own vantage of free will what to agree or disagree with. But aren’t most of our agreements and disagreements features of shared conventions and norms of thinking that bind us together within the communities that we are immersed in? — Joshs

Yes, to this. The OP seems to rely on a presumption of general rationality. To what extent there is any significant impact by real rationality any more is very debatable. Historically, rationality had the upper hand insofar as revolutionary empirical truths could ultimately be expected to win out over traditional myths (viz. heliocentrism over geocentricism). Since the advent of modernity, however, rationality has been degraded to the role of instrumentality.

The assimilating vs individuating distinction is probably valid from a naturalistic standpoint, representing a polar-dyad of competing drives, both of which are operational both individually and collectively, with one or other dominating in a give phase. But modern power-structures have tended to both shatter and shackle the forces governing natural social evolution.

Theory of Society, Volume 1
by Niklas Luhmann

Mendiata's book on Apel's discourse ethics is really excellent.

the interesting thing about relativistic spacetime is that as it expands, its energy content increases — SophistiCat

:up:

Now suppose that the walls of the vessel expand outward. — SophistiCat

Right. So did the expansion take place in order to facilitate the evolutionary process? Or was the initial state itself actually metastable? Perhaps the idea of a closed system is inapplicable?

From a systems perspective, subsystems leech energy (negentropy) from their parent systems. So if entropy were ever at a "universal maximum" it would be theoretically impossible for any subsystem ever to emerge. Since cosmic evolution is manifestly systemic evolution (concurrent with the emergence of new dominant laws) entropy would have to be at an initial minimum. Either that, or the entropy of the universe would have to change over time.

In what sense could a completely undifferentiated cosmos even be said to be ordered though?

1848: Year of Revolution by Michael Rapport — Maw

A good read. Enjoy.

A fraudulent god; there's a concept.

Since the first commandment is "Thou shalt have no other gods before me" you could say that Christianity is explicitly polytheistic. Of course, the phrase "the one true god" is also found in the texts of many different faiths. Implying that "other gods" are all frauds.

This is a fallacy called reductio ad Hitlerum. — frank

Nazism was itself the product of a complex historical chain of ideological and political developments. Just because it went horribly awry in the hands of the reigning psychopaths one cannot for that reason alone condemn and convict all of its historical antecedents. Likewise, as a contemporary, Heidegger certainly could not help but be a product of the same historical milieu. Perhaps he was a sympathetic exponent of a version of the system that actually came to into being, perhaps he was even cast in the role as an apologist for that system by its ideologues. But that doesn't make him culpable for the worst of its failings, or incriminate him as one of its architects. He was an intellectual existing in an unfortunate milieu.

To this extent I'd agree with your characterization of the fallacy. Hitler was responsible for what Hitler did; history was responsible for creating the conditions that made Hitler possible.

:up: :up:

The Adventures of Transcendental Philosophy: Karl-Otto Apel's Semiotics and Discourse Ethics
by Eduardo Mendieta

Spinoza: Practical Philosophy
by Gilles Deleuze

What’s your solution, best guess, or daydream? — Experience of Clarity

I think you optimize your mind towards the object of application for the general benefit. So how you do that varies with your personal preferences and skills and context I guess. Which why it is great there is such a variety of philosophical domains.

Personally, I'm starting to volunteer at the local library, trying to get more politically involved, trying to figure out where and how we may be going wrong today by understanding the history of class conflicts and revolutions. Those are my strategies.

But i say again, it is the way of how philosophy should achieve this combination that makes all the difference.That's the "juice" and the real question I think. — dimosthenis9

I was thinking about that this morning. I guess this is asking, to what extent is philosophy modular? And it is as modular as you need or want it to be. Cognitive science and philosophy of mind play well together. So do neurology and neurocomputation and linguistics. But you can make a lot of progress just focusing on epistemology, which itself covers a lot of ground.

So maybe, is there some core thing to which all of these various areas of interest contribute mutually, whether individually or in concert? Time and again the answer seems to be the self or (as I see them inextricable) the self-in-society. In which case, those philosophies which examine this theme explicitly, social-ethical which I picked, or maybe cognitive-phenomenological seem to best exemplify what philosophy is about, qua ultimate practical application.