The human body might be more complex than a plant and a computer but its internal behaviour is still causally influenced by external stimulation. The human body is not an isolated system.
If you want to argue against determinism (whether compatibilist or incompatibilist) and in favour of libertarian free will, then you must reject eliminative materialism, because eliminative materialism entails that human behaviour is a deterministic response to prior physical causes, both internal and external to the body.
The soundwaves cause transduction to happen which causes neurons to fire which causes the muscles to contract and relax which causes the ball to be kicked which causes the window to break.
As I said before, your claim that one causal chain ends at this point and that a second causal chain starts immediately after, and that there's no causal connection between the two, is both inconsistent with physics and an arbitrary delineation.
All physical events are a response to prior physical events. Matter doesn't move apropos of nothing. The human body and brain are material, and behave according to the same principles as all matter. If my arm moves it's because it was caused to move by something else, often electrochemical signals from the brain, and if these electrochemical signals are sent then it's because they were caused to send by something else – and oftentimes they were caused to send by stimulation of the sense organs. That's just how biology works.
It's not clear to me what you mean by "a human being is the source of his own actions". I think you're equivocating. If you mean by this something similar to "a Venus flytrap is the source of its own actions (e.g. closing its jaws)" then it does not contradict what I am saying, because it is also correct to say that a Venus flytrap's jaws are caused to close by a fly's movements. But if you mean by this to argue that humans (unlike Venus flytraps) have something like libertarian free will then this requires either that physics as we understand it or eliminative materialism are false such that the electrochemical signals sent by my brain to my arm are not a causal response to sensory stimulation but a response to some mental "will".
Yes. Determinism is the inevitable consequence of eliminative materialism.
I haven't done anything like that. I have simply pointed out that – if eliminative materialism is correct – the physics is clear; the wider environment causally influences human behaviour, just as it causally influences animal and plant behaviour, and so your suggestion that another person's speech cannot causally influence my actions is wrong.
You somehow seem to want something like libertarian free will whilst also denying anything like a non-physical mind. These positions are incompatible. So, once again, you need to pick your poison and abandon one of these two positions.
This seems to me like saying that if I kick a football through a window then I didn’t cause the window to break, as if I’m causally responsible only for kicking the ball and not also for what the ball does to the window after being kicked.
Your suggestion that this sequence of events is one causal chain, that this subsequent sequence of events is a second causal chain, and that there's no causal connection between the two is both incompatible with physics and a seemingly arbitrary delineation.
A brain state is just the state of the brain, i.e its composition and the behaviour of its neurons. It is the way it is because of a long chain of causal events, both internal to the body and external. Our brains are not isolated systems.
Also of relevance is causality and the science of human behaviour. Unfortunately I don't have access to the full paper, but as a summary:
The general point is that your claim that speech can't influence behaviour is incompatible with eliminative materialism, which you seem to endorse.
So either speech can influence behaviour or eliminative materialism is false. Pick your poison.
Still, it is not obvious why Peirce should view the question of the ontological status of laws and universals as fundamental to philosophy. Nor is it obvious what there is in so abstract a question to elicit the contempt he directs towards his nominalist adversaries. Peirce insists that a pragmatist ‘will be the most open-minded of all men’ (5.499, c. 1905), yet this does not stop him from denouncing nominalism as ‘the most blinding of all systems’ (5.499, c. 1905), a ‘disgraceful habitude’ (6.175, 1906) and a ‘philistine line of thought’ (1.383, c. 1890). He declares nominalism ‘a protest against the only kind of thinking that has ever advanced human culture’ (3.509, 1897) and ‘deadly poison to any living reasoning’ (NEM 3: 201, 1911). He takes it to involve ‘monstrous’ doctrines (1.422, c. 1896) defended by ‘mostly superficial men’ (W2: 239, 1868) who ‘do not reason logically about anything’ (1.165, c. 1897). Nominalism, he says, is ‘of all the philosophies the most inadequate, and perhaps the most superficial, one is tempted to say the silliest possible’ (NEM 4: 295, 1905). It ‘and all its ways are devices of the Devil, if devil there be’ (SS: 118, 1909).
- Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism
Can I ask why you dedicate so much energy into arguing a point that is illogical? What is the point of this if there is no effort to find common ground?
Principles are indeed important. But are principles mental constructs of our mind or something else? That's the metaphysical question, yet it doesn't matter to the importance of principles themselves.
Think about that you love some person, be it your parent or child or a loved one. Surely there is that subjective part of you loving somebody. Is that then different if you believe in metaphysical question in nominalism or realism? In my opinion it doesn't matter.
And a concept is an abstract idea, so you are going in circles. Yet people do live in more or less organized communities that we call societies. And there's many words or names for this.
Something is a human being because it looks like what?
How does one collocation of sense data "look like a human being?" in any definitive sense? It seems we are just attaching names to regularities in sense data, right? By what criteria do we attach such names? Supposing I'm a racist and I do not find it "useful" to attach the name "human" to Asians, why am I wrong about what a human being is? It's just an ensemble of sense data after all.
And what about any particular ensemble of sense data makes it worthy of dignity?
I rephrased it as I did because what you're saying is straightforwardly question begging. The realist claims we see humanity every time we see a man. To expect to "see" (sense) a universal as one would a particular isn't a critique of realism, it's just failing to understand it.
I disagree.
Politics and ethics as other moral issues are very important irrelevant of them being either our mental constructs or them being something independent of us. What we do, the actions, are important. The reasons why we do something only explain our actions, but the actions themselves are the important issue here.
Now I don't follow your logic at all. Society is a word and we give words / names for complex things like society.
Nominalism and individualism aren't synonyms. And here individualism or collectivism aren't metaphysical questions.
If something "looks like a human being" we should treat it with dignity because...?
"Nominalism is true because realism is certainly false." Good one.
Surely if that's the threat then people's treatment of each other must have improved markedly after 1500, when nominalism became ascendent. More nominalist Protestant nations like the US must have treated minorities better, and the Soviet Union and communist China must have been particular exemplars of upright behavior. In terms of the volanturism that tends to accompany nominalism, I am aware of a society called "the Third Reich" that vastly prioritized the will, which should have resolved the problems of intellectualism in ethics. Let me just flip to my history book to confirm this...
The stance of there existing universals and abstract entities doesn't create anything more to the issue. Metaphysics doesn't answer moral or social questions.
Interesting OP, but I don't follow this sentence at all. Peirce is not saying that figment is all that can be loved...? (Edit: So is it the idea that realists are interested in abstractions apart from particulars? That seems a strange construal.)
This may tell you something about your argument, then. If all and sundry are rejecting it for being both impractical, and logically weird (not a knock-down, to be sure) you might want to rethink it. Either you think crimes constituted by speech are not crimes (fraud, perjury, incitement, contract evasion and several other kinds besides) should never been curtailed by law.....
.... or you think they should.
So...you're saying fraud and defamation are perfectly fine, because the freedom of speech trumps them.
Never?
You and your five sprinting friends are at the track at the starting line. Someone says, “On your marks…Get set….”
What act would follow someone yelling “Go!” at that moment? Nothing? Because acts are not the consequences of speech? Or would running and racing be the consequence of that little speech?
I brought the issue of fraud and libel to NOS4A2 in another thread, and he never responded to those points. I'm curious in any free-speech absolutist will try and rebut anything you said.
Does it? They certainly exist as ideas.
And this of course exactly not Ockham's idea (as I understand it).
Interesting topic, but could you clarify just what the - your - question is?
I'm not sure if this makes much sense as a critique. A lot of realism is extremely person centered and sees a strong telos at work in history (the history of particulars). Valuing particulars is not really what is at stake.
Actually, I think some realists attack nominalists precisely for destroying particulars and turning them into a formless "will soup." Note that personalism and phenomenology seems to be biggest in traditional Christian philosophy, which tends to be unrelentingly realist.
The former president’s halting responses to questions by a special counsel show him exactly as a majority of Americans believed him to be — and as Democrats repeatedly insisted he was not.
-An agreement for Qatar Airways’ purchase of Boeing aircraft. Trump said the agreement is for more than 160 jets worth over $200bn.
- A range of defence agreements, including a letter of intent on defence cooperation and a letter of offer and acceptance for MQ-9B unmanned aerial vehicles.
- A joint declaration of cooperation between the two states.