I think the motivation for claiming that a problem doesn't exist is to resist change, basically.
We're all guilty of that to some degree, whether it be by race, sex, age, or whatever, though we can try to change our implicit biases.
Rather, claiming to not believe in racial taxonomies attempts (badly) to rationalize the status quo.
Not true. A full-blown nazi white supremacist, or Scott Adams for that matter, has the ability to distinguish individuals.
It's a bad question but I'm curious how false taxonomies motivate discrimination against others. I have no idea how you would try to explain that. Please try.
Most probably, you mean an entitity, a living organism. Which is a special case. You can't generalize it and apply it to inanimate things, can you? This is what I meant.
Statehood is something that's deeply embedded in who we are as a species now. Does it have a downside? Of course. It's like our knees: they cause all sorts of problems, but we can't very well stop using them.
This sounds just like John Searle’s Chinese Room thought experiment to show computers have syntax but not semantics. In this case, Y is just “moving” symbols around.
So what you are saying is that, in addition to whatever is encoded in the sentence, there is an additional element which only exists in the actual communicative event?
I think so. It seems I'm a legal positivist. I think the use of the words "law" and "rights" result in confusion, and the law is distinct from morality. I favor legal rights as I think they serve to put limits on governmental power. But rights which aren't legal rights are what people think should be legal rights if they're not already.
I favor virtue ethics and other ethics which aren't based on concepts of individual rights. People claim so many rights.
Then what can you say you do with the visual components of your dreams? With the auditory components?
Basically the same place as the visual representations in your dreams. You see things in your dreams, right?
I just don't get how that is possible when you have a massive network, distributing sensory experience from different regions and rei-integrating them together. No one is going to have complete understanding of what is going on, but certainly, the medium matters, and the fact that there is a medium means that something is going on that isn't simply a mirror reflected of "reality". For example, an input in a computer becomes an electrical signal that then gets turned into a logic gate that affects the system and thus produces an output. I press a key on my keyboard and it almost instantaneously shows up on a computer screen. The physical stroke of my fingers is not the visual representation that shows up on my screen.
You are mixing the hard problem and the easy problem in wildly unproductive and invariant ways that confuse the whole issue. I am a pro-hard problem. That is to say, I think there is one. People like @Banno try to downplay it, it seems.
In this computer keyboard/monitor situation, for example, there is already an interpreter that interprets the letters as something meaningful. Therefore there is an extra layer in the equation beyond just input and output. Thus, as I've stated before, this is the Cartesian Theater problem whereby there is a constant regress whereby the mind "integrates" (aka the Homunculus Fallacy). However, direct realism doesn't solve the problem so much as raise questions as to how it is that sensory information is simply a mirror and that there is no processing involved as well. Again, certainly other animals process the world differently, as do babies when developing. There are differences in individual perception, etc. This to me indicates construction not wholesale mirroring.
With touch, your body is directly interacting with the perceived object. But touch is not special. Like other senses, touch, via sensory receptors, must induce nervous activity. And then this nervous activity must be somehow transformed to, or interpreted as, experiential content. You know what it is like to touch an object by way of this experiential content.
In what sense is this sequence "direct"? Certainly, a transformation or interpretation of nervous activity is not the same as the touched object.
Great, I never said it was. My point, again, is that what is *directly* interacted with, by the body, (on one side of the table, in terms of the OP's metaphor), is something totally other than the tree: its imprint on light which has interacted with it. This is just one of the gaps I've described between perceiver and perceived which makes nonsense of the "direct" in direct realism.
When you see a tree, you are directly seeing not the tree but it's reflected light. That is one level of indirection.
Your body might tumble around and bump into other objects. But, you are not your body. You are the part of your brain that is aware. If you fall into a vegetative coma, you are gone, even if the rest of your body is healthy. If your awareness survived your body's death, you would survive.
This part of the brain that is aware has no direct access to the world. It can only interpret certain brain activity sensorily. These interpretations, experiences, are at a great remove from the objects that stimulate them.
Which is not to say you only access these experiences. These experiences track real actions and properties of real objects, and so you are aware of objects, not merely experiences. But this awareness is at a remove from the objects, it is indirect.
You cannot see the tree as it really is, this is a contraction. To see is to experience subjectively. Bats will see the tree differently than us, and aliens will see it differently than us and bats. There is no right answer among these different ways of seeing, they are all interpretations.
Ok, I'm stuck on this point because you seem to be incredibly wrong to me. I see some stars very far away. There is obviously an intermediary between my perception and the stars which I perceive. What is this intermediary, space, light, ether? How do you think that any of these proposals to account for the apparent separation between me and the stars, would be directly accessible to be perceived? I see each and every one of such proposals as a logical construct produced as a means to account for the intermediary. Don\t you? If I could see the thing between me and the stars, it would block my vision of the stars.
