No. Just a thing that exists. It doesn't matter where it is. the network analysis is the same, it's based on data flows, not location. The estimation of hidden states by nodes inside a Markov Blanket excluding those states is just a mathematical expression. It's irrelevant where anything is in the physical world.
What the latter shows is that direct connection is necessary to experience a thing. It does not then follow that all things we experience are external world objects, nor that we experience all external world objects.
For your argument to hold it is necessary to show that the causes of our sensations match the objects we experience since the 'direct connection' you theorise is between an external world and a sensory receptor. But I do not experience 200,000 firing neurons when I lift my tea cup. I experience the lifting of my teacup. So the object of my experience is the teacup. You've yet to show that this teacup is also the thing in contact with my nerve endings.
I'm not asking about the TV. I'm asking about the rock. When I see a rock on a TV screen, am I seeing the rock directly?
That doesn't make it direct. There are real, physical connections when a rock is seen in the reflection of a mirror, but I'm not seeing the rock directly. There are real, physical connections when a rock is seen on TV, but I'm not seeing the rock directly.
That shows only that we contact the world directly. To show that we 'experience' the world directly, using that argument, you'd have to also show that what we call 'experience' is the sum total of all processes from the sensory receptors onward.
I'm saying that it doesn't follow from "the painting is of a woman" that there is a direct connection between the painting and the woman, and similarly that it doesn't follow from "the experience is of an external world object" that there is a direct connection between the experience and the external world object.
You need to do more than just say "we experience external world objects" to make a case for direct realism. If I see a rock through a TV screen then I'm seeing a rock, but I'm seeing it indirectly. So it can be that we experience external world objects and that indirect realism is the case.
So if I see a rock in the next room through a TV screen and a camera feed then I am not seeing that rock indirectly? Then it's not entirely clear to me what you even mean by seeing something either directly or indirectly. Because that seems to me to be a prime example of seeing something indirectly.
Yes, and we paint people and write about history. But it doesn't then follow that there is a direct connection between the painting and the woman or the writing and the war. So it doesn't follow from us perceiving external world objects that there is a direct connection between perception and those external world objects. The grammar of how we describe the intensional object of perception says nothing about the (meta)physics of perception.
I'm saying what I said above: that experience is a mental phenomena, that there is no direct connection between mental phenomena and external world objects, and that the qualities of mental phenomena are not properties of external world objects.
Then what do you think consciousness is? Some etherial entity that extends beyond the body and somehow "contains" or "touches" the external world object that is said to be the object of perception?
This doesn't say anything of relevance. The painting is of a woman, not of paint, but the painting is still paint, not a woman. There's no "direct connection" between the paint and the woman. So even if the experience is of an external world object (and you still haven't explained what it even means for an external world object to be the object of perception) it doesn't then follow that there is a "direct connection" between the experience and the external world object.
Note that I'm not saying that we "experience an experience" or "perceive a perception" (anymore than I'd say that the painting is of paint); I'm saying that experience is a mental phenomena, that there is no direct connection between mental phenomena and external world objects, and that the qualities of mental phenomena are not properties of external world objects.
None of this entails the kind of red-herring grammar ("we experience an experience") that you're trying to argue against. After all, when I dream I don't dream about dreams; I dream about eating an apple - and it's all just mental phenomena with no direct connection to external world objects.
See my post here about glasses, microscopes, telescopes, mirrors, and camera feeds.
We are fighting to impose a higher social justice. The others are fighting to maintain the privileges of caste and class. We are proletarian nations that rise up against the plutocrats.
- Mussolini
It is already war history how the German Armies defeated the legions of capitalism and plutocracy. After forty-five days this campaign in the West was equally and emphatically terminated.
- Hitler
This combat between proletariat and plutocracy is, after all, itself a civil war. Two inferiorities struggle for the privilege of polluting the world.
- HL Mencken
Sorry, but your "solutions" sound like pipe dreams.
What you're suggesting would all need to happen from the top down. It's clear that those at the top are not going to do anything that would in any way endanger their position of power.
What do you mean exactly by "directly interact" ?
State intervention in the service of plutocrats.
Your solution: abolish or minimize state intervention; keep the plutocrats.
My solution: abolish or minimize plutocracy. Keep and strengthen democracy.
In general I sympathize with that principle. Let's test it. Imagine a progressive professor who starts referring to all of her students as 'she.' Would you have a right to complain?
A rather misanthropic, defeatist viewpoint imo.
You can surrender to the dictates of the oligarchs if you want to. Meantime, we socialists will try to save you from your despondent hellish vision of ‘real life.’
If the cells are a part of me, and if sound affects the cells, and if speech is sound, then speech affects me.
So? According to your account of causation as explained above, I pulled the trigger, the gun fired the bullet, and the bullet killed the target.
If I didn't cause the window to break in the previous example then I didn't cause the target to die in this example. But if I did cause the target to die in this example then I did cause the window to break in the previous example.
I don't consciously control the actions of the hair cells in my ear. Their actions are determined by the sound waves that reach them.
Right, so I'm not causally responsible for breaking the window when I kick a ball into it. The extent of the causal power of my kick is the ball moving; anything that happens after that is the responsibility of the ball.
Why does that matter? It's the same principle whether the material is organic or metal.
Neither are the hair cells in my ear. I don't know what you're trying to argue here.
So? The sound waves cause the hair cells to move which cause the nerve impulses to fire.
The irony here is that your account of causation would entail that it is guns, not people, which are responsible for murder because it is the internal mechanics of the gun that cause the bullet to fire, not me pulling my finger on the trigger, and that the gun wouldn't fire if something inside it was broken.
