The order of the O.P.'s premises leads to a contradiction.

For, if, according to "premise 1," "somethings are pious while others are sin," then, contrary to "premise 2," God couldn't have decided that "somethings are pious while others are sin," since, according to the order of the premises, the fact that "somethings are pious while others are sin" antecedes what God decides (in "premise 2").

the whole bike exists and all its parts — Gregory

The whole bike exists, or rather all of its parts. Yet, again, the parts themselves can be divided, even if they actually aren't divided; & until they are, they're a single or undivded thing. & so there's an actually finite, but potentially infinite, amount of divided parts composing the bicycle.

A part of say a bicycle doesn't exist potentially however — Gregory

However, an extension in the distanced traveled or moved, such as either the revolution about the surface of Gabriel's horn or the rotation about its axis, can most definitely subsist, that is, can remain, as a potentiality; & therefore it may approach or tend to infinity but without ever actually being infinite. This is precisely what you're missing about the case of Gabriel's horn. The extension of its surface area is potentially infinite, as it can just keep going on & on, but it's never actually infinite.

Now does an object have infinite unseparated parts — Gregory

If there are "unseparated parts," how would I know how many parts there are, infinite or otherwise? If they're not separted or divided, they're not parts; if they're separated or divided, they're parts. "Unseparated parts" is an oxymoron (another logical blunder); as all parts are separate from each other, despite how deceiving appearances may be.

Indeed, as a single, undivded thing.

It's like talking to a rock. If parts can be divided they are there — Gregory

... says the wall who's incapable of grasping that what can be parted isn't parted. The only thing that you've refuted is any claim of yours to logical competence.

If a piece of matter is infinitely divisible it has infinite parts in actuality — Gregory

A subtle distinction is being overlooked here, which is, what I take to be, the root of your mistake. What's divisible into, say, two parts, isn't actually divided into two parts, for it was, then it wouldn't be "divisible" into two parts but actually divided into two parts. This subtle distinction, between being "divisible" (which is a possibility, as in being capable of being divided but literally being divided) & being (actually, not potentially) divided, should lead one to see that what's potentially infinitely divisible isn't actually infinitely divided. Comprehending this is the key to understand that what's potentially infinitely divisible is never actually infinitely divided, & therefore it's never actually made up of infinitely divided or separated parts but only potentially; &, moreover, if one pursues the division of what's potentially infinitely divisible into discrete parts, they'd always be at an actual finite amount at any point in their progress.

Which reinforces what I wrote earlier in one of my replies to you...

Also, Aristotle's point was that a potential whole is only potentially composed of parts, & not actually — aRealidealist

Meaning, a potentially infinite whole is only potentially composed of infinite discrete parts, but it's never actually composed of so many parts.

I can tell what someone's argument is — Gregory

As I far as I see it, no, you can't. Anyhow, take care, pal. Your bare assertions are leading us nowhere. However, I still thank you for our back-and-forth. Peace.

I only read the important parts of replies. — Gregory

You mean, what you consider to be important. For what's really important & what you take to be important aren't the same evidently.

The whole doesn't supersede its parts. — Gregory

Who's claimed, let alone implied, otherwise? You're going off of the rails. Also, just like I've thought, no citation of Aristotle leading people to believe what you've alleged that he has is forthcoming; just more bare claims. Not surprising.

Supercalifragilisticexpialidocious, not.

A potential infinity can't just subsist. That's Aristotle's great error, who in his ignorance lead people to think that a whole only potentially has parts — Gregory

Yes, it can. It subsists as a possibility relative to what can initiates its unfolding in time, despite its unfolding not yet having been initiated in time. To say that a potential infinity isn't possible before unfolding in time, which you maintain, contradicts the assertion that a potential infinity is even possible at all. Ironic. Also, Aristotle's point was that a potential whole is only potentially composed of parts, & not actually. Can you provide, from his writings, a citation of what you allege that he has led people to believe? I think not.

Though, yeah, just like I've thought, you couldn't predict what the first words of my next reply to you were going to be, despite you claiming that all moments, past, present, & future, or an infinity of them, are unfolded to your consciousness. Just saying something doesn't make it true.

If the series is infinite and each moment enfolds only to our consciousness, the fabric of the universe in it's eternal state would be infinite. The rock "now" and then "at another time" would each be all there at once so the universe, instead of being in the present, would be all at once infinite. — Gregory

So an infinitude of moments has unfolded to your, or everyone's, consciousness, past, present, & future? Okay, if that's so, & the present & the future are all there at once to your consciousness, then tell me with what words my next reply to you will start with. Your answer will be quite telling. & why can't people predict the future as accurately as they can discern the present, I mean, if it's all just there at once? Such a claim contradicts all of experience. Abstract mathematics has taken some people far away from reality.

Now you object to calling eternity an instant but how else would you describe it while keep it a temporal thing? — Gregory

No, I don't object against the possibility of an instant being eternal, but I object to the reality of change, such as that of motion, being compatible with one eternal instant or moment (for reasons that I've provided in my previous posts above).

Finally, there is no "potential infinity" where there is no time. — Gregory

Granted, a potential infinity can't unfold but in time; nevertheless, a potential infinity is still possible even if it's not unfolding, & therefore it's possible before unfolding in time, i.e., a potential infinity is still possible even if it's not unfolding in time. If it wasn't possible before unfolding in time, then it could never proceed to unfold in time!

If we approach an infinite surface area and it is potentially infinite to our action then it is infinite in itself — Gregory

Uh, no, it's not, precisely because this potential hasn't been, nor will ever be, rendered actual (distinction between potential & actual is crucial here); no more than a potential limitation in one's enumeration of the series of whole numbers is an actual limitation, for they can just keep on going & going but without ever stopping, although stopping is always a possibility.

Well you are wrong about Gabriel's horn. Infinite surface area with finite space within! — Gregory

From Wikipedia (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gabriel%27s_Horn): "Gabriel's horn is formed by taking the y = 1/x, with the domain x ≥ 1 and rotating it in three dimensions about the x-axis." "Mathematically, the volume approaches π as a approaches infinity." "There is no upper bound for the natural logarithm of a, as a approaches infinity." - Thus, it should be clear that infinitude, in this context, is strictly generated by the rotation about the axis (as I've stated in my post that you're replying to); which approaches or tends to infinity but is never itself infinite. Hence, the surface area is never in fact infinite, but, like an object proceeding or moving about a circle's surface, it's approached or tended to by a never-ending revolution about the horn's surface or rotation about the axis.

an eternal instant is just my phrase for B Time. "Instant" keeps the element of time intact. An absolute flow of time is inconsistent with relativity as understood by Einstein. So if there is something objective here it would be an eternal moment and all it contains. — Gregory

Motion is no less compatible with the idea of an "eternal moment" than it is with an "eternal instant"; the word changes, but the incompatibility remaims. For what distinguishes one moment from another, if not their content that defines them? So, if x is in point A at a given moment, then when it's in point B, this would, by definition, constitute a different moment; because two moments that are defined the same wouldn't be two different moments but one & the same, while two moments with different definitions would literally be two different moments. So, again, motion is incompatible with a changless moment that's one & the same (or defined as such) eternally so, i.e., an "eternal moment"; indeed, the change of place/position, i.e., motion, requires one moment to end, i.e., x in point A, & another to begin, i.e., x in point b, in order for it to occur, whereby neither moment (as neither what begins or ends) is eternal.

Einstein even realized that an "eternal moment" is incompatible with, or allows no, change, which is precisely why he was lead, quite illogically, to deny the distinction between past, present, & future. "The distinction between past, present, and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion." - Einstein

but my point still stands that if B Time is true and the series of past events is infinite, the universe would be infinite — Gregory

Sure, if time is infinite, then time in the universe would be infinite; nevertheless, this doesn't mean that space or a shape would have to be infinite, but only the series of events.

But you initially made an absolute statement, and you then qualified it as a relative statement after I pointed out your error to you. So congrats on understanding what I said to you and putting in the correction. — fishfry

Lol, if you really that think I've corrected myself, rather than having repeated my original assertion, this conversation is wayyy beyond me.

You can have the last word. — fishfry

Aw, why thank you. Aren't you just the perfect combination of genius & kindness? Take care, pal.

That, I believe. — fishfry

... you should also that believe that your illogical assertion caused it.

You can't determine what's moving on the condition that motion is defined as the change of place/position. Lol, your profundity is so overwhelming, I can't handle it.

Thus you inadvertently refute your own statement. You said, and this is a direct quote: "For motion can only be defined as a change of place or position,"

But since by that definition everything is in motion relative to something, your definition is true but useless, since I can't use it to determine whether a thing is moving or not. — fishfry

Lol, are you saying that two, or multiple, things can't be moving relative to each other? So, yeah, there's no self-refutation. You just seem miss the fact that, given a determinate context, the motion of multiple things can be distinguished by their directions.

since I can't use it to determine whether a thing is moving or not. — fishfry

How do you figure? In my previous post, I've shown that, given a determinate context, motion & rest (as the change of place/position, or the lack thereof) are easily determined. I'm honestly stupefied by this conclusion of yours. You seem to think that just saying it makes it true.

So you agree that all motion is relative. — fishfry

Yes, relative to place/position, as I've originally asserted.

Something is moving only in relation to something else, and not in any absolute sense. That's a lot different than what you said initially. Can you see that? — fishfry

No, I can't; because I've originally said that motion is defined as change of place or position, the motion relative to a thing's place or position - which is always relative, not absolute, so it's not a lot different than what I've said initially but equivalent with it.

If I'm sitting on the couch, I'm motionless with respect to the couch, but moving at very high velocity relative to the galactic core.

So how can I know, using your criterion, whether I'm in motion? — fishfry

By determing in what context you view yourself. Relative to your couch, you're at rest, if you only take into consideration your couch & self, but relative to the galatic center, you're both in motion; yet, notice that the only way which you've determined that you're motionless, or in a state which is the opposite of motion, relative to the couch, is by not changing your place or position on it, thus inadvertently implying that motion, or a state which is the opposite of being motionless, is determined by the change of place/position. Thus you inadvertently grant my definition of motion.

If everything is in motion, then your definition doesn't distinguish anything in the universe. — fishfry

Uh, yes, it does, precisely because, although everything can be said to be in motion or changing place/position, everything isn't, in the same context, moving in the same direction, e.g., one thing can be said to be moving to the left of another & this other thing moving to the right of the former (or, depending on the context, vice versa); thus distinguishing between movements by direction.

Apologies for the late reply.

I'm not sure you are right. There are different types of infinities so an object might be infinite in some ways but not in others. I hear many physicists say that the universe can be infinite and bounded at the same time. There is Gabriel's Horn as well (something finite with an infinite surface area) — Gregory

Sure, I've also heard of physicists talk about something being infinite but bounded, yet, nevertheless, these are physicists who say such things, they're neither logicians or philosophers; if they were either the former or the latter, they would've taken the care to understand that the object which they're talking about, technically, isn't infinite.

When physicists talk about something that's infinite but bounded, they reference a circle, or some round form, as well as another thing which moves about its surface - and here's the kicker. So, when physicists talk about infinitude in this context, the circle itself that they reference is never infinite. Actually, what's taken as infinite in this context, strictly speaking, is the procession or motion of the other thing about the circle's surface, insofar as this other thing can proceed or move about the circle's surface without it ever potentially meeting an end, extremity or edge, i.e., its procession or motion about the circle's surface is potentially infinite or never-ending; for it can be supposed that this other thing can just keep on going round, & round & round the circle ad infinitum. Now understanding this, one should grasp that the circle itself is never infinite, i.e., there's no "infinite shape" in this context, but, in fact, it's the procession or motion of the other thing about the circle's surface which is taken as infinite; & which doesn't necessitate a spatial infinitude, or an "infinite shape," but a temporal infinitude, inasmuch as motion is conditioned by space & time, & not just space per se - hence, space by itself, in this context, isn't what's infinite, i.e., there's no "infinite space" or "infinite shape" in this context.

Gabriel's horn, honestly, is not really different, because what's taken as infinite, in that context, is the rotation about the horn's surface - in other words, the revolution about the horn's surface or the rotation about the axis is what's taken as infinite, & not the object itself per se (if you consider the matter closely, I think that you should see this to be the case).

Thus, in neither case that you've referenced is an "infinite shape" instantiated; for, again, such a thing is a direct contradiction in terms & therefore impossible. Yet, if you still think otherwise, I'm more than desirous to hear your counter-reply.

if time is objectively an eternal instant and infinite motions hold together frozen in that instant, it seems to me the series would be geometrically infinite — Gregory

As I see it, an "eternal instant" & "motion(s)," be it infinite or not, are incompatible ideas.

For motion can only be defined as a change of place or position; & as if it's the case that the definition of one instant doesn't differ from another, then these two instants would be indiscernible from each other & wouldn't be two instants but one & the same. Yet, as the change of place or position, or motion, necessitates differentiating between one instant from another, e.g., x in point A defines instant-1 while x in point B defines instant-2, no kind of motion(s) can involve an "eternal instant," or a changless instant that always has one & the same definition; because, again, motion necessitates a change in the definition of instants, & which therefore negates the possibility of an instant which is one & the same (or defined as such) eternally so, i.e., an "eternal instant."

Understanding this word, "in-finite," in the most literal sense, which is strictly negatively, or, in other words, as in meaning not-finite or not-limited, then an "infinite shape," such as either a block or sphere, would be/is a contradiction in terms. For, for a shape to be one necessitates that it has extremities/edges or is bounded; & as being bounded means the same thing as being limited, then, by definition, what has extremities/edges or is bounded, i.e., a shape, can't be not-limited or unlimited, insofar as this amounts to saying that what's bounded isn't bounded (self-contradiction). Thus an "infinite shape" is a contradiction in terms.

Moscow — Banno

What's that?

So if one says that two people pre-existed their child's birth, they mean that those two people didn't actually exist, but only had the potential to, before their child's birth? That can't be right. Commonly used & understood, "pre-exist" means existed before, & not the potential to exist (any dictionary definition will attest to this).

Also, going off of what you've just written, if mind is needed to actualize such potential, it would itself have to be actual in order to do so; since potentiality can't actualize itself or another. So there would still be something, namely, mind, that existed independently of this potential, which proceeds to actualize it.

See 26c — Fooloso4

What's that?

Socrates was accused of atheism. If he did not believe in the gods then he would have regarded the mystical prophecies as human inventions. — Fooloso4

He was actually accused of perverting the youth by teaching them or preaching them atheism. His own atheism was collateral damage. — god must be atheist

Don't know if you guys are being sarcastic or not, but Socrates was neither an atheist or formally/expressly charged by the Athenian state for teaching "atheism"; taking "a-theism" in the most literal sense of the word, as one who denies or disbelieves in the existence of any kind of God &-or gods. In fact, he'd considered himself to be sent by "God" (whom he refers to in the singular form during his hearing/trial) to the Athenians.

Socrates, as he's quoted by Plato in the "Apology," had stated during his hearing/trial, "I am the gadfly of the Athenian people, given to them by God, and they will never have another, if they kill me. And now, Athenians, I am not going to argue for my own sake, as you may think, but for yours, that you may not sin against the God by condemning me, who am his gift to you. For if you kill me you will not easily find a successor to me, who, if I may use such a ludicrous figure of speech, am a sort of gadfly, given to the state by God; and the state is a great and noble steed who is tardy in his motions owing to his very size, and requires to be stirred into life. I am that gadfly which God has attached to the state...."

..., the substratum is independent of mind but it does not amount to existence, it pre-exists. — Nelson E Garcia

Well, there's your own rebuttal. For, on your view, this "substratum" exists independently, since "pre-existence" doesn't mean "non-existence" but solely existence before another; as, for example, my parents pre-existed me, yet that doesn't mean that they didn't exist before me, but contrariwise.

On another note, dependency can't ultimately be without independency (yet not vice vers); & contrariwise can't be so, because what's dependent would have no foundation that's different from it to emerge out of. The coupling of an individual with another makes two of them; the fact of these two depending on the coupling of one individual with another individual who are both independent, & also the condition, of it. Thus dependency is impossible without independence, i.e., dependency is always conditioned on some form of independence.

... it seemed that you were saying that you were challenging the causality of senses. — Jack Cummins

Yeah, that’s one way of looking at it; but I would describe it as challenging the knowledge of the reality of sense-organs, & not solely of their causality. So it does seem as if you’ve been thrown off, a little, by my manner of writing. So, to be sure, I’m not solely challenging the knowledge of the causality of the sense-organs but of their reality altogether.

Our knowledge that these are the senses is primarily our sensory experiences. — Jack Cummins

Yet, but note that the knowledge of these are themselves reducible to sensuous identities, i.e., sensations; & that therefore these can’t be the reality upon which sensations depend or are conditioned.

Of course, if I read beyond the surface of your logic we could be left with a new question in terms of why do we need to experience life in sensory terms at all? — Jack Cummins

“Why,” as in a purpose? Surely one can explain “how” things are, without explaining why, or for what purpose, they are; & so I’ll skip over the question of why “we need to experience life in sensory terms at all?” & instead proceed to the question of “how” one could possibly raise your question, if sensory information is all there is? Seems as if the very possibility of raising this latter question would provide the answer to it. “How”? By the very same kind of way that we can intelligibly represent, in our question, that which exists other than in “sensory terms.”

The main premise of sensualism, i.e., that all our knowledge involves sensations or sensory-information, can be reduced to absurdity, if one first attacks their distinction of sense-organs & sensations or sensory information.

For, if all our knowledge is obtained by sensations or sensory-information, & the latter are what are caused by, & not what are the causes of, the sense-organs (otherwise, we’d have to say that sensations or sensory-information are the causes of, & so existed before, the sense-organs [an absurdity]), then, logically speaking, we could never demonstrate (according to the very same main premise of sensualism) that the sense-organs, in fact, exist. In other words, if the sense-organs supposedly are what are the causes of sensations or sensory-information, & not the effects of them, & all our knowledge solely involves sensations or sensory-information, we then could never, therefore, actually sensibly demonstrate the causes of sensations or sensory-information, i.e., sense-organs, because our knowledge solely involves the effects of them, i.e., sensations or sensory-information; & as no effects can be identified with the causes of them, our knowledge as sensations or sensory-information can’t be identified with the causes of them, i.e., sense-organs: we thus have no sensations or sensory-information (which, according to sensualism, can be the only basis of knowledge) of the existence of the sense-organs (a contradiction against their very own claim).

Seems to me, the main premise of “anti-realism” is, as it’s been expressed in the O.P., self-contradictory.

For if by “objective,” it’s meant (as it would quite plainly) “not-subjective,” that is, not determined by any subject, then the very premise itself is self-defeating. For if this is a fact, it must be so independently of any subject’s determination, i.e., it mustn’t be dependent on any subject’s determination; & therefore it must be an objective fact (an “objective” fact, as in a fact that’s not determined by any subject), & so is objectively real, an objective reality.

On the condition of distinguishable times in general, one may act, as well as require others to do so, accordingly; that is, relatively to the time; quite similarly to how a parent may require their child or children, at different times in their life or lives (e.g., in adulthood rather than childhood), to act, and interact with them, differently, just as the parent themself will do so accordingly.

So, sure, obviously, it’s a given that the Christian idea of God, which is specifically represented by the Bible, couldn’t have been known before the Bible, because then such a revelation would’ve have had to have been reveled before it was, in fact, actually revealed; which is a contradiction, & so (granted as) false.

Yet, again, this is only relative to the time (going back to my first paragraph). Consequentially, although the Christian idea of God couldn’t have been known before Christianity, it can logically be argued that the God who’s revealed through Christianity is, in fact, one & the same God as the God of a prior religion (for example, Judaism), & so on & so on (thus having had existed before Christianity); it’s just that the relationship between such religions presupposes a temporality, i.e., humanity’s timeline, & therefore it represents, not of a change in the fact of God existing but in the relationship (over time) to God.

So, again, to be sure, the God who’s revealed through Christianity mustn’t logically be, per se, different than, or incompatible with, any kind of God who was reveled before, despite if the texts that are used in these respective religions don’t completely say the same thing about God. For, referring back to the parent-child/children analogy (in my first paragraph), a parent may relate to their child or children differently at different times in the child’s life or children’s lives, but they’re still nevertheless their same parent; &, in like manner, God may relate, & so be revealed, differently at different times in humanity’s timeline, while nevertheless being one & the same God.

In conclusion, neither is the peculiarity or date of origin of Christianity’s revelation any kind of a logical proof against any of its validity.

Sorry for the very late reply; I really haven’t had the time to sit down & log into my account lately. So if you don’t reply, I’ll understand.

What era does your realidealism come from? — Mww

Is this relevant? Either you accept (the premise of) the argument, my friend, or you don’t — i.e., what’s created by us can be altered or changed by us, if it can’t then it’s not.

The form of the argument is certainly valid (so it’s left for you to grant the premises or not)...

-If X, then Y
-Not Y
-Therefore not X

-If A created B, i.e., “if X,” then A can alter or change B, i.e., “then Y”
-A can’t alter or change B, i.e, “Not Y”
-Therefore A didn’t create B, i.e., “therefore not X”

-If human conception created the law non-contradiction, then human conception can alter or change the law of non-contradiction
-Human conception can’t alter or change the law of non-contradiction
-Therefore human conception didn’t create the law of non-contradiction

If you grant the premises, & also acknowledge the validity of the argument’s form, then I don’t see how you can claim that the principle of reason or logic, i.e., that of non-contradiction, is a product of human conception?

Very sorry for the (about a month) late reply; but I haven’t had the leisure-time, for some while now, to sit down at my computer &, so, be able to trade thoughtful responses over it (being preoccupied with work, the family & all). So I’ll understand if you don’t (want to) reply; though everything which I’m going to respond to, from your posts, I’ll directly quote, so that you won’t have to go back & review any of your older comments (focusing only on what’s quoted from your most recent posts).

Sure, but Kant here has introduced a Copernican twist, as he says. Classical metaphysics has sought to find synthetic principles a priori about things. Kantian metaphysics dispenses with things and explains synthetic a priori principles as conditions of a priori knowledge. — David Mo

The point that metaphysical knowledge is based on form, & not the particular materials or matter of any empirical intuition, taking Kant’s “Copernican revolution” into account, still stands, precisely because everything which is contingently given to us in empirical intuition is conditioned by the form of our subject; so that any synthesis apriori holds good for all possible experiences &, therefore, isn’t limited to either a single subject or instance of empirical intuition. In other words, any synthetic apriori determination stands over & above every particular instance or state & holds good throughout all possible experiences. Hence, “meta”-physics... such sythetic apriori knowledge is “beyond” any particular empirical or physical state, & so its validity is independent of any one altogether.

"The cat was advancing with feline steps." The argument is rational. “All cats' footsteps are feline“ — David Mo

To take your example... the truth of this judgement is independent of any particular instance or state of an actual cat, as it holds good for all possible cats. Such that, even if there were no actual “cats,” it would still hold good because it’s applicable to all possible cats altogether; & so it would pertain to the judgement with hypothetical logical necessity — i.e., “If there’s a cat advancing with footsteps, then they would be feline.”

The only thing that Kant did not justify is that mathematics or logic are absolutely a priori. — David Mo

How so? Are you saying that mathematics can be something which is valid only aposteriori, such that it’s possible for its determinations to be valid in one instance of intuition & then change, & not be so, in another? If not, I fail to see, how is it not apriori, i.e., not independent of any one instance of intuition?

The inconceivable is not the impossible. Kant demonstrated that the principles of logic are indissolubly associated with the forms of our intellect. — David Mo

On the basis of Kant’s claim that our knowledge is limited to the form of our subject, how can you know that the inconceivable isn’t the impossible? For you can’t transcend the form of your subject in order to determine that there are possibilities which violate what’s (logically) inconceivable to us. Thus you can’t know the truth of it; & your claim that the inconceivable isn’t the impossible simply takes the point for granted & begs the question. Either way, even if one is to grant this claim of yours, under Kantian principles, it would be wholly irrelevant; because we could never know of them, i.e., possibilities that are inconceivable, & they wouldn’t apply to us or our knowledge; as we’re limited to what we can know only under the form of our subject, which can never violate the principle of reason or logic, i.e., that of non-contradiction.

Any day an artificial superintelligence can give us a hard time. — David Mo

Yet never so hard a time as to violate the principle of reason or logic, i.e., that of non-contradiction; & if otherwise were to be the case with an “artificial superintelligence,” in order to for us to know of this, it would have to enter through the form of our subject, which would then make it conform to the form of our subject, such that it couldn’t then violate the principle of reason or logic, i.e., that of non-contradiction.

Modern formal logic contradicts him. There are other possible logics. — David Mo

Let it be so... yet & still none of them violate the principle of non-contradiction. The self-referential “barber paradox” is no instance of this; for it obfuscates the modality of possibility. A barber who shaves all those who can’t shave themselves, misses that a barber can shave all those who’re capable of shaving themselves (which logically includes himself), even if he hasn’t or doesn’t.

Excuse me. If metaphysics were merely formal, it wouldn't be a scandal for Kant. The problem with it is that it pretends to be both pure and synthetic. I'm with Kant on this. The only synthetic source of reason is experience. — David Mo

You must bear in mind that all syntheses aren’t apriori, as synthesis can be aposteriori too; & the latter is what Kant had in mind when referencing either what’s empirical or dependent on experience. Hence, he states, “There are synthetic a posteriori judgements of EMPIRICAL origin, but there are also others which are certain a priori, and which spring from PURE UNDERSTANDING AND REASON.” Thus synthetic apriori truths are based on pure understanding & reason, not experience or what’s empirical. Therefore, in principle, metaphysics is purely formal (although the TOTALITY of our knowledge isn’t), & is independent of the material(s) of experience.

Nowhere is it written that rational knowledge has to be absolute and synthetic. — David Mo

Yet if it wasn’t, that is, wasn’t absolute, then it wouldn’t be rational. I’m going to further inquire about your claim here, in what I ask you in response to what I quote next of your post.

Logical principles are absolute as long as they are kept to pure formality. — David Mo

Can you give me an example of a logical principle that isn’t a pure formality, i.e., that isn’t independent of particular materials altogether?

What modern relativists (Feynman?) mean is that systemic reason cannot reach absolute truth unless it loses all real content. — David Mo

Right, unless we lose all real content; that is, unless we don’t refer to any of the materials of experience. In other words, unless we don’t refer to experience at all; hence, experience is inherently contingent & not absolute.

There is nothing incongruous in assuming that a world with rational beings that organize their experience in another way could have a different logical system. — David Mo

On the contrary, this is precisely my objection... assuming that a logical system can be, in principle, i.e., in regards to form & not the particular material(s) employed, constructed in a way which is different from how we can possibly form our own, is exactly to oppose the very principle upon which a logic or reason is conceivable; hence, such an assumption is inconceivable & therefore can’t even be thought, let alone assumed.

“Awareness” is an abstract noun formed from the adjective “aware,” i.e., “awareness” by itself is an abstraction by definition. Now as an adjective without a noun that it qualifies is a contradiction, the quality of being “aware” without a thing that is so, is too. Thus, we can’t talk of being “aware” without presupposing a “thing” that is so; such that any claim to the contrary is contradictory, & therefore irrational.

There one learns, or experiences — jgill

Ironic, you deny the individual while presupposing it. Who’s this “one” who learns or has experiences, if not the individual person or subject?

Hume’s claim that one’s perception is derived from or caused by a bundle of impressions can be denied on the very same grounds, or the very same means, which he denies causality.

So let’s refer to his notion of causality.

Hume states that, “We may define a ‘cause’ to be ‘An object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are plac'd in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects, that resemble the latter.’” So that if there’s no precedency, there’s then no causation.

Now given that, in general, no impressions can precede perception, that is, impressions aren’t something prior to or outside of perception, then, by definition, no impressions can be the cause of one’s perception; since they must’ve preceded it, in order to have caused it. Yet, again, as impressions don’t, in general, precede perception, & so no necessary causal connection is maintainable between them, impressions then can’t be the cause of one’s perception, by Hume’s own accord. Thus, according to his own definitions, Hume’s derivation of one’s perception from impressions is inherently self-defeating (no pun intended).

Possibility/impossibility is absolutely meaningless without relation to the agency to which they apply. Which means that which is possible/impossible, from the empirical and rational world alike, is determined by that agency, for that agency. — Mww

If possibility & impossibility, both in empirical & intellectual intuition, are determined by our agency, then why can’t their bounds be changed or altered by this very same determination of agency ours? Why can’t we then, either in empirical or intellectual intuition, change the fact of a square circle, or X = -X, being an impossibility, for example? I fail to see how possibilities & impossibilities are determined by us, when we work within their bounds & not versa, i.e., their bounds aren’t set by us.

I think that your claim, which is what’s possible/impossible is determined by our agency, misses a major point... there are different types of causes, e.g., material or formal as opposed to efficient causes. Yeah, we may be the efficient cause of a change, i.e., that which fulfills an actual change, yet, what change is possible, or impossible, in the material or the form upon which we purse to fulfill a change isn’t caused by us, as it’s precisely what allows us, in the first place, to fulfill whatever change that we actually have; in other words, to realize a possibility isn’t what caused the possibility (which is the ground of its realization).

So this is how we’re to view the form of reason or logic, that is to say, the boundary of its form isn’t set, i.e, determined or caused, by the realization of our ideas, but it’s the very ground of them apriori, i.e., through which they’re possible.

I refer you to the categories, for which you should have already taken account. The categories determine for us, not the possibilities/impossibilities the sensible world contains, but rather the possibility or impossibility of us cognizing what they are. — Mww

Right, exactly, the logical categories or pure concepts determine, as you’ve just said, “FOR US,” not vice versa; that is, we don’t determine or cause their bounds but are forced to work within them. This is exactly what I’m saying about rational or logical form.

How do these propositions not contradict each other? — Mww

They don’t contradict each other because the apriori form of reason isn’t something that we’ve created aposteriori, or at all; in other words, we don’t have a say on how it imposes form onto things. So that’s what was meant, that our volition isn’t what creates the given materials of our aposteriori constructions; unlike a pegasus or a unicorn which it does, with such given materials, according to the form of reason.

Correct, iff reason is a fundamental human condition, a metaphysical notion used in an attempt to logically thwart infinite regress.

Wherein lay the intrinsic circularity of the human rational system: we can only talk about reason using the very thing we’re talking about, and the very purpose of speculative epistemological philosophy is to not make it catastrophically fubar. — Mww

If the form of reason is taken as an axiom, rather than what’s both derived & presumed, from whence arises the circularity? As we’re not deriving the conclusion from any premise, & then subsequently using, in turn, the former to explain the latter (& so on cyclically).

we are discussing is whether you can talk about science as rational knowledge

When Kant speaks of metaphysics he adds the term ‘pure’ reason because it claims to be the science of the a priori. But it does not occur to anyone to say that empirical science is not rational. It's just not pure.

Though that’s the very point. The pure or the formal is contrasted, thus not being equivalent, with the empirical, as apriori is contrasted with aposteriori. So that if it’s empirical, it isn’t either purely or formally rational; the latter pertaining to what’s apriori, the former to what’s aposteriori.

This is why scientists can’t claim to have obtained anything absolute; hence, Lawrence Krauss states, “In science, we don’t... claim to know the absolute truth.” He’s also stated, “Not knowing is fine. In fact, it is a central part of science,... nor do you claim to have absolute knowledge.” Richard Feynman, the famed physicist, as well has stated, “All scientific knowledge is uncertain.”

Yet the apriori assertion that “a part isn’t greater than the whole of which it is one” is absolute or certain, for it’s rationally rather than empirically based. Thus “scientific reasoning” is a misnomer, no matter who uses it or in what article, whereby the term “reasoning” should be replaced with “conjectures,” “inferences.” “assertions,” “judgements” or “statements”; that is to say, what’s contingent upon experience rather than what’s based on reason absolutely, either purely or formally.

Not from where I sit. A law, to distinguish itself from a rule or a directive, adheres to the principle of necessity and universality. In that case, law presupposes the principle, whereas rules presuppose only the contingencies which justify them. It is absurd to think mathematics, and logic in general, is governed by mere rules.

From an etymological standpoint, in one way or another, “principle,” “law,” & “rule,” aren’t as different as you’re trying to make them seem, & they can be understood to coincide if one looks past nominal trifles.

“Law” is traceable to the old-English word of “lagu,” which means “ordinance, RULE prescribed by authority, REGULATION”; & “rule” is traceable to the old-French word of “riule,” which means “PRINCIPLE or maxim GOVERNING conduct”; while “principle” is traceable to the Latin word “princeps,” which means “RULER or leader” (the Romans thus called Trajan the “optimus princeps,” or the “best ruler”).

Now, in all of these etymological definitions, there’s an obvious commonality (to the point of where, surely enough, each of the terms include one of the other terms in their very etymological definition [thus their meanings are basically identical & interchangeable]), which is the signification of control (for the lack of a better word). So that all three of these terms, when included within a noun phrase, e.g., the rule of integers (thus “rules” can be said to govern mathematics [which isn’t therefore absurd, like you’ve claimed]), the law of identity, or the principle of inertia, signify, in one way or another, the control or governance, i.e., the regulation, of the object(s) or referent(s) of whatever word which they’re used with in a noun phrase.

The only way one can thus differentiate between these terms, or rather between how these terms are themselves used, is in regards to quantification; in other words, whether it (the “rule,” “law” or “principle”) controls or governs all possible & actual members of a set or class, i.e., in a universal sense, or whether it controls some, as opposed to all, possible & actual members of a set or class, i.e., in a limited sense that’s constrained to a subset.

So the distinction between a “law,” “rule” or “principle” in terms of universality is merely nominalistic & can be overcome if each term is quantitatively qualified in either a common or peculiar way (which is quite possible & permissible).

If that is the case, we are at a loss as to how we can be mistaken in identifying an object, or, which is the same thing, not being able to identify some object at all. We are also at a loss to explain how it is we can be irrational, if reason adheres to the universality and absolute necessity of law.

Not in any way are we at a loss as to how we can experience mistaken identity, granted that the principle of reason is a reality; this is explainable in terms of the subject’s confused or erroneous knowledge, which is rationally distinguishable from clear or veritable knowledge. For example, an impersonator; one may think that they’re looking at the real Barack Obama, although they’re actually looking at an impersonator; which if only they knew all of the qualities constituting the real Obama, would reveal to them that they’re looking at an impersonator instead of the real Obama.

Moreover, being “irrational” is explainable or to be explained in merely in a colloquial sense, in the way of impracticality or improbability; like when one says to a heartbroken friend that they’re being “irrational” by thinking that waiting outside their ex’s house will win them back over, as this is highly improbable or impractical. Though I do maintain that ontological irrationality is an impossibility; so there’s no need to seek an explanation of it, since it’s literally impossible.

Object and precepts are determined by reason in accordance with a law, but reason is not itself lawful.

Reason is lawful, that is, recognizable by its law or rule, in the same way the apriori forms of sensibility are; objects being subject to their invariant form. Thus reason is lawful because, like space or time, it determines things under a fixed law, rule or condition (which doesn’t change, like the objects that it subjects may).

But I understand what you’re trying to say, in that reason, to be any real use to us, must act lawfully

Reason itself IS THE LAW by which objects or percepts act lawfully.

Oh, but it can, and it does. It is the ground of all the differences in human thought: I think the Mona Lisa is an ugly broad because of the principles by which I judge beauty, you think the Mona Lisa is angelic because of....obviously....a different set of principles by which you judge beauty.

Apriori, beauty is in the eye of the beholder. So I fail to see (no pun intended) how your example here is proof that rational or logical thought can form constructs which are in disagreement with itself? Since the disagreement of your example here pertains to AESTHETICS, rather than to logic or reason per se.

Ok, fine. What form does reason have, that isn’t assigned to it by reason? How would reason attain its form?

Reason no more attains or is assigned a form than space or time, as its character or form is what it is apriori & isn’t determined aposteriori, i.e., it’s not attained or assigned aposteriori or in time.

If reason has a form just because it inheres in human subjects, then it is no different than being a condition by which the reality of the human qua human rationality, is possible.

Right, as I’ve said in my past replies, it’s the form or condition by which human thought is possible; it being something actual apriori (like the forms of sensibility are), through which the latter (thought) is possible.

Fine. How? How does a concept alter, regardless of the actual reality of that to which they are applied? Bearing in mind a concept represents a thing or a possible thing. An impossible thing is, of course, inconceivable, that is, has no concepts belonging to it at all. The concept of “dog” (“unicorn”) presupposes the object (possible object) dog (unicorn), otherwise, to what does the concept relate? If the thing is presupposed, how in the hell can a concept create it?

Now, a thing can be altered, certainly. A dog with a bushy tail is one thing, a dog with a non-bushy tail in not that thing, merely from the different constituent concepts of “tail”. Obviously, if this is true, but if it is true because concepts themselves are the causality for the altering, then we must admit concepts think. Say wha?!?!?!?

Concepts don’t create, they facilitate and that which is facilitated, is understanding. So if you want to say concepts create understanding, I’ll let that slide, to wit: I can cognize what a unicorn would be, whether or not there is one, merely from the concepts my understanding says it must have in order to even be a unicorn. Understanding being nothing but a part of my reason, in the case of unicorns a priori; in the case of dogs, a posteriori.

It should be noted that the way which I say that one “creates” in conception/abstraction is somewhat similar to how one would “create,” say, a clubhouse. In this way, the materials that are used to create aren’t themselves what are created, but they’re merely assembled, arranged, & joined in a way which they weren’t originally given. So, to be sure, I’m not saying that one’s concepts/abstracts create the materials that they utilize, but that one can create or form artificial objects of thought, such as a pegasus or unicorn, with materials which are already given.

Now, objects that are altogether impossible to form in the sensible world, e.g., a square circle, can’t be created even in abstracts/concepts; & so this impossibility crosses over into abstracts/concepts & can’t be altered by them.

So now the point should be reemphasized: the very fact that one’s abstracts/concepts can only be formed or created in such a way that agrees with what’s possible in the sensible world, & not in a way which disagrees with what’s possible in it, shows that the possibilities & impossibilities of the sensible world aren’t determined by abstracts/concepts; for if they were, then they could be altered by them, like the features of the artificial creations of one’s abstracts/concepts, e.g., a pegasus or unicorn, as that which determines a thing has the power to alter it in some way, e.g., as the relationship of one’s abstracts/concepts have to artificial objects of thought like a pegasus or unicorn. Yet, again, since abstracts/concepts can’t, in any way, alter what’s either possible or impossible in the sensible world, this shows that abstracts/concepts don’t determine them. &, moreover, this same reasoning, is applied to be reason itself; that is to say, as one’s abstracts/concepts can’t alter what’s rationally possible or impossible, e.g., can’t form any contradictory objects, this shows that reason isn’t determined by abstracts/concepts.

As for the rest.....you think idealistically, so kudos for that.

Thanks, friend, I do appreciate the compliment.

A “principle” is to be understood as one understands the word “law.” So the principle of reason is just another way of saying the law of reason — in other words, that by which it governs or determines either the identity or formation of objects or percepts.

So I don’t see what’s so hard to grasp about the term “principle of reason”? I think that it’s because you claim that “ALL principles are given from reason.” Yet, this seems to put the cart before the horse, so to speak, as reason itself must have a form by which it can possibly give principles, PRIOR TO actually doing so; this form thus IS the principle or law of reason. Which, moreover, isn’t a redundant term (no more than the term the “principle of inertia” would be); for it emphasizes that reason isn’t an object or a percept per se, but a condition for them altogether (as the “principle of inertia” isn’t an object or a percept per se, but a condition for them altogether).

Reason needs to justify the bounds of its proper employment

Again, since reason has an intrinsic form, it doesn’t need to go on to justify the bounds of its employment, for the bounds of its possible employment are self-evident in its form already; such that the only thing which needs to be justified is what’s maintained to be bounded in its actual employment, that is, whether such things are in accord or discord with it.

‘It’ being reason? So you suggest reason could create two mutually contradictory domains? Yeah...no. Not in its pursuit of knowledge as we understand it, and certainly not in the speculative epistemology I favor.

Contingent constructions of reason is possibility. It is irrational to suppose domains using principles for its rules, should operate on possibility, at the exclusion of necessity.

No, I didn’t suggest that reason can create contradictory domains. My point was that your claim that reason “... in and of itself doesn’t have a principle, but rather, constructs them” suggests that, since reason doesn’t have a principle of itself, i.e., a fundamental principle, it should then be able to create ones which contradict each other; for as it has no foundation in itself, there shouldn’t be a SINGLE principle which holds true in all of its constructs. Yet, since it can’t do such a thing, this proves that reason does of itself have a foundation, i.e., a fundamental principle, which pervades or holds true in all of its constructs — contrary to your claim about reason in & of itself.

A square meets these principles, a circle meets those principles, all constructed by reason a priori, which is sufficient for squared circle to be impossible, within the domain reason created: synthetic a priori cognitions.

My point with the square circle goes back to showing that abstracts/concepts can only alter what they’ve created (like being able to alter the features of a pegasus or a unicorn); & if they can’t alter something, it’s precisely because they didn’t create it (such reasoning was to be applied to the principle or law of reason itself). Without sensations, abstracts/concepts couldn’t come to posses any shape, i.e., abstracts/concepts can’t of themselves purely intuit shapes (this admission is enough to satisfy my point). Now, the formation of a square circle can’t take place in any empirical intuition, such that the impossibility of which holds true in abstraction/conception as well & can’t be altered by it; this latter fact shows that abstraction/conception doesn’t determine or create what’s possible or impossible in empirical intuition, but it simply reflect them. So that the same is the case for the principle of reason; in other words, since what’s possible or impossible with reason can’t be determined or altered by abstraction/conception, i.e., abstraction/conception can’t form what’s contradictory, this goes to show that they’re not a creation of abstraction/conception, but it simply reflects them.

It's not a tautology, it's a redundancy. To say ‘rational reasoning’ is a redundancy

“Redundancy,” “tautology,” ultimately end up meaning the same thing (this is a mere quibble with words), which is insignificance due to repetition. ‘Tautology’ literally means “repeating what has been said,” while ‘redundancy’ means, in the context of discourse, what’s useless, superfluous, or doesn’t add any meaning, because it’s been said before. Either way, you admit that your term (“rational reasoning”) is redundant, right, &, so, useless? This was basically my point; modifying the term “reasoning” with the adjective of “rational” is insignificant, for the former term is already qualified as such &, therefore, cannot be otherwise without invalidating the usage of the word altogether.

... because every argument we want to make for or against something will use reason in one way or another.

Yet my original point was that one can’t make an argument against reason, in general, without already presupposing its validity; such that their argument would be inherently self-defeating.

Reason is not a method of justifying anything. It is not the method of proving that the current pandemic is caused by a virus.

Yet in my view, it is a method, or rather the principle of a method, for justification, namely that which is analyzed apriori; although when experience is concerned, such as the particular aposteriori cause of a pandemic, reason is insufficient, & we must have recourse to observation or perception for obtaining what’s true.

Aristotle does not distinguish between logic and reason because these two terms are alien to his terminology.

Sure, their contemporary rendering may be alien to his terminology, but the etymological root of both of them, i.e., “logos,” definitely isn’t; which denotes (what in English means) “reason, idea, word.” So this proves my point that a distinction between them is ultimately flawed, because the root of “reason,” which is the Latin “ratio,” derives from the Greek “logos”; & therefore these terms originally have one and the same thing, so that a distinction between them is inadmissible.

As scientific methods have proved very effective in similar cases. And we call those methods and other similar ways of thinking rational or ‘reason’ for short.

Only in colloquial terms can the method of ‘science’ be called “rational,” as its mode of investigation isn’t apriori but aposteriori. Here “rational” can only simply or casually mean something like “prudent” or “judicious.” To call the method of science “rational,” in the formal sense, is a misnomer.

... he does distinguish between the study of the forms of argumentation and categorization (which would be roughly equivalent to today's logic) and the sciences (which would be equivalent to today's reason).

“Reason,” in the original or truest sense of the word, is in no way equivalent with the sciences (as was stated, in my previous paragraph, about the term “rational” [i.e., that which pertains to ‘reason’]), if we understand that etymologically it means “to reckon, think.” Thus science, either currently or in the past, can’t be equated with “reason” or what’s “rational,” since it’s not based purely on reckoning or thought (this would be an awful mischaracterization of it).

This is actually affirmed by Aristotle, in the beginning of his “Metaphysics,” when he states that, “But in fact science and art come to men through experience.” Science, according to Aristotle, is thus derived from experience, & isn’t equivalent either with “today’s reason,” as you’ve put it, or reason in the past, i.e., “logos.”

Now, I agree that Aristotle distinguishes between forms of argumentation/categorization & the sciences; but I want to respond to this point, & some others, in what comes next, after I quote other parts of your post.

Logic is therefore a method of deduction that allows us to move from premises to conclusions, from some statements to others. You can call that a method of ‘formation’ of statements, but not hide that this formation is a deductive procedure of passing from some statements to others.

This misses that statements themselves are made up of components, which aren’t themselves statements; hence, in the “Categories,” Aristotle asserts, “None of these terms (‘substance’ or ‘quantity’ or ‘quality’ or ‘relationship’ or ‘the doing of something’ or ‘the undergoing of something’) is used on its own in any statement, but it is through their combination with one another that statement COMES INTO BEING.” Now these components are what any statement, let alone the passage of one statement to another, depend on to come about (as was just noted); & the being of these components themselves are subject to a certain principle, without which they couldn’t be formed. This principle is the primary principle of logic or reason, in general, & not only a rule on how to pass from one statement to another; for, again, it’s what allows for the possibility of an initial statement, as to the components of a statement, in the first place.

Thus Aristotle states, in book IV of his “Metaphysics,” “It is clear, then, that such a principle is the most certain of all and we can formulate it thus: ‘It is impossible for the same thing at the same time to belong and not to belong to the same thing and in the same respect’”, “It is for this reason that all who carry out a demonstration rest it on this...; for this is naturally a beginning also of all other axioms.” In other words, demonstration, in general, is based on this principle, i.e., it’s the beginning of it & all other axioms; & therefore the principle of logic or reason doesn’t solely concern the passage of statements to other statements, i.e., premises to conclusions, but it’s the basis of the formation of an initial statement, & its components, altogether.

Now, considering all of this, I fail to see how logic & reason are distinguishable? Since your equating the sciences with “today’s reason” is inadmissible on the grounds that, according to Aristotle, science is derived from experience (“Metaphysics,” Book I), while all demonstration is based on a fundamentally presupposed principle. So, sure, Aristotle distinguishes between forms of argumentation/categorization & the sciences, but no such a distinction is expressed between logic & reason. Also, & again, as your equating of the sciences with “today’s reason” is inadmissible, I’m still convinced that you haven’t actually distinguished between logic & reason, but you’ve only pretended to.

“Therefore, to say that there is ‘one’ logic (please, note this ‘one’) is an abstraction that we use in ordinary language to talk about or group the different logics. A logician will always specify the branch of logic in which he works.”

Try to distinguish between different types of logic without having recourse to their different objects of consideration; the inability to do so will show that logic itself isn’t distinguishable, but only the objects to which it’s applied are. Aristotle even states this about science; that is, science doesn’t differ in general, the various types of science only being distinguished by their particular objects of consideration: “But all these sciences have marked out for themselves some particular thing that is, some particular class of objects, and concern themselves with that.” (“Metaphysics, Book IV)

I follow the current philosophy that makes a clear distinction between logic and reason, considering logic a part or instrument of rational procedures of thinking. Simply put, the concept of reason is broader than that of logic.

Yet if “today’s reason” isn’t equivalent with the sciences, or experience, as by their etymological definition “reason” & “experience” can’t be synonymous, I fail to see how you’ve distinguished between logic & reason, except by having “reason” to mean “experience,” i.e., except by a word-game? & if we don’t allow reason to mean experience (the latter being what the sciences are derived from), how then are logic & reason different? Well, if we don’t allow this linguistic exception, then it’s evident that they aren’t.

“Energy,” based on E = mc2, is inconceivable without time; such that it can’t be separate from it, in order to be eventually combined with it. For energy is a product of mass in motion, & motion, as change of place, is time-dependent. Thus (all) energy without time, i.e., with “no time,” by definition, is inconceivable.

“But there are no natural squares or circles, in the same way bodies are extended in space. If they don’t occur naturally other than an artificial creation specific to a particular instance, one wonders about the first instance of them, and if he wonders long enough, he finds them to be nothing but derived from concepts, or, more accurately, the principles concepts validate. These can arise in no other way than from the intelligence that thinks them, by means of what has come to be known as pure reason.” — This misses that it’s possible to come across a designed sensible object whose formation one wasn’t a witness to. For example, I personally can draw, in a park somewhere, a seemingly perfect circle or square with sensible or natural forms, & there can be a child, of 4 or 5 years of age whose cognitive powers haven’t fully developed yet, who subsequently comes along & sees it; this child would then have a bare sensuous observation of it, say, without knowing what the shape is called (they’re deaf, mute, & haven’t learned how to sign or read braille) & that such a shape is “perfect”; so that his intellect wouldn’t be thinking it, although he’d be sensuously intuiting it.

Yet, the point of there being no perfect circles or squares in the sensible or natural world is ultimately beside the point; for, either way, the point is that abstractions/conceptions can’t alter things which aren’t created by them. Again, if the principle or condition of reason was created by abstraction/conception, the latter would be able to alter it (like it can alter the abstract/concept of a pegasus or a unicorn), such that it could make X = -X; yet since it can’t, it’s obvious that the principle of reason isn’t created by abstraction/conception.

Now, you say that you sort of agree that conception/abstraction can’t occur without the principle of reason; your point of difference is that it can’t occur without “functional human reason,” & not “the principle of reason.” For, “in and of itself,” you say about reason, it “doesn’t have a principle, but rather, constructs them on its own accord,” which, you go on to say, “is why we can’t even think squared circle, much less cognize its objective validity, because such cognition violates the principles reason already supplied. In effect, a square circle is merely a euphemism for an impossible cognition, allowing us to see how irrational we can be.” — I fail to see how reason can “construct” a principle without already presupposing one by which it proceeds in construction? Again, repeating what I’ve been stating over & over but most recently in the paragraph before this current one (it seems as if the cogency of the fact is being overlooked), IF the principle of reason was a construction, THEN the cognition of a square circle would only be impossible within the domain that it itself has created or supplied; so that IF this domain is merely a contingent construction of reason, THEN it should be able to create or supply another domain in which a square circle wouldn’t be impossible to cognize. Yet, again, since it can’t, this only goes to prove that reason doesn’t construct its principle, but proceeds to construct BY MEANS OF it.

“I don't know if there is any nuance of English that escapes me” — No offense, but it seems like a lot of your statements come down to nuances of language, or “language games.” Allow me to explain in what follows.

“My starting point is that we call various methods of reasoning rational.” — Rational reasoning is tautological, just as empirical experience would be. The modifying adjective “rational” is thus meaningless as such; yet to say that all reasoning isn’t rational, as one can be “irrational,” & therefore there’s irrational reasoning as opposed to rational reasoning, doesn’t help you, for if one is being irrational then they’re not, in fact, reasoning, & so this, i.e., irrational reasoning as opposed to rational reasoning, would be a false (meaningless) dichotomy from the get-go.

“Logic is a part of rationality. Even the Greeks, who made the first distinction between sciences, like Aristotle, do not place logic as ‘the’ reason. Traditionally, various forms of rational reasoning are distinguished, including science, philosophy, technology and even rhetoric. This is my starting point. ‘Reason’ is said of many things.” — If you can give me the citation where Aristotle specifically distinguishes between logic & reason, this would be very helpful: to my knowledge, no such distinction is to be found in his work. Now, sure, “reason” is said of many things, for it’s applied to different objects; although, the point is that many things aren’t said of “reason,” for its principle remains uniform irrespective of the different objects that it’s applied to.

“I don't think I said that.” — You did, check your fifth post on the fifth page of this thread.

“Logic is a form of thought associated with philosophy, generally allowing to pass from one statement to another by means of formal rules. There are different types of logic. It is even said that there is a logic of common sense. And a formal logic and a mathematical logic. All this is logic. I don't think it's an abstraction like the concept of reason.” — In my view, logic or reason isn’t just what allows the passage from one statement to another, but it’s the very principle that allows for the formation of a statement at all. Now, there are different types of logic not because logic itself is variant, but because of the different types of objects that it’s applied to; which is what I’ve said about reason, that is, reason is said of many things, but many things aren’t said of reason. Yet you distinguish between these two, logic & reason; so can you please, for my understanding, define how you distinguish the two words? This’ll greatly help me to understand your overall position.