you can (in theory) explain reason in neuroscientific terms as long as you don't explain it away, as long as your explanation accounts for the agency and utility of that symbolic level that it explains. — Olivier5

I don’t see how accounting for it can not amount to explaining it away.

I completely accept that h. Sapiens evolved to the point of being able to understand abstract truths of reason. But those truths, such as the law of the excluded middle, are not, on those grounds, the product of that evolutionary process. The law of the excluded middle, and such like, are by definition ‘true in all possible worlds’. So, we’re dependent on the (physical) brain to be able to cognise such ideas, but the ideas themselves are not the product of a material process, rather, they are what must exist prior for any material process to occur (hence ‘a priori’).

No, my friend, yours wasn’t the fallacy of circularity; but that of inconsistency, or incongruity (to use a term that you’ve used).

The fallacy of circularity involves attempting to justify one thing, or set of them, by means of another thing, or set of them, while also attempting to justify this latter by means of the former, & then cyclically repeating (hence, the circularity of) the procedure.

For example, Y is “iff” X is, for when X was, then Y was too; & strictly since Y is “iff” X is, but only because when X was, then Y was too, & so on & so on ad infinitum.

Yet, this wasn’t what you did, since what you’d tacitly derived, i.e., the utility of reason, wasn’t what you’d presumed or presupposed, i.e., the uselessness of reason, but it was in direct opposition to it; so that your reasoning wasn’t circular, since, again, what you’d derived didn’t justify your presupposition, nor vice versa, but it was in direct opposition to, thus being INCONSISTENT with, your presupposition. Therefore your fallacy was that of inconsistency, not circularity.

Now, I don’t agree that logic is a rational method, for logic is the rational method. These two words, logic & reason, etymologically have ultimately one & the same meaning; the former being Greek in origin, the latter Latin. You actually affirm this, that “logic IS reason,” later in your reply.

Moreover, I don’t agree that logic or reason is an abstraction; as it’s a principle or condition for it, & therefore it can’t follow or be derived from it. This is provable on the basis of no abstraction being able to be in conflict with it; meaning that IF it was a production of abstraction, THEN abstraction could produce it in another way, i.e., whereby X could = -X; yet since it can’t, this should show one that it’s not a production of abstraction, but the condition or principle for it.

:up:

I appreciate your approval, friend. Thank you. :up: :up:

I don’t agree that logic or reason is an abstraction — aRealidealist

Isn’t that exactly part of the overall problem? The materialists will...must...insist reason, tacitly granting there is such a thing, is an abstraction of the cause/effect processes of physical matter. Enter epiphenomenalism and such. Oh...and pineal glands. Don’t forget those mysterious little doo-dads. Point being of course, folks been trying to source reason for many a minute.

Even if reason cannot be an abstraction of the human cognitive process of which it is the founding member, it still doesn’t just appear without causality, without contradicting natural occasions. And to say reason is merely one of two necessary human conditions doesn’t shed any light on its fundamental origin.

Reason the faculty that connects judgement to cognition giving rise to knowledge is not an abstraction; reason the unity of human intellectual apparatus, is.

I don’t see how accounting for it can not amount to explaining it away. — Wayfarer

Let's take an example. Chemistry can explain how DNA is a relatively stable, potentially very long molecule, where variations in the use of some elements (the nucleobases) can be introduced without affecting the molecule structure. This gives you a very long molecule which can be used to encode information, through the use of the different nucleobases as "letters". Biochemistry can further try to explain how DNA is encoded, decoded, expressed, supressed, copied, mutated, etc. through chemical equations, enzymes and the likes.

Does this chemical explanation of the genetic code "explain away" its capacity to support life? No it doesn't. It doesn't say: "DNA is an epiphenomenon, don't you worry about it, it means nothing of use." On the contrary, the chemical argument only supports the conceptual construct of a genetic code, which does all sorts of marvelous stuff. The explanation opens up a new realm, builds up a platform on which many other stuff can develop.

Now, I certainly hope we will one day find a rational, fact-based explanation for how neurones generate thoughts, that describes how biochemistry can open up an entirely new realm (the symbolic realm) and how it makes entirely new things possible thanks to this realm, including the explanation itself.

Just like DNA makes things possible, including the life of the very guys who study DNA.

we're employing reasoning based on abstraction. — Wayfarer

Absolutely.

I’m not trying to define ‘reason’ in a general sense. — Wayfarer

Understood. Although I would say reason has been defined in a general sense. A cursory search of “reason is” in CPR B alone, gives 99 returns. Even with sufficient exposition of the distinctions in all those returns, still leaves plenty of room to confound one with another, which, as precedent shows, entices arguments concerning reason to traipse off into various metaphysical Never-Lands.

This is because we're dealing with a philosophical argument, not a scientific hypothesis per se... — Wayfarer

We may disagree over whether minds have purely physical causes, but it would be hard, I think, to deny that they have physical effects, and this alone puts them in the domain of scientific study - not that I think these ontological / "proper domain" arguments are useful in cases like this, anyway: ontology bends to fit knowledge, not the other way round.

...I’m not saying that ‘reason is circular’ in any general sense. I’m saying there is circular reasoning implied in materialist theories of mind, in particular, which claim that mind (reasoning, thinking) can be understood in physico-chemical terms (as per Armstrong). — Wayfarer

Firstly, note that if this circularity of minds studying minds is doomed to fail, then, despite your assertion to the contrary, it applies to all study of the mind - scientific, philosophical, whatever (actually, even more so in the case of philosophy: neuroscience is minds studying brains, while the philosophy of mind is nominally minds studying minds.) If it is a problem - and I have seen no other argument that it is, beyond the claim that this circularity somehow means that it must be - then the study of the mind will either run into insurmountable problems, or run on interminably without delivering results. This may be so, but your statements do not show that it must be so.

Self-referentiality in logic is indeed tricky, but it can be dealt with when handled with care - or even used creatively to expand our understanding, as Gödel did. Russell's barber paradox was a warning shot across Frege's bows, and what your circularity claim is missing is that sort of argument, showing the problem that this circularity causes.

Its more subtle than that. We don't actually know everything about matter. — Punshhh

There's a lot we don't know about the universe in general that we know we don't know. Much more than we even suspect. That makes it possible to write science fiction novels. But the philosophy is more serious. It is not about the possible but about the existing and, at best, about what we can predict from the existing. The horizon of our hopes and their foundation.
Attributing consciousness to material things is like imagining a monkey writing Dante's Divine Comedy in one go. Possible? Imaginatively possible, metaphysically possible and very impossible to have happened. So we'll leave the theory of the literary monkeys to fantasy. Anything else would not be a subtlety but an absolute waste of time.

since, again, what you’d derived didn’t justify your presupposition, nor vice versa, but it was in direct opposition to, thus being INCONSISTENT with, your presupposition. — aRealidealist

Aside from this emphatic statement, it would have been nice if you had tried to prove it with a little analysis of my reasoning. You will understand that your proclamation is not convincing to me without some kind of argument behind it.
My starting point is that we call various methods of reasoning rational. The conclusion is that these methods are more effective than the irrational ones.
I don't see any circularity or inconsistency.

I don’t agree that logic is a rational method, for logic is the rational method. — aRealidealist

Excuse me. Logic is a part of rationality. Even the Greeks, who made the first distinction between sciences, like Aristotle, do not place logic as "the" reason. Traditionally, various forms of rational reasoning are distinguished, including science, philosophy, technology and even rhetoric. This is my starting point. "Reason" is said of many things.

You actually affirm this, that “logic IS reason,” later in your reply. — aRealidealist

I don't know if there is any nuance of English that escapes me, but I wanted to say that logic is a form of reason. Not that it's the only form of reason. It's not easy to handle the determined articles in the English grammar.

Moreover, I don’t agree that logic or reason is an abstraction; — aRealidealist

I don't think I said that. Logic is a form of thought associated with philosophy, generally allowing to pass from one statement to another by means of formal rules. There are different types of logic. It is even said that there is a logic of common sense. And a formal logic and a mathematical logic. All this is logic. I don't think it's an abstraction like the concept of reason.

My argument is that you can't provide an account of reason on the basis of physico-chemical reactions or activities, — Wayfarer

If I wanted to do that I'd be a reductionist and I'm not. I have made an argument that the brain can be considered the cause of the mental. Not that it can be used to describe the mental.

But the argument is based simply on an analysis of the nature of reason and meaning - no spooky stuff required. — Wayfarer

At this point I'm not sure if you're advocating panpsychism or not. But what you have said is that making a distinction between the mental and the physical is not acceptable. That means we can't distinguish between an emotion and the molecular behavior of limestone. For example. And that's what I'm asking you for a demonstration, a clue or any kind of argument that can prove such a thing. Because I don't see emotion in limestone, no matter how hard I try. And if you say it's something more subtle, you'll have to risk saying what is this subtle thing between an emotion and limestone.
The opposite would be to go around the subject without specifying anything. Which I'm afraid is what we're doing.

So, we’re dependent on the (physical) brain to be able to cognise such ideas, but the ideas themselves are not the product of a material process, rather, they are what must exist prior for any material process to occur (hence ‘a priori’). — Wayfarer

Ideas do not exist before they materialize into a brain and a language. At most, the relationships that those ideas express exist previously. Because the same relationships can be expressed with different ideas.

Before anything, just want to say sorry for the long reply.

Firstly, no, I don’t think that’s per se the problem, IF, in the first place, it’s granted there’s such a thing as abstraction/conception.

For, as I’ve stated in my post which you’ve replied to, abstraction/conception, in general, can’t occur without the very principle of reason; again, if otherwise was possible, we could have examples of abstracts/concepts that violate the principle or condition of reason, &, therefore, are inherently contradictory, e.g., such as a square circle. Yet since we don’t & can’t, this suffices to show that reason isn’t an effect of or derived from abstracts/concepts, as they don’t & can’t condition its rules, but vice versa.

Think of it like this, anything that’s an effect of or derived from abstracts/concepts can be altered by them, such as a “pegasus” having wings made of carrots as opposed to feathers; yet whatever abstracts/concepts can’t alter, was never something which was an effect of or derived from abstracts/concepts, such as their inability to alter a square or a circle into a square circle because neither a square nor a circle was an effect of or derived from abstracts/concepts but sensations (which are independent of them); this latter reasoning, again, of what they’re incapable of altering not being an effect of or derived from them, is to be applied to reason itself, thus demonstrating its independence from them (as sensible objects, like a square or a circle, are).

Now what the problem really is, as I see it, is how the materialist can demonstrate the being of abstraction/conception by purely physical means (& not per se how reason arises from the former [so let’s not get ahead of ourselves, as this is something to be explained only after the fact of demonstrating how conception/abstraction arises from physicality]). For, in the context of the mind, induction is an actual thing, i.e., thinking certain things about the future (for example, causal connections [a-la Hume & Kant]), yet no physical thing, such as a set of neurons, can transcend its present state & actually refer to the future in order to make claims about it. So, in my view, the problem of the materialist per se isn’t explaining reason arising from abstracts/concepts, but, in the first place, the latter on a purely physical basis.

Now, moreover, I agree that reason can’t appear to us without causality, yet this doesn’t necessarily mean that reason is an appearance, but only that our initial knowledge of it occurs by means of a conditional application of it to some object.

“And to say reason is merely one of two necessary human conditions doesn’t shed any light on its fundamental origin.” — Sure, but my opposition to the claim that it arises from abstraction/conception isn’t so much about what its fundamental origin is, as what its fundamental origin IS NOT, i.e., conception/abstraction.

neither a square nor a circle was an effect of or derived from abstracts/concepts but sensations — aRealidealist

Yikes. I don’t know how to respond to that. Just let me say that the proposition is true, if taken from the current empirical state of affairs, insofar as nowadays everybody was initiated into geometric figures by means of sensation....your teacher drew one on the blackboard and told you what name to know it by. Same with all other abstractions used on phenomenal enterprise, from justice to numbers, ideals to universals, and a myriad of other such things.

But there are no natural squares or circles, in the same way bodies are extended in space. If they don’t occur naturally other than an artificial creation specific to a particular instance, one wonders about the first instance of them, and if he wonders long enough, he finds them to be nothing but derived from concepts, or, more accurately, the principles concepts validate. These can arise in no other way than from the intelligence that thinks them, by means of what has come to be known as pure reason.
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abstraction/conception, in general, can’t occur without the very principle of reason — aRealidealist

Agreed.....sort of. Can’t occur at all without functional human reason. Reason here meaning some systematic rational procedure, not the faculty itself.

Not sure what you mean by a principle of reason. Reason in and of itself doesn’t have a principle, but rather, constructs them on its own accord, in conjunction with the domain under which they are employed. Which is why we can’t even think squared circle, much less cognize its objective validity, because such cognition violates the principles reason already supplied. In effect, a square circle is merely a euphemism for an impossible cognition, allowing us to see how irrational we can be.
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in my view, the problem of the materialist per se isn’t explaining reason arising from abstracts/concepts, but, in the first place, the latter on a purely physical basis. — aRealidealist

That is the very problem I mentioned, if you mean the materialist has great trial and tribulation explaining abstracts/concepts from a purely physical domain. But when push comes to shove, everything that happens from a human perspective, is the purview of the brain, which science tells us operates on strictly natural deterministic rules, because it is, after all, just matter. But I don’t care about all that; my brain works, cogito........done deal.

“I don't know if there is any nuance of English that escapes me” — No offense, but it seems like a lot of your statements come down to nuances of language, or “language games.” Allow me to explain in what follows.

“My starting point is that we call various methods of reasoning rational.” — Rational reasoning is tautological, just as empirical experience would be. The modifying adjective “rational” is thus meaningless as such; yet to say that all reasoning isn’t rational, as one can be “irrational,” & therefore there’s irrational reasoning as opposed to rational reasoning, doesn’t help you, for if one is being irrational then they’re not, in fact, reasoning, & so this, i.e., irrational reasoning as opposed to rational reasoning, would be a false (meaningless) dichotomy from the get-go.

“Logic is a part of rationality. Even the Greeks, who made the first distinction between sciences, like Aristotle, do not place logic as ‘the’ reason. Traditionally, various forms of rational reasoning are distinguished, including science, philosophy, technology and even rhetoric. This is my starting point. ‘Reason’ is said of many things.” — If you can give me the citation where Aristotle specifically distinguishes between logic & reason, this would be very helpful: to my knowledge, no such distinction is to be found in his work. Now, sure, “reason” is said of many things, for it’s applied to different objects; although, the point is that many things aren’t said of “reason,” for its principle remains uniform irrespective of the different objects that it’s applied to.

“I don't think I said that.” — You did, check your fifth post on the fifth page of this thread.

“Logic is a form of thought associated with philosophy, generally allowing to pass from one statement to another by means of formal rules. There are different types of logic. It is even said that there is a logic of common sense. And a formal logic and a mathematical logic. All this is logic. I don't think it's an abstraction like the concept of reason.” — In my view, logic or reason isn’t just what allows the passage from one statement to another, but it’s the very principle that allows for the formation of a statement at all. Now, there are different types of logic not because logic itself is variant, but because of the different types of objects that it’s applied to; which is what I’ve said about reason, that is, reason is said of many things, but many things aren’t said of reason. Yet you distinguish between these two, logic & reason; so can you please, for my understanding, define how you distinguish the two words? This’ll greatly help me to understand your overall position.

But the philosophy is more serious. It is not about the possible but about the existing and, at best, about what we can predict from the existing. The horizon of our hopes and their foundation.

What exists beyond what can be tested for, or observed is up for debate. Our hopes can be narrow minded, confined to the conditioned reason that we are presented with by our culture. Presumably metaphysics tries to look beyond these confines, but where to look?

I have made an argument that the brain can be considered the cause of the mental.

Could it possibly be a host to the mental, or a cause of the expression in the host?

Hey Wayfarer!

I'm trying to get up to speed on the discussion...who here is the Materialist?

“But there are no natural squares or circles, in the same way bodies are extended in space. If they don’t occur naturally other than an artificial creation specific to a particular instance, one wonders about the first instance of them, and if he wonders long enough, he finds them to be nothing but derived from concepts, or, more accurately, the principles concepts validate. These can arise in no other way than from the intelligence that thinks them, by means of what has come to be known as pure reason.” — This misses that it’s possible to come across a designed sensible object whose formation one wasn’t a witness to. For example, I personally can draw, in a park somewhere, a seemingly perfect circle or square with sensible or natural forms, & there can be a child, of 4 or 5 years of age whose cognitive powers haven’t fully developed yet, who subsequently comes along & sees it; this child would then have a bare sensuous observation of it, say, without knowing what the shape is called (they’re deaf, mute, & haven’t learned how to sign or read braille) & that such a shape is “perfect”; so that his intellect wouldn’t be thinking it, although he’d be sensuously intuiting it.

Yet, the point of there being no perfect circles or squares in the sensible or natural world is ultimately beside the point; for, either way, the point is that abstractions/conceptions can’t alter things which aren’t created by them. Again, if the principle or condition of reason was created by abstraction/conception, the latter would be able to alter it (like it can alter the abstract/concept of a pegasus or a unicorn), such that it could make X = -X; yet since it can’t, it’s obvious that the principle of reason isn’t created by abstraction/conception.

Now, you say that you sort of agree that conception/abstraction can’t occur without the principle of reason; your point of difference is that it can’t occur without “functional human reason,” & not “the principle of reason.” For, “in and of itself,” you say about reason, it “doesn’t have a principle, but rather, constructs them on its own accord,” which, you go on to say, “is why we can’t even think squared circle, much less cognize its objective validity, because such cognition violates the principles reason already supplied. In effect, a square circle is merely a euphemism for an impossible cognition, allowing us to see how irrational we can be.” — I fail to see how reason can “construct” a principle without already presupposing one by which it proceeds in construction? Again, repeating what I’ve been stating over & over but most recently in the paragraph before this current one (it seems as if the cogency of the fact is being overlooked), IF the principle of reason was a construction, THEN the cognition of a square circle would only be impossible within the domain that it itself has created or supplied; so that IF this domain is merely a contingent construction of reason, THEN it should be able to create or supply another domain in which a square circle wouldn’t be impossible to cognize. Yet, again, since it can’t, this only goes to prove that reason doesn’t construct its principle, but proceeds to construct BY MEANS OF it.

I fail to see how reason can “construct” a principle without already presupposing one by which it proceeds in construction — aRealidealist

Correct. Enter the Aristotelian Three Logical Laws of Thought, from which all principles follow.
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IF the principle of reason was a construction, THEN the cognition of a square circle would only be impossible within the domain that it itself has created or supplied — aRealidealist

Still not sure what a principle of reason is; ALL principles are given from reason, so saying “principle of reason” is redundant on the one hand, and leads to the notion that reason needs a principle to justify itself on the other, which is quite absurd. Reason needs to justify the bounds of its proper employment, but has no need or want to justify its subjective reality.

Anyway.....Mere observation is probably responsible for the creation of the domain of geometry, re: the shape of a bunch of sticks laying on the ground; the way moon looks closer earlier and further away later; the appearance of a spherical rock that from a certain perspective has no third dimension. But from the sticks, the principle “no two straight lines enclose a space” is derived completely a priori; from the moon rising, “perceptual magnitude is inversely proportional to distance”; from the rock, the principle “a sphere is an infinite number of immediately adjacent circles”.

A square meets these principles, a circle meets those principles, all constructed by reason a priori, which is sufficient for squared circle to be impossible, within the domain reason created: synthetic a priori cognitions.
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it should be able to create or supply another domain in which a square circle wouldn’t be impossible to cognize. — aRealidealist

“It” being reason? So you suggest reason could create two mutually contradictory domains? Yeah...no. Not in its pursuit of knowledge as we understand it, and certainly not in the speculative epistemology I favor.

Contingent constructions of reason is possibility. It is irrational to suppose domains using principles for its rules, should operate on possibility, at the exclusion of necessity.

How do you reconcile these observed medical qualities with ideas such as pan-psychism consciousness is a fundamental force of nature, or inherent to all matter — Benj96

All the contemporary panpsychists that I’m familiar with (including myself) say that it is only the metaphysical whatever that’s necessary to have any first person experience at all that is inherent to everything, and the particular kinds of experiences that particular beings have are completely dependent on their functionality in a way that drugs etc can totally influence.

we do not really interact with a material world so much as the information about a material world — Pop

That information just is the material world.

Now what the problem really is, as I see it, is how the materialist can demonstrate the being of abstraction/conception by purely physical means — aRealidealist

Dose a computer do this?
Cellular microtubulles look promising :

https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/01/140116085105.htm

Still not sure what a principle of reason is; ALL principles are given from reason, so saying “principle of reason” is redundant on the one hand, and leads to the notion that reason needs a principle to justify itself, which is quite absurd. — Mww

Try this:

Consciousness = reason + emotion
Consciousness - emotion = reason

I do not think we can understand reason until we have a reliable model of consciousness, since it is a function of consciousness. I think, if we had a model, we would see how unreasonable reason can be:

@Banno illustrates this point with: A belief that is not subject to doubt is a certainty.

Delving into consciousness is highly problematic, in many different ways, so I can understand / respect peoples reluctance to do so.

That information just is the material world. — Pfhorrest

I'm an idealist - peace brother!

a lot of your statements come down to nuances of language, or “language games.” — aRealidealist

And in your case too. It's natural with any language that isn't univocal like science.

Rational reasoning is tautological, just as empirical experience would be. — aRealidealist

It's not a tautology, it's a redundancy. To say "rational reasoning" is a redundancy because every argument we want to make for or against something will use reason in one way or another. Therefore, to demand that reason be justified with non-rational arguments is an absurd demand. If it is possible to justify reason, it will always be with rational arguments. Here the irrationalist violates the common use of language by creating a pseudo-problem. Also when he says that reason cannot be justified with reason. Reason is not a method of justifying anything. It is not the method of proving that the current pandemic is caused by a virus. That is demonstrated by one particular method that has proved very effective in detecting the bug. As scientific methods have proved very effective in similar cases. And we call those methods and other similar ways of thinking rational or "reason" for short. And I don't think what I'm saying is inconsistent.In every case, you seem to be unable to prove that it is, because you have avoided rationally justifying your accusation of inconsistency.

You did, check your fifth post on the fifth page of this thread. — aRealidealist

I haven't seen it. I think you attribute something to me that I haven't said because you identify reason and logic. Don't make me work in vain and quote my exact words, please.

If you can give me the citation where Aristotle specifically distinguishes between logic & reason, — aRealidealist

Aristotle does not distinguish between logic and reason because these two terms are alien to his terminology. But he does distinguish between the study of the forms of argumentation and categorization (which would be roughly equivalent to today's logic) and the sciences (which would be equivalent to today's reason). According to him logic is not a "science" (it is not included in any of the five sciences mentioned at the beginning of Physics), but a propaedeutic that helps to shape syllogistic deductions so that they are rigorous. That, at least, is the interpretation that the Aristotelians gave to their treatises on logic. What we call "logic" now, of course.

Now, there are different types of logic not because logic itself is variant, but because of the different types of objects that it’s applied to; — aRealidealist

Yet you distinguish between these two, logic & reason; so can you please, for my understanding, define how you distinguish the two words? — aRealidealist

Years ago I took a course in formal logic that made me sweat blood. Although I don't remember everything, some things I did get out of it.
Firstof all, that formal logic (that of predicates is the one I remember most of all) consisted of establishing a series of deductive steps that started from axioms to conclude (demonstrate) theorems by means of a series of inference rules. Logic is therefore a method of deduction that allows us to move from premises to conclusions, from some statements to others. You can call that a method of "formation" of statements, but not hide that this formation is a deductive procedure of passing from some statements to others.

Moving from one statement to another is also the goal of Aristotelian logic (from premises to conclusion), but in the course I learned that contemporary formal logic is not the same as Aristotelian logic, since the latter contained some deficiencies that were overcome by current formal logic, which was very different from Aristotelian logic. Syllogistic logic has remained something that can be used in everyday life and that from time to time is tried to be reformed, but in its pure state it is a thing of the past among today's logicians and mathematicians.
There I was explained the differences between formal logics which were quite a lot. Neither the terms nor the rules of deduction were the same. Especially if we add the inductive logics. Therefore, to say that there is "one" logic (please, note this "one") is an abstraction that we use in ordinary language to talk about or group the different logics. A logician will always specify the branch of logic in which he works.

Leaving aside Aristotle, who is a bit old, I follow the current philosophy that makes a clear distinction between logic and reason, considering logic a part or instrument of rational procedures of thinking. It is a part that deals with the possible ways of passing from one statement to another, the form of deduction or the admissible rules of inference. Say it as you like. But reason (rational methods of thinking) has many other components. For example, valid systems of collecting empirical information, language analysis, rules of interpretation, etc. etc.
Simply put, the concept of reason is broader than that of logic.

I hope I have made my position clear because it has taken me a while.

Could it possibly be a host to the mental, or a cause of the expression in the host? — Punshhh

I don't think we're invaded by a parasite called "mind". We're not in Alien. We're not doing science fiction.
What there is is an exact relationship between the mind, which is the manifestation of certain verbal and gestural actions, and the brain. Remove one, and the other ends. There's no indication of a mental parasite. And if a word has no directly or indirectly observable reference, a word has no meaning.

At this point I'm not sure if you're advocating panpsychism or not. But what you have said is that making a distinction between the mental and the physical is not acceptable. That means we can't distinguish between an emotion and the molecular behavior of limestone. For example. And that's what I'm asking you for a demonstration, a clue or any kind of argument that can prove such a thing. — David Mo

It’s not so much ‘making a distinction’, as ‘dividing up the problem along those lines’.

I mean, humans really do have minds, mental tendencies, mental problems. If you were a doctor - I’m not, but bear with me - when someone came in with some bizarre behavioural problem, you might ask ‘is this guy under the influence of a substance, or is it a brain injury, or is it a mental illness?’ Some cases have a genuinely physical cause - like a tumour or ingestion of methamphetamine - some seem to originate in disordered cognition. Within this spectrum it seems logical to me to distinguish physical and mental, and there are many other such cases.

But getting back to limestone, or inorganic stuff generally - what it doesn’t convey, or embody, is information. I mean, unless you’re really eccentric, rocks don’t think - actually the thing I don’t like about ‘panpsychism’ is that it seems to suggest they actually do.

So living beings, generally, are obviously distinguished by experiencing sensations, by being self-organising, self-motivated, by being able to heal, breed, mutate and so on. All of that introduces levels of organisation which are not observed in inorganic life. And that level of organisation has its own rules and logic which can’t be accounted for by the same basic laws that govern inorganic material.

Life seems to embody a symbolic code, to embody information on a fundamental level. DNA, which has been mentioned here, is the obvious example. So that general observation has given rise to the discipline of biosemiotics, which ‘ is a field of semiotics and biology that studies the prelinguistic meaning-making, or production and interpretation of signs and codes in the biological realm‘. And many of the exponents of biosemiotics recognise that the laws that govern signs, exist independently of those that govern physical objects, even if in some sense they’re dependent on them.

In the human form, that organisation reaches another level again, that of reason and language, which enables capabilities that other animals don't have (although I'm learning from this forum, that this is a somehow controversial view.)

Semiotics points to another form of dualism namely, matter form (hylomorphic) dualism. I’ve been reading about it, and I find it quite persuasive; it’s grounded in Aristotelian philosophy, and is a genuine alternative to Cartesian dualism. And this approaches the whole issue of mind and body differently - in terms of matter and form, not matter and mind.

Ideas do not exist before they materialize into a brain and a language. — David Mo

It's mainly accepted nowadays that ideas can only exist in minds, which in turn can only exist in brains. The problem you've got, though, is that (for example) Pythagoras' theorem would be true (to quote Einstein) 'whether anyone discovered it or not'. And it's an idea!

I have more examples.

Does this chemical explanation of the genetic code "explain away" its capacity to support life? — Olivier5

I'm approaching it from a different perspective: that science does indeed explain many things, in an absolutely marvellous and useful way, but what explains science or scientific laws? I'm not being facetious here. Wittgenstein 'the whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena' (TLP 6.371).

if this circularity of minds studying minds is doomed to fail, then, despite your assertion to the contrary, it applies to all study of the mind - scientific, philosophical, whatever (actually, even more so in the case of philosophy: neuroscience is minds studying brains, while the philosophy of mind is nominally minds studying minds.) If it is a problem - and I have seen no other argument that it is, beyond the claim that this circularity somehow means that it must be - then the study of the mind will either run into insurmountable problems, or run on interminably without delivering results. — A Raybould

Oracle of Delphi to Socrates: ‘Know thyself!’

Socrates to Oracle of Delphi: ‘No can do! We don’t have the science yet!’

Although I would say reason has been defined in a general sense. — Mww

And I would agree, with the caveat that modern philosophy often tends to portray it in terms of an adaptation, which leads to what critical theory describes as its 'instrumentalisation'. You notice the amount of pushback on the idea of the uniqueness of the human faculty of reason; it's 'species-ism', very non-PC.

By the way if you haven't yet encountered the contemporary philosopher Sebastian Rodl, look him up. He’d be of interest to you, I suspect. (Pretty tough read!)

But those truths, such as the law of the excluded middle, are not, on those grounds, the product of that evolutionary process. The law of the excluded middle, and such like, are by definition ‘true in all possible worlds’. So, we’re dependent on the (physical) brain to be able to cognise such ideas, but the ideas themselves are not the product of a material process, rather, they are what must exist prior for any material process to occur (hence ‘a priori’). — Wayfarer

Surely that's trivial to discount. First, it assumes the answer to the question by asserting that "the ideas themselves are not the product of a material process". Second, I can point to quantum mechanics where the law of the excluded middle does not hold (e.g. either the radioactive atom decayed or it did not), and the people dealing with it are fine. The law of the excluded middle worked as long as our experience of the material world fitted in with it. Then it was abandoned by some people for something more general when experience begged to differ.

Did the a priori fact of excluded middles suddenly change? Is it's truth dependent on circumstance? Or did its seeming truth derive from experience and pedagogy?

EINSTEIN: I cannot prove scientifically that Truth must be conceived as a Truth that is valid independent of humanity; but I believe it firmly. I believe, for instance, that the Pythagorean theorem in geometry states something that is approximately true, independent of the existence of man.

When Einstein Met Tagore.

I am quite in agreement with this statement, with the caveat that only a rational intelligence is capable of grasping the Pythagorean theorem. It is, therefore, something which is both real, and immaterial. It's a real idea, not dependent on a mind, but only discernible to reason. It's certainly not 'a product'; it's a discovery.

I do not think we can understand reason until we have a reliable model of consciousness, since it is a function of consciousness. — Pop

Nope, not buyin’ that. Reason is the ground of everything mental in a rational agent with respect to what is or may be, including the exposition and subjective validity of consciousness.

Consciousness = experience + emotion. Consciousness is the state of my being conscious, the unity of that of which I am conscious. I am not conscious of my reason, but only the manifestations that represent it.
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A belief that is not subject to doubt is a certainty. — Pop

Ehhhh.....all judgements arising from certainty is knowledge, so was never a mere belief to begin with, so yes, a worthy illustration of how unreasonable reason can be.

I can point to quantum mechanics where the law of the excluded middle does not hold (e.g. either the radioactive atom decayed or it did not), and the people dealing with it are fine. — Kenosha Kid

(To say nothing of the most embarrassing graph in modern physics....)