'Berkeley is begging the question.' This is what I refute Berkeley's position. 'Berkeley is confused.' This is what Moore refuted Berkeley's position. 'Berkeley isn't a bearer of shits.' This is what Frege refuted Berkeley's position. Do you want more? Do you still think that your cognitive faculty is normal? Should I go back to the past to let you remember the whole story?

If you are not mentally-disordered fellow, go back to read 'your broken mug cup' examples. Do you still think it is begging the question?
All of Berkeley's reason assumed that there are collections of sensations that aren't material. Berkeley is begging the question.

'Berkeley is stupid and wrong. And Moore failed to refute Berkeley. Berkeley remains stupid and wrong.'
This is based on your comment.
I gave you the reasons for which material objects are different from ideas. You called it 'begging the question'. You are stupid.
All of Berkeley's reason assumed that there are collections of sensations. Berkeley argued from 'there are sensations' to 'there are only sensations'.
Do you not see that Berkeley is begging the question? If Berkeley's doing this way is allowed, then I can argue from 'there are material things' to 'there are only material things'.
What you showed amount to 'there are collections of sensations'. Does 'there are only collections of sensations' follow from 'there are collections of sensations'? You are begging the question to defend Berkeley's stupidity.
The issue of whether Moore is successful to refute Berkeley contains the issue of whether Berkeley is successful to support his view. This follows that you are a liar and fraud.

No. Berkeley is begging the question. 'Objects are collections of sensations.' Why? 'Objects exist without human perception because god is perceiving.' Does god exist?
I provided you with a bunch of reasons that I reject Berkeley's idealism. I don't think that I am begging the question.

Sensations of broken mug cup depend on mind. Material broken cup does not depend on mind. You can manipulate sensations of your broken mug cup. However, you can't get back the material broken mug cup by mere manipulation of sensations. Don't be silly. Just admit that Berkeley is stupid.

Your broken mug cup is different from your idea of your broken mug cup *in kind*. Your broken mug cup ceased to be as it used to be. You can't use it as you used to do. Your idea of your broken mug cup is that you can do anything.
This follows that material objects and ideas don't share some properties. This implies that they are different.

I still think that material objects are not identical to ideas. Suppose that I broke your mug cup. Your mug cup is material and destroyed. However, the idea of your mug cup remains. Do you not see how they are different? Don't you know about 'Leibniz's law'?

If existing things are ideas plus spirits, why are material things not allowed? Berkeley just claims that there are ideas and spirits. Anyone can claim that there are ideas and spirits and material objects.
Perceptions of material objects are different from material objects. Ergo, Moore defeated Berkeley.

Did Berkeley really say that bearers of ideas are spirits? What's the difference between ideas and spirits? Any citations???

I think that Berkeley's thoughts are still absurd. Berkeley's idealism was refuted by Moore as well as Frege.
Berkeley's idealism implies that bearers of ideas are also ideas. However, Frege claims that bearers of ideas can't be ideas. Supoose that Berkeley's body contains shits. Then, Berkeley is a bearer of shits. However, Berkeley himself is not a shit.
This analogy properly works to refute Berkeley's idealism. See 'Thought' by Frege.

Suppose that your mother put some gift on your bed in Christmas eve night. You found the gift in Christmas morning. You might respond like either:
(1) The mother put some gift last night.
(2) The non-existent Santa Claus put it last night.
(1) is a rational choice, (2) is not so.
Now Berkeley found that things exist without perceiving them. The options are:
(3) This is evidence of the existence of external objects.
(4) This is because god still perceives them.
(3) is rational, (4) is absurd, and Berkeley chooses (4).
Berkeley is the same as children like believing Santa Claus.

It's silly. I'm criticizing Berkeley, and you are defending Putnam. It's like I'm doing kick boxing, and you're doing figure skating.

Didn't Berkeley say "esse est percipi"? Your version of Berkeley is weird. Whom do you defend?

Moore claims that Berkeley did not distinguish perceptions of objects from objects. See 'The Refutation of Idealism'.
Berkeley is confused between 'a cup on the table' and 'an idea of a cup on the table'. Berkeley is confused between 'outside of mind' and 'inside of mind'.
Okay???

I forgot about eastern traditions.

The question was whether there is a better approach than of Quine...
Simple rejection does not help.

Quine actually offers '(7) (∃x)(Ralph believes that x is a spy). It is interpreted in Quine's method as '(∃x)(Ralph believes y(y is a spy) of x)
In Quine's paper, (7) is de re interpretation, and (8) is de dicto interpretation.
(8) is 'Ralph believes that (∃x)(x is a spy)'.

Actually, Quine offers two possible interpretation on 'Ralph believes there is a spy':
(1) Ralph believes there exists some x such that x is a spy. (de dicto)
(2) There exists some x such that Ralph believes y(y is a spy) of x. (de re)

I am 100% sure that you never touched Lewis's books. Your opinions about Lewis are formed by secondary sources.

If you have a complain about modal realism, then provide citations.

Why?

Hello?

Moore says that Berkeley did not tell objects from perceptions of objects.

With his 'The Refutation of Idealism'.

The most over-rated philosophers are three philosophers: Plotinus, Malebranche, Berkeley.
It seems that Plotinus is not similar to Plato. I don't think that Plotinus is a platonist at all.
Malebranche is worse than Descartes. Malebranche's metaphysics is the composed volume of falsity.
Berkeley was defeated by G. E. Moore. Many people hate idealism.

I think that Plantinga is a skillful and technical philosopher. Plantinga is known as one among top 4 possible worlds theoreticians (the others are Lewis, Kripke, Stalnaker, anyway).
If the most important thing in philosophy is clarity, then Plantinga is a good philosopher. He deserves to be spoken as the best philosopher of religion. However, most of his conclusions are somewhat ridiculous. So, I disagree with his opinions.

I think that religious beliefs are not basic. There is no evidence that religious beliefs are rational. I think that atheists can be spiritual. The whole scenario fabricated by Christian theologians has nothing to do with spirituality.

Some Christian philosophers including Alvin Plantinga tried to offer a slogan like 'Faith and Rationality'. Plantinga claims that theistic beliefs are basic or rational. (I disagree with him.)
Some atheists like Richard Dawkins used to say that atheists can be spiritual. They think that naturalists like them can be spiritual.
Some atheists like Christopher HItchens may deny any spiritual or supernatural things...

I changed the question.

You can choose your favorite work.

Every formally valid argument is not begging the question.

If a motorcycle runs, then Agustino is an idiot.
A motorcycle runs.
Therefore, Agustino is an idiot.
This argument has two premises. The proof goes as follows:
1. (∃x)(Fx & Gx) → Ha
2. (∃x)(Fx & Gx)
// Ha
3. asm: ~Ha
4. ~(∃x)(Fx & Gx) (from 1 and 3, modus tollens)
5. Ha (from 3; 2 contradicts 4, reductio ad absurdum)
Q. E. D.

Here's an example of one-premise arguments:

Agustino is a stupid idiot.
Therefore, Agustino is an idiot.

The structure goes as follows:
A & B
Therefore, B

You should look into logic textbooks.

It's an argument. The structure goes as follows:
A
Therefore, A
It is proved by natural deduction as follows:
1. A
// A
2. asm: ~A
3. A (from 1, reiteration)
4. A (from 2; 2 contradicts 3, reductio ad absurdum)
Q. E. D.
The argument is formally proved as valid.

You are a stupid idiot. Therefore, you are a stupid idiot. This argument is better than your objection to modal realism.
So, what's your argument against modal realism?

Your attack is not on modal realism, but on the reason for modal realism. I defended the latter. Modal realism won.

It's logic. Conclusions follow from premises. Good arguments are formally valid arguments. My argument is formally valid. You say that the premises and the conclusion are all okay. Modal realism wins.

I say "the reason for modal realism". You say every premise above is okay, and you accept modal realism.

We can think about the way things could have been. Anything thinkable can exist. Possible worlds (= the ways things could have been) are thinkable. Therefore, possible worlds can exist. This is a summary of the reason for modal realism. I think that your objection to modal realism is not about it above.

Your attack on Lewisian modal realism has no specific content. You're just saying it is useless. You're just saying it is insignificant. I don't think that it is useless. I don't think that it is insignificant. You just hate Lewis because you don't understand him.

Many philosophers think that modal realism significantly contributes to metaphysics.