I think that Berkeley's thoughts are still absurd. Berkeley's idealism was refuted by Moore as well as Frege.
Berkeley's idealism implies that bearers of ideas are also ideas. However, Frege claims that bearers of ideas can't be ideas. Supoose that Berkeley's body contains shits. Then, Berkeley is a bearer of shits. However, Berkeley himself is not a shit.
This analogy properly works to refute Berkeley's idealism. See 'Thought' by Frege.

Berkeley's idealism implies that bearers of ideas are also ideas. — mosesquine

No, the bearers of ideas are spirits. Properly speaking his idealism is that only ideas and spirits exist. The focus was just on non-spirit things (e.g. tables and chairs and apples and whatnot).

Did Berkeley really say that bearers of ideas are spirits? What's the difference between ideas and spirits? Any citations???

Did Berkeley really say that bearers of ideas are spirits? What's the difference between ideas and spirits? Any citations??? — mosesquine

Section 2 of Principles of Human Knowledge:

"As well as all that endless variety of ideas, or objects of knowledge, there is also something that knows or perceives them, and acts on them in various ways such as willing, imagining, and remembering. This perceiving, active entity is what I call ‘mind’, ‘spirit’, ‘soul’, or ‘myself’. These words don’t refer to any one of my ideas, but rather to something entirely distinct from them, something in which they exist, or by which they are perceived."

If existing things are ideas plus spirits, why are material things not allowed? Berkeley just claims that there are ideas and spirits. Anyone can claim that there are ideas and spirits and material objects.
Perceptions of material objects are different from material objects. Ergo, Moore defeated Berkeley.

If existing things are ideas plus spirits, why are material things not allowed? Berkeley just claims that there are ideas and spirits. Anyone can claim that there are ideas and spirits and material objects.
Perceptions of material objects are different from material objects. Ergo, Moore defeated Berkeley. — mosesquine

What he says is "Thus, for example, a certain colour, taste, smell, shape and consistency having been observed to go together, they are taken to be one distinct thing, called an ‘apple’. Other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and similar perceptible things."

So his claim is that those things that we call material objects are actually a collection of ideas. The above "refutation" is just a denial of Berkeley's claim. But a denial isn't a refutation. It's just question-begging.

I still think that material objects are not identical to ideas. Suppose that I broke your mug cup. Your mug cup is material and destroyed. However, the idea of your mug cup remains. Do you not see how they are different? Don't you know about 'Leibniz's law'?

I still think that material objects are not identical to ideas. Suppose that I broke your mug cup. Your mug cup is material and destroyed. However, the idea of your mug cup remains. Do you not see how they are different? Don't you know about 'Leibniz's law'? — mosesquine

All that's happened here is that the image (and any other relevant sensation) has changed. We then describe this change as some material object breaking.

Your broken mug cup is different from your idea of your broken mug cup *in kind*. Your broken mug cup ceased to be as it used to be. You can't use it as you used to do. Your idea of your broken mug cup is that you can do anything.
This follows that material objects and ideas don't share some properties. This implies that they are different.

Your broken mug cup is different from your idea of your broken mug cup *in kind*. Your broken mug cup ceased to be as it used to be. You can't use it as you used to do. Your idea of your broken mug cup is that you can do anything.
This follows that material objects and ideas don't share some properties. This implies that they are different. — mosesquine

The broken mug is just a collection of sensations. The unbroken mug is just a different collection of sensations.

You haven't shown that there's more to either the broken or the unbroken mug than just a collection of sensations, so you haven't refuted Berkeley.

Sensations of broken mug cup depend on mind. Material broken cup does not depend on mind. You can manipulate sensations of your broken mug cup. However, you can't get back the material broken mug cup by mere manipulation of sensations. Don't be silly. Just admit that Berkeley is stupid.

Sensations of broken mug cup depend on mind. Material broken cup does not depend on mind. You can manipulate sensations of your broken mug cup. However, you can't get back the material broken mug cup by mere manipulation of sensations. Don't be silly. Just admit that Berkeley is stupid. — mosesquine

Again, you're just begging the question. You have to show that there is such a thing as a material object that isn't just a collection of sensations. You can't assume your conclusion to refute Berkeley.

No. Berkeley is begging the question. 'Objects are collections of sensations.' Why? 'Objects exist without human perception because god is perceiving.' Does god exist?
I provided you with a bunch of reasons that I reject Berkeley's idealism. I don't think that I am begging the question.

No. Berkeley is begging the question. 'Objects are collections of sensations.' Why? 'Objects exist without human perception because god is perceiving.' Does god exist? — mosesquine

Maybe, but whether or not Berkeley has successfully supported his position isn't at issue here. What's at issue is whether or not you (or Moore) have successfully refuted it. An argument from ignorance isn't a refutation.

I provided you with a bunch of reasons that I reject Berkeley's idealism. I don't think that I am begging the question.

All of your reasons assume that there is a material object that isn't just a collection of sensations. So, yes, they beg the question.

'Berkeley is stupid and wrong. And Moore failed to refute Berkeley. Berkeley remains stupid and wrong.'
This is based on your comment.
I gave you the reasons for which material objects are different from ideas. You called it 'begging the question'. You are stupid.
All of Berkeley's reason assumed that there are collections of sensations. Berkeley argued from 'there are sensations' to 'there are only sensations'.
Do you not see that Berkeley is begging the question? If Berkeley's doing this way is allowed, then I can argue from 'there are material things' to 'there are only material things'.
What you showed amount to 'there are collections of sensations'. Does 'there are only collections of sensations' follow from 'there are collections of sensations'? You are begging the question to defend Berkeley's stupidity.
The issue of whether Moore is successful to refute Berkeley contains the issue of whether Berkeley is successful to support his view. This follows that you are a liar and fraud.

You're making a habit of insulting other posters here. I'd suggest you refrain in the future.

If you are not mentally-disordered fellow, go back to read 'your broken mug cup' examples. Do you still think it is begging the question?
All of Berkeley's reason assumed that there are collections of sensations that aren't material. Berkeley is begging the question.

If you are not mentally-disordered fellow, go back to read 'your broken mug cup' examples. Do you still think it is begging the question?
All of Berkeley's reason assumed that there are collections of sensations that aren't material. Berkeley is begging the question. — mosesquine

Again, maybe he is, but that isn't what's at issue here. What's at issue is whether or not his position has been refuted. An argument from ignorance isn't a refutation.

'Berkeley is begging the question.' This is what I refute Berkeley's position. 'Berkeley is confused.' This is what Moore refuted Berkeley's position. 'Berkeley isn't a bearer of shits.' This is what Frege refuted Berkeley's position. Do you want more? Do you still think that your cognitive faculty is normal? Should I go back to the past to let you remember the whole story?

You are really stupid — mosesquine

Don't worry mate, this guy only knows one way to deal with those who disagree with him >:O A real prick!

'Berkeley is begging the question.' This is what I refute Berkeley's position. — mosesquine

To refute a position is to show it to be false. You don't show a position to be false by arguing that it hasn't been shown to be true. That's an argument from ignorance.

'Berkeley is confused.' This is what Moore refuted Berkeley's position.

And this begs the question. It asserts that things and the ideas of them are different, which is the very thing that Berkeley is trying to show is false. It's not a refutation of Berkeley but a denial.

'Berkeley isn't a bearer of shits.' This is what Frege refuted Berkeley's position.

As I've already said, Berkeley didn't claim that the bearer of ideas are ideas, so this is a strawman.

Berkeley's idealism implies that bearers of ideas are also ideas. — mosesquine

No it doesn't; you don't know what you're talking about.

Karl Marx.

I appreciate this well-written response.

The first type of thinking deals with specific beings, while the second focuses on Being--or, more properly, the Being of beings. And since the Being of beings is not an extant being, a form of thinking predicated upon representation and calculation cannot, ipso facto, address the very 'thing' which makes us who we are. — Erik

I've seen interpretations that talk about "Being" as that which makes meaning possible or, alternatively, as a sort of invisible or receding framework in which or through which beings are disclosed. I roughly associate a sort of anti-metaphysical insight here with an idiosyncratic understanding of ordinary language philosophy. To speak intelligibly, we seem to depend on a "background" of practices that we cannot get perfectly clear about. But this anti-metaphysical insight is arguably obliterated (the medium defeating the message) when expressed in "grandiose" or highly technical ways.

We live in the spiritual wasteland that Nietzsche predicted, and this is the predicament that Heidegger was responding to. If you don't feel that alienation and dehumanization are becoming more widespread, then once again Heidegger will not resonate with you. — Erik

This is a strong point. I personally don't feel that alienation and dehumanization are becoming more widespread. I can't identify with such a gloomy view. Sure, the world refuses to conform to individual desires, but this strikes me as nothing new.

Finally, I'd be curious to see how you might elaborate on your own interpretation of Heidegger, especially on the being issue and its relevance.

The way that Aristotle is treated, taught, etc. in contemporary settings generally isn't very good...generally speaking, contemporary philosophical education isn't very good.

Modern philosophical education: Begin with Descartes, pretend as though philosophy starts there, and then give the student a little smattering of everything, and then somehow expect the student to be something other than horribly confused at the end.

I recommend Alisdaire MacIntyre's "Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry" on this point. MacIntyre's writing style is...I won't lie to you...absolutely torturous. It's convoluted, long-winded, confusing and...I'll just say it.

It's terrible.

That said, many of the ideas are pretty good and worth making it past his bad writing.

At any rate, there are many factors that could have led to you not being impressed by Aristotle, which can include:

1. Bad translations.
2. A lack of understanding of the technical terminology.
3. A lack of context for his philosophy as a whole and how the texts were interpreted by later commentators.
4. A complete lack of Greek.

At any rate:

Posterior Analytics + St. Thomas Aquinas' commentary on the Posterior Analytics.

Worth it.

The second and third paragraphs weren't supposed to be an explanation of Berkeley's view but my own. Regarding Berkeley, I only meant to say that his argument is that a cup and an idea of a cup are the same thing, so to respond by saying that he confuses them is to beg the question and assume that they're distinct. — Michael

Wait though--if ontologically cleaving perception and what the perception is of is question-begging from a perspective of idealism, why isn't ontologically merging perception and what the perception is of question-begging from a perspective of realism?

Also, he didn't deny there were external objects, in the sense of sensible objects in space outside of the body — The Great Whatever

Wouldn't that have to be something like "'outside' (outsideness a la spatial location being merely an idea) of one's own set of ideas."

Wait though--if ontologically cleaving perception and what the perception is of is question-begging from a perspective of idealism, why isn't ontologically merging perception and what the perception is of question-begging from a perspective of realism — Terrapin Station

What I'm saying is that if someone is trying to argue that such a separation is mistaken then it's question-begging to claim that such a position is wrong because the separation isn't mistaken.

You need to show that it's correct, not just say that it is.

What I'm saying is that if someone is trying to argue that such a separation is mistaken then it's question-begging to claim that such a position is wrong because the separation isn't mistaken. — Michael

Shouldn't that last phrase have been "because the separation is mistaken"?

And yeah, I'd agree that if someone is arguing that the separation is mistaken because the separation is mistaken, then that's obviously circular.

And likewise if someone were arguing that the separation isn't mistaken because the separation isn't mistaken.

However, when someone responds to Berkeley, say, by saying "wait a minute--you're conflating the perception per se with what the perception is of," they're not arguing that there's a difference between the perception per se and what the perception is of because there's a difference between the perception per se and what the perception is of.

I don't recall offhand what Berkeley's argument for the two being the same would be--it's been ages since I read Berkeley, but I know that when people say things like that on boards like this, they almost never present any sort of argument for the perception and what the perception is of being the same. They just apparently conflate the two, which is why folks in the other camp (like me) point out that they're conflating the two. If they'd actually presented some sort of argument for why it's not a conflation, why they're the same thing instead, then folks in my camp would instead respond with critiques of aspects of that argument rather than just saying, "Hey, you're conflating those two things," and we certainly wouldn't say something like, "You're conflating those two things because you're conflating those two things," as if the because clause is supposed to explain the first clause.

However, when someone responds to Berkeley, say, by saying "wait a minute--you're conflating the perception per se with what the perception is of," they're not arguing that there's a difference between the perception per se and what the perception is of because there's a difference between the perception per se and what the perception is of. — Terrapin Station

What they're saying is that the claim that there isn't a difference is wrong because there is a difference, which begs the question. It's like arguing against the theist by saying that they're wrong because God doesn't exist. It's not a refutation of the opposing claim, it's just a denial of the opposing claim.

Saying that idealism is wrong because materialism is right isn't an argument.

You have to actually show that there's an ontological difference between perception and the object of perception (as opposed to just an intentional difference, à la paint and Dali's melting clocks).