Berkeley's idealism implies that bearers of ideas are also ideas. — mosesquine
Did Berkeley really say that bearers of ideas are spirits? What's the difference between ideas and spirits? Any citations??? — mosesquine
If existing things are ideas plus spirits, why are material things not allowed? Berkeley just claims that there are ideas and spirits. Anyone can claim that there are ideas and spirits and material objects.
Perceptions of material objects are different from material objects. Ergo, Moore defeated Berkeley. — mosesquine
I still think that material objects are not identical to ideas. Suppose that I broke your mug cup. Your mug cup is material and destroyed. However, the idea of your mug cup remains. Do you not see how they are different? Don't you know about 'Leibniz's law'? — mosesquine
Your broken mug cup is different from your idea of your broken mug cup *in kind*. Your broken mug cup ceased to be as it used to be. You can't use it as you used to do. Your idea of your broken mug cup is that you can do anything.
This follows that material objects and ideas don't share some properties. This implies that they are different. — mosesquine
Sensations of broken mug cup depend on mind. Material broken cup does not depend on mind. You can manipulate sensations of your broken mug cup. However, you can't get back the material broken mug cup by mere manipulation of sensations. Don't be silly. Just admit that Berkeley is stupid. — mosesquine
No. Berkeley is begging the question. 'Objects are collections of sensations.' Why? 'Objects exist without human perception because god is perceiving.' Does god exist? — mosesquine
I provided you with a bunch of reasons that I reject Berkeley's idealism. I don't think that I am begging the question.
If you are not mentally-disordered fellow, go back to read 'your broken mug cup' examples. Do you still think it is begging the question?
All of Berkeley's reason assumed that there are collections of sensations that aren't material. Berkeley is begging the question. — mosesquine
'Berkeley is begging the question.' This is what I refute Berkeley's position. — mosesquine
'Berkeley is confused.' This is what Moore refuted Berkeley's position.
'Berkeley isn't a bearer of shits.' This is what Frege refuted Berkeley's position.
Berkeley's idealism implies that bearers of ideas are also ideas. — mosesquine
The first type of thinking deals with specific beings, while the second focuses on Being--or, more properly, the Being of beings. And since the Being of beings is not an extant being, a form of thinking predicated upon representation and calculation cannot, ipso facto, address the very 'thing' which makes us who we are. — Erik
We live in the spiritual wasteland that Nietzsche predicted, and this is the predicament that Heidegger was responding to. If you don't feel that alienation and dehumanization are becoming more widespread, then once again Heidegger will not resonate with you. — Erik
The second and third paragraphs weren't supposed to be an explanation of Berkeley's view but my own. Regarding Berkeley, I only meant to say that his argument is that a cup and an idea of a cup are the same thing, so to respond by saying that he confuses them is to beg the question and assume that they're distinct. — Michael
Also, he didn't deny there were external objects, in the sense of sensible objects in space outside of the body — The Great Whatever
Wait though--if ontologically cleaving perception and what the perception is of is question-begging from a perspective of idealism, why isn't ontologically merging perception and what the perception is of question-begging from a perspective of realism — Terrapin Station
What I'm saying is that if someone is trying to argue that such a separation is mistaken then it's question-begging to claim that such a position is wrong because the separation isn't mistaken. — Michael
However, when someone responds to Berkeley, say, by saying "wait a minute--you're conflating the perception per se with what the perception is of," they're not arguing that there's a difference between the perception per se and what the perception is of because there's a difference between the perception per se and what the perception is of. — Terrapin Station
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