I am no psychologist, counselor, self-help wizard, or anything to the like. Wanted to however comment:

Although not everyone, many – both hereabouts and in the world at large, myself as no exception – are to large extents self-righteously arrogant, unknowingly ignorant, and ignorantly callous. Which is to in part say that most could hardly give a damn about those in need if they don’t have some material or social capital to gain from it – to not even get into cases where there's a potential loss of either such capital for doing what one can to help. It’s also to say that most people argue not to better discover that which is true but to further fortify their own ego, which in part consists of ready-constructed presumptions about oneself and the world upon which one’s selfhood depends. Such that anyone who significantly differs from oneself is by default deemed wrong and, to varying extents, unfit. This dislike for others emerging irrespective of the other’s moral character and existential innocence.

Neither philosophers nor those who spend time philosophizing are, as cohorts, exempt from this competition of ego.

Life can be rough, this in more than just a few ways. Especially for those who don’t partake of – or who cannot even find any means of relating to – the dog-eat-dog aspects of the world. It's not the whole of humanity, but it is a significant portion of it.

I get some of what you mean by associating the experience of pain with acquisition of new truths. Though not always, there often for me as well is a sting to the ego involved in a new existential discovery. A bursting of a bubble kind of thing, wherein one acknowledges that what one has so far upheld has been wrong all along. This occasional association between pain and truth, however, does not mandate that all new existential discoveries be uncomfortable to oneself. Nor that pain is somehow equivalent to strength. Heck, some intuitions and inspirations that lead one to see things anew with greater clarity can be downright pleasant intellectually, to say the least. And these pleasant occasions can provide a great deal of strength.

All of that briefly touched upon, I think at least part of you is on the right path in learning to think for yourself. This as evidenced by your questioning certain authority figures whose conclusions make little if any sense to you, such as what you’ve done in this thread. There’s something to be said about not following the dictums of authority figures blindly; in understanding that no human is infallible, not even those who are specialists and who most look up to. It's in no way about universal doubt, but about bearing in mind that ego most often prevails – or is at least in part always entwined – this irrespective of philosophical position. Reasoning things out for yourself to the best of your ability is certainly an important part of this. While I’m at this "question authority and think for yourself" motto, engaging in random acts of kindness can be a noble endeavor as well.

As I said, I know of no panacea – and I’m not pretending to. It’s a struggle – for everyone at some time or another. Some treat life as a joke; other’s take it seriously. But everyone suffers during portions of it. One simply has to find the optimal means for oneself to face the storms when they come and battle with them – or, better said, through them. Hopefully findings ways to hold onto integrity – to an ethical heart – in the process.

The answers you seek to your most important existential questions will, imo, likely not come from others, but from within yourself. Even if there is no success, there will still be dignity for yourself you will find in taking on the strife: in the noble battle with whatever obstacles you have to face.

----------

Any way to make it stop? — Darkneos

Again, not as any type of professional but as a fellow imperfect human being dwelling within an imperfect humanity, I wouldn’t address complete strangers with such questions. Too many sharks in the seas to make such open questions profitable to you – most of the time at least. People at large typically aren’t as compassionate as they profess to be. Still, this isn’t to say that good souls don’t occur in the world.

My own best, though imperfect, answer, is provided in what I've already typed. There is no stopping life's strife; there's only doing one's best to deal with it. And the personal pride that ought to accompany this.

---------

Hopefully at least some of this post will resonate with you. If not, kindly disregard it. Best of luck to you either way.

p.s. I in all likelihood will not have anything further to add on this matter. Again, I'm no professional on the subject.

I only skinned through the article, short though it was. To be charitable to the guy, his argument could be deemed to boil down to "there's more to us than what we physiologically perceive via our sense organs". For one easy example of this, we are endowed with things such as emotions and goals ... none of which are thus perceivable.

But yea, when it comes to Eastern notions of Maya, I in this case far more respect your instincts than trust his awards.

It doesn't mean not real in BUddhism, it's more complicated than that. — Darkneos

Precisely.

Kudos. Sounds in keeping with C.S. Peirce's point of view. Though something tells me you'd disagree with his pragmaticist conclusions of objective idealism. :smile:

Loosely speaking, the OP is about what is real. I agreed with BC's point that humans are meaning making creatures who invent stories to help manage their environment. (Richard Rorty holds a similar view.) Some of those stories work better in some texts than others. And some of those stories, like the one in the OP, might be borne out of having too much spare time. — Tom Storm

Right. Here's a more pithy question. What then is real rather than invented story?

But this question has the potential to lead one down the rabbit hole of philosophical enquiry. With plenty of potholes along the way.

Ok, I'll cease and desist then. :wink:

I don't think even he really knows what he's talking about — Darkneos

I was addressing not so much the OP's link but the OP's quote.

All the same, in reference to the OP's link, from where I stand, this assessment of yours sums up the situation nicely.

I would include scientism as one of those bedtime stories. — Tom Storm

Curious: would you also include in this list of illusory/delusional bedtime stories the metaphysics of materialism/physicalism?

I ask because the OP’s quote isn’t about scientism - its conclusions are devoid of anything that is empirically demonstrable, which is what science tackles - but instead addresses perspectives directly derived from a materialistic/physicalist platform. Its argument, in a nutshell, is that because there is no significant distinction between life and non-life (due to all life being inferred fully emergent from non-life), and because all that is real is material/physical (which is non-living), then all life is illusory rather than real.

I’ve already addressed some of the reasons for why this argument is lacking in a previous post.

The current point being, the conclusion that “life is an illusion” is not a product of scientism - but a product of the materialism/physicalism on which scientism is typically founded.

As an interesting tidbit in terms of Darwin’s ethics, he is well enough known for his anti-slavery/abolitionist stances. A far cry from what we often interpret by survival of the fittest. For example, here’s an excerpt from his autobiography:

Fitz-Roy’s [the captain of the Beagle, the ship on which Darwin traveled to the famed Galapagos Islands] temper was a most unfortunate one. It was usually worst in the early morning, and with his eagle eye he could generally detect something amiss about the ship, and was then unsparing in his blame. He was very kind to me, but was a man very difficult to live with on the intimate terms which necessarily followed from our messing by ourselves in the same cabin. We had several quarrels; for instance, early in the voyage at Bahia, in Brazil, he defended and praised slavery, which I abominated, and told me that he had just visited a great slave-owner, who had called up many of his slaves and asked them whether they were happy, and whether they wished to be free, and all answered “No.” I then asked him, perhaps with a sneer, whether he thought that the answer of slaves in the presence of their master was worth anything?

To my way of seeing, getting the captain of the ship you are a guest on (in the middle of a vast ocean you could easily fall into) angry by questioning his moral character takes, should I say, a great deal of gall. Kudos to him.

But it might be interpreted metaphorically to signify a quality that living organisms possess. I think a way of conceiving it might be along the lines of the relationship between meaning and the symbolic form in which meaning is encoded. — Wayfarer

I agree.

Another prominent factor I find of interest is that of intentions (teloi). Life is overtly intentional, goal-oriented. Whereas non-life is either fully devoid of intentionality or - if interpreted through certain ancient philosophical perspectives - can potentially be deemed covertly intentional only in so far as it abides by the logos' (universal reasoning's) laws in progressing toward an Aristotelian final cause as prime mover. Although I grant this latter option is very offbeat. Still, either way, I do find that life is fundamentally different from non-life; that there is a "vital impetus" intrinsic to life that is missing in non-life.

At any rate, I deem this a better perspective than declaring life to be illusory. :wink:

It is interesting that none goes for idealism yet. I remember debating in some threads with members who were Platonist. — javi2541997

I myself waver between idealist and neutral monist, but I’d vote for “the alternatives provided in the poll are too unclear to answer” - which, unfortunately, is not an alternative provided in the poll.

If philosophers categorize “non-skeptical realism” then there should also be such a thing as “skeptical realism”. Both of these are to me very muddled concepts in need of further clarification. Assuming this is possible.

Then the categories of “idealism” and “realism” are presented as though they were somehow incompatible when it comes to an external world. C.S. Peirce’s views serve as one clear-cut example to the contrary. Posing idealism against realism is about as philosophically astute as would be posing realism against materialism. Muddled, or at least so I find.

Once we have the leisure to roast domestic rabbits, we start spinning out interesting ideas about gods, illusion, Maya, the Trinity, Karma, and so on. Some of this thinking is not illusory, it's delusional. Our - perhaps - overly intellectual brains seem to need a certain amount of delusional thinking to put up with life. Otherwise, some people find reality terrifying. — BC

We certainly seem to need and cherish our bedtime stories. — Tom Storm

I so far don't understand how any of this is relevant to the OP.

The elephant in the room in this thread is vitalism (not specific variants which oddly enough sought to measure the immeasurable as though life were itself somehow a physical property, but simply as the general idea that life is fundamentally different from non-life). If, as is commonly believed today, vitalism is false such that there is no fundamental difference between life and non-life, and if all that we deem life is emergent in all respects from non-life, then - as per the OP quote - life can be deemed an illusion rather than real. One of those delusional bedtime stories we tell ourselves and our children: that we are alive.

Consequences of materialism 101.

Don’t know about others, but this way of thinking gives me a good laugh. Still, for the typical materialist, it’s nowhere near as worrisome as the prospect of vitalism - wherein the reality of life becomes, for the materialist, something to be scared about.

I want to know how accurate this view is. — Darkneos

From what I’ve read in the OP, life is here considered illusory on account of being emergent (in this case, from non-life). In here granting a materialist’s general perspective, first, on what logical grounds does an emergent property necessitate that it be illusory rather than real? The properties of water are emergent from the properties of two gases - hydrogen and oxygen - when the latter’s atoms are covalently bound together; ergo, the properties of water are illusory? Secondly, from a materialist perspective, what existent would not be in any way emergent from something else - other than, maybe, the quantum vacuum field and/or some free-floating natural laws and the like?

Seems to me that this same argument for life being illusory offered in the OP quote will, by its own reasoning, also conclude in affirming that everything else we commonly appraise as real is likewise illusory - for it is all in some way or other emergent. That a materialist can be fine with entertaining this while in the same breath deploring notions such as Maya is, to me, something of wonder.

when thus understood, "fitness" strictly applies to the Neo-Darwinian synthesis of Darwin and Mendel, ... — javra

You lost me here! :grin:
But it's OK. Not important. — Alkis Piskas

To all the same clarify: Gregor Mendel is the guy who discovered genes by working on pea plants. He knew of Darwin's work but his is work was unknown to Darwin. It wasn't until later than Mendel's discovery of genes was incorporated with Darwin's notion of natural selection. This incorporation of Darwin's work with Mendel's work goes by the name of Neo-Darwinism. Properly speaking, today's biological notion of "fitness" is not a Darwinian concept but a Neo-Darwinian one - one which Darwin himself was ignorant of, since he did not know about genes.

I consider all this an exellent analysis! :up: — Alkis Piskas

Glad it made sense. Cheers. :grin:

His moral and political philosophies contradict the implications adopted by others, for instance eugenics, showing that his haters have wrongly and undeservedly cast him with aspersions from which his reputation has yet to recover. Such a shame. — NOS4A2

Out of curiosity, I once read though most of his "Principles of Ethics". I found it to be utilitarianism 101. A very different spiel than what we now commonly interpret by the notion of "Social Darwinism". So I'm seconding your comments here.

the latter phrasing [re: “survival of the form that survives in successive generations”] can just as well be reduced to “survival of that form which survives”. — javra

I see what you mean. But is just "survives" enough? Every organism survives ...
I believe that Darwin's "reproductive success" is very clear and satisfies his theory. If we have to translate it in to "survival", we could say "the form that survives longer, in terms of generations". As we say figuratively that a person "survives through his children".

it depends on how the phrase "survival of the fittest" gets interpreted. — javra

Yes, it can be interprested in different ways. However, as I mentioned to Vera Mont, there's only one definition as far as Darwin's theory is concerned. Which, BTW, I missed to include in my description of the topic. — Alkis Piskas

To try to clarify what I was saying:

A) When contextualized by the modern field of biological evolution, the term “survive” can in a very rough way be equated to the term “outlive” (as in, "children typically survive their own parents", as you've mentioned) - this rather than holding the meaning of “continuing to live”. Since “survival of the fittest” is applied in the context of biological evolution, this phrase could then be reworded as “the outliving of those forms which are fittest”.

[Hence, to my understanding: When the term is thus evolutionarily applied, an organism that lives its whole life without reproducing does not evolutionarily survive - for there is no form it serves as ancestor to that outlives it.]

B) Next, when “fitness” is biologically defined as “the quantitative representation of a form’s reproductive success” or something to the like (of note: when thus understood, "fitness" strictly applies to the Neo-Darwinian synthesis of Darwin and Mendel, being a semantic unknown to Darwin himself), the term “fitness” too can be roughly equated to “the attribute of outliving (that which one was biologically generated by)”.

[Note that “the continuing to live ("survival" in this sense) of that form which holds greatest reproductive success ("fitness" in its modern evolutionary sense)” is not a very cogent proposition in the context of evolutionary theory. For example, an organism with very short lifespan that successfully reproduces galore will have a relatively great fitness - despite not continuing to live for very long.]

C) Then, when integrating (a) with (b), within this context of Neo-Darwinian biological evolution, one could potentially conclude that the biological phrase “survival of the fittest” can translate via its biological semantics into “the outliving (of ancestors) of that form which most outlives (its ancestors)” or, again via semantics typically applied to the field of modern evolutionary theory, into “the survival of that form which most survives”.

[To emphasize, "fitness" as, in short, reproductive success is a biological notion that was unknown to Darwin and his contemporaries (Spencer, Wallace, etc.). It was first proposed with its modern biological sense [url=https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fitness_(biology)#History]in 1924.[/url] So, while “survival of the fittest” could have made sense in a Darwinian model of evolution (given that "fitness" did not then entail a quantitative representation of a form's reproductive success), in the Neo-Darwinian model of evolution this phrase does run a significant risk of being interpreted as a tautology among biologists in the field.]

That’s my best current impression, at any rate.

I only read The Origin of Species, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, and his autobiography - this decades ago with no recollection of the editions I read, nor with much background knowledge of how he incorporated “survival of the fittest” into later editions due to, I believe it was, Wallace’s influence. So I'm no academic on the matter. But I did find this news article which supports the impression that reading him made on me back when I read Darwin: he didn't endorse the notion of selfish individualism being a leading driver of evolution. Here’s a noteworthy, though inadequately referenced, excerpt from the article:

Charles Darwin not only did not coin the phrase “survival of the fittest” (the phrase was invented by Herbert Spencer), but he argued against it. In “On the Origin of Species,” he wrote: “it hardly seems probable that the number of men gifted with such virtues [as bravery and sympathy] ... could be increased through natural selection, that is, by the survival of the fittest.”

Darwin was very clear about the weakness of the survival-of-the-fittest argument and the strength of his “sympathy hypothesis” when he wrote: “Those communities which included the greatest number of the most sympathetic members would flourish best and rear the greatest number of offspring.” What Darwin called “sympathy,” in the words of Paul Ekman, “today would be termed empathy, altruism, or compassion.”

Darwin goes so far in his compassion argument as to tie the success of human evolution (and even “lower animals”) to the evolution of compassion. He writes that as the human race evolved from “small tribes” into large civilizations, concern about the well-being of others extended to include not just strangers but “all sentient beings.”

Wayfarer's recommendation reminded me of this complementary work, The Genial Gene.

Are selfishness and individuality—rather than kindness and cooperation—basic to biological nature? Does a "selfish gene" create universal sexual conflict? In The Genial Gene, Joan Roughgarden forcefully rejects these and other ideas that have come to dominate the study of animal evolution. Building on her brilliant and innovative book Evolution's Rainbow, in which she challenged accepted wisdom about gender identity and sexual orientation, Roughgarden upends the notion of the selfish gene and the theory of sexual selection and develops a compelling and controversial alternative theory called social selection. This scientifically rigorous, model-based challenge to an important tenet of neo-Darwinian theory emphasizes cooperation, elucidates the factors that contribute to evolutionary success in a gene pool or animal social system, and vigorously demonstrates that to identify Darwinism with selfishness and individuality misrepresents the facts of life as we now know them.

Read it some time ago. Found it an enjoyable read, and remember it being well supported by a good amount of scientific research.

To add my two cents, though I now see some of this overlaps with some previous comments:

To paraphrase a former professor of mine as I can best recall, the phrasing can well be deemed tautological; consider that “survival of the form that will leave the most copies of itself in successive generations” can biologically well translate into “survival of the form that survives in successive generations” and, since evolutionary survival is always implicitly understood in terms of generations (rather than in terms of one individual organism’s lifespan), the latter phrasing can just as well be reduced to “survival of that form which survives”.

That tidbit mentioned, to further opine, as to (1) it depends on how the phrase "survival of the fittest" gets interpreted. For instance, if “fitness” is philosophically understood in the more abstract terms of “the attribute of being conformant to some given” and one further infers that this conformity first and foremost addresses something akin to objective reality when it comes to life and its inherent subjectivity, then one can obtain the rather realistic view that those lifeforms which best conform to the requirements of objective reality’s ever-changing parameters will be most likely to survive (i.e., will, as forms, be most likely found to continue occurring in latter generations). Though this understanding of fitness is different from the official understanding of fitness as, in short, reproductive success, the two understanding can very well converge to my mind. Hence, when thus interpreted, for one example, the present human species can be deemed of very low fitness since it is not fitting itself into, i.e. conforming with, the ecological requirements of the biosphere, but instead diverging from these requirements … with global warming and its ever more devastating consequences as one primary outcome of this. Yes, a lot is opined here but, again, it's mentioned with intent to illustrate that the realism to “survival of the fittest” is contingent on how the expression is interpreted.

As to (2), how most interpret “survival of the fittest” is to my mind a simple mirror held up to the principle values which humanity at large currently entertains. We too often value authoritarian dominance over other, this being implicitly deemed synonymous to fitness by many if not most, as contrasted to living in harmony with other. In reality, non-human species that tend to not live in harmony with their surrounding species and environment also tend to not be very fit, apex predators included. If a predator species eats too much of its prey species, then the predator species will collapse and, if its collapse and absence of food is sufficient, it can go extinct. Maybe for obvious reasons, not many, if any, living examples of such species of apex predators (humans here excluded), but from what I recall ecological models illustrate this just mentioned tendency.

And in terms of (3), again imo, given the aforementioned perspectives, the phrasing is morally detrimental in so far as it reinforces the predominant view of “fitness” being equivalent to a kind of individualism wherein the individual person or cohort outcompetes all others in a zero-sum game. The phrasing further seeks to root this mindset into the objective reality of biology at large when, in fact, this mindset, generally speaking, directly contradicts what the natural world of life for the most part consists of. Competition stands out to us against a background of cooperation and harmony; we focus on the first and tend to neglect the second.

So, to sum my own perspective up, there’s a lot more cooperation and harmony in nature than what we are typically interested in acknowledging, such that it is this very cooperation and harmony which leads to the fitness of the species and individuals from which the biosphere is constituted. But cooperation and harmony is most often opposite to what we commonly interpret via the motto of “survival of the fittest”.

I'd say sure, if by "thinking thing" one would include all forms of awareness as thoughts; thereby, for example, granting that lesser lifeforms are also thinking things. (I'm not big on Cartesian implications of the cogito.)

At any rate, good enough for me to agree.

I think, maybe, we might now be in agreement? To use your own terminology:

If others think of the thinker A as ignorant, and if the thinker A thinks of him/herself as ignorant, then thinker A could well be wise instead of ignorant. A Socratic figure of sorts. Nevertheless, all the potential and actual illusions pertaining to what thinker A is will not dispel the existential fact that thinker A is … for thinker A must be in order to entertain the illusions, their own and others’, regarding what thinker A is.

Does this work for you?

As you can see we run into trouble in trying to get a fix on the self - it's in the simplest sense the thinker and I'll leave it at that. — Agent Smith

Ditto, although I favor something more akin to the "awareness-er".

What's left then to be the true self? — Agent Smith

Maybe delving into these metaphysical waters would get us too close for comfort to certain so-called religious beliefs - here mainly thinking of the Hindu notions of Brahman and Moksha. Because of this, I won't insist on the matter.

In me humble opinion combining the two selves makes more sense than opting for either alone even though both [...] are illusions. — Agent Smith

Hence the crux: illusions to whom? To non-existing givens?

However, knowledge (epistemology, not ontology) of the self consists of the self to the self or the self to others; there's no third alternative, — Agent Smith

Yet the same can be said of anything physical: e.g. knowledge of a rock consists of the rock to the self or the rock to others. But this does not then signify that a rock's "real identity" = "rock to one's self" + "rock to others".

As to a third alternative, I'll tepidly propose that personal identity is as subject to indirect realism as would be anything physical, consisting in part of aspects that are independent of particular thoughts or beliefs (of noumenal givens, as Kant might call them) and, in part, of aspects that are a directly construct of particular thoughts or beliefs. For instance, a self requires a first-person point of view, whatever that might ontologically be, that partitions reality into self an other - and this irrespective of particular thoughts or beliefs on the matter. On the other hand, that this first-person point of view is itself endowed with this or that attribute can then well be a full construct of the particular thoughts and beliefs - one's own and other's - in question.

Still, this would mean that the equation you've proposed is not fully accurate.

Hm … do you then hold that human selfhood is Berkeleyan (“to be is to be perceived”) while reality is not? This where reality includes things such as human bodies and brains and facts (including facts of what one has previously intended and chosen)?

To me this seems too much of an ontological mismatch. And I’m personally not one for Berkeleyan immaterialism.

There are 3 selves (identities)
1. Who others think you are (So)
2. Who you think you are (Ss)
3. Who you really are (Sr)

Sr = So + Ss — Agent Smith

Don’t have an answer for the OP, and while I agree that the human self is in many a way interpersonal and multidimensional, the implications of this math feel off.

If the equation is right, then: A guy who is thought to be X by others and who thinks of himself as X then will mandatorily be X.

Won't necessarily apply if X is “a god” or “an extraterrestrial alien” or “a subhuman”. But to be more detailed: If a guy perpetually lies to himself and to others with enough cunning to make his lies convincing, if others thereby think him to be honest, and if he holds a psychosis in which he also thinks himself honest, does this then make this teller of lies an honest person?

As my example tries to illustrate, there seems to be more to the reality of personal identity - or at least some aspects of it - than the mere sum of thoughts (one’s own and others’) regarding it. For instance, personal identity will in part consist of existential facts regarding what one has intended and chosen so far in one’s life; thoughts, one’s own and others’, might either correspond to these facts or they might not - but thoughts per se can’t alter or otherwise recreate these facts.

That said, this is deep waters for me, and I’d rather not swim too far out.

RIP Z :roll: — jgill

Darn. Saw the banning only after my last post. Seems like play time might be over for me. Oh well.

Perhaps in lieu of putting words in my mouth and inserting your foot in yours, you can ask for clarification and/or additional support for claims made. — Zettel

OK then, maybe I've read too much into what you're saying. I'll give it another go. From the OP:

Are metaphysical doctrines such as aesthetics and ethics really "branches" of philosophy, or are they just thinly disguised poetry? The propositions issuing from metaphysics and philosophy seem logically and epistemologically distinct.

Philosophy means "love of wisdom". Wisdom requires knowledge, not belief, opinion, sentiment or personal view, else how does (read: "can") one 'know' who or what is wise? — Zettel

So, "philosophy means 'love of wisdom'" and "wisdom requires knowledge". OK, though this does not then imply that philosophy is "love of knowledge" per se.

If I understand the OP well enough, it contends that "love of wisdom" which aspires to gain knowledge of what values are (such as ethical and aesthetic values) and why they are as they are should not be properly considered philosophy.

So far you've specified that this is so because ethics and aesthetics (both of which consist of values, or worths) are not empirically verifiable and so cannot consist of knowledge (regarding "what is" rather than "what is to you")

But this again seems self-refuting to me: "love", emotive though it is, holds a value, a worth, otherwise it becomes a meaningless term; so your very affirmation of what proper philosophy (i.e., "love of wisdom") is will be grounded on that which you claim to be the "thinly disguised poetry" of metaphysics, rather than on empirically verifiable knowns. Thereby (given the dichotomy you're presented) by your own standards making the enterprise of demarcating proper philosophy - i.e., proper love of wisdom - itself metaphysical, i.e. thinly disguised poetry.

On the other hand, if you can somehow demonstrate love to be an empirically verifiable known regarding "what is", then you'd likewise demonstrate a value/worth to be an empirically verifiable known - thereby making axiology (which again encompasses the study of ethical and aesthetic value) a worthwhile philosophical study by the OP's standards.

This is not to say you are not entitled to your feelings; it is to say that your feelings do not describe "what is", only "what is to you". Big difference. — Zettel

by knowledge I mean awareness of "what is". "What is" is that which is empirically verified. — Zettel

An argument: the proposition that axiology (i.e. the philosophical study of value)—which can thereby include the study of ethical and aesthetic values—ought not be properly considered a subset of philosophy on grounds that axiology does not address “what is” (which is empirically verifiable) but “what is to you” (which is not empirically verifiable) is, in short, self-refuting; this because the very affirmation’s truth value (if any) is contingent on standards of value (such as in relation to what is good, right, correct, or proper and their converse in respect to philosophy) that cannot be empirically verifiable via observations and, thereby, which hold no truth value in relation to “what is”.

Intending to simplify the just expressed: you’re using your own empirically unverifiable system of values to make the philosophical assertion that the study of values and has no philosophically worth on grounds of not being empirically verifiable—thereby entailing your own assertion to have no philosophical worth.

As others have mentioned, metaphysics tends to concern itself with first principles, which I’ll contend include first principles in relation to value. These, then, address issues such as why it is that you yourself value empirically verifiable philosophy and disvalue empirically unverifiable philosophy in the first place.

Anyway, is your example irony? I don't think so. — T Clark

Hmm, the definition provided can be an instance of feigned ignorance intended to confound or provoke. Its intended meaning could be that the search for a definitive definition of “irony” might be a wild-goose chase. A playing the bimbo deal.

Else, one can take the face value intent of the definition at its word, in which case it could not quality as irony.

There’s a lot here and I’m sure there’s a lot more to say, but I’ve always found definitions of “irony” unsatisfying. — T Clark

I’m surprised that no one has so far stated this obvious definition: “Irony” means “having the quality of iron”. For example, “The Iron Age was very irony”.

Yes, this to me can be an ironic comment - without being sarcastic, satirical, or hypocritical. Knee-slapper though it may be.

Sarcasm makes use of mockery whereas irony does not. All satires I know of make use of irony whereas not all ironies are satirical. The hypocrite engages in a form of doublethink in which they hold or act on two contrary views as though both were true or correct, whereas the ironist knows full well of the intended mismatch.

My own take is that the best cases of rhetorical and dramatic irony can be likened to an intelligent blond playing the bimbo, this so as to get their way with minimal resistance from those who presume the blond to be unintelligent or unimportant, hence from others who thereby remain ignorant of what’s in fact occurring: Those in the know - be it the rhetorician, the dramatist, or even fate for some folk, this in addition to the onlooking audience, if any - get that what’s at hand is a concealed means of actualizing an end toward which those not in the know are being led without their immediate awareness.

Socratic irony might well be a misnomer - in that Socrates deemed himself wiser than his opponent in not thinking to know that which he did not know, and there’s no definitive reason to presume Socrates insincere in so affirming. If so, Socrates never feigned ignorance to begin with.

Still, I kind of like the definition first offered in this post. Has a far more definitive ring to it by contrast to the ambiguous dictionary definitions so far here discussed. :smile:

There's a difference between a list that could never, in principle, be completed. and one which is potentially finite, but large enough that we could never find the time to complete it, ... — Janus

Either way, wouldn’t the full list be never completed, hence never expressed, hence remain inexpressible?

:razz:

... But there's always more to be expressed in relation to much ado about nothing, no doubt.

... Ever wonder if the frog thinks that everything worthy of expression can be expressed in croaks, this in principle if not in practice? Hmm, a humorous way of trying to draw attention to the possibility that a hundred thousand years from now they might be conveying information in manners that human words as we know them can't, thereby allowing for the public conceptualization of ideas we humans cannot conceive of.

But back to: if you think some things are inexpressible in words then prove it expressing in words that which you deem to so be inexpressible in words. :joke:

My view is that no animal, humans included, forms connections between word-sounds and certain neural networks. — javra


This seems to be directly contradicted by the evidence. Am I misunderstanding your claim, or are you just saying that evidence from cognitive science is all wrong? — Isaac

You’ve misunderstood. I’m saying that first-person awareness - such as of word-sounds - can be said to supervene upon neural networks but that this does not imply that neural networks are equivalent to first-person awareness. This just as a table is not equivalent to the molecules upon which it supervenes. And this irrespective of whether the supervenience that occurs in mental processes is strong or weak.

A word-sound only occurs relative to awareness. Otherwise, the issue would be about a certain type of vibration in air waves affecting some sensory receptors tied into certain neural networks. I'm saying that aspects of awareness do not form connections to neural networks, that this conceptualization holds a maybe subtle but very drastic category error, for all aspects of awareness supervene on neural networks.

Instead, I find it correct to conceptualize the issue in the following manner: certain neural networks form connections to other neural networks - while, concurrently, certain aspects of awareness which supervene on the first grouping of neural networks will form connections to other aspects of awareness that supervene on the second grouping of neural networks.

All this in the context of first-person awareness associating words to concepts.

But it seems clear we hold very different models in relation to minds. Since its not something that will be easily resolved, I'll try to step out of the overall conversation.

In short, unless one has his head up in faith land (I don't differentiate between theists and atheists in this), all one knows will be acknowledged fallible. Correct till evidenced otherwise. Akin to how the empirical sciences go about business.

If one says that good is to be associated with correct, then wouldn't wrong be associated with false? — ToothyMaw

I'd rephrase it: correct (what is right) is good; incorrect (what is wrong) is bad. Don't know, but am thinking this might make significant differences to your question.

And if that is so, then how does falsifying things tie into your assertion that we consider correct answers to be good regardless of their actual correctness? You could have a claim that is believed to be true that may actually be false, and then the values "wrong" and "good" are assigned to the same answer, even if it is unbeknownst to the people reaching the answer. That is, if you believe that perceived correctness actually makes something good. — ToothyMaw

I'm working with the presumption, if one can call it that, that everyone is fallible. If one wants to assume some infallible proclamation of truth, correct proposition, etc., then this departs from my own point of view. I do place a strong emphasis on verification and falsification of all beliefs. This though might end up heading toward epistemology. A different topic than that of this thread.

I don't see how your statement about an apple being added to an apple constitutes any serious account of the fact that people often times recognize that they are wrong, and do not just assume that anything they have determined to be correct (whether or not it is actually correct) is good. — ToothyMaw

You wanted things simple, so I expressed a simple example. That adults take the example for granted does not imply that so do young enough children first learning their maths.

But what value does a false thing have if not wrong if good is assumed if a thing is correct? — ToothyMaw

Could you clarify this question?

Yes, I think people pursue correct answers and acknowledge when they don't find them. — ToothyMaw

As do I, as I believe I previously expressed via "verification and falsification".

And no one just equates "good" and "correct". That would be like saying that 2 + 2 = 4 could be a moral principle because it is correct. — ToothyMaw

The good, goodness, expands far beyond morality. "That was a good movie / book" isn't about morality. But it yet addresses that which is good. Same with correctness in non-ethical judgments.

Point being, despite all the relative issues involved with correctness, it as thing to be striven for is not relative to the whim of cultures or individuals but, rather, is a universal to all individuals and cultures regardless of whims. Hoping that makes sense.

So, we blindly pursue correct answers because they are considered "good", and we may not reach correct answers but still call them correct, and also inevitably go with our account of what is correct because we deem it correct (and, thus, "good").

That doesn't seem circular to you? — ToothyMaw

Not necessarily. We perpetually verify and, where possible, falsify: one apple and one apple indeed equate to two apples and not one.

All the same, do you find that appraisal discordant to the way thing are in the world?

I wasn't speaking ill of such a project. — ToothyMaw

We likely then have different sentiments toward Frankenstein's monster. Ok, then.

If we do what Javra says and try to form some sort of Frankenstein's monster of psychology, ethics, and neuroscience, we could come the closest to having some sort of objective moral project short of throwing our lot in with God. — ToothyMaw

Ha. Is this fear before rationality? If converging psychology, ethics, and neuroscience is off-putting to you, then by all means proceed otherwise. Good luck to you.

It was about correctness, not truth. Though I grant the two can overlap.

In simplistic terms, when one appraises if 1 + 1 = 2 is correct, one's judgment will be fully relative to that concerned in one's appraisal (differing from, say, if it is correct that 236 - 45 = 6) but in all such cases the notion of correctness remains constant irrespective of that addressed. We furthermore universally deem correct answers good - so that we all seek correct answers to questions, irrespective of what we may deem to be the correct answer in concrete terms (e.g., if we deem it the correct answer that 1 +1 = 1 we will then abide by that answer on account of deeming it correct).

I'm not here arguing that they are; I'm only suggesting that it is possible for ethical judgments to hold the same roundabout property. Always relative to context and it's particulars. Yet always holding a universal and constant good that is universally pursued irrespective of concrete particulars and our biased judgments.

John Dewey had a rebuttal to this notion, as explained by Putnam. Just substitute ‘avoidance of suffering’ for ‘pleasure’.

If “agreeableness is precisely the agreeableness or congruence of some objective condition with some impulse, habit, or tendency of the agent,"

then

"of course, pure pleasure is a myth. Any pleasure is qualitatively unique, being precisely the harmony of one set of conditions with its appropriate activity. The pleasure of eating is one thing; the pleasure of hearing music, another; the pleasure of an amiable act, another; the pleasure of drunkenness or of anger is still another." — Joshs

This to me gets into the issue of universals. One could also stipulate that since each and every apple is unique no such thing as the concept of apple can be real or have any import in what we do. This being a different issue to me.

Besides, my principle claim was the following only:

Of course, all this is contingent on there being a) a universal, foundational, (one could add, metaphysically real) drive to all conscious beings in everything we do and b) some means of satisfying it in principle. Yet, if (a) and (b), one could then well make sense of objective ethics and morality – in so far as there being an objective good to pursue by which all actions can be judged as either better or worse. — javra

A lack of disagreement doesn't mean that something is objectively true, merely that everyone agrees on it. — ToothyMaw

I wasn't addressing lack of disagreement. I was addressing the possibility of an objectively true psychological reality that universally applies to all psyches. If it were to be somehow discovered, all would have it, true. But it's objective truth wouldn't be a product of agreements.

Yes, one could make moral claims that would be correct, but these claims would still be relative. — ToothyMaw

Would this analogy help?: In parallel, all analytical judgments of correctness will always be relative to those particulars address, yet the notion of correctness remains constant.

I dunno….just seemed to smack of anthropomorphism. — Mww

You've cut the first quoted sentence short. I find the sentence important in it's entirety, including the part about "the culturally-relative, abstract, connotations which redness can imply". To me words facilitate the ability to form abstractions from abstractions from abstractions ... ultimately abstracted from experienced particulars. We may make use of the former while lesser animals don't, but I take it both experience the particulars. To be more blatant about things, while some mammals can visually associate the redness of inflamed genitalia with a readiness for reproduction, they will not be able to associate redness to, for one example, what the red circle in the Japanese flag symbolizes (the sun; power, peace, strength) - which is a culture-relative, abstract connotation that red can invoke.

Lesser predators are not aware of red or blood, for those are conceptions that belong to language using intellects. Lesser predators are aware of that which triggers their instincts, — Mww

This, though, denies the well documented reality that lesser animals can and do learn - including by forming associations. But I grant, my bias is not to deny lesser mammals the presence of any and all intellect, despite their lack of language and far less able cognitive faculties.

But alas…..we’re freakin’ married to our own words, and don’t employ a sufficient work-around when trying to show them impossible to use. — Mww

I get that, it's a little like a vicious circle. It's why I'm now leaning into ethology (animal behavior) in this discussion.

Thanks for the comments.