Do we….or do we not….still need to stipulate the criteria for determining how the unknowable isn’t a mere subterfuge? Seems like that would be the logical query to follow, “only the unknown cannot be put into words”. — Mww

It need not be unknowable in principle, just unknown in practice - and we would need to know that it is so. Some givens, via reasoning or experience, can be demarcated as known unknowns (if one pardons my Rumsfieldesque expression). All known unknowns will then be known ineffables.

To readdress examples in my first post here, hence, among some theistic folk, if G-d is a known unknown to them, G-d is then ineffable to them, and known to be so. As an alternative more down to earth example, if I know how to describe a painting but also know that I don’t know how to describe the particulars of how the painting makes me feel, then the painting’s properties will be effable to me but not the precise aesthetic experience which the painting provokes in me. All the same, it’s it, and known to be so by those who might express, "it is ineffable".

Can known unknowns be intersubjectively shared? Language use indicates that they can. As is exemplified in our being able to understand skits such as “Dude, you know.” “Know what?” “Dude …” “Oh, right, of course.”

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And as could also be argued for some Fly of the Lords or other: were it to be a known unknown.

It always struck me as odd that a bunch of numbskulls oblivious to the fact that a train is about to hit them should be rescued so as to live and reproduce in favor of killing an individual that, in one way or another, has no evident stupidity to speak of. … A kind of Darwin Awards handed to those who so select for the human species’ gene pool.

p.s. I should add: that whole intentional killing of a person thing aside.

Your castaway might well be able to find a better way to deal with their stress. — Banno

I’m curious: How do you differentiate the philosophical issue of “how one should live” from that of “morality”? (I view the former as a subset of ethics - very much including virtue ethics - but you might disagree in so far as interpreting ethics to be equivalent to morality.)

Because the nature of their reality is not subject to verification. They are processes inside the subjective consciousness of an organism: real to the subject, unreal to everyone else. — Vera Mont

You say, “unreal to everyone else,” am I’m about as flabbergasted as one can get. Like, the wants, the desires, of your loved ones are unreal to you unless they act out - and then it’s a “maybe” and “just in case” kind of mindset on your part as to them actually having any desires.

Since I’m in no mood to argue this very pivotal disagreement we have, I’m gonna part company right here.

In trying to address the basics:

I already stated that it's not a question of truth. — Vera Mont

Because psychological wants have no reality? If wants are real, then there will necessarily be truth-apt propositions in reference to them. Hence, a question of truth.

I don't believe in a disembodied 'underlying want' that can seek fulfillment. — Vera Mont

Um, yea. Neither do I. As I hope is not a news flash, humans, for instance, are embodied together with their psychological wants.

If you don't believe in wants that seek fulfillment, then what would a "want" entail other than that it be fulfilled? Wants can be subconscious emotions that attempt to influence us as conscious agents or else be our own, as in "I want X"; either way, they seek fulfillment as far as I know.

As to not believing in such a thing as an "underlying want", when a person wants to turn on the radio it's usually because of an underlying want to hear what the radio is playing. Examples of underlying wants can be quite numerous. On what grounds to you conclude that sentience does not have a base underlying want that motivates all others?

(I'm running short on time; will check in later on.)

For instance, is it right, or else good, that mental aberrations occur? — javra


This is not a question of ethics or morality — Vera Mont

Never claimed it is. I claimed that we ascribe value judgments to it: as in, it is of value or not of value ... right / good or wrong / bad in this sense ... and not one of ethics, which would be a category error unless the mental aberrations were to be intentionally caused.

Is the person's self-cutting neither good nor bad? — javra

Yes.
To me, morality is an issue of individual-in-the-world; a karmic issue, if you like. — Vera Mont

It to me seems obvious that if the self-cutting serves to satisfy the immediate want of the individual then the act is good relative to the short-term goals of the individual. If it does not, or else is contrary to the more long-term goals of the individual, than it is not good to the very same individual. Individuals can and often enough do hold contrary wants at the same time but in different respects.

In this case, I'm not sure either that responsibility can attributed, or that harm has been done.
Is scarification morally wrong? It's certainly deemed ethical in their cultures. Is it okay for western people to have tattoos and studs? — Vera Mont

Psychologically speaking, self-cutting is intentionally done for the purposes of inflicting bodily self-harm intended to result in various degrees of emotive euphoria. It's like a drug to those who do it: a kind of runner's high incurred from willfully inflicted pain. It is not done so as to decorate oneself, apropos to tattoos and studs.

----

Aside from which, all this is sidelining the main issue I've brought up. Here, for the sake of argument, I'll momentarily consent that ethics by necessity entails the interaction between agents. Is it not logically possible that ethical judgments can be correct or incorrect? Such that if one judges that torture is bad, this ethical judgment can be truth-apt relative to the reality of a universally shared, underlying want that seeks to be fulfilled? (Here presuming you've read my previous posts on this matter.)

I would call it a mental aberration rather than a wrong action. This is not an intellectualized answer but my gut reaction: "Poor guy's going bananas over there!" I would wish he didn't, but not blame him for it. — Vera Mont

Fair enough. We nevertheless do hold value judgements in regard to mental aberrations. For instance, is it right, or else good, that mental aberrations occur? As to the ethical component, to me it yet remains a murky issue, this with the understanding that ethics addressed right and wrong conduct - and, in this sense, conduct which is either good or bad. Is the person's self-cutting neither good nor bad?

BTW, I wouldn't blame the individual either in the sense of finding the individual deserving of punishment or scorn for their actions. But in a different sense of the word, who else is technically responsible for the act of self-harm but the individual themselves?

Thanks, though, for the honest reply. Something to think about.

Banno seems to have a very big problem with this, [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

I've noticed. :grin:

In fairness to me, these are only forum postings, so they’re not as robust in their content as one might want of a comprehensive philosophy. My main intent was to show how it is logically possible that value judgements - in relation to both preferences and ethics - can be eighter correct or incorrect. In short, if there is a universal want, and a means of satisfying that want that all individuals can in principle approach, then all ethical judgments of good and bad - wherein two or more individuals interact - can in principle be appraised by the metric of how well the given action or interaction satisfies the complete fulfilment of the given universal want: this complete fulfilment then being that which is the correct, universal good. All this having been somewhat better expressed in my previous post.

As to there being a sharp distinction in type between value judgments applied to personal preferences and value judgments applied to ethics, I by in large agree: ethical values for the most part tend to always concern two or more interacting agents each with their own personal preferences (despite all holding an underlying universal want, if such in fact does occur). This interaction between agents being to my mind fully subsumed by the logical possibility of correctness previously addressed.

But here’s one possible exception to the rule of thumb: a sole castaway on an island with no hope of rescue cuts themselves to relieve stress. Since there’s no interaction between persons, is this action then good strictly on account of it being the personal preference of the individual? I know that various intellectualized answers could be provided, but also believe that in our gut we all sense there’s something wrong with so doing … despite the activity not infringing upon anyone other and it being what the person wants. To me this is a murky area of ethics: it addresses harm and health of life in manners that ice-cream flavor preferences do not.

BTW, I use "ethics" instead of "morality" because the latter to me strongly connotes established mores (customs and norms) whereas the former does not - instead strictly addressing right and wrong conduct. One can for example thereby stipulate: the morality of female circumcision held by some people is unethical (such that the given morality is of itself unethical).

:up:

Piggybacking on your example for a bit in terms of truth of value judgments:

From the very simple: If I deem strawberry ice cream to be a bad ice cream flavor, then it will be true that strawberry is a bad flavor of ice cream for me.

To the slightly more complex: If all humans find dirt-flavored food to be bad, then it will be true that dirt-flavored food will be universally bad for all humans.

And to the somewhat extreme: If a) all life strives to successfully live and b) no life can survive consuming what is relative to itself a lethal poison, then it will be true that consumption of lethal poisons will be universally bad for all life in general.

Maybe needless to add, such that “bad” is of itself a value judgment - irrespective of how tacitly it might be made.

--------

… And now likely distancing myself from your views by a few lightyears’ distance:

As regards ethics in general: One could in theory progress in the same manner from concrete personal truths to concrete universal truths regarding what is good by finding out what is the/an underlying universal want shared by all life, oneself included. If this premised universal want shared by all life were to be existentially true (i.e., conformant to the reality of the matter), then the complete satisfaction of this want among all life would in turn be an existentially true, universal good. Then, anything which serves to satisfy this true (again, conformant to the reality of the matter) idealization of a universal good would itself be a good in due measure; whereas what deviates from satisfying this universal good would be in due measure a bad. Hence, here, for any action X, one could in turn ask: “Is it true that X serves to satisfy that which is universally good?” If yes, then X ought to be done; if no, then it ought not be done.

But this in large part pivots on there being such a thing as an underlying universal want shared by all life. Maybe obviously, it would need to be something extremely generalized: maybe - as psychologists might say - such as notions of optimally reducing negative valence and maximizing positive valence in oneself given interactions with one’s surroundings or - as us more common folk might translate - finding a means wherein one no longer unduly suffers while yet being with others.

Then again, this gets into metaphysical contemplations regarding what drives life in general and, as is by now no surprise, for many (especially those of a physicalist bent) even contemplating such notions is tantamount to philosophical absurdity.

For my part, though, I’m gonna leave this in as an earnest illustration of how it in fact is logically / metaphysically possible that ethical value judgments could be correct or incorrect - and, by extension, either true or false. Make of it what you will.

No one said it was. — Banno

:cool:

:rofl: Since when has the popularity of beliefs become an accurate indicator of their truth-value?

For all prom queen wannabees out there: the striving for popularity is a Socially Transmitted Disease. Something to do with selling out and lack of authenticity or other. But then all the prom queen wannabees are bound to disagree. :roll:

This is because we have been pacified for far to long to conceive of and work towards these arrangements. — NOS4A2

Agreed.

For what it's worth:

In an idealistic sense, I find the notion of pure anarchy to be almost, if not fully, indistinguishable from the notions of pure communism (or, community-ism) and of pure democracy (akin to what they were close to having in ancient Athens). Not wanting to write a thesis on this, in short, they to me all seem to require the same codes of conduct. Things don't ever remain static, so, from my pov, it's a question of whether societies move toward this just expressed ideal of universal "fraternity, equality, and liberty" or else toward its converse: that of an ever-more powerful authoritarian regime (which some do hold as their ideal governance, given that they happen to be on the side which is in control).

Obviously, the former ideal is unrealizable in the world as we presently know it, but incremental progression toward this for now utopian state of affairs is not: Hence the ideals of the functional democratic-republic wherein, for one example, all powers are to be in checks and balances and, as yet another example, all citizens are to be deemed endowed with equal right regardless of the power they might wield.

Yes, the aforementioned is somewhat overly simplified, and will likely be rather controversial for many, but I find that the issue is always a matter of where we're headed to politically. And without a clearer sense of the ideals we strive for, it's likely that we'll move about like a headless chicken ... which is to say randomly, in contrast to having an idea of where we should be going as our long term goal which guides our actions in the present.

Statism also requires that everyone is on the same page in terms of ethical conduct. If anyone violates certain rules, for instance, he can be kidnapped and imprisoned. — NOS4A2

To be more specific about what I wanted to say: Unlike any Stalinistic governance that ever was, I find that a sustained anarchy will require that no one individual in the community violates the implicitly agreed upon ethical conduct of the community, and this of their own accord. And this because ...

I’m not so sure it’s utopian, though. A consequence of ending a monopoly on violence is its dispersion, and I’m sure most anarchists are aware of that. Violence will occur; people will try to seize control; and hopefully they will be met with the force of free people. — NOS4A2

I take it that violence toward others and attempts to seize control will both be violations of the ethical conduct which anarchy assumes. Given this:

When starting off with a baseline of anarchy (no governance) in a given community, violators of ethical conduct will gain power over non-violators of said conduct, thereby resulting in a governance of the community (one that will quite arguably be corrupt to boot) and thereby an end of the anarchy which previously was. To prevent this, a sustained checks and balances of power is required; in an anarchistic community this will translate into all individuals of the community needing to wield equal power - be it physical, social, economic, etc., or any combination of these - so as to prevent one individual assuming more power than the rest.

While this can be done with good enough approximations of the just stated ideal in very small communities, in large societies it to my thinking does become utopian thinking - by which I here mean unrealistic thinking.

The social contract (which is, granted, not a signed document. and nobody thinks it is) yields mutual support and benefit. That's how a functioning society works.

The social contract of mutually beneficial behavior would exist in an anarchist society as much as, maybe more than, it does in a hierarchical society. Our human ability to mirror other people's needs, desires, pains, etc. long preceded civil society. — Bitter Crank

Well said.

As a kind of apropos, if one cares to think of it this way, social lesser animals also each have their own “unsigned social contracts”: a grouping of meerkats (which are relatively, but by no means perfectly, non-hierarchical, if I remember right) will abide by a social contract different from that of a grouping of wolves (which are relatively speaking very hierarchical, starting with two alpha mates and going down to the omega) - yet both these examples can perform feats of reciprocal altruism that some humans can only presume to be “unnatural”.

Well, my take on the philosophy of anarchy: it's the unrealistically optimistic belief that all individuals in a large grouping of humans can remain ethical toward each other’s needs without hierarchical governance and policing - and that it's this very governance which makes many humans less than ethical. I find its unrealistic optimism right up there with the ideal of communism (in contrast to the concrete practice of what can be termed Stalinism): can work for some very small groupings, like a kibbutz, but it requires that all participants are on the same page in terms of ethical conduct … without there being any rotten apple to spoil the bunch.

There are no correct moral claims. People only have incorrect opinions on what's good/bad, what should/shouldn't exist.

To say that torture is bad is to say that moral claims can be true. If moral facts could not ever be true, the torture would not be bad, there would be no reason to prevent torture. — Leftist

Value judgements have connection to truth in that value judgements can be correct or incorrect. [...] They must all always be incorrect claims, if it is true that no claims made of value can be true. Otherwise, there must be an actual system in place that determines actual morality, much more than just "x people think y should be done, therefore y should actually be done". — Leftist

What your posts seem to be asking for is some substantial argument for the occurrence of a universal good that is always existentially correct. Something akin to what Plato addresses as “the Good”. I say, good luck with that.

Until then, here is one example wherein value judgments can be correct and incorrect:

You want to visit a relative who lives in some distant part of the world across some ocean, and this in a relatively short period of time. To accomplish this feat, you will need to fly there.

Here are two conceivable options: a) going to the top of some tall building and jumping off of it while flapping one’s arms so as to fly to the given destination; b) investing some money in an airplane ticket so as to fly to the given destination.

If one deems option (a) to be the good option to take, this being a value judgment, the value judgment would be incorrect - for (a) cannot fulfill one’s want. Deeming option (b) to be the good option to take, however, would be a correct value judgment - for (b) readily can fulfill one’s want.

Here, the correctitude or incorrectitude of the matter in no way relies upon what a majority of people think.

Therefore, value judgments can indeed be correct or incorrect, as I think this example makes clear. While this doesn’t account for everything, it to my mind does demonstrate that value nihilism - a position maintaining that no value judgment can be correct or else incorrect - is an erroneous position.

Which in turn evidences the logical possibility that at least some moral claims can be correct or incorrect. To be clear, I'm not here going to uphold that they in fact are ... but am only suggesting that it's logically possible that they might be.

Can thoughts ever be aware of themselves or can only the thinker create thoughts without fully knowing what they are? What is being asked? — TiredThinker

Just saw the video. It’s always possible that something important becomes lost in translation. Nevertheless, to me:

1) Consciousness is synonymous to first-person awareness (in contrast, for example, to unconscious awareness)

2) First-person awareness is no more equivalent to the things it thinks than it is to the things it perceives - instead being that which is aware of thoughts and perceptions. Hence, first-person awareness is not equivalent to thoughts - but is instead that which experiences thoughts.

3) So when asking “can consciousness be aware of itself” one is asking “can first-person awareness be aware of itself” - such that its thoughts have nothing essential to do with the issue.

There might be contention with the just mentioned. Still, given this understanding, I can’t make heads or tails of the video’s propositions.

But in answer to (3) as just mentioned, my take is: yes, all the time, and necessarily so.

When one as a conscious being - i.e., as a consciousness - is joyful, sorrowful, certain, doubtful, pensive, surprised, “in the zone”, etc. one will only ascertain and thereby know this about oneself as a first-person awareness by being directly aware of oneself as a first-person awareness. Such that, here, there is no gap - else stated, no duality - between that which is aware and that which it is aware of. Thoughts do not need to be in any way involved here, and most of the time aren’t.

Though of course one can invoke thoughts simply by thinking about this otherwise ordinary state of affairs. And this state of affairs will be utterly different then that type of self-consciousness wherein one is aware of a conceptual understanding, hence of thoughts regarding, what oneself as a first-person awareness is (e.g., I am a human earthling, such and such’s child, of this height rather than that, etc.).

I gather this is most likely a very different view from that entertained by Krishnamurti ... but it does address the question of whether consciousness can be aware of itself.

The one you previously quoted. All the same, never mind.

This does not address the question, wherein alternatives to choose among occur.

So it's said, in my opinion, if there are no cognized alternatives to choose between, then there is no choice being made ... hence, no enaction of free will.

Then our actions are partly intended and therefore partly unfree, and also partly unintended and therefore partly unfree too. — litewave

I never claimed this, did I. Our (intentional) actions are always fully intended. But this does not signify that we are fully determined in what we enact. Intents don't establish which of two or more alternatives we choose (with all viable alternatives being able to satisfy said intents).

For example, your intent is to learn about subject X; how does this intent of itself establish whether you choose a) to read a book about X or b) to see a documentary about X?

I think compatibilist version of free will has some merit because it says that we have free will if we can do want we want. But it also admits that our actions may still be completely determined by factors that are ultimately out of our control (we do what we want but our wants are ultimately ingrained in us), which seems to conflict with what we usually mean by free will when we bother to talk about it: a free will that gives us ultimate control and moral responsibility that can override all circumstances. — litewave

It's a different variant of compatibilism. One that is more in-line to my interpretations of Hume - who to my knowledge was to first to propose the impossibility of a) free will devoid of determinacy (but do note that determinacy does not equate to determinism) and b) responsibility devoid of free will.

I accept top placement of metaphysics on a flow chart tracking scope of inclusion.

I don’t accept top placement of metaphysics on a flow chart tracking logical priority.

I think you and Joshs, in your conceptualization of metaphysics, are conflating scope of inclusion with logical priority. — ucarr

Speaking for myself, while I can respect your view, I’m still very much inclined to that of logical priority. I can't envision anything being inferred about the physical world in the absence of, again, identity/change and causality. Whereas, as previously noted, from my pov ideas of identity/change and causality can be entertained and made use of in the absence of inferences regarding the physical world.

Generalization of logical data organization to a multi-disciplinary scope of inclusion does not necessarily grant such expanded scope logical priority to the disciplines included. — ucarr

To be clear, I'm not affirming that one must first be a metaphysician (a philosopher specializing in the study of metaphysical concepts) in order to then be a physicist - or anything similar. I'm only suggesting that physics, or even the notion of physicality as we adults know of it, is impossible without first holding some estimate of what identity and causality are - these being metaphysical concepts. Again, such that a baby will need to first make some inference of what identity and causality are prior to having any possibility of making inferences regarding what is and is not physical.

The crux of our disagreement might be your view: placing metaphysics logically first, conflicting with my view, placing metaphysics_physics logically simultaneous. — ucarr

So its said, I agree with this assessment.

Yet, for my part, I'm OK with agreeing to disagree on what I find to be a relatively minor difference.

So ultimately all your choices are completely determined by factors that are out of your control or maybe are partially undetermined, which precludes your control too. — litewave

This topic of concern is not "your choices" but "you (as the agent which enacts your choices)". It's not your choices that are partly undetermined - your choices are here fully determined by you the agent - but, rather, it is you who is partly undetermined in the choices you make. Makes a world of difference, since the latter grants you (at least some meaningful measure of) control in the choices you make.

To the extent that your action is not determined by your (ultimately ingrained) goals, it is unintended and therefore unfree. — litewave

To try to make this clearer: What I’m suggesting is that there isn’t a strict logical dichotomy between “completely determined (hence no free will)” and “completely undetermined (hence no intentionality)”; that there logically can very well occur something in-between, a “partly determined and hence partly undetermined” state of being that (partly) defines us as agents; and that our free will - if real - would necessarily be of the latter state of affairs: e.g., always partly determined by intents (among other possible factors), but never completely determined. This latter state of being, while of itself being beyond the control of the agent, will yet nevertheless endow the agent the existential freedom to choose otherwise given the same set of intents and cognized alternatives.

Trying to evidence this is no easy task, I grant. But then I'm only affirming the logical possibility of this being so.

It is logically possible that we as agents are not completely undetermined, for there is always a telos or teloi that "set limits or boundaries" to what we end up choosing, making our choices intentional; but that neither are we as agents completely determined (causally and in all other manners) in which alternative we end up choosing - making our choosing this alternative rather than that contingent on us as agents, rather than being contingent on the set of all factors which would otherwise be deemed to completely determine us as as agents (as would for example apply in a system of causal determinism).

Its a variant of compatibilism, though I take it you're not much enamored with the prospect of compatibilism.

Free will would entail that at the moment of choice we do not interact at all with our environment, including the choices we are presented with; [...] No choice I make is fundamentally mine and only mine for that would require that I receive no external influence, at all, no? — Daniel

I don't follow the entailment proposed. As per existentialists such as Sartre, someone could hold a loaded gun to my head and tell me that if I don't choose A rather than B he'll shoot. This being a rather extreme influence upon what choice I make. And yet I still have the existential freedom to choose B over A. So external influences, though notably important, play no essential role in determining whether or not we are endowed with free will.

I argued that causation does not imply determinism. — Banno

Duly noted. If I remember right, the issue was one of how actions can be physically caused without being physically determined (by their physical causes) - this having nil to do with determinism as an ontological worldview wherein everything is deemed completely determined causally.

and a preference for some form of anomalous monism... — Banno

Cool. I'm myself preferential to neutral monism when not in my "objective idealism" mood.

But there are other fish here to fry. — Banno

True.

I'd suggest that our actions are physically caused yet not physically determined. — Banno

Can you elaborate? Do causes not determine their effects?

Free will is from early 13c, and apparently related to arguments concerning the problem of evil. — Banno

I counter that with reference from the same SEP article previously linked to: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/#AnciMediPeri

I take the Frankfurt examples as further argument for the incoherence of free will, which seems to be an invention of theologians. — Banno

This seeming ... well, as a non-theologian that sees considerable merit to the notion, I disagree. Babies and bathwater sort of thing.

So, I'd say absolute free will does not exist. — Daniel

Do you know of any established philosopher or philosophy that makes a distinction between “absolute free will” and “non-absolute free will”?

To my knowledge free will simply expresses the ability to choose otherwise than what one ends up choosing - such that the adjective “absolute” doesn’t add any apparent meaning to what “free will” signifies.

Hmm. I've commented elsewhere on arguments that assume ontology and epistemology are incommensurate. I don't find that line of reasoning at all convincing. — Banno

Interesting; neither do I … but I did mistakenly presume that you did.

And we have Frankfurt's examples of feee choice without alternative possibilities. — Banno

A correction: Frankfurt’s examples and like cases are one’s in which one could not choose otherwise between alternative possibilities yet supposedly retains moral responsibility for what was effected - basically arguing for the occurrence of moral responsibility in the absence of free will.

One possible objection among others is that such examples presuppose the condition of causal determinism in attempting to evidence that free will is unnecessary for moral responsibility. Whether or not free will occurs is thereby not addressed by such examples.

If interested in a reference: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/#FreeDoOtheVsSourAcco

Like, I have an intention to read a book and also an intention to see a movie? How do I intentionally decide between them? I would need an intention to yield to the first or the second intention. But how do I choose that intention? — litewave

The overarching goal that facilitates you choosing between two alternative lesser goals (e.g., seeing a documentary or reading a book) could either be something you chose for yourself previously (e.g., to learn about subject X rather than not so learning about subject X) or, else, could be something ingrained that operates within you subconsciously and teleologically drives all your choices (though I disagree with the details, a common enough example of this could be the goal/intent of self-preservation - I in part disagree because unfortunately some do choose the opposite while yet holding the intent of not suffering in mind).

Either way, be it something you’ve previously chosen for yourself of something ingrained that is beyond your choosing, it does not nullify the logical possibility of free will in the choices you do make at any given juncture.

Well, in physics the outcome is determined by the joint influence of all present forces. It seems similar with my decision/action - it is determined by the joint influence of all my present drives. — litewave

That’s the crux of the matter for many: a perceived conflict between a causally deterministic physics and the occurrence of free will. Still, one’s preference between these two alternatives does not resolve the issue of whether free will – i.e., the ability to choose otherwise in a selfsame situation - is real or not. Nor would the occurrence of free will necessitate that causal determinacy does not take place in the world - it would only necessitate that the world is not one of (complete) causal determinism.

I want to eat a cookie — litewave

A person can and often enough does have conflicting wants ... these then being the alternatives we choose between.

So to the extent our action is determined by our intentions it is not free. But to the extent it is NOT determined by our intentions it is unintended and therefore not free either. — litewave

No. Our actions would yet be "free" if we could choose otherwise in a selfsame situation - hence a situation wherein the same overarching intent (e.g., to increase one's own happiness) and the same alternative / conflicting wants (e.g., seeing a movie or reading a book) occur.

... will be taking a small break from the forum for now.

But how do I choose an intention without already having it? — litewave

By choosing between alternative potential intentions - like the intent to read a book or the intent to see a movie.

Even if what one will do next were [completely, rather than partly] determined, the choice remains. — Banno

Epistemologically, yes, of course. But this does not resolve the ontology of the world in which we dwell. We, in a sense, could be fated in a causal determinism to always hold the illusory sense of us having free will via our ontological nature of not being omniscient: the epistemological uncertainty as to which course of action is best then resulting in an epistemological sense of freedom in what we choose.

Hoping the terse aformentioned summation makes some sense.

Still, for one example, in this ontology of causal determinism, no degree of ontic uncertainty - no degree of "tychism" as Peirce would call it - could occur in the world. Rendering all that we do predetermined in full, ontologically.

The difference might not be important for every day applications, granted, but it does make a significant difference in terms of what can be infered about the world we live in. But I think this now is deviating too much from the thread's topic of interest.

Seems like a row of billiard balls. — litewave

Not quite. Intents are teleological processes, i.e. teloi, and not causal processes as the latter is understood in modernity via Hume's notion of causation and the notions of those who followed.

But, as to the issue of determinacy, if we do hold free will then we are only partly determined by determinants (teloi and antecedent causes included) in the choices we make, and thereby remain partly free to choose what we see fit (I have no idea what "absolute freedom" would be anyway). If we do not hold free will, then we are completely determined by determinants in all we do, including our choices.

This issue, however, cannot be resolved via feelings of what is either way.

As a heads up, if you want to argue against free will the best bet I currently know of is in research attempting to show that our unconscious mind chooses our choices before we are consciously aware of so choosing. That said, the issue of whether or not free will occurs is as of yet very much unresolved - very much despite all such research, which tmk so far is inconclusive.

Why would agents do that? Because they are driven by thoughts, including by thoughts to choose between thoughts. Or when they are not driven by thoughts, their choices are unintended, which precludes free will too. — litewave

If you take intents to be thoughts, then I might in this way alone agree: in so far as out choices are always in part determined by that which we intend to accomplish. Still, intents do not of themselves choose outcomes. We as agents so driven by our intents do.

Point taken. :grin:

If I’m presented with two options, A and B, I can choose between them. The question is, can I choose the thought which chooses between them? If not, do I have any control over what I choose? — Paul Michael

In slight difference to 's answer, I find this to be quite a misguided conceptualization. The “I” in these propositions is not a thought contemplated by a being which is itself a thought contemplated by a being, ad infinitum.

The “I” addressed is itself a being with agency.

Thoughts don’t choose between thoughts. Agents - such as one’s own conscious being - choose between thoughts. Hence the agency of choice as it pertains to beings / agents (and not to the thoughts which agents / beings think of).

This observation is apart from the issue of whether we as beings hold the ability choose otherwise in a selfsame situation, i.e. are endowed with free will. If we are not, then the choices we effect are themselves always completely determined by antecedent causes - making us as responsible for what we effect as would be a billiard ball. If we are, then in some way what we effect is not fully determined by antecedent causes - at the very least not when we actively choose - and our effects thereby originate with us in some meaningful sense.

Maybe getting closer to your concern:

In either perspective, we as conscious agents would have no choice in whether or not we hold free will: either being existentially fated by reality to have it whether we want it or not or, else, being existentially fated by reality to not have it regardless of what we’d want to be the case.

That we hold no free will in our existential condition of so having free will (were we to have it) does not, however, of itself invalidate the logical possibility of us having it.

Metaphysical concept Vs. Metaphysical worldview > Is the difference that concept is an abstract idea whereas worldview is an abstract idea in application to the real world and thus contextualized empirically? — ucarr

Well, the metaphysical ideas of identity and causality, for instance, are themselves abstracted from experience, and most (if not all) of these abstracted ideas of metaphysics are in application to the "real world" as we best interpret it.

As to the issue of normalization, I merely intended to evidence that there cannot be concepts in physics without a preestablished foundation of metaphysical concepts. Whereas the contrary is not true: one can work with metaphysical concepts abstracted from experience - however tacitly they might be held - without in any way entertaining concepts in physics: for one example, via a good measure of trial and error, a toddler will actively learn and apply metaphysical concepts such as those of identity/change and causation - this non-linguistically - without making use of concepts pertaining to physics, be it Newtonian physics or that of relativity.

That said, I in general do agree with the notion of normalization as your present it, which, if I’m not mistaking your position, can be express as follows: metaphysical worldviews ought to account for all the data which humans have accumulated in the span of our history.

I would only add the understanding that our so far established inferences from said data do not equate with the data itself - hence making possible paradigm shifts (taking the form of novel metaphysical understandings) that better account for today’s data than today's inferences (paradigms) do.

1. If one can do otherwise, then one can do either A or not-A at the time of action.
2. If one can do either A or not-A at the time of action, then A and not-A are both possible in the same sense at the same time, which is a contradiction.
3. Therefore, one cannot do otherwise. — Paul Michael

Possibly subtle, but important: One cannot do both A and not-A at the same time of action in the same respect. Instead, one can only do either A or not-A at the time of action. It's not an issue of both occurring at the same time in the same respect. It's an issue of either one occurring at the expense of the other or vice versa.

This "at the time of action" stipulation seems to be implicitly equivocated with "before the time of action (before the choice is made)". Before the time of action two or more alternatives are present at the same time but in different respects: each alternative presenting its own unique possible outcome. The alternatives are not deemed to be identical to each other - hence to occur in the same respect. The don't have the same features of details.

Unless one can evidence how what I've addressed is wrong or misconceived, then what I've mentioned will make the argument invalid. But I'm always open to being wrong.

‘To choose’ implies that a set of options exists *from which one chooses*. I don’t see how else ‘to choose’ could be understood. So in order for one to be able to choose their thoughts, they would have to be able to *think* of several options and choose one of them to be their next thought *without thinking their next thought in the process*, which is of course impossible.

If this is correct, does this automatically rule out the possibility of free will? — Paul Michael

In agreement, no, we don't and can't consciously think up the alternatives we choose between at each juncture wherein we sense ourselves to choose between alternatives (an ad infinitum regress of thought would result, tmk). Instead, our unconscious mind does this for us.

We don't choose our thoughts-as-alternatives; we only choose between what is given to us by our unconscious mind as thoughts-as-alternatives.

The possibility of free will merely stipulates that we as conscious agents can choose among these unconsciously emergent alternatives such that, in principle, the one choice we end up making is not necessarily the only one choice that we could have made.

So while the issue remains open-ended, the fact that we as conscious agents do not bring into being those alternatives we choose between doesn't rule out the possibility of us conscious agents being endowed with free will.

While I agree that all humans necessarily share a set of commonly held experience in order for human language to be of any use to us, linguistics might not be the best way to justify this. More specifically:

It must be the case that identical form has identical content, such that the proposition A "the bird is blue" has the same content as proposition B "the bird is blue". — RussellA

Identical form does not always have identical content. The form of propositions sentences A and B can well be identical as forms go while nevertheless being endowed with the following, differing, propositional contents:

A: the bird is of a certain color termed "blue"
B: the bird is of a certain emotive state termed "blue"

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If the meaning of a word changed with context, language would have no foundation, and there would be the problem of circularity. I wouldn't know what a word meant if I didn't know the context, and I wouldn't know the context unless I knew the meaning of the word.

A stone may be used as a hammer. A stone may be used as a door stop. The meaning of "stone" is independent of any use it is put to. A stone being used as a hammer means that the nail will be driven into the wood. A stone being used as a door stop means that the door will remain open.

The way that the word is being used has a meaning and changes with context. The meaning of the word doesn't change with context. — RussellA

One way to make sense of this is to infer that use is purposeful and, in at least some sense, is synonymous to purpose ... and that all words have intersubjective meanings / purposes relative to some cohort as top-level context. When viewed as such, words can then be further fine-tuned in meaning / purpose via the subcontext-situated intents of some individual(s) within the cohort

For example: The intersubjective purpose of the either visual or auditory symbol "stone" among the cohort of all English speakers is to reference a hard earthen object whose parameters allow for some leeway in terms of what the material object might be: e.g. a rock, a pebble, a large formation of marble, etc. This is the meaning relative to all English speakers as generalized, top-level context. Whereas, as one example, the purpose of this same symbol can among a subset of English speakers, here jewelers, be that of referencing diamonds. This being a subcontext of the former.

The only way it is possible as a literal reality is in idealist views of reality in which the non material fell into matter because that might allow for time to be outside of the material universe as some form of eternal cycles. — Jack Cummins

In case you're not familiar with it, there is this:

The Big Bounce is a hypothesized cosmological model for the origin of the known universe. It was originally suggested as a phase of the cyclic model or oscillatory universe interpretation of the Big Bang, where the first cosmological event was the result of the collapse of a previous universe. It receded from serious consideration in the early 1980s after inflation theory emerged as a solution to the horizon problem, which had arisen from advances in observations revealing the large-scale structure of the universe. In the early 2000s, inflation was found by some theorists to be problematic and unfalsifiable in that its various parameters could be adjusted to fit any observations, so that the properties of the observable universe are a matter of chance. Alternative pictures including a Big Bounce may provide a predictive and falsifiable possible solution to the horizon problem, and are under active investigation as of 2017.[1] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Bounce

So it's said, this model can be accommodated for by both physicalism and at least certain types of idealism or neutral monism. And it is one of "eternal return" / "circular time".

EDIT: wanting to preempt this just in case it might come up: to use certain terminology commonly enough used on this forum: if - for example - a panpsychistic objective idealism, then the Big Bounce can be accommodated by such system of idealism.

You are again addressing the issue in terms of metaphysical worldviews rather than, as I specifically asked for, metaphysical concepts. So as to try to be on the same page, metaphysical concepts include those of ontology - which is what you so far are strictly focused on - but also very much include those of identity and change, space and time, causation, and necessity and possibility. A reference for this is the non-exotic, standard fare, Wikipedia page on metaphysics.

Asking the same question I previously asked in greater detail: How can one justify physicality in manners that make no use of identity or change, space or time, causation, and necessity or possibility? All these being subjects of metaphysics and most of these not being topics of investigation in physics.

Notice I specifically said:

How would anyone, yourself included, justify physicality per se without use of metaphysical concepts?

... rather than "metaphysical worldviews". And I know that in my many posts in this thread I've repeatedly made explicit mention of identity and causation as metaphysical concepts requisite for the study of physics.

A foundational plank in the edifice of my concept of ontology says, "Material objects cannot be justified." — ucarr

This is clearly not the case. One noteworthy example to refute the affirmation is that of materialism as metaphysical worldview, i.e. as ontology. But then the same can also be said for non-physicalist ontologies such as Peirce's objective idealism, which also justifies the reality of material objects. ... Unless one assumes that ("true") justification produces infallible results, which I for one don't find in any way warranted.