I need to revisit those articles, as I'm not sure if they're adequate as sources of how intelligence (hence consciousness) developed. — L'éléphant

OK. Yet one can have intelligence in the absence of consciousness. Current AI as example. They're not the same.

So, we can proceed then to discuss how biology is the reason why consciousness exists -- as a start. — L'éléphant

This is a significant change in argument. The OP, to which I responded, addresses evolution as explanation for consciousness - not biology. There's a very distinct difference between the two.

What is lacking in our accepted definition/description of consciousness? Because I'm good with it. But if you're not, what's your definition of consciousness in humans, in animals? — L'éléphant

I've missed our agreed upon definition of consciousness. By common standard, it can be deemed equivelent to awareness, hence to a first person point of view, hence to firsthand experience.

Is this something we agree upon?

BTW, my personal take - which I find not possible to definitively prove - is that consciousness is a staple factor of all lifeforms.

They do. Let's cite some studies from the medical community. For example, the consciousness of babies is defined as that recognizing the mother's voice and face, then later awareness of body parts, etc. As adults we are aware of our own mortality and what is death. So, we are aware of the future and what happened in the past.

Tell me, what is it that's inadequate as explanation in your opinion? Let's start there. — L'éléphant

What you provide is not an explanation of how consciousness comes about via the mechanisms of biological evolution - in brief, natural selection acting upon mutations.

It is of course adequate as an explanation. But, again, it is not an explanation via biological evolution. Biological evolution does not address at which stage of an embryo does the species-specific consciousness takes hold. Nor does it address if gametes are themselves conscious But note that a sperm is well recorded as recognizing direction toward the egg and, furthermore, contact with the egg, at which point the sperm attempts to penetrate the egg. Whether or not this evidences some degree of consciousness on the part of sperm is again not something that biological evolution in any way addresses, much less explains.

Whether all life requires some degree of consciousness (firsthand experience) in order to function or else whether consciousness appears at some point in life's evolution is not something that evolution of itself explains.

Again the issue I'm addressing is biological evolution explaining the how of consciousness. Just that.

To be clear, my question was that of “how does biological evolution explain how consciousness comes about, this when biological evolution (as theory we employ for explanations and predictions) does not of itself provide us with an explanation of what is conscious and what is not conscious."

This has to do with the limitations of biological evolution as a system of explanation, and not with our firsthand experiential knowledge of so being conscious.

What does and does not have consciousness is an inter-disciplinary topic covered by biology, psychology, and specialized areas such as neurology. — L'éléphant

You're not mentioning philosophy, which I think is of greater importance than the disciplines you've mentioned. The cogito comes to mind on one side of the spectrum. Philosophies such as that of autopoiesis in respect to non-human minds on the other.

It's hard to have a discussion when one starts with "what does and does not have consciousness", because we know humans have consciousness. — L'éléphant

Sure, but we don't know this via our inferential knowledge of biological evolution, right?

Philosophically, we cannot answer why humans have sensations, consciousness, and feelings. We can only answer the how humans became this way -- through mutation, evolution, etc. — L'éléphant

Yep, I agree. — schopenhauer1

Maybe I'm misinterpreting or else missing something. So I'll ask: How can the mechanics of biological evolution explain how consciousness comes about when it cannot provide an explanation of what does and does not have consciousness?

Assuming that a dolphin has firsthand experience of its species-specific senses, what is it like for the dolphin to perceive its surroundings via echolocation? Or for the homing pigeon to perceive the skies via magnetoception? And so forth. It converges the experience of sense-dependent phenomena we ourselves do not experience with the experience of understanding these phenomena in manners that allow the organism to function. This as occurs in firsthand experience.

That’s my understanding of the phrase.

For instance, assuming that a homing pigeon has firsthand experiences of the world, I have no idea what a homing pigeon's awareness of the Earth's magnetic field is like. But I know it wouldn't be visual in the way that I visually perceive the world - for I don't have perceptual awareness of the Earth's magnetic field, be it visually or in any other manner.

How does one actually get the point across why this is not an acceptable answer as far as the hard problem is concerned? — schopenhauer1

As something different from the answers already provided, that biological evolution has taken place in no way specifies what does, and does not, have consciousness. First off, we know we have consciousness because we experientially know we are conscious (and not because biological evolution tells us so). Secondly, we infer that we acquired the specific forms of our consciousness via evolution. To which I say of course. But how can evolution explain if nematodes (which have a nervous system) have, or don’t have, consciousness? The same question can be asked of any other non-human lifeform, ameba included. Note: all I mean by “consciousness” here is “firsthand experience”.

The occurrence of evolution no more explains the occurrence of consciousness than does the occurrence of change: as in, consciousness occurs because change occurs. Which is to say, it holds no satisfactory explanations regarding the matter. Because it does not explain what does, and does not, have consciousness, it does not explain why consciousness is nor how consciousness comes to be wherever it does.

I don't want to bicker either. It was just what I hoped to be a helpful clarification. — Benkei

Thanks. :smile:

I'm not sure this is particular to current markets. All market transactions, even before capitalism, aim at that short term goal: profit.

[...]

So I think there's just more of it rather than that we've become more shortsighted than in the past. — Benkei

To my mind, there is such a thing as the delayed gratification of profiting more from long-term investments. Which requires more forethought. Short-term investments do not require the long-term sustainability of the business, or even of the business model for that matter. It's what populates the world with pyramid schemes - be these hidden or out in the open.

Then again, to me, an economic model axiomatically founded on infinite growth and resources which unfolds in a finite world is, simplistically addressed, itself a large scale kind of pyramid scheme.

I don't know enough about the subject to explore the nuances of how things have changed over the span of decades and centuries, but I do find this to be the current state of affairs. And, in so being, to be detrimental to our long-term benefit.

Hence my opinion that forethought, such as in the form of long-sighted interests in regard to profit, is not something which is selected for via optimal profits in our - at least - currently held, global economy.

As I initially commented, I'm all for a meritocratic economy of competition, but am opposed to the current, by now almost ingrained, outcome of those who are greedy being most deserving of the greatest profits (and along with these, of greatest financial power over others). Again, though - other than the vague, sophomoric, and overly idealistic notion of "raising human consciousness" or some such - I don't know how this problem could be corrected via the implementation of a different economic model in a democratic system.

The materialism-antimaterialism debate no longer holds much interest for me. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Were it to be so for most. Who knows? Time will tell.

Materialism tells a good part of the story - but any kind of extremism is, to my view, ill-advised. — ZzzoneiroCosm

also

What I mean to say is there is some kind of relationship (link, connection) between mystical and schizophrenic phenomena and experience. It's a complex relationship (link, connection) and this thread is designed to increase my understanding of it. — ZzzoneiroCosm

To be clear, I acknowledge the often occurring commonalities between mysticism and madness so far presented. That said, do you have a working thesis on what distinguishes mysticism from madness that is more philosophically precise than the metaphor of how one deals with waters one is surrounded by?

To me, mystics (that are not madmen self-appraised as mystics) hold insights into (non-materialist) existential truths. At least, that's the best working thesis I have on a whim. At any rate, this to me signifies that materialism/physicalism as a doctrine (and not the presence of the material/physical) is in some way false.

Now you want to revise my phraseology. I said links and I meant links. — ZzzoneiroCosm

As in there can't be mysticism devoid of schizophrenia, bi-polarity, or the like? We may have different understandings of the term "link".

Alright. Got it. Thanks for the clarification.

Not only wrong for so assuming but wrong in methodology as apparently your approach is to make a wild, baseless assumption and then ask if it's wrong. I don't get that. Why do that? — ZzzoneiroCosm

It's a conclusion that materialists are likely to make ... if not the only logically necessitated conclusion which materialism allows. Oh, and materialists are prevalent on this forum.

ought the Dalai Lama be given medications till he holds no more belief in Nirvana and related and/or derivative Buddhist ideas - this on grounds that mysticism is linked to madness? — javra

I never said anything remotely like the above.

Keep reading the thread if you want to learn more about the link. I'll be posting more soon. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I’ve done my fair share of research into psychology and psychiatry. What you and express are nothing novel to me. I could probably further stoke this fire, so to speak, with other similar observations. So what conclusions do you draw from the links/connections correlations you’ve presented - and likely will further express - between the experiences of some mystics and the experiences of some madmen?

More concretely asked: Are all insights from the vast array of mystics to be considered the delusional insights of madmen - and, in so being delusional, thereby devoid of any existential truths? Taoism as just one example among many.

I know that the default answer of materialism is “yes”. Nothing novel in this either. Here, any and all spiritual/non-materialist experiences/insights and related reasoning are at best delusional. I’m so far assuming this is your stance - and, if so, so be it.

I’m asking you so as to find out if I’m wrong in so assuming.

Which also in no way answers the question.

BTW, https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/697780

To clarify my just asked question by example:

A Buddhist mystic with insight into Nirvana will neither talk to Nirvana nor have Nirvana talk back to him/her, yet will be a mystic nonetheless.

The Dalai Lama is likely a case of swimming. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Which doesn't answer any of the questions posed.

So much for challenges being fun, I guess. OK, then.

And how does that quote address there being a link between mysticism and madness?

I said that I’m not getting it and that it’s OK by me, and I stand by that. But in speaking to someone aiming for the mental health professions, where choices are made in who is and is not insane:

If some set of cars are linked to some set of red things, there is an analyzable link between said set of cars and said set of red things. — ZzzoneiroCosm

The only link between cars and red things I can find is that some cars will be red things and vice versa - which of itself doesn’t say much regarding the link between cars and red things. One could abstract that both are objects but, again, can't find the importance to this in terms of links. What other significant “links” between these two categories can you think of?

Edit: "If there is a link, then there is a link," is a bit tautological, imo, and doesn't of itself evidence there being a link to begin with.

I think you're concocting difficulties where none are obvious. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Which I’m in obvious disagreement with.

At any rate, this thread isn't interrogating the existence of a link between mysticism and madness. I begin with the premise - the assumption, if you like - more accurately, the hypothesis, grounded in lifelong more or less scholarly interest in and research of both phenomena - that a link exists between mysticism and madness. — ZzzoneiroCosm

So, granting that the present Dalai Lama is sincere in his views and thereby a mystic, what would link the present Dalai Lama to madness? And, more concretely: in your view, ought the Dalai Lama be given medications till he holds no more belief in Nirvana and related and/or derivative Buddhist ideas - this on grounds that mysticism is linked to madness?

I appreciate your challenge, challenges are fun. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Consider me here to please.

This suggests shares trading affects investment but that's not how it works. — Benkei

I don't want to bicker on the details of how things work; it's not a field I deem myself to be sufficiently knowledgeable about.

But I am curious to know if you disagree with the overall conclusion that current markets by and large select for short-sighted / short-term interests at the expense of long-sighted / long-term interests.

The gas prices of tomorrow verses the global economic insecurity of global warming as one, granted simplistic, example.

If some Xs are linked to some Ys - but we grant that not all Xs are linked to all Ys - there is still a link, an analyzable link, between X and Y. — ZzzoneiroCosm

If some cars are linked to some red things - but we grant that not all cars are linked to all red things - there is still a link, an analyzable link, between car and red thing.

I'm not getting it, but OK.

I'd like to take a look at the link between madness and mysticism. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Since this is a philosophy forum, what I take to be commonsense reasoning: That some X’s are Y’s and some Y’s are X’s does not imply that all X’s are Y’s and vice versa, thereby requiring a linkage between the two.

Not all mystics are schizophrenics, and not all schizophrenics are mystics.

Treating the two as though they are linked is as irrational, to not say irresponsible, as would be the prejudicial conviction that there is a linkage between materialists and idiocy - to address an example that a materialist might better grasp.

The fact of life that some materialists are idiots, and that some idiots are materialists, does not then rationally imply that there is a linkage between idiocy and materialism. Same with any contrived linkage between madness and mysticism.

Unless, of course, one assumes that (intelligent?) materialist platform from which any spiritual insight or experience is indicative of unhealth - this by sheer fact of not being accordant to a materialistic world view of reality.

It wouldn’t be “profit over everything”, there would be less short term thinking, more investment in communities and general welfare. — Xtrix

I know you're using shorthand in the statement "profit over everything" but to try to spell out what I find to be pivotal to this: profit for whom?

I think most will agree that it ought to be “profit for those deserving of it”, harkening back to what initially was the satirical term “meritocracy”.

Current global economy works by selecting for, as you mention, short-sighted interests profiting over long-sighted interests. Pithily expressed in the dictum “greed is good”. So those who are most greedy then gain most profits and, in tandem, most power over the way things should and will be - selecting against most all non-greedy interests, this in the long term at least.

For instance, you have 10 corporations with stocks that compete. As it currently stands in the world we have, if one of these ten corporations desires to invest some of its profits in being non-toxic to the environment, it will make less profits in the short term. Stock owners will then tend to invest in any of the other 9 corporations, resulting in this one environmentally sound corporation loosing out and, quite possibly, going out of existence. The corporations with short-sighted interest profit at the expense of those with long-sighted interests, as so too profit those investors in stocks who don’t care about long-term consequences but about their short-term profits.

I find that governance - here tersely read as intent regarding future outcomes - of some kind is always in some way in control of economics - here tersely read as what resources are appropriated to whom. And never the other way around. As a more concrete example, the state always governs who has what in some way - taxation laws as one example - regardless of how de-regulative it claims to be. This in order for the state to maintain itself. Trouble is, there of as yet is no (one would hope democratic) global governance regarding things such as a globally uniform taxation policy, despite there being a quite global economy. Which results in those countries that are more long-sighted in their governance of economy tending to lose out economically to those countries that value short-sighted profits. Simplistically, any country that increases the taxes of ultra-rich corporations, for example, will have these same corporations migrating as best they can to countries where these taxations don’t occur (the same can be said of individual states in the USA), and so will lose out on profits from taxes - inevitably impoverishing its citizens. Globally, this general problem to me is most apparent in terms of corporations’ migration to countries with little to no labor rights, hence where corporations maximize their profits via exploitation of workers … leading to a global race toward minimizing labor rights.

At any rate, I tend to agree with you. But I don’t find the problem to be that of profit over everything per se (to the extent I'm interpreting you properly) but, again, that of the human-devised system we currently have (which will inevitably select for profit being realized for some human traits at the expense of some other human traits) such that what is selected for nowadays is short-sighted interests at the expense of long-sighted interests. Which those who seek to become wealthy must incorporate to so become.

For the record, I can’t discern any easy fix to the problem I see in current economics. Still mentioning it because I find there can be no resolutions if problems aren’t identified. Maybe tangential to OP, but still...

Hey, I agree with you. I'll be reading to see if others see it differently.

Computer processes things. If the universe is a process then where do its inputs come from. A difference machine which has randomness in it. — Jackson

(I should have articulated "an uncreated cosmic computer that feeds off itself" rather than simply say "computer ..."; it's what I intended at any rate.)

So, if the universe is an uncreated cosmic computer with randomness as inputs for its processes, would it then be properly conceived of as alive/animate/organic, dead, inanimate and perfectly fixed (as per the block cosmos), or something other? Can't figure out what the other could be in this scenario.

Cheers, mate.

Leibniz was to the first of think of the entire universe as a computer. Feeding off itself. — Jackson

Interesting: can a computer that feeds off itself - reminiscent to me of the Ouroboros symbol's significance - not be conceived of as organic? And, if organic, to what extent can it be conceived of as a computer?

... trying to work through some semantics.

Conclusion: The cosmos is not like a machine but like an uncreated being. Of course, this would welcome in concepts of pantheism and panentheism as God. Is the cosmos evil? “In part; in part not,” seems to be the most appropriate answer.

Or can one have a machine devoid of design?

Not that I find your reply addressed my questions in regard to truth, good, and beauty/fairness (I'm living with it just fine), but OK. Yup, monkeys (and other animals) - can not only communicate but also intentionally deceive - thereby evidencing innate awareness not only of what is true and what is false but of what is termed a theory of mind.

But then establishing the truth of it? Some of us are still trying to establish the truth of “I am”. — javra

Very sensible. First is it true? then, (if I am), am I good? and am i beautiful? can be considered. — unenlightened

I can work with your appraisal.

How would you respond to the claim that “even primordial sentience needs to be innately aware of truths (conformities to what is real) in order to survive; that only more developed sentience will become in any way aware of notions of ethical good; and that the awareness of beauty is relegated only to the most developed of sentience,” this as we know of sentience on planet Earth … say from monocellular organisms (granting their being sentient) to humans?

This addresses “awareness of”, be it consciously reasoned or not. But, then again, why care at all about truth (lower case “t”) if it is neither a good to be pursued nor something just and, thereby, an aspect of what is fair? This at least for us humans that can discern and contemplate all three.

(For instance, your reply to 180 Proof seems to indicate that truth is both good and fair (in the sense of just).)

the reality of X or any of its properties — javra

Properties and relations are where correspondence gets too grand for me. They are too much like verbs and adjectives to be plausible as contenders for ontological commitment along with X, Y and Z. And they aren't required for asserting truths about X, Y and Z. — bongo fury

I kind of want to ask, though a bit off topic: a property of liquid water (not ice or steam) is that it's wet. I can sort of see the argument that wetness is subjectivity dependent, hence mind-dependent, hence not "objective" in the sense of mind-independence. Still, would you be arguing that the wetness of water does not correspond to reality? If so, on the grounds that I've just mentioned? (Probably won't argue with your answer; just curious.)

:smile: :up:

This might help out:

Historically, fallibilism is most strongly associated with Charles S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and other pragmatists. Global fallibilism (also called pragmatic fallibilism, contrite fallibilism, epistemic fallibilism, epistemological fallibilism or fallibilistic empiricism) implies that no beliefs can be conclusively justified,[3][5] or in other words, that knowledge does not require certainty.[6][7] Moreover, global fallibilists assert that because empirical knowledge can be revised by further observation, any of the things we take as empirical knowledge might turn out to be false.[4][8] The claim that all assertions are provisional and thus open to revision in light of new evidence is widely taken for granted in the natural sciences.[9] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallibilism#Global_versus_local_fallibilism

the latter is Socratic knowledge (I know that I don't know). — Agent Smith

Why not? "I fallibly know that I infallibly know nothing."

There's another thread, by Jack Cummins, on human judgment & error. Can error ever get a handle on accuracy? — Agent Smith

I'll fallibly affirm "yes". I'm a fallibilist, after all.

Even so, we could set that aside and run with it. Where does the path of relativism lead before it bleeds to death from a self-inflicted gunshot? — Agent Smith

Ah. I'll leave that for the relativists to answer.

I see that as rephrasing of what I affirmed. Am I missing something?

No doubt. But here there is a logically invalid conflation of these concepts in their absolute form - Truth with a capital “T”, and so forth - with non-absolute, and hence imperfect, instantiations of these perfect ideals …. Or so the argument might go.

But yes: The rapist, for one example, rapes because the rapist’s desires are gratified by so doing and, so, the raping is good for the rapist, minimally, while the action takes place. Ever seen the movie Perfume; it illustrates how acts such as murder can be or become aesthetic for the murderer. So too I imagine can become most any commonly deemed wrong that is a personal good for the person engaging in it, like the act of manipulating others. Or, the reality that many truths can hurt, at least in the short-term, and are thereby often treated as bad, furthermore often deemed untrue on this count. Human caused global warming comes to mind.

Nothing new in all this, I would think.

Nevertheless, in any supposition of True = Good = Beauty these terms can only be interpreted in terms of absolute ideals, or universals, from which all imperfect variations which we deal with result. So, for one example, the doing of wrongs is good for the wrongdoer, otherwise they wouldn’t be done, but this instantiation of “good” would be so far removed from the “Good” so as to either be deemed a bad or an evil by most.

To not be addressing these perfect ideals is to instead be addressing the notion of “truths = goods = beauties”, but I’ve never read it expressed as such by any philosopher, and this expression would indeed at best be buffoonery I would think - as per above examples.

Then again, there’s always relativism to fall back on for some - such that there is no such thing as a universality shared by all truths, by all goods, and by all beauties.

Maybe, just maybe, Truth = Good = Beauty. They're the same thing?!

My analysis is incomplete. Maybe someone can help out. Establish the truth ( :chin: ) of the following equalities:

1. Truth = Good
2. Good = Beauty — Agent Smith

This might make a little more sense if interpreted along the lines of:

1. (Complete) Conformity to that which is real = (Complete) Gratification of life’s deepest ingrained desire (i.e., the deepest ingrained desire of each and every psyche)
2. (Complete) Gratification of life’s deepest ingrained desire = (Complete) Fairness, as a composite of both that which is (completely) just - correct, right - and that which is (completely) aesthetic

Since we are imperfect, we can’t have it (this equivalency) in its complete, absolute, form - this being instead the ideal - but can only appraise proximity or furtherance from this complete state of Truth/Good/Beauty as ideal, this being the pragmatics of life

And such means of interpreting would not necessarily be equivalent to:

What is = what ought to be = what is desirable? — unenlightened

But then establishing the truth of it? Some of us are still trying to establish the truth of “I am”.

As a psychotherapist in training — ZzzoneiroCosm

A psychotherapist ... Cool.

If the book's theme intrigues you, see is you can do anything with the musing that "depression is nature's way of telling there's something wrong". No references; kinda a personal partial takeaway from "What doesn't kill you makes you stronger". Basic point: figure out what's wrong, resolve it to a good enough extent, and you grow as a human being because of it, rather than being debilitated by the same states of mind. No problem if not interested. But it's helped me out in my life often enough.

Good luck in your endevors!

IOW, per SCOTUS, a woman doesn't have a right to choose, but the state does have the right to choose for her. — Relativist

How libertarian / laissez faire / anti-government control of our human liberties the current conservative SCOTUS is!!!*

* sarcasm, if I need to spell it out

I'll let others comment on this as they will.

There is no specific point: an individual human life gradually emerges during the development of that "bundle of human cells". — Relativist

No, there is no mathematically strict dichotomy to this transformation. Agreed. This can be likened to the questions such as that of "when does the color orange become the color yellow?": no strict dichotomy, but it yet happens all the same. This being in many ways very entwined with the paradox of the heap: roughly expressed, asking at which point does a heap take form. To me, Roe v Wade in its addressing the three trimesters of pregnancy and their significance gives a very good and informed overall answer to this question you've quoted.

As to my use of the term "point", it was not meant to be taken so literally. My bad, if required.

But how do you interpret this lack of a strict moment of dichotomy to weigh in on the issue? Are you one to rationally uphold because of it that Y’s potential to become X at some time in the future entails that Y = X in the present? This so as to justify that a human blastula = a human being? But then a seed would of itself be a tree. And so forth in innumerable directions.

Consider that there is no set of necessary and sufficient properties for "human personhood". We can identify traits that most humans have, ranges of DNA, and reference to parenthood,, but it's impossible to narrow any such properties into being necessary and sufficient. — Relativist

I've considered it. What conclusions are we to then draw from this: that no such thing as "human personhood" occurs?