May I ask which scenario you are referring to: the Russell example or the counter-example? — fiveredapples

Via the Russel example, I was addressing the understanding that the man can only know its 3 o'clock if his beliefs conform to reality. His primary belief is that he is observing the reality of a working clock, from which is derived the second belief of what time it is. In Russell's scenario, the second belief (is assumed to) conform to reality only via the first belief's (assumed) conformity to reality. Differently stated, in the stipulated case, it is only the (assumed) truth of a working clock that justifies the man's (assumed) truth of what time it is - which, in this example, luckily happens to be correct.

But the first belief is untrue.

Still, it is - or would be - the reality of a working clock that leads - or would lead - to knowledge of what time it is.

Because the man has no justification by which to deem that the clock to not be working, to him he holds knowledge of what time it is.

To those who are aware that the clock is not working, the man does not hold knowledge of what time it is - this because the primary belief upon which his second belief is founded is untrue, thereby making the second belief factually unjustified, despite if happening to be correct by mere luck.

I suppose the pivotal part of my previous post was this:

declarative knowledge is: true belief that, on account of being true, can be factually justified without end were one to so want and be capable of doing. — javra

From my perspective, since the man would not be capable of so justifying his conviction of what time it is, he does not hold what he and everyone else deems to be knowledge.

In the Russell example Bartricks gives, the man has justification under the JTB conception of knowledge. If he didn't, it would pose no problem for the JTB conception of knowledge. The problem is that our intuitions about knowledge tell us that something is awry. We don't think he has knowledge, pace JTB, and we pinpoint the problem to the source of his belief: namely, the broken clock. There is no human fallibility at play here. To think fallibility is at work here -- to respond that the man made a mistake in thinking the broken clock was a working clock -- is to not realize that the justification criterion, per JTB, has actually been satisfied in the example. — fiveredapples

(Nice posts, btw).

Why, or how, does the man know that it’s 3 o’clock? Only because he looked at the clock which, to his mind, was working properly. The obtainment of truth that it is 3 o’clock is thus here directly determined solely by the reality of there being a working clock.

As uncomfortable as this might be, remove the god’s eye view from the scenario. If the man goes about life from here on out without ever observing anything which contradicts with his conviction that it was 3 o’clock on account of a working clock so showing, to the man this belief will be a known. Hence, to him and all others that he interacts with, there will be no evidence that he did not obtain a true state of the world (the correct time) from observing a working clock (a reality to which his beliefs accurately conform). If enquiry was made into how he knows this, his justification (of a fact, rather than ethical justification for the acceptability of so believing – the two forms of justification sometimes get conflated) will be that a working clock informed him of it so being. Here, a working clock showing that its 3 o’clock is, again, the reality to which his true proposition of it being 3 o’clock conforms. And again, because nothing he encounters will contradict his justified true belief, that it was 3 o’clock will to him be knowledge.

Now, where he to any point in the future to discover things that contradict with what is to him a known, he at this point will know (as per the LNC) that some or all of the data involved are in fact mistaken. At this point what is and isn’t known becomes doubted to varying degrees. Say he then discovers that this same clock was not working properly via enquiry. Now, he gains awareness that his then held truth of it being 3 o’clock (on account of a working clock so showing) was in fact a belief-that (a belief of what is true) that did not conform to what was real – was in fact a false belief. He can now ethically justify his stance that it was 3 o’clock but can no longer factually justify it – for the reality on which it was dependent turn out to be bogus.

The person now knows that he was wrong in what he presumed to be knowledge.

None of us have a god’s eye view of the world. Factual justification of our beliefs of what is true in fact being true is all we have to go by. Most of the time, we don’t spend a lot of time in justifying our knows. They simply cohere into other knowns without contradiction and this, typically, serves as sufficient justification for them. But when there is a contradiction between what we take to be knowns, then we know that some of the givens we’ve taken to be knowns are not.

Placing the god’s eye view of the scenario back in, the terminology gets confused: the man only thinks he knows that its 3 o’clock – something we know on account of knowing that the reality of it being a working clock is bogus. But, because the person is unware of this, to the person his known is, at least for the time being, fully secure, and he has no reason to doubt his knowledge.

My take away from this is that declarative knowledge is: true belief that, on account of being true, can be factually justified without end were one to so want and be capable of doing. In practice, we never spend an entire lifetime factually justifying one single belief-that, so our justifications are never perfect but always approximate. Regardless, we assume that anything we consider a known could be so justified ad infinitum without and problems manifesting in the process. The shortened version of all this is then, imo, JTB.

The Pythagoreans originally insisted vehemently that every number could be expressed as a ratio of two integers, and then someone refuted that by showing that some definitely cannot. Is that refutation not set in stone now, as much as the observation of one black swan forever refutes the claim that all swans are white? — Pfhorrest

It's in trying to answer questions like these that I believe the Ancient Skeptics got such a bad reputation over the years. :wink: It requires illustration of possibilities that evidence a lack of infallibility which then gets others to doubt things unreasonably.

There's this fallback:

if one cannot prove that at no future time will anyone find conceivable what to us is currently inconceivable (say some sapient being that will exist a million years from now) then neither can one demonstrate the infallibility of the claim. We find it impossible to conceive of how the square root of 2 is not irrational; can this of itself demonstrate that all intelligences that shall exist for all time yet to come will likewise find it impossible to conceive of some justifiable alternative to this affirmation? If not, then we have not demonstrated that no unknown future refutation is possible. — javra

This same argument would apply for the refutation of all swans being white as well.

Being only humorous, what if all swans that appear to be black were in fact white swans that some person painted with permanent ink? Yes, this is absurdly non-credible for a number of reasons. Yes, other more sci-fi possibilities could be easily produced, maybe without end - some of which might hold more sway. But before the topic enters into issues such as that of mass selective hallucinations telepathically produced by aliens with a funny sense of humor, and the like, the point to any such possible example is here only to show that the criteria of being "perfectly secure from all possible error", i.e. of being infallible, hasn't been met.

And this absence of currently held infallibility will then apply even for the refutation of any given argument.

But not all fallible, psychological certainties are of the same strength. One can be certain of a gut feeling that one has not justified but most will deem such psychological certainties to be weaker than the thoroughly justified psychological certainty that planet Earth is spherical. Strong refutations, just like strong arguments, are of strong psychological certainty.

Am a bit tired now, but if didn't express something properly or am wrong about something, I'm sure I'll find out about it later.

Very nicely said!

a market of fair competition. — javra

Has given us landfills . — ovdtogt

So its your stance that economic competition has so far been mostly equitable?

I don't find it to be so. But I won't be debating the issue.

If I were to try to play devils advocate, I'd try using Agripa's trilemma as a counter. But I'll be forthright. At first glance, I like you're argument B.

Just in case it is sound:

Hence, all sound deductive reasoning is less than infallible in its conclusions. — javra


Agreed. — TheMadFool

:smile: :razz: ... This wouldn't tarnish the argument's strength though.

I hear you. The definitions can be contentious, often emotively so. For example, socialism for most - at least in my neck of woods - most always invokes notions of what I term Stalinism. I do favor Sanders (a socialist democrat) as a candidate in the USA, but I for example can also find a lot of merit in Warren, who's a self-proclaimed capitalist. But to the degree I'm wrong in my terminology, I stand corrected. Regardless of terminology, though, I do uphold a market of fair competition.

To be clear, by "capitalism" do you just mean free trade, or do you mean the division of society into a class of owners and a class of laborers? — Pfhorrest

Not a very easy question to properly answer. In earnest, by "capitalism properly structured" I interpret a meritocratic system of capital acquisition wherein those with greatest ability gain the most. The leading problem I currently find with capitalism as-is is that it selects for those with most greed to be endowed with most capital and, hence, economic power. The stock market has nearly no interest in long-sighted success but, instead, is most interested in short term gains, nowadays at least - often time leading to long-term calamities (economic, environmental, etc.). A CEO that destroys a company, instead of being financially ruined him/herself, often gets selected to run other companies. If the head destroys the body, its unnatural for the head to be placed on another healthy body and prosper. By comparison - as an ideal economic model to be pursued and developed - an economy structured by the people (with the people at large being its governance) in manners that select for qualities we value (as per the golden rule) to gain greatest economic power would by my appraisals be commendable. There would still be competition for capital here and, hence, to me the latter is yet a system of capitalism.

But less idealistically and more directly, in a forced choice, I'd select the "free trade" meaning of the word. Still, class division is by my appraisals not requisite for capitalism. As one example, cooperatives can - or at least could - prosper economically with a system of fair competition - if we actually lived in such a system. Here, the owners are in part or in whole the laborers.

Gave a longer spiel than anticipated. I usually try to shy away from partaking in these subjects due to their complexity - especially when it comes to debates. It just that the idea of economy in the absence of any governance doesn't so far strike me as realistic.

Do you by any chance interpret the financial aid provided by governments to corporations and banks in 2008 - and still provided by governments to petroleum companies, for example - as welfare? If not, why not? It is financial aid provided by the government to those it deems to be in need.

I ask in part because I don’t find evidence that economy ever prospers - or maybe even exists - in the complete absence of governance. What type of governance, and governance by whom, to me are the pivotal issues.

To that effect, governance of economy and governments alike by an ever concentrated sum of corporate oligarchs is to me not a good thing, and that’s where I see things headed. So I’m not misunderstood, I do endorse capitalism when properly structured.

The basic question is: Is logic derived from how the world works or is logic independent and prior to how the world behaves? — TheMadFool

I’ll offer my perspective, but, before I do, as per the contents of my previous post, I do find that no matter the answer affirmed, it will be less than infallible.

As for my non-orthodox view, on one level, all sound deductive logic will require true premises. The truth of premises will in all cases require some reality that is conformed to. The conformity to the referenced reality will be less than infallible. Hence, all sound deductive reasoning is less than infallible in its conclusions.

As to logic itself as laws, principles, and rules into which data is inputted, so to speak, logic cannot be used to substantiate the credibility of logic, for so attempting presumes the very conclusion one is attempting to arrive at from the very get go - this irrespective of the specific instantiation of logic used. This makes the credibility of logic in general less than epistemically infallible. Notwithstanding, we are psychologically stuck with needing to find logic in general trustworthy; to my mind, that should answer that.

As to the metaphysics of logic, my own view is that logic is neither derived from the world nor independent of the world. Logic when generally addressed, hence when starting with rudimentary laws of thought, is rather an a priori aspect of awareness (my view is somewhat Kantian on this). From its a priori aspects we sapient beings can then extrapolate axiomatic rules and experiment with them via trial and error. But logic when more loosely interpreted as the rules which govern reasoning and inferences (rather than formalized logic or, else, the study of the rules which govern inferences) is, again, an a priori aspect of experience - again, neither derived from the world nor independent of it.

[edit: The laws of identity and of non-contradiction, for example, are integral to any instantiation of immediate experience. For instance, because everything that occurs within any given moment of immediate experience will occur during the same span of time, these contents cannot be discerned to be mutually exclusive strictly from the given experience and, hence, can only abide by the law of non-contradiction (contradictions require that givens discerned to be mutually exclusive are further discerned to co-occur at the same time, at least imo). And these two laws' innateness to experience is prior to use of these same laws to infer their manifestation via abstract thought. This in itself is probably deserving of further explanation, but I thought I should better substantiate my aforementioned claim that logic is an a priori aspect of experience.]

Don’t know if it’s of any benefit but that’s my current take. And while I’m certain there is a lot that could be debated in at least some of what I’ve just affirmed, my basic point was this: Logic itself cannot be epistemically evidenced to be infallible – this though we have no choice but to trust its capacity of producing accurate results whenever devoid of errors.

I’m avoiding the particle-wave duality issue because I don’t want to here engage in speculations of how QM might not in any way be inherently contradictory.

The problem of induction and Popper's falsifiability anticipated. I don't know if it works for deductive logic though. The square root of 2 was irrational before the Pythagoreans deduced it and will always be irrational till the end of time itself. — TheMadFool

As for example, when someone proposes an argument to us that we cannot refute, we say to him, "Before the founder of the sect to which you belong was born, the argument which you propose in accordance with it had not appeared as a valid argument, but was dormant in nature, so in the same way it is possible that its refutation also exists in nature, but has not yet appeared to us, so that it is not at all necessary for us to agree with an argument that now seems to be strong."

Sextus Empiricus — ZzzoneiroCosm

The square root of 2 being irrational to me seems to be precisely the type of affirmation which we cannot refute in practice. While I find the boldfaced text somewhat weak in its argument (and, for that matter, dislike the emotive tone of what follows and thereby ends the sentence), the idea that I make out is this: if one cannot prove that at no future time will anyone find conceivable what to us is currently inconceivable (say some sapient being that will exist a million years from now) then neither can one demonstrate the infallibility of the claim. We find it impossible to conceive of how the square root of 2 is not irrational; can this of itself demonstrate that all intelligences that shall exist for all time yet to come will likewise find it impossible to conceive of some justifiable alternative to this affirmation? If not, then we have not demonstrated that no unknown future refutation is possible.

I mention this because a) it (fallibly) evidences that all our affirmations are fallible, even the ones we cannot refute (such as the example you've provided) and, to me far more importantly, b) it illustrates the absurdity of doubting the truth of any affirmation merely because it is not evidenced to be epistemically infallible.

Also the word "refutation" says a lot about what Sextus Empericus meant. It implies a premise or premises will turn out to be false but it's unlikely that there will be a problem with validity. This ties in quite neatly with the problem of induction and Popper's falsifiability doesn't it? — TheMadFool

Not "will turn out to be false" but "might (or might not) turn out to be false". We already know that "all swans are white" is false. That "all swans are either white or black" might someday turn out to be false just as readily as it might never turn out to be false (the latter on account of being ontically true).

Yes, I for one do see an important tie with induction and the principle of falsification - and, hence, with knowledge gained from the empirical sciences.

Does the prospect of a unknown future refutation make the strongest argument weak? — ZzzoneiroCosm

No. The purpose of an argument or justification is to substantiate that one's belief-that (always of what is true) is in fact true (in fact conforms to that which is real). The unknown of whether or not an unknown future refutation to that which is affirmed exists doesn't change the fact that the given substantiation for the affirmation is strong.

The unknown of whether or not an unknown future refutation exists only makes the substantiation, and therefore the affirmation, less than epistemically infallible.

Should it at the very least temper a dogmatic approach to knowledge- and certainty-pronouncements? — ZzzoneiroCosm

If the dogmatism deals in infallible pronouncements - such as in "it is unquestionably true because I (or he, etc.) says so" - then yes. Otherwise, it to me seems contradictory that affirmations are not a product of psychological certainty for that affirmed. The affirmation quoted in the OP gives all indications of Empiricus being very psychologically certain of what he states, for example.

Addendum: It's wise to beware (moreover) of an uknown future refutation of the possibility of an unknown future refutation. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Agreed.

Is it possible to refute the possibility of an unknown future refutation? — ZzzoneiroCosm

Until such refutation is provided, it can only remain unknown whether or not such refutation is possible. But until it is provided, all affirmations remain less than infallible, i.e. fallible to varying degrees.

My take so far is that their fallibility is why we must be capable of justifying our beliefs to be true if they are in fact true. If they're untrue, our attempts to justify them will at some point become inconsistent, incoherent, or both. Hence the notion of (fallible) knowledge-that as JTB.

Got it. Thanks.

As for me, consciousness - as in "that which is aware of" - is itself other than information - as in "that which informs". The former is informed by the latter. But this seems to be neither here nor there in this debate.

At any rate, thanks again for the forthright reply.

That is irrelevant if you understand the distinction between the things I labeled “physical/actual” vs things I labeled “abstract/virtual”.

Those are two distinct categories of existence as I described, and you may label them as you wish or think about them whatever you want, but as long as we agree the distinction exists, then the question still stands whether qualia belongs in one or the other category. — Zelebg

Going by this created dichotomy, all instantiations of immediate experience would be "physical/actual". Abstract concepts that emerge from these instantiations of experience would then be "abstract/virtual".

More specifically, qualia as an abstract conceptualization is abstract/virtual, but any instantiation of qualia as immediate experience (say, a sensed aesthetic) would be physical/actual.

But so dichotomizing doesn't so far make sense to me. This because I do not deem actual, concrete experience to be the same as physicality. It almost seems that you believe in experience's equivalence to physicality. Can you better explain this, or how this is a mistaken interpretation of your view? My bad if I've missed this explanation somewhere in the thread.

As we concluded over the last few pages there are only two possible modes of existence we know of, actual and virtual. Thus the nature of subjective experience, aka qualia, can either be physical or abstract phenomena. — Zelebg

Firstly, physicality is itself an abstraction. Secondly, immediate experience (be it of pain/pleasure or of empirical givens) is itself not an abstraction but, instead, that from which abstractions result.

If abstractions are virtual and immediate experiences are actual, then the following doesn't contextualize the issue properly:

Now, if we can agree with all the above, then the question is what do you think ‘subjective experience’ or qualia is, physical or virtual phenomena? — Zelebg

It's true.

The only way it's truth-value would be problematic is *if* you have never told a lie in your life *and* you know this to be true *and* you speak what you know to be untrue. You find this scenario feasible in real-world applications?

'I am a liar.'

is already a paradox. Tell me if you know I am a liar or not? — ovdtogt

The strengthened liar paradox – “this very sentence is false” - is an abstraction obtained from either “I am a liar” or “I am lying”.

A liar: a) someone who tells lies (not “someone who never tells truths”), b) someone with a propensity to lie, such that they are attracted to lying, or c) someone whose propensity to lie is greater than average.

A lie: an intentionally (or, less commonly, unintentionally) told statement known to the speaker to be untrue whose contents are intended to be believed true by those to whom the statement is told. (If the speaker believes her statement to be true, the statement would not be a lie.)

“I am a liar” (or “all people are liars”, etc.) cannot then feasibly be a contradiction, for it intends to correlate to the fact that the individual (or that all people, etc.) has told lies or, else, has some propensity to lie in certain contexts. Or, in some contexts, it would be the momentarily honest expression that one or all of one’s cohort has a greater than average propensity to lie. In all such cases the statement would be unequivocally true.

It is not feasible that a human never utters a true sentence in the entirety of their lives. If for no other reason, no such person could tell successful lies, for no trust would be imparted upon such person and, so, none of their false statements would be believed true by others. Hence, the equivalence of a liar to someone that never tells truths – something that appears required for the liar paradox to obtain - is a product of mistaken reasoning.

“I am lying,” on the other hand, is in real world application made in reference to sentences that have already been spoken or, less commonly, that have yet to be spoken. This, again, is not a contradiction. The statement of “I am lying” would itself be unequivocally true in these cases.

The liar paradox is then always abstracted from mistaken reasoning applied to the significance of real world cases in which “I am a liar” or “I am lying” is spoken. Given the verity of this, the liar paradox – both strengthened and non-strengthened – is the product of faulty reasoning. And, if the product of faulty reasoning, then the contradiction it presents is itself as specious as would be any other contradictory outcome of reasoning.

You didn't take my last post seriously, did you. Please do.

You're out of your depth. — Bartricks

You, guy, are more than correct in this. When someone does not know what is meant by the law of noncontradiction but considers dialetheism to be consistent with his theory ... I at that point am out of my depth.

Shallow sounds about right right now.

I do not know what you mean by LNC, or how what you're saying responds to what I have already said about this.

Dialetheism is the theory that there can be true contradictions.

That's not a theory about truth, but a theory about what can be true.

It is consistent with my theory. — Bartricks

Um, OK. I was hoping you'd provide something I could reply to, though.

You agree with gibberish? What do you agree with? — Bartricks

Unless I misunderstood creativesoul's remark, I agree that reasoning is subject to laws of thought and that these are presupposed true in the very use of reasoning - such that their truth can only be a priori to any use of reasoning, including any assertion thereby obtained. Hence, that truth and reasoning are two different things. This in a way touches upon my first post on this thread which you've not yet replied to.

The correspondence theory of truth is not a substantial theory of truth. It is true - no one disputes that it is true - but it is true because it is trivial. It says "a proposition is true when it corresponds to the facts", yes? — Bartricks

This is only a particular instantiation of, "a proposition's correspondence to that which is real", and I take the latter to sum up the correspondence theory of truth. I in my own way agree that the correspondence theory of truth is insufficient, but I do take it to be a necessary aspect of any theory of truth that addresses propositions. (When I say it's insufficient, it for example does not easily explain "the arrows aim was true" or "a true friend" and like semantics of the same term, so to me there's something more general involved.)

But you disagree that it is a theory of truth at all. True is an adjective whereas truth is a noun form of this same adjective. To me truth is not a sharply different semantics from true but, instead, addresses what all instantiations of true hold in common as their property.

I get we don't agree on what truth is. But I'd ask you to reply to my previous post as pertains to the validity of your own theory. For ease, I'll re-post it here:

Dialetheism is the position that some statements are both true and false, i.e. that some contradictory propositions express what is termed “true contradictions”. I hold disregard for dialetheism, but the point is that it uses reason to make and substantiate this assertion. Dialetheism stands in contradiction to the law of noncontradiction (the LNC), which also uses reason to make and substantiate its assertion.

If truth is that which Reason asserts, given that reason can assert both dialetheism and the LNC, would both dialetheism and LNC be true?

If they’re not both true, wouldn’t this evidence that truth is not a product of what reasoning asserts? Reason can assert both dialetheism and the LNC but, here, they’re not both true – hence one given which reason asserts is here necessarily false.

Alternatively, if they are both true, then how does this not negate the LNC in favor of dialetheism and, in the process, evidence that truth is not a product of what reasoning asserts? Reason can assert the LNC but, if both dialetheism and the LNC are true, the LNC would necessarily be false as entailed by the true contradiction of both being true – thereby again making something which reason asserts false. — javra

(As to its last paragraph, I get the incomprehensibility of the LNC being false if it were to be true in conjunction with dialetheims - but this is what contradictions are, incomprehensible. Nevertheless, since the LNC stipulates that no contradictions can occur, were any contradictions to be deemed correct, the LNC would be false - and dialetheism contradicts with the LNC.)

Reason presupposes truth as correspondence by virtue of presupposing the truth of it's premisses. — creativesoul

As should be apparent, I fully agree. A tricky philosophical question that ensues: To what does reasoning’s premises (first principles at least) correspond to?

As for me, since I have idealistic leanings, these correspond to universally applicable aspects of awareness – regardless of its type or degree – such that awareness per se is presumed a metaphysically real given (rather than a physically real given). Quite the mouthful, I know, but here truth as correspondence to that which is real is maintained.

I’m curious to discover alternative understandings regarding what reality the first principles of reasoning would correlate to.

As an example, one could make the case that Aristotle's laws of thought pertain to the physical wold and we gain knowledge of them via empirical observation - such that their truth is a correspondence to physical reality. The problem I find in this is that it places the cart before the horse: we as aware beings require the laws of thought aprioristically in order to engage in empirical observations - at the very least, the law of identity - and, moreover, aprioristically require these same laws of thought so as to hold the capacity of obtaining generalities (in this case, reasoning's premises) from observed particulars.

Edit: Just realized I might have misinterpreted what you meant by "reasoning's premises". You many have been strictly addressing formal reasoning which, as such, requires premises from which to infer things. If so, please interpret my usage of "reasoning's premises" as strictly specifying the laws of thought which we premise to be required for correct reasoning to obtain.

So, absent some good reason to think otherwise, our working hypothesis should be that truth is a performative of Reason. What it is for a proposition to be true, is for Reason to be asserting it. — Bartricks

Dialetheism is the position that some statements are both true and false, i.e. that some contradictory propositions express what is termed “true contradictions”. I hold disregard for dialetheism, but the point is that it uses reason to make and substantiate this assertion. Dialetheism stands in contradiction to the law of noncontradiction (the LNC), which also uses reason to make and substantiate its assertion.

If truth is that which Reason asserts, given that reason can assert both dialetheism and the LNC, would both dialetheism and LNC be true?

If they’re not both true, wouldn’t this evidence that truth is not a product of what reasoning asserts? Reason can assert both dialetheism and the LNC but, here, they’re not both true – hence one given which reason asserts is here necessarily false.

Alternatively, if they are both true, then how does this not negate the LNC in favor of dialetheism and, in the process, evidence that truth is not a product of what reasoning asserts? Reason can assert the LNC but, if both dialetheism and the LNC are true, the LNC would necessarily be false as entailed by the true contradiction of both being true – thereby again making something which reason asserts false.

Hey, in adding some content to my previous post, here presenting a counterpoint to the “it’s too late” angle:

If the global mass disruptions that are now inevitable will in turn result in a global consensus of what should be done – rather than a global, tyrannical, surveillance-infused dystopia the likes of which we have never known – then research dollars will be heavily invested in carbon capture programs, along with more efficient renewable energy, etc. (One current problem is that over five percent of the global GDP is spent subsidizing fossil fuels rather than being invested in renewables.) In this optimistic scenario, although there will be extreme damage done to humanity and to life in general, there will also be a) relatively successful counter measures resulting from b) a global accord regarding (none tongue in cheek) democratic values. But all this is obviously a very big “if”, to say the least – especially since it will need to be global to have any meaningful effect. And this can only come from the people themselves.

As general rule, though, people don’t like immediate pain and suffering, so when it will hit most of mankind, things will either change for the better or for the worse. But whichever direction the change occurs, it will be significant.

As with yourself, I’m not here degrading the issue by entertaining thoughts of human caused climate change possibly being a hoax propagated by fake news. Or was it China?

The question is on par to asking: Is the challenge of changing the global status quo of “greed is good” something that is too great for humanity to handle?

It’s not something that can be easily answered.

But I reckon that those who still have a whole life ahead of them will address the issue with motivations that differ from those who’ve become jaded by the life they’ve so far lived.

My answer: Don't know.

Meaning, if the language of mathematics (metaphysical abstracts) is encoded into all of the physical/natural world, what does that infer? To me, it infers that a metaphysical reality exists.

The next question would be here, did that metaphysical truth always exist independently, or did humans invent it(?). Objectively, not sure anyone knows... — 3017amen

Stepping away from mathematics for a moment, I’ll address the possible metaphysical reality of first principles.

Consider the law of identity (A = A). Is the law of identity something that exists apart from our understanding of it? Or is it something we’ve created axiomatically and then put to use which we then reify into a metaphysically real given?

Since its impossible to create it sans the a priori existence of the law itself, and since young enough preadolescents have no understanding of it while yet making use of it (ostensibly, as do lesser animals), I heavily lean toward it being a non-created, a priori, metaphysical reality.

The same can then be stated of a priori mathematical givens: they can become intelligible to us, but exist apart from our understanding of them, all the while constraining what can be.

And as with laws of thought, we're free to concoct any mathematics that we please axiomatically, but those which are metaphysically real shall always remain irrespective of what we assume.

In one word: Trump. Whom we all know is our esteemed comrade of superior equality relative to everyone else in the world, this because he is the bestest leader in the history of trump = unrivaled truth. (Remember now, ignorance is power.)

And if this weren’t enough, he has supporters, both at home and abroad.

Nah, I don’t feel there’s a global conscious awakening on the horizon. Unless it’s about giving the rich more untaxed money so that more could trickle down to the ever growing poor, kind of thing.

Excuse me for my sarcasm. I have to joke about the unpleasantries I do feel in relation to what’s going on so as to keep some morsel of sanity. Still, no, the feeling you’re experiencing isn’t something that everybody else shares – definitely not something shared by me.

Then again, maybe you’ve had a lucky strike of pleasant encounters? I’d still say it’s not something global.

Let's take an empirical claim such as: All objects obey the laws of gravity. Notice that it is a Aristotelean categorical statement. Isn't it necessary then to consider the logical character of such statements before we talk of its empirical import? What do you think? — TheMadFool

While I find a sharp distinction between rationalism and empiricism specious - Kant gave good examples of why this is, imo - the only way to substantiate the claim that you give is empirically, hence inductively. Its truth cannot be derived merely from axioms.

If a scientific theory is categorically true then it is ontically unfalsifiable and the only way we can know that is to show that it's epistemically unfalsifiable. — TheMadFool

The underlined portion doesn't work. That's the thing to induction: it can't evidence something with absolute certainty, which our empirical propositions and theories most often implicitly purport. For instance, "All swans are white" explicitly states a determinate state of affairs as though it were an absolute certainty - that it isn't an absolute certainty remains implicit.

Because we cannot ever show that an empirical claim is ontically unfalsifiable, it will always remain epistemically falsifiable to us. This even if it happens to be "categorically true", in which case it would be ontically unfalsifiable. The best we can do is not be able to falsify it in practice despite trying to - while never knowing if it can be falsified in principle. Not being so able, in turn, substantiates the belief that the claim is true.

Let me cheat and use categorical logic to show that indeed I am, very surprisingly to me, right.

All swans are white in logic doesn't have existential import unlike its negation: Some swans are black which can only be true if and only if there is at least one black swan.

Lacking claims of existence the proposition: All swans are white, is true even if you never saw a swan let alone white swans. I think in predicate logic the statement gets translated as:

IF x is a swan then x is white. Emphasis on "if". — TheMadFool

This thread is about empirical knowledge, I presumed, not axiomatic claims. Aside from which, how would "all unicorns are white" not be a true statement given the system of logic you're presented?

Aside from a contradiction in your statement which I expect to carry some deep meaning I'll focus on the words "impossible to falsify". Such statements would be metaphysical for Popper, right? — TheMadFool

OK, too brief in the expression. No contradiction intended. What I was addressing is a proposition that is epistemically falsifiable but not ontically falsifiable. This presumes that our knowledge is imperfect. To better illustrate via example: I say "all swans are either black or white" while holding imperfect knowledge of the world; I could falsify this claim by observing a red swan in some remote location; so its epistemically falsifiable. However, reality has it (here assuming a perfect knowledge of the world) that only black and white swans exist. So no matter how much I - the one with fallible knowledge - look in attempts to falsify this proposition, I will never be able to. Because only black and white swans exist, the proposition is not possible to falsify ontically.

This state of affairs is what makes the following understandable:

However, if that addressed is falsifiable and if we are unable to falsify it despite our best attempts, then it gives all indications of in fact conforming to that which is ontic (else, of accurately corresponding to that which is real), i.e. of being true. — javra

The above argument looks ok but actually has a flaw in that when predictions fail to materialize (aren't observed) it doesn't always mean the theory in question is false. Take for example the classic case: All swans are white. If you fail to observe white swans it doesn't mean that the claim is false. It just means that you haven't discovered evidence for the claim. The only way we can say that the claim, all swans are white, is false is by observing a non-white swan. — TheMadFool

This one example doesn't work. If one fails to see any swans period, then the proposition of "all swans are white" is no better than "all unicorns are white" - and there are no grounds to believe that swans are real (much less that they're only white) due to the proposition being unfalsifiable (here simplifying things by not introducing reasoned conclusions, such as could apply to the probability of alien life). However, if one does observe swans but fails to see a white swan, then the proposition is falsified.

Can't think of a different example to substantiate the claim you want to make. Maybe you can?

Why is falsification more important than verification to Popper? I think the reason has to do with induction failing to provide definitive truth. If we are to put our trust in a theory it can't be based on it being true because the nature of induction only allows for tentative truth. — TheMadFool

I think the underlined portions miss the mark. Truth is, but appraising when it is is not something that can be done with what others term absolute certainty. For as long as a falsifiable theory is not falsified, it can well be true - in an ontically determinate way. But since our subjectivity is not 100% objective (this being shorthand for a long-winded argument - my bad), we can't subjectively know with absolute subjective certainty that every instantiation of what we deem to be true (personally or collectively) actually is in fact true. However, if that addressed is falsifiable and if we are unable to falsify it despite our best attempts, then it gives all indications of in fact conforming to that which is ontic (else, of accurately corresponding to that which is real), i.e. of being true.

To this effect, hypothesize that a falsifiable proposition or theory is impossible to falsify both in practice *and* in principle. By what reasoning could one claim that this proposition or theory holds any chance of being untrue?

So, I think that we trust falsifiable theories that have not been in any way falsified precisely because we expect them to be true.

I agree with the general gist of your arguments so far, btw.

First, Hume is difficult to interpret which makes him difficult to categorize. — Ron Cram

OK. So he is difficult to categorize. Yet this directly contradicts your stance throughout this thread that the proper way to categorize Hume is obvious. I get the sense that this too will be ignored by you. But I find it very significant.

This is due in part to Hume's self-contradictory statements, called antinomies, in the philosophy literature. — Ron Cram

Antinomies are not logical contradictions; they're two or more conclusions that are each equally well justified yet appear to contradict each other. To me, Hume's greatest antimony, so to speak, is his justification that free will and determinism not only coexist but require each other. But this doesn't make him contradictory to himself, i.e. self-contradictory, this makes him a compatibilist.

Likewise, he was neither an obvious idealist nor an obvious materialist. With both SEP and Wikipedia as references, Hume is commonly considered a neutral monist. This conclusion is not devoid of criticism, but it is what most subscribe to. In this light there are no contradictions in his philosophical works as regards idealism and materialism.

I can't grasp why it is that you're so certain of what was going on in Hume's head. Especially when you characterize him as someone who is difficult to categorize.

Unless one equates hate to a mere dislike of something, but this denotation doesn't seem right to me. — javra


Ditto as well as with like versus love. — Gnostic Christian Bishop

Ok, each to their own takes. So I clarify why my take is different than yours, one will risk and sacrifice for givens that are loved, but not for givens that are merely liked. Than one loves ice-cream is an aberration in other languages, ancient Greek being a well known one. Unless one believes that languages create our core emotions, this is then sufficient evidence that the English term love conveys emotive states of being that, while including that of intense liking, also consist of sentiments that are other than liking. One can, for example, deeply love someone whom one at the same time thoroughly dislikes.

Hate is not the same. I can't imagine how one could deeply hate someone whom one at the same time thoroughly likes. To earnestly hate can, and most often does, convey some measure of visceral disdain for that which is hated. Hence, I can greatly dislike earthworms without hating them (not that I dislike earthworms).

So, the way you're using the words, their referents could be conceptualized as a dyadic relationship. But not in the way I'm using them. Still, I'll skip on "what is love" debates.

Cool.

Noticed in this thread that you nitpick what to reply to in relation to my posts. Leaves me to believe that you might not address other's writings, such as Hume's, with a fair sense of impartiality. Can you provide any reference to Hume being a "skeptical idealist"? Or else one that critiques Hume as "doubting the existence of an external world"? Fallible though I am, these complaints seem idiosyncratic.

The link I put up shows otherwise. Dualism exists in our emotions, like it or not. — Gnostic Christian Bishop

I haven't once denied that there is both love and hate in the world, nor that these two emotions stand in opposition to each other. That said, the video - nice contents, btw - only evidences, at worst, an innate bias toward self and against other. But this bias can be maintained in the absence of hate for other - and none of the babies or children exhibited signs of hatred in their choices. So the video doesn't illustrates that hate is as an essential aspect of our constituency, much less that it is as essential as is love. It does illustrate that self-love is innate from the get go, however.

Unless one equates hate to a mere dislike of something, but this denotation doesn't seem right to me.

The bundle theory of substance thus rejects the substance theories of Aristotle, Descartes, and more recently, J. P. Moreland, Jia Hou, Joseph Bridgman, Quentin Smith, and others." — javra


This is not Hume's theory of substance. Notice that Hume's name does NOT appear in that list. — Ron Cram

Why would Hume appear in a list of individuals whose theories of substance the bundle theory of substance rejects?

You asked for a quote directly from the Treatise. Here's a quote from 1.1.6: — Ron Cram

Greatly appreciative of that. I'm now content, and actually happy to see that he did write something regarding a bundle theory of substance - and not just of self. So I acknowledge being wrong in remembering him to only address the bundle theory of the self. But we obviously interpret his comments in considerably different ways.

I don't think Hume ever claimed that individuals were immutable. — Ron Cram

No, Hume's bundle theory of the self claims that there is no immutable self - which is what I've previously stated.

What I asked is where Hume specifies a bundle theory of objects.

I don't have a quote at my fingertips but the Wikipedia article on Bundle Theory, the one you linked above, has this quote:
"Thus, the theory asserts that the apple is no more than the collection of its properties. In particular, there is no substance in which the properties are inherent."

Wikipedia has it correctly. — Ron Cram

Its not a long article, form the same article:

"The bundle theory of substance explains compresence. Specifically, it maintains that properties' compresence itself engenders a substance. Thus, it determines substancehood empirically by the togetherness of properties rather than by a bare particular or by any other non-empirical underlying strata. The bundle theory of substance thus rejects the substance theories of Aristotle, Descartes, and more recently, J. P. Moreland, Jia Hou, Joseph Bridgman, Quentin Smith, and others."

god said he was a jealous god when speaking of his love for us. — Gnostic Christian Bishop

:smile: Reminds me of Nine Inch Nails song I like. "Bow down to the one you serve; you're going to get what you deserve" kind of thing. Why on earth should I bow down to an omnipotent hater? Give me eternal hell instead. I imagine one would get quite used to the flames after a while, anyway. :joke:

Besides, the archaic definition of jealousy is "concern for that which one is jealous of; vigilance; protective; guarding".

Which are determined by what one loves, which is why I did not like you trying to separate the Yin and Yang of love and hate. — Gnostic Christian Bishop

Yea, pain and pleasure duality kind of thing. Reality has both. Still, in my experiences at least, when I've felt the most intense moments of love, hate was utterly absent - be this love platonic or otherwise. When I've hated, I've always loved that which what I've hated was antagonistic to. So, I maintain my conviction. Love can exist without hate; hate can't exist without love. One is essential; the other isn't.

I think there's a misunderstanding at the back of this, though, arising from the anthropomorphism of 'God as super-engineer'. In that vein, both the pro- and anti- sides of the argument have it wrong - if you believe that the order of nature 'proves' that God exists, then you're tending towards Biblical literalism, i.e. interpreting myth as fact; and if you believe it 'proves' that God doesn't exist, then you're tending towards scientific materialism, which is kind of a mirror image. (That's why, as many have noted, Dawkins himself comes across as a kind of secular fundamentalist.) — Wayfarer

I'm not in disagreement with this. I do tend to think that most people, be they theists or atheists, associate the term God with an omnipotent psyche (meaning soul or mind). I'm reminded that even the "teleological argument" most often aims to validate just such a personage. This means of conceptualization, however, stands in stark contrast to Stoic concepts of an anima mundi of logos, or to the Neo-Platonic notions of the One, among other similar outlooks in western culture alone - all of the latter being in some form of another teleological without invoking the idea of a creator deity, be s/he theistic or deistic.

In any case, interesting to note that many modern classical (e.g. Thomist) theologians and philosophers will have no truck with any design arguments whatever. For that, they are sometimes branded as atheists or closet atheists by the ID advocates - which says a lot, in my view. — Wayfarer

It does say a mouthful. I haven't taken the time to read Aquinus carefully, but I've perused enough to get the cliff-notes version. I remember admiring him, in large part, because he upheld the reality of Divinity while simultaneously drawing attention to what we'd now term empirical approaches to studies of nature. Maybe in time I'll have a second look at his writings, but, for now, I'm a little overwhelmed by my reading list.

I'm primarily asking because in a forced choice between actualizing Nirvana and actualizing an absence of all suffering via the noneixstence of all future life, I so far view the first to be less fantastical. — javra


I am not sure what you mean by being less fantastical, but the idea of Nirvana is not deviating from Schopenhauer. In fact, it aligns well with him since he very much agreed with Hindu ideas of Moksha and Buddhist Nirvana as salvations of sorts for the Will to diminish its constant state of desire. So quite the opposite actually. — schopenhauer1

I know Schopenhauer borrowed ideas from the East, but didn't catch him entertaining the notions of Nirvana or Moksha.

My point was that stopping all humans from reproducing seems impossible, but if it were possible, how would one stop all greater apes from reproducing? If not, they will experience their own suffering and will eventually evolve into sapience akin to our own. This same reasoning can be taken all the way to bacteria reproducing. If all life on all planets is not completely abolished by prohibiting all reproduction everywhere, suffering will yet be. And life has a way of evolving into sapience. Succeeding in this endeavor, then, is to me unrealistic. Btw, I know some Buddhists maintain such general perspectives on prohibition of reproduction, but I do disagree with them in this.

Anyway, wanted to better express my point of view.

[...] I provided Hume's quote saying that he understands that his theory of personal identity is not correct and that he cannot find a way to rescue it. — Ron Cram

Yes, I recall that statement. What makes his bundle theory of the self imperfect is the presence of what some might term a unified first person point of view. Still, I can well argue that this imperfection does not in any way invalidate the claim that there is no permanent, immutable, aspect of the self.

Hume's bundle theory states that an objects consists of its properties and nothing more. — Ron Cram

OK, I haven't read him in a very long time. Still, I don't recall him saying that "objects consist of its properties and nothing more". All I recall is his argument for the bundle theory of the self, in which he states that the self is a commonwealth of elements that constantly change.

Can you point out where in his own works Hume claims a bundle theory of objects?

No, all material objects are mutable. The substance objects are made of are well characterized. Take any object to a condensed matter physicist and they can tell you all about the substance and its properties. — Ron Cram

As to modern bundle theory, it does not deny substance, but presents the view, roughly speaking, that substance is composed of an aggregate of properties (such that properties can includes relations, which include causal relations.) The link I previously gave can serve as reference to this.

Also, we are addressing substance within contexts of philosophy, not those of science. It makes for a world of difference. If properties do not inhere into the immutable substance of "apple", for one example, I still fail to see how the modern notions of bundle theory are erroneous? (note, I presume an external world throughout) But I gather this issue addressing bundle theory isn't central to the thread.