The self annihilating suicide could be considered as such [selfless, I mean]. — jambaugh

When would suicide (self-murder) be anything other than a selfish act? One seeks to escape pain, conceives of death as a perfect liberation from all pain via the actualization of non-being, and then kills oneself without any consideration for the repercussions this will hold for others. Sometimes suicide can be understandable; even then, it still remains a selfish act.

Of course a person jumping onto a grenade which others are standing near to is open to interpretation. But if the person jumps on the grenade out of concern, hence love, for others’ wellbeing, this it is then commonly deemed to be a selfless act and, hence, not a suicide. If, however, the person jumps on the grenade to ensure he/she will quickly die, this out of a want to die that is indifferent to the wellbeing of others, then his/her intentions would be at once both selfish and suicidal.

Self-sacrifice that is by default done out of love does not equate to suicide—but is in many ways the converse.

Wrong analogy. Its more along the lines of what Nirvana signifies to some: being in the form of awareness sans any selfhood and, by entailment, any otherness. And yes, while heretical of me to say so, the Buddha as person was an ego and thus less than truly selfless, obviously. Same goes for your example of JC. Seems like the topic is changing from that of how love is defined.

I believe I understand your point. However, every ego is ego. In other words, everyone has one. It is inescapable in so far as we only have access to our own experience/consciousness and have to infer what others experience through analogy to our own. — Noah Te Stroete

I in no way disagree with this. We often use absolutes in qualifying people, as in “that person is selfish” and “that person is selfless”. If a person, for one example, speaks at least one language, they then can’t be purely selfish—for they then hold some aptitude for integrating what goes on in the minds of other egos with their own (hope this shorthand argument is sufficient to make the point of there not being such a thing as absolute selfishness). Conversely, regardless of how selfless a person might be by comparison to others, by mere virtue of being a self separate from at least some other selves, they will hold some ego-centric interests that, for example, will conflict with those of some others—as you say, they thereby will yet hold some egocentricity due to being egos and, hence, will not be perfectly selfless.

I, though, am a non-physicalist and, as a pivotal part of what makes me so, I hold the belief in there being such a metaphysical given as an absolute state of selfless being. Not quite a Platonist notion of “the Good”, but to me close enough to warrant mention.

Didn’t, and don’t, intend for the discussion to get too metaphysical. I in part gave the post because I am genuinely curious to discover if there are meaningful disagreements with this:

My own general take is that the rational to (genuine) love is to bring egos into a closer proximity to a selfless state of being relative to each other. The smaller the egos - which divide by rationing the world into self and others - the greater the unity of psyches that can be gained via their closer proximity to selflessness.

If this is disagreed with, I’d like to hear why. — javra

Still, the question I posed to me seems to stand as a logical enigma, if nothing else. Selflessness cannot (it seems to me) have any other rationale than itself—otherwise it would be selfish interests rather than selfless interests. (BTW, this to me does not in any way contradict the Darwinian evolution of love as sentiment among more intelligent and social animals, with its culminating pinnacle being so far found in (some) humans.)

There are emotions that in English are labeled “love” which are selflessness-yearning or aspiring and there are emotions also termed “love” in English that are egotistic. The second is the easier type to demarcate: It is a strictly egocentric affinity wherein that which one loves is loved solely for its instrumental value, particularly, to oneself. Love of money is an example. When and if it is no longer useful to one’s literally selfish interests, it then loses all value relative to oneself. People can love other people in this same way; it is often enough associated with a sense of possessing an objectified other as one’s property. Much like a trophy, one here feels one can do as one pleases with the other, whose value is, again, solely instrumental to oneself. In contrast, selflessness-aspiring love is where, for example, one will willingly self-sacrifice for the other even without anybody else finding out about it - it’s not done for the egotistic reason of being praised as being a good boy/girl by others. Love of children tends to be, or at least is supposed to be, of this second generalized emotive form. At any rate, this second type of love wherein, for example, two hearts can be said to grow into one over an extended span of time (gaining common affinities, understanding of the world, etc.) is the more difficult to philosophically demarcate. This is in part because while it can be qualified as selflessness-aspiring, it yet consists of two or more (as can be exemplified by loving families) egos, each with its own egocentric needs and wants.

Despite the difficulties in finding accurate demarcation, the distinction between these two forms of emotion, both often termed “love”, seems to me rather evident. Covetousness to possess, be it money or some other person, is a bogus form of love; despite it being common enough to say that many people love money, I don’t know of any that would self-sacrifice for the well-being of the money they love. Whereas one would self-sacrifice for the well-being of kids, parents, friends, lovers, etc. if one happened to love them in non-bogus manners. As another example, when someone kills their partner upon finding that their partner no longer want to stay in the relationship, we sometimes term this “a crime of passion” but never “a crime of love”—I take it because it’s generally understood by non-psychopaths that if the first genuinely loved the second they would not have murdered the latter.

So, while I can’t speak for Wayfarer or for others that believe they get Wayfarer’s general comment of:

The point about love is that it has to be its own rationale - as soon as it serves something other than love, then it ain't love. — Wayfarer

... I do find that any emotion which could be termed “love” whose rationale is that of satisfying egocentric interests will be a false form of love, will be a perversion rather than the real thing. Love—be it for cats stuck in trees, for someone whom one also happens to have the hots for, or for humanity at large—will always open up one’s ego so that it in some way incorporates the egos of other, i.e. will make one more selfless than otherwise such that the other’s states of being become in some way incorporated into one’s own. Else expressed in terms others have mentioned, love unifies. One as a psyche does not unify with the money (nor with the ice-cream, etc.) one loves.

-------

This as background to the following:

My own general take is that the rational to (genuine) love is to bring egos into a closer proximity to a selfless state of being relative to each other. The smaller the egos - which divide by rationing the world into self and others - the greater the unity of psyches that can be gained via their closer proximity to selflessness.

If this is disagreed with, I’d like to hear why.

If not disagreed with, then this relevant question ensues: What rationale can the earnest human inclination to approach a state of selfless being hold other than the state of selfless being itself?

To say that the state of selfless being is instrumentally beneficial—hence, that it is not its own (inherent) rationale—is to make its benefit egocentric in some manner; this then thereby nullifies the reality of it being a selfless state of being whose proximity one as ego intends to approach or to maintain.

forgot to mention:

Free advice. — Xtrix

well taken by me. Thanks

A quick word on this (I'm out right now and don't have access to my usual stuff): this cannot possibly be the case. — StreetlightX

Not very charitable of you, but I've no intention to bicker.

Read: Language evolved for reasons other than language. About as clear-cut as you can get.

[...]

Read: FLN was not an adaptation. — StreetlightX

The suggestion that FLN (narrow faculty of language) – namely, universal grammar (UG) – was an exaptation (traditionally termed “pre-adaptation” - strictly speaking, not an adaptation) is not contradictory to mainstream knowledge concerning biological evolution.

It may or may not so be, but the idea that UG’s current functionality did not initially evolve for the purpose it currently has is not, of itself, absurd.

As far as I'm concerned, this post isn't about Chomsky but about what is and is not acceptable in relation to mainstream biological evolution.

No, I'm not. That Chomsky's thin gruel speculation on language amounts to "language popped into existence somehow somewhen because of totally unspecified changes to something somewhere probably genetic but we really have no idea, and then somehow somewhen probably started to be used by humans because no idea" has nothing to do with the reality of PE. — StreetlightX

I get the sarcasm and your dislike, but I don't yet get why. About the same account could be given for our bipedalism. We don't yet know the specifics of why our species' ancestors became bipedal, but it happened - evolutionary speaking, this overnight, and this aspect of us has remained in stasis. Although there are known cases of feral children that did not walk bipedally (with possible reasons for this being numerous), we do furthermore tend to assume that this inclination toward bipedalism is genetically inherited.

Placed in proper context, Chomsky's argument was against BF Skinner's behaviorist approach to language acquisition. In brief, operant behavior (and its conditioning) cannot account for human language acquisition, given the latter's complexity and variety.

BTW, this, to my mind, doesn't in any way deny that operant behavior has actual application. It only specifies that there must first be innate, general cognitive abilities that can facilitate species-specific operant behavior. For example, both a dog and a pigeon can be operantly conditioned, but each will so be in different species-specific manners due to (not behaviorist conditioning itself but, rather) the innate generalized cognitive faculties of each particular type of animal. This being where cognitive science holds sway over behaviorism - the former acknowledges the importance of innate mental predispositions whereas the latter does not.

To not be presumptuous, are you proposing that Skinner had the correct hypothesis?

If not, and the syntax to language is not acquired strictly via behaviorist means, I don't understand why you find fault with the arguments proposed by Chomsky and others of the same perspective? After all, punctuated equilibrium would account for a cognitive know-how of grammar that is genetically inherited rather than behavioristically learned - one used to acquire specific human language(s) - which has since its genetic acquisition by our species remained in a state of evolutionary stasis.

Quite literally, he has to be committed, on pain of incoherence, to the insane idea that language initially evolved for means other than language. — StreetlightX

To my recollection, Chomsky’s, Pinker’s, et al.’s hypothesis concerns neither language nor communication (where differentiated) but the grammatical syntax to these - which is found only in Homo Sapiens.

In which case, it would be correct to say, "the occurrence of syntax to language initially evolved by means other than syntax to language (via some adaptive mutation(s))"

Be this as it may.

It just popped into existence one fine day, and will remain the same forevermore.

If that isn't magic, I don't know what is. [...]

And that's the thing: this is a problem specific to Chomsky's position, and not one facing evolutionary accounts of language in general. — StreetlightX

Are you ridiculing as stupid the position of punctuated equilibrium?

Were grammatical syntax to have rapidly evolved in some evolutionary ancestors followed by a period of evolutionary stasis that persists to this day, this is nothing else but the position of punctuated equilibrium – which holds application to evolution in general. There’s a plethora of empirical evidence in support of this view, be the view taken as antagonistic to the hypothesis of phyletic gradualism or not (they need not be antagonistic hypotheses of evolution). Phyletic gradualism, for example, fails to explain what are sometimes referred to as living fossils - the common example being the horseshoe crab - while punctuated equilibrium can easily account for these.

All of these alternate possibilities, while I concede are far-fetched (brains in vats) or not the norm (hallucinations), are what make one a skeptic of one's own knowledge and skeptical of our understanding of what knowledge actually is. If we can't have proof that one's knowledge is actually true, then it is illogical to say "truth" is a property of knowledge. — Harry Hindu

To me, at least, you’re addressing things outside of their proper conceptual order. So I would address things in this way:

Firstly, is truth - conformity to that which is real - possible? To argue that it is not is to obtain a contradiction. Briefly expounding on this: if conformity to reality entails that there can be no conformity to reality, then conformity to reality will both occur and not occur at the same time and in the same respect. I thereby take it for granted that we agree that the obtainment of truth (of conformity to reality) is possible.

Secondly, wherever truth is obtained, will it be possible to not hold factual justifications for the given truth? If claim X conforms to reality, then (I presume we both agree) one will be capable of factually justifying claim X by means of other facts without end.

Therefore, those beliefs that happen to be true will also necessarily be justifiable without error regardless of extent of justification involved.

At this point, fallibilism takes this form: because we are not omniscient, we cannot hold an awareness perfectly devoid of all possible errors regarding all that is. The reality of this then entails that a) we are sometimes wrong in what we believe to be true and b) we are incapable of providing a perfectly complete (i.e. absolute) justification for those claims that do happen to be true. This, of itself, however dispels neither that true beliefs can and do obtain nor that, when they obtain, they will be capable of being justified without any error.

That a belief taken to be true might not so be is the very reason why justifiability is a requisite part of JTB – the factual justifiability of our beliefs of what is true is the optimal guarantee we can hold in practice for our beliefs in fact being true. Again, just in case they are true, they will then be justifiable without error and without end.

As with the principle of falsification as it applies to empirical claims of what is, until a claim of knowledge becomes falsified, we hold no grounds by which to assume that it is not a true belief - which, on account of so being, can thereby be justified without end by us in manners perfectly devoid of error.

Then, to ask, “How do we know when we in fact know,” either equivocates between two implicitly referenced forms of knowledge - one infallible (which, for example, is obtainable via omniscience) and the other fallible - or, otherwise, can be answered thus:

We hold no reason to doubt that we hold true beliefs that are thereby justified (i.e., knowledge) of holding true beliefs that are thereby justified (i.e. of holding knowledge) whenever the former and the latter cannot be evidenced false via the scrutiny that is either directly or indirectly placed on it.

This is fallibilism. There here is no denial that beliefs of what is true can in fact be true. And if there’s no evidence of their falsity, there’s no reason to presume them untrue. One freely trusts that one’s beliefs are in fact true when one can justify them without error - for their truth would require that they be so justifiable. One just simply doesn’t presume oneself to be infallible - but this doesn’t diminish the trust just addressed.

As to the more explicitly asked question, “How does one infallibly know when one’s fallible claims of knowledge are in fact unassailable and when they are not,” the answer from a paradigm of fallibilism is, “Never; for infallible knowledge, as with infallible awareness of anything, is not something we are capable of.”

It’s not that one knows nothing; it’s that one is fallibly knowledgeable - in manners not yet falsified by any evidence - of not being endowed with any infallible knowledge.

I don't think indefeasible and infallible are synonymous, but I get your objection.

Well, of course I have discovered many times that what I thought I knew was not in fact knowledge. That's just to say I didn't really know back then, so of course it wasn't knowledge that got defeated. — fiveredapples

(Just saw that @Janus addressed something of the same. Notwithstanding, I’m still interested in your answers)

From a theoretical view of what knowledge is, I say of course. From the stance of practice (praxis), however, I’m very curious to better understand:

What is your contention against the following position: All of our claims of knowledge are to be treated as instantiations of knowledge until they become falsified by evidence, if such falsification were to ever occur.

Importantly, the underlined portion, to me, is what makes all our claims of knowledge less than indefeasible in practice. This being the stance you previously mentioned you’re not OK with.

For clarity, according to Wiktionary, “indefeasible” is given one definition: “not liable to being annulled or declared void”.

Or are you suggesting that unlike some past experiences, everything you currently (claim to) know can never be "annulled or declared void" as knowledge regardless of what evidence might be discovered?

Again, I'm trying to better understand you're affirmations.

No. Last I checked, the term "indefeasible" is synonymous to "infallible". You take your knowledge to be infallible. Hence, you never discover that what you once you thought you knew was in fact not knowledge - for everything you know is indefeasible. Do correct me if I'm wrong, but I can find no other way of interpreting your statement.

Yes, everything I know is indefeasible. — fiveredapples

OK. Now I know your point of view. Thanks.

I would point out that this commits you to knowledge that is defeasible, but you seem to be okay with this too. I am not okay with it. — fiveredapples

Is this to say that everything you know is indefeasible? As an example pertinent to the discussion: Your knowledge that the last clock or watch you looked at was working properly and thereby gave the correct time will be indefeasible on what grounds?

:grin: Just as long as it doesn't turn into a coherency theory of truth. :ok:

Maybe coherentism is too complex for me. I'm asking myself "acceptable for what?" and I can't come up with a good answer.

Can the knowledge that platen Earth is approximately spherical be to any measure justified by the two facts that a) pyramids are not square and that b) oranges have an orange color? — javra


Okay, now this is more my speed. My answer here is no, not on the face of that justification alone. — fiveredapples

So are we now cool with the claim that justification requires coherency of beliefs?

Would you say that one does not know whether a rock that is to be thrown up into the air at some point in the future will fall back to down to earth? — javra


Yes, that's what I'm saying. — fiveredapples

Hm, I can understand your logic for so affirming, but it doesn't so far strike me as in accord to the term's common usage. I, for example, make numerous decisions based on things I presume within what I consider a context of knowns regarding the future - such as that gravity will apply or that the sun will again rise. But again, to me all knowns are to varying extents fallible.

But it was a genuine request. I don't know the terminology. — fiveredapples

LOL. Yea, I get how "valid justification" might seem weird on it own. But "invalid justification" sounds about right to me. So until we can devise a different term for the matter ... I'll be peevishly using it.

To not beat around the bush, your reply doesn’t address the heart of the matter in relation to the one principle discrepancy you pointed out: coherentism (which I've just now seen you've amended in your first post to me). Cohrentism comes in two varieties: the coherence theory of truth, which I disagree with, and the coherence theory of justification, which I agree with. My question to you was whether or not it makes sense to you that justifications which are not coherent are to be deemed well grounded, acceptable, and/or correct (since you don’t like the colloquial use of “valid”).

Well, I would assume that that satellite is providing information for the basis of your belief. I would assume that your cat's position next to the plant provided similar information. — fiveredapples

As to the details of your reply, you’ve addressed a presumption of how the two stated facts are intended to cohere into the belief which is claimed to be knowledge, this in the first example I gave – it seems by importing the details of the second example which is coherent into the first. I’ll try for a more forthright example: Can the knowledge that planet Earth is approximately spherical be to any measure justified by the two facts that a) pyramids are not square and that b) oranges have an orange color?

If so, how? Here there are no contradictions but I don’t find that there is any coherence between the two facts and the knowledge claimed.

My question, again, is bluntly this: Can a justification hold if it does not consist of givens that cohere into that which is justified, if not also into each other?

As an aside, or maybe not so aside, I have always considered beliefs about the future outside the realm of knowledge -- for the simple fact that they could be defeated by things not turning out as you predict. — fiveredapples

Would you say that one does not know whether a rock that is to be thrown up into the air at some point in the future will fall back to down to earth?

There are also more worn-out examples such as knowing that the sun will rise again tomorrow.

Is validity used to talk about justification? Having studied a little logic, it has always bothered me when people use the colloquial use of 'valid' in philosophical discussions. Sorry, just a pet peeve. But do enlighten me, not that it matters to our discussion (as I understand you) if I'm wrong about validity as a term for justification. — fiveredapples

It's the colloquial use. Tell me of your preferred term for claimed justification that doesn't amount to a squat of beans, and I'll use it in our debates.

But more importantly, this asking me to enlighten you is to me a little irksome – maybe because of the day I’ve had. If you ever happen to seek some form of enlightenment, I’d recommend that you don’t ask other people for it. Simply because there are a lot of charlatans out there, as I’m certain @Bartricks would agree, and they all claim wisdom. From a song by Leonard Cohen called Teachers that I happen to greatly like: “’Follow me’ the wise man said, but he walked behind.”

So, my position - as described in the OP - is that knowledge consists of a feeling Reason is adopting towards true beliefs. — Bartricks

As we once concluded a few days back, I’m not profound enough to understand the subtleties of your position regard Her: Reason. To which I again say, so be it! Off to the shallow tides with me.

But to give a reply given the best of my understanding regarding the position you affirm:

I have yet to encounter this person you refer to as Reason. But if I did, I’d do my best to explain to Her that truth is a conformity to what is real, that only if something is true can it be justified without error regardless of degree, and that there can be no knowledge in the absence of truth. I think I’d try to tell Her this even if Reason’s feelings might get hurt by me so saying. (I don’t like unnecessarily hurting persons, even if they are strangers to me.)

This may or may not be in accord to your position. But again, I’m not of that depth.

But it still seems true (and would seem true to them too, were they aware of the nature of their situation) that they do not, in fact, possess knowledge. — Bartricks

As I believe I've addressed in my posts, I agree with this.

To me the conceptual problems only emerge when we presume (or else intend to gain) an omniscient perspective of reality and, thereby, possession of an infallible knowledge. We never hold such.

Still:

declarative knowledge is: true belief that, on account of being true, can be factually justified without end were one to so want and be capable of doing. — javra

True propositions that can be thereby justified ad infinitum without problems - where it to be feasible to so justify - occur. When they occur will always remain to some measure fallible for all of us non-omniscient beings.

Just in case an example would be of help:

Suppose I affirm knowledge that it will rain today. You ask me why. I then reply by justifying this belief to true with the following: there’s a satellite up in the sky and my cat is next to a plant out in the backyard – with this being the full scope of my justification. The two givens, even if true, do not cohere in any intelligible manner to my belief.

Here, I’d consider that my justification was invalid.

Now suppose that I explain things in a coherent manner as such: the satellite up in the sky has given a weather forecast of 80% chance of rain and my cat has always had a weird habit of sitting next to a plant in my backyard a few hours before it rains, next to which he is now sitting. The same basic truths are presented, but now the explanation provided makes them cohere with my belief that it will rain today.

Here, I’d consider that my justifications were valid – even if less than perfect.

In case it does rain – thereby evidencing my belief-that to be true – I can then maintain my claim of having had JTB in the latter case, but I can't claim JTB in the former case.

(edited the last sentence for better semantics)

No worries.

Do you mean...Can I reasonably hold two beliefs which don't cohere? — fiveredapples

No, that anybody can.

Can you validly justify a belief-that via use of givens that do not cohere?

Am I wrong that you're a Coherentist? — fiveredapples

In its pure traditional form, quite.

Coherency of beliefs applies, in part, to justifications - not to truth. Do you find that justifications for beliefs can be incoherent and yet valid?

No, that's not enough. If that were enough, then he could simply guess the correct time and he'd have knowledge, according to your definition. This is an even weaker conception of knowledge than JTB.

At least JTB attempts to tie the belief to reality by way of a reliable source of truth. — fiveredapples

I will not repeat what I said in my previous posts, but this clearly did not take what I said in context.

May I ask which scenario you are referring to: the Russell example or the counter-example? — fiveredapples

Via the Russel example, I was addressing the understanding that the man can only know its 3 o'clock if his beliefs conform to reality. His primary belief is that he is observing the reality of a working clock, from which is derived the second belief of what time it is. In Russell's scenario, the second belief (is assumed to) conform to reality only via the first belief's (assumed) conformity to reality. Differently stated, in the stipulated case, it is only the (assumed) truth of a working clock that justifies the man's (assumed) truth of what time it is - which, in this example, luckily happens to be correct.

But the first belief is untrue.

Still, it is - or would be - the reality of a working clock that leads - or would lead - to knowledge of what time it is.

Because the man has no justification by which to deem that the clock to not be working, to him he holds knowledge of what time it is.

To those who are aware that the clock is not working, the man does not hold knowledge of what time it is - this because the primary belief upon which his second belief is founded is untrue, thereby making the second belief factually unjustified, despite if happening to be correct by mere luck.

I suppose the pivotal part of my previous post was this:

declarative knowledge is: true belief that, on account of being true, can be factually justified without end were one to so want and be capable of doing. — javra

From my perspective, since the man would not be capable of so justifying his conviction of what time it is, he does not hold what he and everyone else deems to be knowledge.

In the Russell example Bartricks gives, the man has justification under the JTB conception of knowledge. If he didn't, it would pose no problem for the JTB conception of knowledge. The problem is that our intuitions about knowledge tell us that something is awry. We don't think he has knowledge, pace JTB, and we pinpoint the problem to the source of his belief: namely, the broken clock. There is no human fallibility at play here. To think fallibility is at work here -- to respond that the man made a mistake in thinking the broken clock was a working clock -- is to not realize that the justification criterion, per JTB, has actually been satisfied in the example. — fiveredapples

(Nice posts, btw).

Why, or how, does the man know that it’s 3 o’clock? Only because he looked at the clock which, to his mind, was working properly. The obtainment of truth that it is 3 o’clock is thus here directly determined solely by the reality of there being a working clock.

As uncomfortable as this might be, remove the god’s eye view from the scenario. If the man goes about life from here on out without ever observing anything which contradicts with his conviction that it was 3 o’clock on account of a working clock so showing, to the man this belief will be a known. Hence, to him and all others that he interacts with, there will be no evidence that he did not obtain a true state of the world (the correct time) from observing a working clock (a reality to which his beliefs accurately conform). If enquiry was made into how he knows this, his justification (of a fact, rather than ethical justification for the acceptability of so believing – the two forms of justification sometimes get conflated) will be that a working clock informed him of it so being. Here, a working clock showing that its 3 o’clock is, again, the reality to which his true proposition of it being 3 o’clock conforms. And again, because nothing he encounters will contradict his justified true belief, that it was 3 o’clock will to him be knowledge.

Now, where he to any point in the future to discover things that contradict with what is to him a known, he at this point will know (as per the LNC) that some or all of the data involved are in fact mistaken. At this point what is and isn’t known becomes doubted to varying degrees. Say he then discovers that this same clock was not working properly via enquiry. Now, he gains awareness that his then held truth of it being 3 o’clock (on account of a working clock so showing) was in fact a belief-that (a belief of what is true) that did not conform to what was real – was in fact a false belief. He can now ethically justify his stance that it was 3 o’clock but can no longer factually justify it – for the reality on which it was dependent turn out to be bogus.

The person now knows that he was wrong in what he presumed to be knowledge.

None of us have a god’s eye view of the world. Factual justification of our beliefs of what is true in fact being true is all we have to go by. Most of the time, we don’t spend a lot of time in justifying our knows. They simply cohere into other knowns without contradiction and this, typically, serves as sufficient justification for them. But when there is a contradiction between what we take to be knowns, then we know that some of the givens we’ve taken to be knowns are not.

Placing the god’s eye view of the scenario back in, the terminology gets confused: the man only thinks he knows that its 3 o’clock – something we know on account of knowing that the reality of it being a working clock is bogus. But, because the person is unware of this, to the person his known is, at least for the time being, fully secure, and he has no reason to doubt his knowledge.

My take away from this is that declarative knowledge is: true belief that, on account of being true, can be factually justified without end were one to so want and be capable of doing. In practice, we never spend an entire lifetime factually justifying one single belief-that, so our justifications are never perfect but always approximate. Regardless, we assume that anything we consider a known could be so justified ad infinitum without and problems manifesting in the process. The shortened version of all this is then, imo, JTB.

The Pythagoreans originally insisted vehemently that every number could be expressed as a ratio of two integers, and then someone refuted that by showing that some definitely cannot. Is that refutation not set in stone now, as much as the observation of one black swan forever refutes the claim that all swans are white? — Pfhorrest

It's in trying to answer questions like these that I believe the Ancient Skeptics got such a bad reputation over the years. :wink: It requires illustration of possibilities that evidence a lack of infallibility which then gets others to doubt things unreasonably.

There's this fallback:

if one cannot prove that at no future time will anyone find conceivable what to us is currently inconceivable (say some sapient being that will exist a million years from now) then neither can one demonstrate the infallibility of the claim. We find it impossible to conceive of how the square root of 2 is not irrational; can this of itself demonstrate that all intelligences that shall exist for all time yet to come will likewise find it impossible to conceive of some justifiable alternative to this affirmation? If not, then we have not demonstrated that no unknown future refutation is possible. — javra

This same argument would apply for the refutation of all swans being white as well.

Being only humorous, what if all swans that appear to be black were in fact white swans that some person painted with permanent ink? Yes, this is absurdly non-credible for a number of reasons. Yes, other more sci-fi possibilities could be easily produced, maybe without end - some of which might hold more sway. But before the topic enters into issues such as that of mass selective hallucinations telepathically produced by aliens with a funny sense of humor, and the like, the point to any such possible example is here only to show that the criteria of being "perfectly secure from all possible error", i.e. of being infallible, hasn't been met.

And this absence of currently held infallibility will then apply even for the refutation of any given argument.

But not all fallible, psychological certainties are of the same strength. One can be certain of a gut feeling that one has not justified but most will deem such psychological certainties to be weaker than the thoroughly justified psychological certainty that planet Earth is spherical. Strong refutations, just like strong arguments, are of strong psychological certainty.

Am a bit tired now, but if didn't express something properly or am wrong about something, I'm sure I'll find out about it later.

Very nicely said!

a market of fair competition. — javra

Has given us landfills . — ovdtogt

So its your stance that economic competition has so far been mostly equitable?

I don't find it to be so. But I won't be debating the issue.

If I were to try to play devils advocate, I'd try using Agripa's trilemma as a counter. But I'll be forthright. At first glance, I like you're argument B.

Just in case it is sound:

Hence, all sound deductive reasoning is less than infallible in its conclusions. — javra


Agreed. — TheMadFool

:smile: :razz: ... This wouldn't tarnish the argument's strength though.

I hear you. The definitions can be contentious, often emotively so. For example, socialism for most - at least in my neck of woods - most always invokes notions of what I term Stalinism. I do favor Sanders (a socialist democrat) as a candidate in the USA, but I for example can also find a lot of merit in Warren, who's a self-proclaimed capitalist. But to the degree I'm wrong in my terminology, I stand corrected. Regardless of terminology, though, I do uphold a market of fair competition.

To be clear, by "capitalism" do you just mean free trade, or do you mean the division of society into a class of owners and a class of laborers? — Pfhorrest

Not a very easy question to properly answer. In earnest, by "capitalism properly structured" I interpret a meritocratic system of capital acquisition wherein those with greatest ability gain the most. The leading problem I currently find with capitalism as-is is that it selects for those with most greed to be endowed with most capital and, hence, economic power. The stock market has nearly no interest in long-sighted success but, instead, is most interested in short term gains, nowadays at least - often time leading to long-term calamities (economic, environmental, etc.). A CEO that destroys a company, instead of being financially ruined him/herself, often gets selected to run other companies. If the head destroys the body, its unnatural for the head to be placed on another healthy body and prosper. By comparison - as an ideal economic model to be pursued and developed - an economy structured by the people (with the people at large being its governance) in manners that select for qualities we value (as per the golden rule) to gain greatest economic power would by my appraisals be commendable. There would still be competition for capital here and, hence, to me the latter is yet a system of capitalism.

But less idealistically and more directly, in a forced choice, I'd select the "free trade" meaning of the word. Still, class division is by my appraisals not requisite for capitalism. As one example, cooperatives can - or at least could - prosper economically with a system of fair competition - if we actually lived in such a system. Here, the owners are in part or in whole the laborers.

Gave a longer spiel than anticipated. I usually try to shy away from partaking in these subjects due to their complexity - especially when it comes to debates. It just that the idea of economy in the absence of any governance doesn't so far strike me as realistic.

Do you by any chance interpret the financial aid provided by governments to corporations and banks in 2008 - and still provided by governments to petroleum companies, for example - as welfare? If not, why not? It is financial aid provided by the government to those it deems to be in need.

I ask in part because I don’t find evidence that economy ever prospers - or maybe even exists - in the complete absence of governance. What type of governance, and governance by whom, to me are the pivotal issues.

To that effect, governance of economy and governments alike by an ever concentrated sum of corporate oligarchs is to me not a good thing, and that’s where I see things headed. So I’m not misunderstood, I do endorse capitalism when properly structured.

The basic question is: Is logic derived from how the world works or is logic independent and prior to how the world behaves? — TheMadFool

I’ll offer my perspective, but, before I do, as per the contents of my previous post, I do find that no matter the answer affirmed, it will be less than infallible.

As for my non-orthodox view, on one level, all sound deductive logic will require true premises. The truth of premises will in all cases require some reality that is conformed to. The conformity to the referenced reality will be less than infallible. Hence, all sound deductive reasoning is less than infallible in its conclusions.

As to logic itself as laws, principles, and rules into which data is inputted, so to speak, logic cannot be used to substantiate the credibility of logic, for so attempting presumes the very conclusion one is attempting to arrive at from the very get go - this irrespective of the specific instantiation of logic used. This makes the credibility of logic in general less than epistemically infallible. Notwithstanding, we are psychologically stuck with needing to find logic in general trustworthy; to my mind, that should answer that.

As to the metaphysics of logic, my own view is that logic is neither derived from the world nor independent of the world. Logic when generally addressed, hence when starting with rudimentary laws of thought, is rather an a priori aspect of awareness (my view is somewhat Kantian on this). From its a priori aspects we sapient beings can then extrapolate axiomatic rules and experiment with them via trial and error. But logic when more loosely interpreted as the rules which govern reasoning and inferences (rather than formalized logic or, else, the study of the rules which govern inferences) is, again, an a priori aspect of experience - again, neither derived from the world nor independent of it.

[edit: The laws of identity and of non-contradiction, for example, are integral to any instantiation of immediate experience. For instance, because everything that occurs within any given moment of immediate experience will occur during the same span of time, these contents cannot be discerned to be mutually exclusive strictly from the given experience and, hence, can only abide by the law of non-contradiction (contradictions require that givens discerned to be mutually exclusive are further discerned to co-occur at the same time, at least imo). And these two laws' innateness to experience is prior to use of these same laws to infer their manifestation via abstract thought. This in itself is probably deserving of further explanation, but I thought I should better substantiate my aforementioned claim that logic is an a priori aspect of experience.]

Don’t know if it’s of any benefit but that’s my current take. And while I’m certain there is a lot that could be debated in at least some of what I’ve just affirmed, my basic point was this: Logic itself cannot be epistemically evidenced to be infallible – this though we have no choice but to trust its capacity of producing accurate results whenever devoid of errors.

I’m avoiding the particle-wave duality issue because I don’t want to here engage in speculations of how QM might not in any way be inherently contradictory.

The problem of induction and Popper's falsifiability anticipated. I don't know if it works for deductive logic though. The square root of 2 was irrational before the Pythagoreans deduced it and will always be irrational till the end of time itself. — TheMadFool

As for example, when someone proposes an argument to us that we cannot refute, we say to him, "Before the founder of the sect to which you belong was born, the argument which you propose in accordance with it had not appeared as a valid argument, but was dormant in nature, so in the same way it is possible that its refutation also exists in nature, but has not yet appeared to us, so that it is not at all necessary for us to agree with an argument that now seems to be strong."

Sextus Empiricus — ZzzoneiroCosm

The square root of 2 being irrational to me seems to be precisely the type of affirmation which we cannot refute in practice. While I find the boldfaced text somewhat weak in its argument (and, for that matter, dislike the emotive tone of what follows and thereby ends the sentence), the idea that I make out is this: if one cannot prove that at no future time will anyone find conceivable what to us is currently inconceivable (say some sapient being that will exist a million years from now) then neither can one demonstrate the infallibility of the claim. We find it impossible to conceive of how the square root of 2 is not irrational; can this of itself demonstrate that all intelligences that shall exist for all time yet to come will likewise find it impossible to conceive of some justifiable alternative to this affirmation? If not, then we have not demonstrated that no unknown future refutation is possible.

I mention this because a) it (fallibly) evidences that all our affirmations are fallible, even the ones we cannot refute (such as the example you've provided) and, to me far more importantly, b) it illustrates the absurdity of doubting the truth of any affirmation merely because it is not evidenced to be epistemically infallible.

Also the word "refutation" says a lot about what Sextus Empericus meant. It implies a premise or premises will turn out to be false but it's unlikely that there will be a problem with validity. This ties in quite neatly with the problem of induction and Popper's falsifiability doesn't it? — TheMadFool

Not "will turn out to be false" but "might (or might not) turn out to be false". We already know that "all swans are white" is false. That "all swans are either white or black" might someday turn out to be false just as readily as it might never turn out to be false (the latter on account of being ontically true).

Yes, I for one do see an important tie with induction and the principle of falsification - and, hence, with knowledge gained from the empirical sciences.

Does the prospect of a unknown future refutation make the strongest argument weak? — ZzzoneiroCosm

No. The purpose of an argument or justification is to substantiate that one's belief-that (always of what is true) is in fact true (in fact conforms to that which is real). The unknown of whether or not an unknown future refutation to that which is affirmed exists doesn't change the fact that the given substantiation for the affirmation is strong.

The unknown of whether or not an unknown future refutation exists only makes the substantiation, and therefore the affirmation, less than epistemically infallible.

Should it at the very least temper a dogmatic approach to knowledge- and certainty-pronouncements? — ZzzoneiroCosm

If the dogmatism deals in infallible pronouncements - such as in "it is unquestionably true because I (or he, etc.) says so" - then yes. Otherwise, it to me seems contradictory that affirmations are not a product of psychological certainty for that affirmed. The affirmation quoted in the OP gives all indications of Empiricus being very psychologically certain of what he states, for example.

Addendum: It's wise to beware (moreover) of an uknown future refutation of the possibility of an unknown future refutation. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Agreed.

Is it possible to refute the possibility of an unknown future refutation? — ZzzoneiroCosm

Until such refutation is provided, it can only remain unknown whether or not such refutation is possible. But until it is provided, all affirmations remain less than infallible, i.e. fallible to varying degrees.

My take so far is that their fallibility is why we must be capable of justifying our beliefs to be true if they are in fact true. If they're untrue, our attempts to justify them will at some point become inconsistent, incoherent, or both. Hence the notion of (fallible) knowledge-that as JTB.

Got it. Thanks.

As for me, consciousness - as in "that which is aware of" - is itself other than information - as in "that which informs". The former is informed by the latter. But this seems to be neither here nor there in this debate.

At any rate, thanks again for the forthright reply.

That is irrelevant if you understand the distinction between the things I labeled “physical/actual” vs things I labeled “abstract/virtual”.

Those are two distinct categories of existence as I described, and you may label them as you wish or think about them whatever you want, but as long as we agree the distinction exists, then the question still stands whether qualia belongs in one or the other category. — Zelebg

Going by this created dichotomy, all instantiations of immediate experience would be "physical/actual". Abstract concepts that emerge from these instantiations of experience would then be "abstract/virtual".

More specifically, qualia as an abstract conceptualization is abstract/virtual, but any instantiation of qualia as immediate experience (say, a sensed aesthetic) would be physical/actual.

But so dichotomizing doesn't so far make sense to me. This because I do not deem actual, concrete experience to be the same as physicality. It almost seems that you believe in experience's equivalence to physicality. Can you better explain this, or how this is a mistaken interpretation of your view? My bad if I've missed this explanation somewhere in the thread.

As we concluded over the last few pages there are only two possible modes of existence we know of, actual and virtual. Thus the nature of subjective experience, aka qualia, can either be physical or abstract phenomena. — Zelebg

Firstly, physicality is itself an abstraction. Secondly, immediate experience (be it of pain/pleasure or of empirical givens) is itself not an abstraction but, instead, that from which abstractions result.

If abstractions are virtual and immediate experiences are actual, then the following doesn't contextualize the issue properly:

Now, if we can agree with all the above, then the question is what do you think ‘subjective experience’ or qualia is, physical or virtual phenomena? — Zelebg

It's true.

The only way it's truth-value would be problematic is *if* you have never told a lie in your life *and* you know this to be true *and* you speak what you know to be untrue. You find this scenario feasible in real-world applications?

'I am a liar.'

is already a paradox. Tell me if you know I am a liar or not? — ovdtogt

The strengthened liar paradox – “this very sentence is false” - is an abstraction obtained from either “I am a liar” or “I am lying”.

A liar: a) someone who tells lies (not “someone who never tells truths”), b) someone with a propensity to lie, such that they are attracted to lying, or c) someone whose propensity to lie is greater than average.

A lie: an intentionally (or, less commonly, unintentionally) told statement known to the speaker to be untrue whose contents are intended to be believed true by those to whom the statement is told. (If the speaker believes her statement to be true, the statement would not be a lie.)

“I am a liar” (or “all people are liars”, etc.) cannot then feasibly be a contradiction, for it intends to correlate to the fact that the individual (or that all people, etc.) has told lies or, else, has some propensity to lie in certain contexts. Or, in some contexts, it would be the momentarily honest expression that one or all of one’s cohort has a greater than average propensity to lie. In all such cases the statement would be unequivocally true.

It is not feasible that a human never utters a true sentence in the entirety of their lives. If for no other reason, no such person could tell successful lies, for no trust would be imparted upon such person and, so, none of their false statements would be believed true by others. Hence, the equivalence of a liar to someone that never tells truths – something that appears required for the liar paradox to obtain - is a product of mistaken reasoning.

“I am lying,” on the other hand, is in real world application made in reference to sentences that have already been spoken or, less commonly, that have yet to be spoken. This, again, is not a contradiction. The statement of “I am lying” would itself be unequivocally true in these cases.

The liar paradox is then always abstracted from mistaken reasoning applied to the significance of real world cases in which “I am a liar” or “I am lying” is spoken. Given the verity of this, the liar paradox – both strengthened and non-strengthened – is the product of faulty reasoning. And, if the product of faulty reasoning, then the contradiction it presents is itself as specious as would be any other contradictory outcome of reasoning.