using the basic mathematical language of 1s & 0s (something or nothing, on or off, being or non-being). — Gnomon

Might get back to this later. Short on time for now. If we are to entertain ancient concepts, 0 is a representation of a circle. As per Pythagorean philosophy - a relatively well known example - the perfect circle represents being as a whole, also, arguably a perfect wholesomeness. It used to not represent non-being - as it most often is used to represent today. A circle with a point at its center, represented light - in spiritual terms more often than not: nous, understanding. Also the sun, in more physical representations. Symbolically, the centered point could well be interpreted as the universal telos - Heraclitus's "zeus", for instance - that is ever-present to being, the latter represented by the circle.

Where a distinction is made between being (ousia) and existence (that which stands out to being), 1 then could represent a perfect unity of existence, not so much of being. This, at least, in ancient times by at least some ancients that made use of logos as concept.

I'll be hard-pressed to prove the aforementioned, but wanted to mention it as a possible perspective.

The expression "1" does not appear in set theory or in the lambda calculus (axiomatization of anonymous functions). You can optionally produce the concept of "1" as a necessary result of set theory or of the lambda calculus, but you can happily work in both mathematical theories and derive theorems, without ever mentioning the concept of "1". — alcontali

The concept of 1 - of oneness - is however found. Expressions of quantity are obtained, at the very least, via mathematical object(s) in set theory and via variable(s) in lambda calculus (had to look the latter up to verify). That there can be one or more objects is an expression of quantity. Same holds true with variables.

What matters with quantity - at least I'll so argue - is that we idealize givens (be they concrete or abstract) to be integral wholes - i.e., units that by definition are undivided - that, then, can stand in relations to each other. "1" is simply one way to formally represent a singular integral whole. This concept is entailed in there being an object and not more, or a variable at play and not more.

To be explicit, my main argument being that conceptualization of quantity precedes conceptualization of all maths - in that it is prerequisite to mathematical thought. The aforementioned as just one example.

BTW, to my knowledge, no one has provided a logical or mathematical reason for why 1 + 1 must entail an equality to 2. One does not need to formally account for or even express this concept in order to faithfully apply it - this in ordinary life just as in theoretical maths. The same, I imagine, applies to the axiomatization of "1".

The dominant axiomatization in mathematics, ZF set theory (along with AC), does not even mention "1". If you look at its nine axioms, the expression "1" is literally nowhere to be found. — alcontali

I've browsed the link to the nine axioms. Thank you for the link. Here again variables are made use of. And, again, with these variables is entailed notions of quantity. And the axioms addressing variables come before those addressing functions (or relations between variables). For instance, X and Y are understood to be two variables, rather than one.

For example, is a combinator or a function related to quantity? — alcontali

No, I'd say those are complex relations regarding quantity. In other words, they would be pointlessly meaningless - correct me if I'm wrong here - in the complete absence of expressions of quantity such as that of "1".

I don't think that, for example, category theory even ever mentions quantities. It is rather about structures, mappings between these structures, and possible preservation of structure. I don't think you'd ever see a quantity in that context. — alcontali

I'll be explicitly transparent. Yes, I took calculus in high-school, but I'm no mathematician. Not my thing.
Still, I have an exorbitant degree of confidence that none of the above means anything sans representations of unity, aka quantity. A geometric point, for all its marvels of being volumeless, is yet a quantity, for instance.

If the semantics of "quantity" needs better clarification, let me know. Alternatively, if you find I'm mistaken - but understand that "1" represents an idealized perfect integrity, or unity, of existent stuff - please offer some references to maths devoid of notions of quantity (such as the concept of "1", and its derivatives).

satanically — alcontali


that's says something. — Wayfarer

"Satanists" are the Abrahamic way of describing those whom you dislike.

These are empirical patterns in which people detect some form of consistency. Mathematics is only about that consistency, and nothing else. It is not empirical. The language expression "1+1=2" is handled by math, because it is language. What you see in the real, physical world, is not handled by math. — alcontali

You might be using language in a very specific sense. In which case, yes, relations between quantities is not a human language used to convey meaning. All the same, in a broader sense of language, how is mathematics - which is codified quantity and relations between quantity (right?) - not an abstracted form of language employed by humans for various purposes? In physics, such as for the purpose of understanding the world and for predictions.

Of course. — alcontali

OK. So I take it that we agree that what you previously stated is "epistemically impossible" is actually possible.

Mathematics has nothing to do with real-world experience. It is completely divorced from it. — alcontali

There is no other mathematics left than pure mathematics. — alcontali

I'd say bring it down to Earth a bit. We learn as toddlers about mathematics how? By noticing quantity in reality and the relations between quantities - and by giving these quantities and relations names such as "one" and "plus". 1 + 1 = 2 is not pure mathematics. It is a fact that is thoroughly entwined with the reality in which we live. (And I'm not denying Platonic-like ideals in saying this - after all, logos is logos.)

Mathematics does not compete with physics or with science in general. That is epistemically impossible. — alcontali

I've a former friend (but sticking to the point ...) who got himself a doctorate in maths. According to his learning, one can easily construct a coherent theoretical mathematics that blatantly contradicts everyday aspects of reality such as that of gravity. Axioms are what you want them to be and you simply construct from them. In examples such as this, mathematics does (or at least can) compete with empirical physics and with empirical science in general.

I'm in agreement with @Wayfarer in that Kant focuses on issues that precede the "epistemic knowledge-justification method" of modern empirical science and of history. Both employ reasoning, and Kant's focus was in significant part on what reasoning is constituted of.

What principle would force a bit of sanity in metaphysics? — alcontali

The same overall principle that forces sanity in mathematics: accord to our experiences of what is. No?

Theoretical (pure?) mathematics can get a little disjointed from reality at times, last I heard. And unlike the sciences of biology, neurology, cognitive sciences, etc., physics is quite heavily reliant upon mathematical ideas - M-theory and Everett's many worlds as just two physicist hypotheses that have no falsification ability to them. Yet are nevertheless widely enough endorsed.

As to metaphysics, as an abstract principle to be ideally pursued, make its affirmations falsifiable via reasoning and/or experience.

Furthermore, I do not consider this question to be metaphysical at all. — alcontali

So you're saying that the issue of reality is not a metaphysical issue? I can point to a plethora of references that say it is. Wikipedia being my staple on grounds that it is peer-reviewed.

On what merits to you deny that the study of reality is a metaphysical issue?

There is simply no such thing as "Kantian physics". — alcontali

and Bohr’s ‘Copenhagen interpretation’ is arguably Kantian in many respects. — Wayfarer

A little known fact about Kant that I find pertinent:

The nebular hypothesis is the most widely accepted model in the field of cosmogony to explain the formation and evolution of the Solar System (as well as other planetary systems). It suggests that the Solar System is formed from the nebulous material. The theory was developed by Immanuel Kant and published in his Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels ("Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens"), published in 1755. Originally applied to the Solar System, the process of planetary system formation is now thought to be at work throughout the universe.[1] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nebular_hypothesis

Do you know anyone who's actually tried to explain the natural world without recourse to metaphysics? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, there's not way to explain it without implicit or explicit metaphysics? Physicalism? well, it's right there. Natural laws? again right there — Coben

To further compliment this: Truth is an epistemic criterion that is meaningless when devoid of the concept of reality. Reality is studied by ontology. And ontology is a leading branch of metaphysics. Hence, there can be no comprehension of truths in the absence of metaphysics. Reworded, regardless of how naive or formal, else tacit or conscious, one's understanding of the latter is, there must be some understanding of it if one is to have any understanding of truths.

This produces the distinction between determinate and semi-determinate which you referred to. But why do you think that the future is semi-determinate, not completely indeterminate? Doesn't this confuse the distinction, making it unclear? What produces the idea that the future is in some way determinate? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, unclassified semantics can get in the way. Just checked and wikipedia has this to say:

Indeterminism is the idea that events (or certain events, or events of certain types) are not caused, or not caused deterministically.

(emphasis mine)

So indeterminism proper seems to serve as an umbrella term for any category that is not (full) determinism. This gets further complicated by the semantics of determinate and indeterminate, which are not the same as determinism and indeterminism, respectively. What I was alluding to is that the future is always partly determinate and partly indeterminate, rather than fully indeterminate - as in "not possible to determine" or else "not of a fixed state of affairs".

One example: flick a rock from the top of a mountain onto the mountain side. Its future will be partly determinate: it will move downward along the mountain side. Its future will also be partly indeterminate: whether it will stop descending in a few yards distance, lead to an avalanche, moves leftward or toward the right, etc., are things that cannot be epistemically determined and, contingent on ontology, might themselves be ontologically indeterminate. Nevertheless, either way, because the rock will never move upward once flicked (nor sideways), some aspects of its future will remain determinate. And we justify that it will never move upward via a mixture of coherent memories and reasoning that is applied to this former experience (i.e., to memories).

By "semi-(in)determinate" I basically wanted to emphasize that not all future events are fully indeterminate.

I'm a self-labled compatiblist in a Humean sense of the term, so I'm very comfortable with this perspective - though I can apprehend how others might not be: In truth, for the record, I don't take the past to be *fully* determinate either. Via discovery of new info in the future, on occasion our knowledge of our past changes. On an intra-personal level, false memories can be discovered to so be via new info acquired - again, issues regarding coherency of both personal and interpersonal memory. On an inter-personal level, what we once "knew to be historically true" sometimes changes due to new info: take, for example, our once knowing that the story of Troy was fiction and, after discovering ancient city ruins that correlate very well to the city, now knowing that the city of Troy, at least, was real.

But as generalities go, yes, the past is determinate, fixed, and, hence, unchangable - whereas our future is indeterminate. The further into the future we try to predict, the more indeterminate the details of the future become. Upon seeing a cat walking before me, I can easily predict where it will be in ten second's time - not so in ten hours time, and even less in ten day's time.

Nevertheless, my prediction of where the cat will be in ten seconds time pales in degree of certainty when compared with my memory based certainty of where it was ten second's past. And, as per my first post, I think this distinction epitomizes the difference between memory stored past and the expectation stored future.

So the determinateness of the future is distinct from the determinateness of the past, because it relies on the condition of continuity, whereas the determinateness of the past is based in a corroboration of memories. — Metaphysician Undercover

I very much agree.

Therefore we can say that the advanced nations represent the future of the developing and underdeveloped world. In other words the three divisions of time (past, present, and future) exist simultaneously on earth, visible through the differences in the stage of development of the world's nations. — TheMadFool

I’m currently seeing this as mismatch of ideas. For instance, from the pov of some aboriginal society, our modern western societies might be considered to be over-developed, in a negative sense of the term. Not ripe but spoiled, kind of thing. As argument (myself being firmly planted in ‘over-developed’ societies as a constituent), many facets of the developed world are arguably poisoning the world to the point of us nearing a global suicide of sorts, unless things change. Our glutinous dependency on thing such as fossil fuels – powering this conversation as we speak – being an important cause for global deforestation, some 200 species of life going extinct per day (last I heard), us entering a sixth mass extinction, global climate change, lack of resources needed to sustain future human life, etc. (Its a bummer to talk about, but its not a bad thing to explicitly address.) So, in this example, more and less developed, or advanced, or beneficial becomes very contextualized on points of view held. So we can’t affirm a necessity that advanced nations represent the future state of undeveloped nations.

Aside from which, what you address is closer to notions of B-series time than to A-series time. And I’m under the impression that MU was interested in the latter.

Otherwise I like the twilight-zone thought process to the idea.

I’ll give it a try – here borrowing ideas from some of the previous posters.

Experientially speaking, the past is composed of memories, both long-term and short term. The future is composed of both expectations (anticipations) and intentions. The present is where we use our memories to a) construct expectations of what will be so as to b) best appraise how to optimally satisfy our wants via intentions.

Some caveats: Other than that not all of this occurs consciously, we are not sole selves. Hence all three when experientially addressed - past, present, and future – are contingent on a multitude of selves co-existing and, nearly always for almost all, interacting.

The past as memory is grounded in coherency between all memories. This is applicable both intra-self and between selves. When memories result in logical contradictions, something is amiss and we infer that something about our specified set of memories is wrong. Its only when all recalled memories flow effortlessly into themselves that we hold confidence in them. This applies just as well when we interact with each other. Our history is, experientially, composed of intersubjective memory. To the same extent that our memories, both personal and interpersonal, are found to be fluidly coherent and, thus, devoid of logical contradictions, our past is then determinate for us – unchangable.

Intentions are all goal driven. In Aristotelian terms, telos guided. Add the premise of limited freedom of will to a) choose between different alternatives toward that goal(s) aimed for and b) to choose between different goals and the intention facet of the future becomes to the same extent (semi-)indeterminate. Add the fact that the future is partly created by the intentions of multiple selves, and this same indeterminate aspect of the future becomes even more so.

Expectations hold their own reasoning. They are grounded in that which our memories tells us to be determinate. Given facts and causations of the past, the future will then be inferred to be in this way and not that. This will apply to everything from expectations that one will successfully recall a memory at will when so intending to expectations that tomorrow not all leaves of all trees worldwide will be fallen to the ground. I’m inclined to say this inference of future events is no more “imagined” than are our memories—both, when trusted, are thoroughly steeped in reasoning and justification (tacitly so if not otherwise). But unlike our memories which ground us in a determinate past, expectations, being best inferences, are endowed with far greater degrees of uncertainty (but not necessarily doubt: “the future is uncertain” always works, but not “the future is doubtful/dubious”). Experientially, this uncertainty of inferences (most of which will be explicitly inductive) will likewise make the future indeterminate. When conjoined with the indeterminacy of intentions on the part of all selves, this will hold even more so.

So the past, when we are (and hold good reason to be) certain of it, will be experientially determinate for us. The future will, however, be experientially semi-indeterminate (for it is still bound to the determinate facts and causations of the past which we hold in our memories). And the present is where we hold awareness of the past and of the future, as well as where we actively intend (edit: with intentions always extending from the present to the future wherein the goal dwells).

To (again) quote a little jingle that I like from a Tom Waits song, “Time is just memory mixed with desire.” This, at the very least, when experientially addressed.

Of course, all this imo.

Chomsky is an exemplary air-conditioned modeler. Banksy is an aesthete, and made shrewd use of an anti-corporate aesthetic that gibed with the radiohead-era zeitgeist. Now he does gallery shows and stunts at Sothebys. I don't know Amy Goodman and will look her up. — csalisbury

Yes, still, every drop in the bucket counts, is my concise view. I get most worried when no body talks about anything – outside of pounding their fist on tables in support of duckspoken stances or else cheering for such individuals to succeed.

Amy Goodman is the leading figure of Democracy Now, a publicly supported, non-corporatized, left-leaning news organization. On occasion they go overboard (by my tastes) but generally speaking, whats not to admire about news organizations that aren’t governed by corporate cash. The Intercept also comes to mind as an investigative news organization of the same ilk.

Thanks for clarifying your stance in relation to political talk, btw.

As regards eusociality and what you said about fertility, consider the problem of homosexual behavior in both humans and bonobos. How to explain it? It is non-reproductive. Some have argued for eusocial explanations. In humans, such things as celibacy for certain members of the group also might have a eusocial explanation. — petrichor

I can see that argument. I don't know of recorded homosexuals among bonobos, though. They are, however, well documented to be bisexual.

I'd have to give it some further thought, but at the moment, it occurs to me that sexual engagement can serve multiple purposes. And since bonding hormones are involved, social bonds might be solidified. — petrichor

:up: I very much agree. Have gotten into one or two arguments where I asked, paraphrasing, "But if sex is only about reproduction, then what the heck do you make out of oral and anal sex??? To not even address french kisses and the like." Yes, I'm one to strongly believe that social bonding is a very big aspect of sex (a roundabout path to the content of my first post on this thread).

As to the rest, I'm very much inclined to agree.

Did I suggest otherwise? — petrichor

Yes, here:

There are probably eusocial factors at work there for one thing. — petrichor

Anyway, I think what you say about bonobos fits into the basic picture I am trying to paint here, which is simply that our taboos reflect our evolutionary interests. — petrichor

OK, I'm not opposed to the general idea. But how do you figure that our human touchiness in relation to sexual intimacy relates to our closest living evolutionary kin? Well at least one of the two: bonobos.

Of course. We could also get into why human lips turn redder when we get sexually aroused, especially amplified in females with rouge lipstick. But this will likely deviate quite a bit from the theme of this thread. As to bonobos, good ol' wikipedia to the rescue:

Sexual activity generally plays a major role in bonobo society, being used as what some scientists perceive as a greeting, a means of forming social bonds, a means of conflict resolution, and postconflict reconciliation.[42][4] Bonobos are the only non-human animal to have been observed engaging in tongue kissing.[43] Bonobos and humans are the only primates to typically engage in face-to-face genital sex, although a pair of western gorillas has been photographed in this position.[44] [etc.] — Wikipedia entry on bonobos

No, bonobos are quite fertile animals.

Re strategies: From my studies, it boils down to choice between one of two strategies for males: shoot seeds like a madman to increase the probability that some offspring will survive (quantity of offspring) or invest energy in ensuring that the few offspring one does have will all survive (quality of offspring).

The female also has one of two choices: either chose a male that is about quality of parenting (maximizing the likelihood of offspring survival) or, to make something complex oversimplified, mate with a male that is about quantity of offspring and, ideally, having this genetic offspring raised by some male that is about quality of offspring (again maximizing the likelihood of offspring survival).

Humans, we're a mixed bag of all conceivable strategies. I reckon that's due to our behavioral plasticity, itself due to our relatively great degrees of intelligence (and reduced behavioral reliance upon genetically hardwired instincts).

It isn't clear to me that bonobo behavior is at odds with the general thrust of what I am saying. — petrichor

The thrust, to summarize, was that our emotions on sexual intimacy are grounded in evolutionary functionality. Right?

Bonobos, one of our two closest evolutionary kin, have evolved to be promiscuous in manners that do not consist of "cheating", and are emotionally comfortable with that. Point being, this then serves as a major impediment to the theory that we, humans, are the way we are in relation to sexual intimacy due to our evolutionary history.

If you observe animals, you see plenty of examples of them protecting their opportunities to pass on their genes, and strong feelings are obviously involved. — petrichor

Yes, well, bonobos are horny and kinky little monkeys (great apes, to be exact). They'll have sex in exchange for a banana with no hard feelings on anyone's part, Orgies (group sex) are not unheard of. They're also thoroughly bisexual, both females and males. They're anecdotally believed to be more intelligent than chimps by researchers. And they're about as close to us genetically as are chimps - only that we share more analogous evolution with bonobos, such as in the facial expression of smiles (same look, same function).

No, we didn't evolve from chimps or from bonobos. We evolved from a common ancestor whose lineage bifurcated into us and a separate branch which itself bifurcated into chimps and bonobos. But these two great apes are our closest evolutionary kin. So if one looks to evolution, one should be looking to both chimps and bonobos ... as opposed to, say, starfish.

Um, I’ll be one of the prudes, if labels are requisite. I don’t give a damn about how safe the sex is, if a sexual partner of mine (I’m into that mono-amorous stuff) were to have sex with another that would chap my hide. If she were to be in a safe-sex orgy, doubly so.

I find that the OP is onto something.

For the record, for prudes such as myself, where she to kiss another lovingly in a french freedom kiss style (hey, if us US Yankees have freedom fries sanctioned by our esteemed elected leaders …) that would piss me off worse than if she were to have casual sex with him/her.

And kissing has never led to pregnancies.

So yes, there’s something significant about sexual intimacy. For at least a good portion of the populace, including for non-Abrahamic bleeding heart progressives such as myself.

But hey, to balance this shpeal off, there’s nothing sexier than seeing the love of your life look at you lovingly while talking in the other part of a room with a handsome guy at a party, kind of thing. To be loved and wanted by someone you want and love, its a good aphrodisiac.

Cool. No worries.

There's a difference between "I advocate X because I am Y", and "I advocate X because of problems A, B, and C, that affect Ys". — StreetlightX

Sure. But of course. 100% thumbs up. But the tone and overall content of your reply puzzles me. Its as if it was written by a person other than that which wrote this in the OP:

Now, the civil rights activist's point was quite simple: all politics has an effect on the identity of those involved, therefore, all politics is identity politics. This is, in some sense undeniable. But here's the issue: this doesn't mean that identity politics exhausts what politics can involve. All politics is identity politics, but all politics isn't just identity politics. — StreetlightX

You should notice that in all my posts in this thread I did not sanction that all politics is identity politics – not even to the minimalist degree the OP does. I’ve only addressed the notion that all politics concern (the philosophical notion of) identity. To me this shouldn’t have been a news flash, especially not from the person who wrote the OP.

Since you seem familiar with anthropology, you’ll be acquainted with the anthropological distinction between organized Politics and “politics with a small ‘p’”. The latter basically translates into human interaction. It can well be argued to be about ability to obtain what’s wanted in the context of interactions between two or more persons. All wants that hold value will hold value to egos – such that the human identity of these is primarily composed of the wants they value and seek to satisfy. Not their nation, skin color, or the girth of their wallet – which, however, is among the more common ways we interpret identity in the context of identity politics. So, hence, all politics pivots around two or more identities that cooperate, conflict, or are neutral in respect to each other – and is thereby fundamentally about identity – but not all politics is what we commonly understand as identity politics.

Organized Politics is only a more structured version of the same.

You disagree with this? So far in this thread, you’ve debated with me against positions I’ve never expressed, and do not hold. To go back to my first post, for example, I’ve explicitly stated the two (philosophically pertinent) identities of those who value a checks and balances of power and those who value a winner takes all attitude. Let me know of an “identity politics” which doesn’t have a winner takes all attitude toward those who don't fit into the specified 'identity'.

BTW, in reference to statements such as:

It's all too often the case that those who complain about identity politics do so in order to disqualify any politics of race, gender or class, to which is usually opposed some mythical "good of all", or the "community" or "nation" or some such. — StreetlightX

How on earth do you equate nation to community. Like sex and love, its swell when they co-occur, but they’re two different things.

There's a legitimate way out here and its to focus on philosophy or literary criticism. Or gardening, or religion, or meditation. But focusing on the political, as a theorist, is fraught, and has to be sustained with extra-scholastic efforts, otherwise it's just building models in a designated model-space, safe and away. — csalisbury

First, I agree with the sense of political powerlessness. Secondly, darn it but stifling talk about how things could improve is the biggest means of creating hopelessness in people. Not knowing what ideals to aspire toward is like being a chicken running around without a head that nevertheless wants to get somewhere meaningful. And there's no way to find and then agree upon these ideals if individuals don't talk to each other about them. The more people start talking about politics in big picture terms, the more empowered they become by comparison to not so talking about politics. And in light of things such as global warming, I'd welcome more big picture political talk.

Or: who's a good exemplar of 21st leftist who has broke this mould? — csalisbury

Chomsky, Banksy, Amy Goodman, and if you like professional comedians, Bill Hicks. I've got a few others on my mind, but why wouldn't any of these suffice? (Or was the mold-breaking you referred to that of not engaging in extra-scholastic efforts while still effecting change?)

I'm not too far removed from the sentiment of your reply. In fairness, I was addressing that aspect of the OP where it's offered that all politics deals with some form of identity. As @NOS4A2 commented since, though, "identity politics" typically connotes in most, or at least many, cases a biological commonality - rather than a more philosophical meaning of identity. This in parallel to how "power" typically connotes a capacity to do with some other(s) as one pleases - rather than the more formal meaning of "ability to do or accomplish", something ubiquitous to most all living beings most of the time.

Still, approaching things from a more philosophical perspective of identity (this being the only way I can make sense of the statement that all politics concern identity):

The whole question of what you call 'association' is 'backward' looking, at it were. Its anchor is in the past. I 'am' this history or body that has made me (past tense), who I am; and given this, how do I proceed? That's how I understand identity politics in the most broad sense. But politics doesn't have to be about 'association'; that a community wants better roads, or better school curriculums, is largely not a matter of 'associating' oneself with anything at all. — StreetlightX

I did mention tendencies of intention, which are always about goals toward which one proceeds. By 'association' I, in part, meant to address affinity toward other. Things such as empathy, compassion for, and sympathy. Some guy looses in politics. If I feel bad because of this, a part of me (my identity) holds an affinity toward the guy (his identity - including the intentions he has), and I will hold the belief that our identities in some measure overlap. If I don't feel bad about his loss, I in no way associate, or maybe better said, relate, to him, nor his present goals in life, and likely not to the life history that his past goals would have produced. Don't know. Maybe we interpret human identity too differently, this from a philosophical pov.

But yes, some build their personal sense of identity around conserving those aspects of the past they deem to have been of greater benefit for them and their ilk. Others build it around goals toward which they seek to progress. As per your example, such as that of living in a better community of people (a personality type which I happen to associate with, btw). Nevertheless, these two senses of identity, imo, are not always neatly separated from each other. Conservatives do seek to proceed so as actualize their goals. Progressives will learn history and maintain their roots, such as by not forgetting about people such as Martin Luther King, for one example.

Eh, maybe I'm rambling. If there's anything in this post worth furthering, do let me know.

During a recent public round table discussion, I was dismayed when a particularly well spoken civil rights activist made the claim that 'all politics is identity politics'. The problem wasn't that he was wrong. He was in fact quite right about that. The problem was what the statement was meant to imply. — StreetlightX

But there are different modes of identity association. The humanitarian often associates him/herself with a humanitarian identity, where all other humanitarians (regardless of ethnicity, nationality, social class, etc.) are part of his/her identity and group. The racist, nationalist, or rich guy/gal might in turn associate with his/her particular race, country, rich frat club, etc. as being #1.

How about this idea in regard to politics and identity association:

There’s a “checks and balances of power among all people” identity association in political pursuits. Wishy-washy to some, but its what the American forefathers had in mind. As one example, tmk, the second amendment wasn’t about killing deer with machine guns but about granting the general populous the power to overthrow central governments by force were the government to become overly corrupt. BTW, since most people aren’t allowed to own fully armed Apaches, and the like, in their backyards, this potential to overthrow a corrupt government by armed force is nowadays nonexistent – regardless of how many semiautomatics one might own. Wasn’t the case some 200+ years ago.

In contrast, there’s the “winner takes all” identity association in political pursuits. Here, one is inclined to do anything so as to become the winner at the expense of all those that are other.

The first is about optimal cooperation among people that are not perfectly innocent and, hence, somewhat corrupt themselves – or at least hold the potential to so become (namely, each and every human that has ever been). The second is about screwing over all those who are deemed other – via, at best, subjugation.

As to identity, identity is about “who am I”. Some will look to their skin color and proclaim to have discovered who they are. Some will more readily associate who they are to tendencies of intention and the personas that follow suit. Both of these, however, will constitute identity affiliations.

you're asking me for a reference which affirms the nature (or in this case that which is not the nature) of a law of thought you're claiming even 1 year old babies have. — Isaac

Um, no. I was asking you to reference the bit about the law of identity being what you've purported it to be.

I'll agree to disagree at this point.

Simply that a thing must be identical to itself - but... In order for the proposition to not be a tautology, the thing referred to must be a specific and the referring must be general. This requires object permanence which children (very young babies) do not seem to have. Without object permanence one cannot identify that X is X. The two Xs must be specfic/general, otherwise the statement is tautologous and trivial. If we treat X as a state of affairs at T0, then to say that the state of affairs at T0 is the state of affairs at T0nis tautology. To say that the specific, the identified subset of the state of affairs at T0 is the same subset we're referring to when identifying it at T1, is the law of identity. It only applies to logic because only logical objects can be said to have this permanence, unless you're a realist on forms (which is far from an agreed upon position among adults, let alone babies). There's no evidence at all that babies treat logical objects any differently than they do extended ones. — Isaac

This, then, is an important point of divergence. Now, I acknowledged the possibility of my being wrong, so I’ll ask you to reference where you obtain the affirmation that the law of identity specifies T0 = T1 in reference to X, or else that it necessitates a specific/general dichotomy.

Alternatively, explain these two points:

1) Given any semblance of process theory – wherein at least everything physical is in perpetual change (things such as laws of thought not being physical) – how can any physical given X be identical at two different times?

Object permanence, after all, basically has it that objects don’t miraculously appear and disappear out of / into thin air. It does not specify that physical objects do not change over time.

This issue doesn't have to do with cherry-picking properties (what you've termed subsets?) of objects to compare at different times - e.g., the green of a apple tree leaf is as green as that of a ripe apple on the tree, so, therefore, the green is identical. It has to do with the entire physical object itself.**

2) How can one arrive at the conclusion of T0 = T1 in reference to X in the complete absence of the conclusion that T0 = T0 in reference to X, as trivial and tautological as the latter might be?

Given examples such as (1) just aforementioned, it seems to me that T0 = T1 in reference to X does not hold a mandatory ubiquitous application (a newly bloomed flower is not identical to a wilting flower) **. Whereas T0 = T0 in reference to X does seem to hold a mandatory ubiquitous application, thereby having the latter being properly termed a law of thought. But not the former.

** Please note, we have been addressing laws of thought - and not metaphysical issues of what identity (as in sameness) is - which are still much contested among philosophers (not so much scientists). But such metaphysical enquiries into what identity consists of, after all, require laws of thought in order to proceed - and among these is the law of identity (A = A).

I'll reply to your latest post better if you explain something to me.

What do you understand the law of identity to be?

[...] The doctrine still sounds strange: "Die at the right time!" [...] ... In your dying, your spirit and virtue should still glow like a sunset around the earth: else your dying has turned out badly." (Z, "On Free Death") — StreetlightX

Beautiful quote. :up:

Mixing in what I take from some Native American thought - as in "It's a good day to die": If every moment of one's life could be lived so that one would be at least sincerely content to pass away naturally (be this in a battle for virtue or not), than one will have lived one's life to the fullest ... regardless of how long one lives. But Nietzsche's expression definitely outshines mine - and, oddly, is far clearer.

I'm afraid I have no idea what you're talking about here. I don't recognise a thing 'being' to say whether it's presence is absurd or not, I don't know what 'being' is. — Isaac

Being can be expressed as the generalized notion of "anything which was, is, or will be", although as @Wayfarer noted, in many philosophies it is more typically expressible as "any awareness which was, is, or will be". Either way, I stand by my claim that it is 100% absurd - due to its presence being arational.

... from nothing to being there is no logical bridge. — William James quoted on https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Being

How does a human way of thinking affect physics? There's no such thing as hydrogen atoms, there's no such thing as helium atoms, these are both human constructs, there is only stuff (presuming you are a realist about the external world at all). — Isaac

Hold on a minute. This to me sounds like a confusion between the epistemic and the ontic ( -ology is usually added to indicate "the study of"). (BTW, I was addressing the known beginnings of our physical universe after the Big Bang.) We can only use the epistemic to reference the ontic. Much of the human epistemic can be well argued to be a human construct - but not the ontic which it references. There are such things as hydrogen and helium atoms - even if our knowledge of them is imperfect and perpetually improving. You do not agree?

Our laws of thought are about the way we've decided to break up the world, so they're an entirely human invention too (although I think some animals may we have evolved the same or similar tactics). — Isaac

I'm very on board with lesser animals using the same pivotal laws of thought we ourselves use. But - to keep things more concrete - the law of identity is something that we've invented??? When do you suppose this invention occurred?

For the record, my previous post was an attempted argument for pivotal laws of thought, such as that of identity, being time-invariant givens that are thereby non-invented/created - but which instead just are - so I naturally disagree with your current stance.

The evidence (which I know is unpopular around these parts) contradicts this idea. Very young children do not necessarily display an innate understanding of the law of identity, nor of object permanence, nor theory of mind. — Isaac

First off, I said "children" (which can include at least young adolescents) and not "infants" or "toddlers" - only the latter do not exhibit mastery of object permanence (and, possibly, if young enough, of a theory of mind). But please explain how any of the aforementioned do not exhibit use of the law of identity.

If laws of thought are an innate aspect of being, and if the presence of being is (technically) absurd, then the best and only thing we can do to better understand them is enquire into them via philosophy. — javra

I don't follow this line of argument. Are atomic forces not an innate aspect of being? I mean life would be impossible without them. We also have no idea why atomic forces came to be so. Does that mean that atomic forces should be studied by philosophy also? — Isaac

Atomic forces are not blatantly arational. We thereby hold the capacity to obtain sufficient reasons for them. As to your concluding question: Why not? As you've mentioned toward the end, philosophy and science are not "mutually exclusive". They rather benefit from each other.

The fact the it talks about it is not evidence that it addresses it. Otherwise the same is true of psychology. It definitely talks about "that which is not observable via our physiological senses", so why does philosophy get the honour of 'addressing' the problem? — Isaac

I've had the privilege of doing some research in cognitive science psychology as well as in neuroscience. Cog Sci had far less confounding variables and biases of measurement than did the neuroscience research I was exposed to (in other words, cog sci was a "harder science" than neuroscience - this in my particular exposure to both). That mentioned for balance, when it comes to psychology as per Freud, Jung, and others: how is this type of psychology more science than philosophy? I find it to be rather the opposite: it is more philosophy rather than an empirical science. Hence, it is yet philosophy that 'addresses' the problem (as best it can).

BTW, in science, testable hypotheses are basically the testable presumption of a given set of scientists' philosophy regarding a certain topic. Again, philosophy and science are by no means mutually exclusive.

The thing about philosophy is that there is no body of knowledge. Absolutely every position is it possible to hold is held by some philosopher somewhere, and on most matters there is still widespread disagreement. — Isaac

But there are common bodies of knowledge in philosophy - its just that these are not always (especially not historically) obtained via the empirical sciences' peer review method. A ubiquitous and thereby trivial example: all philosophers agree that being holds presence. How is this not knowledge?

I could expand a bit, but have written enough as is for now.

EDIT: I forgot to ask somewhere along the way: How can the empirical sciences discover, for example, what knowledge entails? Is this aspect of mind not the proper subject for philosophy?

Yes. As opposed to "straight." But these terms tend to take on multiple and often contradictory meanings as they are used by different voices over time. To be "straight" can also mean to be boring, uptight and puritanical. "Queer" now refers to all sorts of different performances or stances inhabited by both hetero- and homosexuals.

It's dialogically liberating to listen to and understand the same word one uses being used by others in different contexts which generate different meanings. When someone takes a monologic stance on the meaning of some of these terms, they refuse to acknowledge differences in word use and intentionality, or they attempt to impose a single meaning as "correct." I think on forums it's very easy to forget that we all have many different associations and meanings for words and concepts. — uncanni

Reminds me of a joke: "How do serpents move when they're piss-ass drunk? Straight, of course."

So .... um. Does that make all non-drunk snakes naturally queer?

What? It's a philosophy forum!

On a more sober side:

No species has been found in which homosexual behaviour has not been shown to exist, with the exception of species that never have sex at all, such as sea urchins and aphis. Moreover, a part of the animal kingdom is hermaphroditic, truly bisexual. For them, homosexuality is not an issue. — a quote by Petter Bøckman found on https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homosexual_behavior_in_animals

Seems natural enough to me.

Trick question. I don't. I believe they're a deterministic aspect of sentience endowed existence — javra


That's actually what I meant by "come about", I should have been clearer. I meant to distinguish it from my understanding that such laws are made-up, like maths. I don't believe laws can evolve. I don't really believe in laws at all, other than as a human-constructed convenience. — Isaac

Laws being "human-constructed" is, to me, a very clear means of saying that they "come about". So I'm not very certain of your stance in terms of opposition to the "coming about" of laws of thought. If they evolved to so be, they came about - holding presence after a timespan in which they did not. If they are a byproduct of human society, they likewise came about. Etc. Until you can better clarify you stance, I'll use the terminology as I best understand it.

As to natural laws, here including laws of thought, being non-constructed:

First and foremost, let it be presented that the presence of being is (in the strict philosophical sense of the term) 100% absurd. Absurd because it is, and can only be, arational (meaning beyond the scope of reasoning (and not irrational, i.e. erroneous reasoning)). There is no possible sufficient reason for why there is being rather than ubiquitous nonbeing. Being just is.

That said, laws of thought can either a) emerge somewhere in the course of being (i.e., "come about") or b) they are as ubiquitous to being as is being itself (i.e., they're a (pre)determined aspect of being). Take the law of identity. One imperfect variant of its expression that to me seems adequate: "No given shall be other than itself at any given time". Again, either this property of being developed during the course of being or, else, it always was and always will be in time-invarient ways. Were it to have developed over time, hydrogen atoms might have been other than hydrogen atoms long before helium atoms came about - and so might have helium atoms, etc., till the law of identity presented itself within being. If one cares to argue for this, one will, I believe, quickly slip into nonsense - at the very least, when addressing the history of physical reality (which we address and know of via thought). If, however, the law of identity holds presence in time-invariant ways, then it is a deterministic aspect of being. And no quantity of empirical science can explain why it is present to being:

One does not first learn of laws of thought prior to applying them (children, for instance, utilize laws of thought prior to being aware of them). Rather, our knowledge of laws of thought stem from introspective observation of referents that are, at least in one sense, immutable. One cannot do without the law of identity and remain cogent, to not address mentally healthy. This can be paralleled to our knowledge of the law of gravity. We still don't know exactly what gravity is, but it is immutable, and to jump off of a tall building in the belief that gravity is not ubiquitous is to shortly thereafter no longer be. The referents which we address as "laws" are immutable aspects of being - hence the term we provide them of "laws". Our knowledge of them, however, is less than perfect. Here, I'm thinking of laws of thought in a Kantian manner, as per his categories.

If laws of thought are an innate aspect of being, and if the presence of being is (technically) absurd, then the best and only thing we can do to better understand them is enquire into them via philosophy. The empirical sciences is the cart that is guided by the horse which pulls (the latter here representing laws of thought). For the former to address the latter in non-philosophical manners is for the horse to be guided and pulled by the cart.

Supplementary question: if the empirical sciences cannot address laws of thought (whatever they turn out to be), then how would philosophy have a better chance? Empirical science's measure of rightness is predictability, what would philosophy's be? — Isaac

If it were easy, I suspect it would have already been done. Philosophy too is driven by the same laws-of-thought horse, so to speak. But to address the second question: Firstly, science's measure of rightness consists of far more than predictability (unless one obfuscates the two separate fields of technology and science); it also consists of the replication of data, it consists of fully falsifiable hypotheses that are tested, as well as many of the same principles that generally guide (or, imo, should guide) the measure of rightness in philosophy: parsimony (such as Occam's Razor), consistency (e.g., no contradictions), and explanatory power (how much is explained by the addressed given). One big difference between philosophy and the empirical sciences is that the former can and does address that which is not observable via our physiological senses (visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, etc.). Maybe ironically, thoughts, emotions, intentions, awareness, and will, among other aspects of mind, are not givens that can be observed via our physiological senses. Science, after all, is founded upon philosophy, namely the philosophy of science. And not the other way around. So, for example, that "all humans have thoughts" is not philosophy-devoid science. Rather, to the extent this trivial fact might be scientific, it is science built upon a foundation of philosophy.

Hope I've address the most pertinent parts of your questions.

will try to better address this later on tonight. Need to go to work for now.

Why do you think that the laws of thought "come about" in that way? — Isaac

Trick question. I don't. I believe they're a deterministic aspect of sentience endowed existence, i.e. any conceivable existence wherein sentience dwells. However, I also do very firmly uphold the reality of biological evolution, wherein many aspects of mind evolve over time.

To the physicalist, or to those empathetic of this view, it would, imo, only be logical to claim that laws of thought should have evolved together with sentience-endowed organic matter.

RE: (neuro)science, thoughts, and philosophy. Not intending to stay long in this discussion, but, as an observation:

The actualization of thoughts is not possible in the complete absence of laws (principles) of thought. Things such as the law of identity and that of noncontradiction. At best, a ubiquitous chaos would result in the complete absence of such principles.

I find it indisputable that the study of neuroscience, and the like, benefits us in very many ways. But empirical science is not even close to specifying how laws of thought come about, not to mention what they are. To state the obvious, laws of thought are a priori to thoughts about the empirical sciences and the implications of respective data.

To be explicit about the conclusion: The empirical sciences cannot fully address everything that mind entails (such as its laws of thought). Philosophy as its own branch of study is required if we are to hold any hope of so doing.

What comes to mind:

All our choices between alternatives we sense, regardless of how trivial, are us standing at crossroads. The path we choose obliterates the path(s) we thereby choose against. Each choice leads to its own domino effect of future choices where we will stand at crossroads not yet materialized. But not all of our crossroads are of the same magnitude. The larger the importance of the crossroad, the greater the change in the course of our future lives—and of everything which we affect.

IMO echoing your own examples, this being a kind of chaos theory, replete with the butterfly effect, that is applied to a compatibilist reality.

Thank you for your further clarification. I do, however, feel that I am in agreement with your point of view in all general regards save that of there being such a thing as a homunculus. Please correct me where you disagree.

A favorite example of mine is one’s awareness of “a word that is at the tip of one’s tongue”. Here, the individual has no momentary awareness of what the phenomenal word is (neither via auditory nor visual awareness, etc.), but does, nevertheless, apprehend via awareness its non-phenomenal meaning (which the individual is seeking to express via phenomena). Had a professor I greatly liked who talked to me about “knowing that one knows”; to me also interesting on the same level, but more complex to get into. Awareness of one’s own happiness or suffering, certainty or uncertainty, etc., as a first person point of view also easily qualifies—for none of these are phenomenal; they’re not visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile, etc.; and yet one knows of them via direct awareness.

BTW, from my own baggage of trial and error, I’ve found that “perception” isn’t the most beneficial word to use when it comes to meaning apprehension. It works in the Latin language(s) I know of, where it quickly connotes “understanding”--very akin to the English “see” (as in “do you see what I mean”)--but, in English, perception is greatly associated with, and only with, phenomenal percepts (sight, sound, smell, touch, taste, proprioception, etc.). Though I know that a proper technical term for awareness of such things as thoughts and emotions is lacking.

At any rate, to better express my previous post, I wasn’t intending to reach toward scientism. Rather, we empirically know from others and historically that were we to lose a limb, we’d likewise lose a great deal of awareness that manifests via that limb. We know that were brain damage to occur, we as first person points of view would in due measure to the damage have impaired awareness (in the broadest sense of awareness possible). In other words, whatever the metaphysical relation between mind and body may be, we also know from experience that we as first person points of view are most often unified with our bodies (exceptions such as numbness in a limb being relatively rare).

Nevertheless, our bodies are things, whereas out awareness is not a thing. Our awareness is tethered to our bodies in often indistinguishable ways, but this does not of itself come close to denoting what awareness is. To be curt, what awareness is metaphysically is still a mystery.

Again, my main contention in this thread is that awareness—the first person point of view which perceives phenomena, senses emotions and the like, and understands meanings and abstractions—is not itself a thing within a thing. Hence, that we are not homunculi.

This, I hope, is a better summation of my view.

Since this is of interest to me, and so as to further debate:

I personally view this perceiver as my "self". The self is subject to experience. — Andrew4Handel

I am beginning to sympathise with the idea that perceiver might be the soul [...] — Andrew4Handel

Self, as might be no surprise, if a very convoluted concept. As one example of this, when I strongly empathize and/or sympathize with another such that their state of being becomes my own, they in many a sense become a part of my own self. If a romantic partner, they are not my property but, instead, are and ever become a part of me (belonging can connote both values). More individualistically, self consists of ones unconscious mind and, if for example one accepts Jungian philosophy, also some portion of the universal unconscious (the latter can tentatively be espoused as vehicle for some other person being part of one's self). All this mostly to say that the first person point of view is not an island divided from its total mind--nor, again, is it a static thing; its not a homunculus, as far I understand it.

Roughly speaking, Ancient Latin had it that the soul is the anima and that the mind (mens) consists of animus. While both terms are related to "breath/life", as well as animation, to my best understanding/interpretation the anima was conceived to be more along the lines of that which endows one's body with breath/animation/vitality (even when in dreamless sleep). By comparison, the animus was a realm of challenge, a realm wherein will exerted itself.

Thus conceived, both anima and animus are aspects of one's self. Aspects of self to which the first person point of view is central, but, again, not in a static manner.

Curious to find out the extent to which you'd disagree with these perspectives.

Cheers. FYI, as religions go, I'm a fan of Gnosticism. And am a bit peeved about the at the very least cultural genocide of the Gnostics after the Council of Nicea. I'll be trying to stick out of this debate, though.

From one of Tom Waits' songs, as best I recall: “Everything you can think of is true [...]” This can only make sense, thought, from the roundabout perspective that whatever is believed to be true will, for that same span of time, be true to the given believer. The topic is complex for me since it gets into complex epistemological dichotomies between, what I will for brevity term, “believed truths” and “true beliefs”.

Still, being in accord with your observation that to claim no objectivity exists is to claim an objective/impartial stipulation of what is objective/ontically real (in which case, the statement becomes a logical contradiction: objectivity both exists and does not exist at the same time and in the same respect):

Because the only noncontradictory conclusion obtainable is that some non-relative ontic reality exists (so to phrase), some believed truths can only be untrue. More specifically, wherever there is logical contradiction between believed truths, one, some, or else all of these believed truths will need to be false. This, at least, wherever the law of noncontradiction is granted.