Romans 8:29 For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren. — Gnostic Christian Bishop

Yea, but this term, "image" has always bothered me in Abrahamic scripture, at least as it is conveyed in English. The term ought to be "likeness".

"Image" denotes looks, whereas "likeness" denotes character or, maybe better stated, one's nature as a being. Its the difference between "wear what JC wore" and "be like JC in spirit", for one hypothetical example.

I gave a very simple definition though right? “Something is conscious if it has subjective experiences” — khaled

This is an odd phrasing. What would “subjective experience” stand in contrast to? “Non-subjective experience” comes to mind, but this would be a semantic quagmire at best.

I’m preferential to using “the property of being aware” instead. This since awareness and consciousness are synonymous in most, if not all, ways (save for ocasions when consciousness, unlike awareness, connotes an entailed ability to be aware of awarness).

Second, can you say someone else is conscious with the same degree of certainty you can say the length of a 1 m long rod is 1 m? Where is your measuring instrument? — khaled

Were one to ascribe the capacity of will to consciousness—this as per common sense understandings—then the issue would be resolved for all intended purposes. That which exhibits actions and reactions relative to environmental stimuli will be endowed with consciousness. This because it exhibits both an ability to be aware and an ability to will.

As to strenght of certainty that something which looks like, sounds like, and moves like a duck is in fact a duck and not a robotic decoy, I will grant that the degree of certainty is lesser than that which I hold that I myself am not a robotic decoy. Nevertheless, until evidence emerges that might sugest otherwise, when I will witness something that looks like, sounds like, and moves like a duck, I will remain psychologically certain that it in fact is a duck. For emphasis, this yet remains a type of certainty—rather than an uncertainty or doubt.

In this picture the brain is the perceiver that somehow processes the information received from the nerves into a perception. This does face a homunculi problem of who the observer is.

However the story seems much more problematic when we talk about retrieving memories, accessing word meanings, dreaming and having ideas. — Andrew4Handel

I agree with the gist of your perspective, but don't believe the "mind's eye"—as its sometimes called (i.e., the presence of a first-person point-of-view)—serves as a homunculi problem.

All percepts obtained via physiological senses will be consciously known precisely because they are known (in an acquaintance sense of the term) to the first person point of view. Furthermore, the first person point of view does not stand apart from the physical body but is instead in many ways unified with the body. Tactile perception is often overlooked, but makes for a good example: When feeling oneself touching the ground via one's feet, for instance, this will be the first person point of view which so senses the ground via the skin of one's feet.

Secondly, we hold ample empirical evidence to know that the first person point of view—including its abilities to perceive, sense, understand, and act—is bound by the physiological makeup of its body; in vertebrates, this being primarily constituted of the Central Nervous System.

To my best understanding, a homunculus is a little human within the human body. While this can be a consequence of Cartesian thought (re: the thinker within the body), imo it does not apply to awareness, i.e. the perceiver, i.e. the first person point of view. Reworded, the homunculus is a thing (the thinker) within a thing (the body). By comparison, the perceiver, aka the first person awareness addressed, is—if anything that can be currently inferred—more akin to a process, as per process theory. But it is not a thing and, hence, not a homunculus. Or so I so far believe.

(edited "homunculi" to "homunculus" where appropriate)

So, just got done typing away another long reply. But then I realized that it's all skirting around underlying issues regarding universals—rather than directly addressing the specific comparison you have in mind. Yea, despite my continued interest in the topic, I think we may have well gone as far as we can.

So, I’m now replying, basically, to let you know that I’ve enjoyed talking to you.

As I won't even agree to disagree, haha, you are likely right that we have gone as far as we can with this. I am happy to read and respond to more, but ENTIRELY understand a desire to bow out. — ZhouBoTong

Thanks for this. Cheers.

(to those who decry long posts, feel free to not read this)

[...] Because I don't see how your definition created universality.[...] — ZhouBoTong

There’s a lot that I haven’t yet replied to. Even if I don’t get around to all of it, I thank you for the candid replies. It in the meantime struck me that we might not ever resolve our differences due to reasons that are far more foundational philosophically: those pertaining to our underlying views concerning human universals. I’ll do my best to illustrate this possible disparity via one analogy:

The aesthetic experience is not the only human-relative experience that conforms to the three descriptions we’ve so far roughly agreed upon in relation to aesthetics. In want of addressing the issue somewhat more impartially, I’ll here reference the experience of being in love. Being in love is a) an emotive experience, b) is a narrow subset of attraction-toward, and c) becomes intertwined with one’s own being such that others’ derisions of that person one is in love with is in many ways sensed as a derision of one’s own being.

In further rough parallel to the experience of aesthetics: While some can sincerely fall in love multiple times in the course of a lifetime, others never do experience this state of being. Some find this emotion to be very transient; others can be affected by this emotion for the remainder of their lives. Those givens, such as personality traits, with which one person falls in love with will very often not be those which some other person falls in love with. Relative to individuals that can experience it, this state of being can be of greater intensities and of lesser intensities. Also, there are no currently known empirical means of establishing the specifics of what this experience is like for the average human psyche.

Chances are you’d fall in love with people with whom I’d not fall in love with, and vice versa—this though we’d both experience the same emotive state of being we term “being in love”. Chances are no two people can experience the exact same psychological states of being when being in love—just like no two people can likely ever experience the exact same visual impressions of the same physical object (for no two people share the same spatiotemporal point of view in relation to a commonly experienced physical object). Chances are that being in love with some person qualitatively fluctuates over time. Etc.

Now, if due to the aforementioned you are one to argue that, therefore, what we English speakers commonly term the experience of “being in love” cannot be validly upheld to hold a universal referent relative to our human species—a universal referent relative to which greater or better, and lesser or worse, instantiations of this universal can occur in individuals—I find that we then sharply disagree on the far more basic issue of human ontology at large. This, specifically, in relation to universal properties of human psychology (As an example: such as the human capacity to experience the color red; while some colorblind people may not be so able, this, to me, does not then dispel the human universality of the experience of red as a color). If this disagreement is there, than no amount of discussion on aesthetics per se can resolve our differences, for these differences are then rooted in our differing perspectives in relation to ontology of mind—again, particularly, in relation to the nature of human psychological universals.

If it is the case that we disagree on this rudimentary issue pertaining to the human mind, I’ll then respectfully bow out of this discussion - primarily because the discussion would enter a completely different ballpark.

I am not sure I am answering your aesthetics questions satisfactorily (I certainly have not answered it directly, but think my position can be seen). Feel free to point out where you would like me to state something more directly. — ZhouBoTong

I’ll start with a joke: An artist presents his much anticipated work at a gallery. It’s a large blank canvas. A commoner askes the artist what it’s supposed to be. The artists proudly expresses that it’s a never before so perfectly depicted scene of a cow amid fields of grass. The simpleton asks, “Where’s the grass?” The artist explains that the cow ate it all. “OK, but where’s the cow?” the commoner then asks, still being thoroughly bewildered. The elite artist replies, “The cow walked away in search of other pastures, of course!”

This is my shortcut way of again expressing that I agree with the view that too much of modern art is … well, not good art. My main contention in this thread, though, is that there is such a thing as better and worse aesthetics. I assume that if the just mentioned joke makes any sense, this truism of better and worse aesthetics is at the very least implicitly acknowledged.

Movies and books that average one star reviews, for example, can then be deemed to typically hold poorer aesthetics (this relative to the average human ) than those which average four star reviews or greater.

Since the issue of aesthetics in general, as I broadly understand it, does tie in with one of @Terrapin Station 's recent posts to me, I’ll mention his observation:

Claiming that something is the case for most people for something like this would require empirical studies that no one has done. — Terrapin Station

Very many attributes pertaining to the average human psyche are not possible to empirically demonstrate (as least not currently). As one example, it is impossible to empirically demonstrate that most people out there experience the same exact thing we do in relation to what we all address as the color red—yet there is good reason for all of us to hold this belief to be true. To my mind, this gets into heavy duty issues of epistemology—many being very contentious—of which I have no interest to investigate in this thread.

Nevertheless, it is true that this general aspect of epistemology does apply to issues such as those of imagination (e.g., what of this faculty is commonly experienced among at least most humans, what then constitutes more of it for most humans, and, in consequence, what best improves it for most humans—here of interest, known human conditions pertaining to visualizations can range from photographic memory to aphantasia (the inability to visualize) … and this doesn’t even touch on things such as imagined smells, tastes, etc., or the more complicated forms of conceptual imagination—which is how new theories are for example produced); it likewise applies to the attribute of intelligence (e.g., intelligence’s definition is currently controversial, which of itself makes IQ tests less than objective/unbiased … yet, correlations between IQ scores and other human capabilities often do hold statistical importance), and—here skipping a potentially very long list of psychological attributes—the same epistemological issue also applies to the human capacity to experience aesthetics (an experience not shared to any degree with most lesser animals, and only somewhat with lesser animals of greater intelligence).

Again, without wanting to get into epistemological debates about all of this: As we typically hold good reason to uphold that all humans experience the same quality of color when claiming to see the color red, and that imagination and intelligence as we experience it is something universal to humans at large, so too do we hold good reason to presume that experiences of the aesthetic are universal to humans at large. Likewise, as we hold good reason to judge that some reds are redder than others, and that imagination and intelligence can be more/greater/better, so too can we then hold good reason to judge that some givens are more aesthetic than others (i.e., that some givens hold better aesthetics).

I offer these (imo, generally accepted) perspectives without in any way denying that beauty is in the eye of the beholder, or that variations in magnitude of aesthetic experience can, and likely do, occur among different humans (e.g., the professional musician can be argued capable of finding far more beauty in a liked melody than the typical tone-deaf non-musician who enjoys the same melody; or a mathematician to find more beauty in a mathematical paradigm than the non-mathematician who also likes the same mathematical paradigm; etc.).

Hence, I take the psychological issue of aesthetics to be a very complex topic—and the background I just offered serves to illustrate some of the complexities I find in it. But—just as can be said of imagination, intelligence, introspection, joy, suffering, etc.—I very confidently believe that aesthetics too can be better and worse, or greater and poorer, or more in comparison to less. This despite the epistemological complexities involved.

Having addressed this summarized general understanding (which might be contentious for some) in the hopes of better illustrating where I’m coming from, what I basically wanted to find out is the following:

I was curious about whether or not your own experiences of the aesthetic can be described by the three descriptions I previously offered. In sum:

• Experienced aesthetics are emotive experiences (akin to those of wonder).
• Aesthetics are a narrow subset of experiences of attraction in general (such that not all attraction-toward constitutes the aesthetic—although aesthetic experiences always attract).
• That which we find aesthetic becomes an aspect of our extended selves—such that its value becomes in some ways to us intertwined with the value of our own being (e.g., regardless of what one finds aesthetic, when it is cruelly insulted, demeaned, or laughed at by others we feel ourselves to be hurt to some degree and in some way; everything from feeling ourselves to be insulted (rather than some object out there in the world which we are not) to feeling ourselves to be somewhat lonely, or isolated—with the converse applying when we encounter others whose aesthetic tastes overlap with our own).

I wouldn’t be surprised that these three descriptors of the aesthetic would not be universally attested to by all humans. But, if not, I would then be curious to understand what “aesthetics” then signifies to such individuals; importantly, such that the understanding yet conforms to the common usage of the term.

It seems to me that once we can roughly agree upon what the aesthetic is as a generalized experience, we could then better address whether or not aesthetics can be better and worse.

I agree with much of your latest post, btw. I’ll reply to it later on.

Since this is beginning to overly deviate from topics of aesthetics, while I disagree, I don't have much left to say here.

great. Can you answer this:

But I acknowledge it’s easier, for example, for parents to put their kids in front of TV sets instead of taking the time to read stories to them. I take it that to you these two activities are of equal value to a person’s mental development? — javra

I'm just pointing out that it's not the same for everyone or in each scenario. It's not the case that one thing or the other catalyzes more imagination for everyone. — Terrapin Station

RE: "for everyone":

I’ll in turn point out that your reliance on exceptions to the general given that “books require more use of imagination than do movies” so as to evidence this same generality false, or else devoid of value, is in many ways analogous to the following: someone’s claiming that doors shouldn’t be the height they are because some adult people are far shorter and some far taller than the common door height of our buildings. Exceptions to a common generality do not evidence the commonality of this generality false.

Do exceptions occur? Of course. Does this then signify that the average person thinks, abstracts, and imagines as much when seeing a movie as when reading a novel? No, it does not. Otherwise, a 600 page novel should be no more challenging than a 2 hour movie of the same story. Resulting in more people willingly reading and finding the experience enjoyable. But I acknowledge it’s easier, for example, for parents to put their kids in front of TV sets instead of taking the time to read stories to them. I take it that to you these two activities are of equal value to a person’s mental development?

By the same token, we could say that with books, all the words/thoughts/descriptions are given to you, whereas with films, you need to fill that stuff in for yourself via your imagination. — Terrapin Station

We appear to hold experiences that greatly differ ... especially when assuming you read my first post given today regarding the differences between film and book formats of stories. So be it.

Sure, but the comparison in degrees of imagination was between a good movie and a good book presenting the same story.

Do you disagree with this:

In movies the imagery is given to you. In literature, the imagery is constructed by you via imagination. Of itself, this presents two very different experiences of cognition. — javra

In the spirit of giving a better impression of where I’m coming from:

In movies the imagery is given to you. In literature, the imagery is constructed by you via imagination. Of itself, this presents two very different experiences of cognition.

Then there is the content that is amenable to movie format v. literature format. For example, in Fahrenheit 451—which I read for fun in high school—one of the parts that affected me the most was the spiel that an old-timer gave the protagonist about the reason people cry at the funeral of loved ones. In far more elegant expression, the perspective held that we cry selfishly, for our own ego’s loss, and not for the loved ones that died—regardless of how they died: either they ceased experiencing all experiences and, thus, all suffering or, else, we believe that they passed on to a better place than that in which we’re in (and this because, via our love for them, we deem them to have been good people). But because this portion of the novel is extraneous to the main plot, because movies focus on action rather than contemplation, and because movies are roughly limited to under two hours of storytelling whereas novels are not, no movie of Fahrenheit 451 can likely do this aspect of the novel justice—nor other like aspects of the novel.

Having both read Dune and seen the movie (I enjoyed both), this same disparity applies to the novel Dune to far greater extents. In the novel, erudite observations of politics abound, as do insights into human psychology. One soundbite-friendly observation that comes to mind, paraphrased, is that the typical adult human would rather die than find himself holding beliefs antithetical to those beliefs he’s assimilated into himself as an adult. The movie greatly skims the theoretical aspects of the book in favor of action that is visually depicted—thereby depriving the story of its more pleasant experiences, this while reading the novel.

If we equate plot to story, the story remains roughly the same in a novel and a movie. But just as plot-depicting cliff notes cannot convey the aesthetic experiences of living through the story—regardless of whether it’s a movie or a novel—so too will a good movie not do a good novel justice, for the movie at best abridges far too much of the novel’s contents: those of perspectives, of background, of psychology, of worldviews, etc. And again, by comparison, a good movie will not flex the mental muscles of imagination (so to speak) anywhere near as much as will a good novel.

Now, though unfortunately too often derided among rational types, imagination is of pivotal importance in everything from finding satisfactory solutions to problems (of all types and breadths) to the progress of the empirical sciences (from arriving at new paradigms which explain all outliers of data, like the Theory of Relativity and the Theory of Evolution, to the formulation of worthwhile hypotheses and adequate tests for these). And, quite arguably, among the best ways of improving this cognitive faculty among all individuals is via the reading of literature. Not everyone will find some particular form of creative activity engaging, but all will find storytelling interesting (and the written forms of these is when imagination is greatly required).

On the other hand, a good movie’s characteristics—often including those of detailed, good imagery and quick action given in a succinct two hours’ time—cannot be captured by a novel, regardless of how good the novel is. Hence, movies that are visually stunning can serve as a good example of experiences that cannot be experienced in writing (thereby the cliché that a picture tells a thousand words). Then again, some stories are not interesting enough to warrant being read in novel format—while yet making a pleasant movie experience.

So, this is why the experience of reading a good novel and the experience of seeing a good movie is to me a comparison between apples and oranges. They can both be good, but to me they’re entirely different species.

I hope this also serves to better express why I feel that the four years of required English in high school is best served by a maximal exposure to literature—rather than via exposure to movies. (As to the history that may be involved, it is not about our history per se—which is about historical facts, something that fiction is not married to. Literature form different time periods can immerse one within the “what it is like” to have lived during that era and culture—but, again, it is not about history proper.)

Anyway, I wanted to share my views so as to better justify my being pro the status quo of high school English teaching English via exposure to literature (in fact, with my whishing that more literature would be taught during this four year span).

I still have plenty more to respond to [...] — ZhouBoTong

I’ll likely wait for you to present your views on what is and is not aesthetics, this in general.

this is a very good question, yes, in the relative sense, 'nothingness' points to something with an essence, albeit a purely abstract and conceptual essence which exists in the realms of abstraction in relation to other things; thus we must distinguish between non-existence in the relative sense, which exists as an abstract concept in relation to other existent things and concepts, and Non-Existence in the absolute sense which cannot exist in relation to Existence, for therein would lie a contradiction, that being the co-existence of both Absolute Non-Existence and Absolute Existence, and if Non-Existence exists in relation to existence, and existence is born out of and contained within Non-Existence, there lies another contradiction, that being the the fact that something Non-Existent cannot possess the potential to contain something existent within itself, for otherwise it would have an Essence and thereby be Existent as opposed to Non-Existent. — javra

I agree with this. :up: Still, it doesn't change the fact that many people find the concept of "Absolute Non-Existence" meaningful. But I see how this could fit in with your model.

since that potentiality is necessarily beyond space, it cannot have a quantity more than one. Of course, within itself, my varying concepts can exist in the abstract sense of the word, but they are not mutually exclusive in relation to the whole; therefore, the non-local substratum of potentiality is a unity which contains multiplicity within itself, but not a multiplicity which contains a unity within itself, if that make sense? — TheGreatArcanum

To be honest, no, I'm not yet understanding. The concept might need some further fleshing out, though. For instance, why must a "potentiality [...] necessarily beyond space" be a quantity (of one or less) rather than being a complete non-quantity? Also, if the potentiality is a unity that contains multiplicity which, in turn, does not of itself contain a unity, how would this unity-as-potentiality (hence a "1") then be differentiated from a unity that is an actuality (and, hence, also a "1")?

You're really forcing me to understand my own conception of what is and what is not here, [...] — TheGreatArcanum

I'm very glad I don't come across as adversarial or some such. Yup, that's what philosophical debates are all about, in the best of times at least. :smile: I myself much prefer the experience of discovering new truths via enquiry over not so discovering.

that is to say that something with an essence, or rather, the potential to point to an essence, which is in itself, an essence, cannot point to something which does not possess an essence (i.e. nothingness) — TheGreatArcanum

But then why does the symbol of "nothingness" as a word point to something that we find meaningful, i.e. something that humans deem to hold an ontological value? Nothingness might be a false concept, but it is yet meaningful conceptually (rather than pure gibberish).

As to the symbol of "0" representing potentiality, how again can we then go about saying there is one potentiality rather than two, or none?

I suppose that mathematics has its first appearance in the Law of Identity, not a = a, but 1 = 1, and that 1 points to something which has an ontological value, that is, an essence, and an essence which is equal to itself and not equal to its antithesis so long as it exists, — TheGreatArcanum

How then would you make sense of the law of identity specifying that "nothingness" = "nothingness"? This where "nothingness" is defined as absence of essence. It's still a = a, but it no longer seems to be 1 = 1 by the standard you've just provided.

(btw, non-quantity can be givens other than nothingness; examples can include those of Nirvana. And I grant that such latter examples do hold essence. But this is likely a very different topic.)

I have invented the following symbolism “1 + 1 = 2” and I discover that it has many applications in life. What else is there say? Do we add anything of value to say “and by the way there are these eternal things out there that correspond to these symbols” If one said “We have proven they do not exist” What am I suppose do? Give up Mathematic? — Richard B

Ok, you made me curious.

Unless you’d be one to presume that reality should follow your inventions in all cases without exception, if 1+1=2 as invention were to be discovered to sometimes not apply to reality (say that you’d sometimes experience that 1 and 1 equate to 3), on what grounds would your persist holding fast to this invented mathematics of 1+1=2?

I am certainly no mathematician, but my presumption is that both one and zero stand for mathematical waves of a particular frequency that are either in a state of potentiality (i.e. 0), or in a state of actuality (i.e. 1). — TheGreatArcanum

Isn't this confounding some mathematical models of physics with mathematics per se? For one example, we could address one potentiality as contrasted with two potentialities.

so the law of non-contradiction extends its reach down into the mircocosm and beyond into the omnipresent field of non-locality which precedes and contains all waves and therefore, all actualized things in relative space and time. — TheGreatArcanum

I'm one to support this perspective. I didn't mention the LNC due to the pesky modern notion of dialetheism, which states that the LNC is not a universal law/principle. And its rather difficult to disprove. But yes, when it comes down to it, I agree with your quoted stance.

Closer to our time, logicists hoped to give traditional mathematics an a priori foundation. Recently though these notions have come under attack and have been significantly weakened if not altogether defeated. — SophistiCat

As to mathematics in general, I find that none could be possible in the absence of laws of thought. Some laws of thought can be argued to be, at least in part, invented by us. The principle of sufficient reason here comes to mind; this since there are some things that are factual and which are nevertheless arational (i.e., beyond the boundaries of reasoning, as contrasted to the irrational, here strictly meaning “erroneous reasoning”). A primary example of the arational is the very being of being. Yet, in contrast, other laws of thought can arguably only be discovered. The law of identity serves as a good likely example.

I mention this because I then find the question of what aspects of mathematics are discovered v. invented to be in many ways reducible to the question of what laws or thought, if any, are discovered instead of concocted by us.

For instance, if the law of identity is something existentially determinate which is discovered, rather than something only imagined, then it seems to follow that so too can only be discovered the distinction between the following two: the abstraction of an integral whole of quantity—which we represent by the symbol “1”—and the abstraction of an absence of quantity—which we represent by the symbol “0”. These two abstractions of identity then serve as metaphysical limitations to what identity can be. For instance, in the typical process theory of becoming, no given will either be a strict “1” or “0”—for, given that everything is in flux, no given is either a perfectly integral whole nor is it a perfect non-quantity. Nevertheless, here, 1 and 0 yet serve as limiting extremes to what identity can be.

In sum, I therefor assume that 1 and 0—thus understood as symbolic representations for “an integral unitary quantity” and for “non-quantity”—are as essential to any awareness of reality as is the law of identity. The mathematical—and, if I’ve argued it properly enough, metaphysical—notions of 1 and 0 can thereby only be the discovered limiting factors of existence. They cannot be mere fabrications devoid of truth—for they are determinate limits of what can be.

And, in theoretical understandings of mathematics, I fail to comprehend how any mathematics can be accomplished in the complete absence of these two notions which we codify via “1” and “0”.

p.s. While criticisms are of course anticipated wherever warranted, I mostly mentioned this perspective because I’m curious to see if anyone knowledgeable of theoretical mathematics knows of any such maths that are fully independent of the notions of 1 and/or 0.

Edit:

Essentially, if there is not a field of mathematics which concerns mathematics as it relates to ontology, there should be, because without ontology, mathematics is meaningless. — TheGreatArcanum

You beat me to the punch. :smile:

I think this sounds like you might be OK with replacing 50% (+/-) of Shakespeare that is taught in school (below college level) with modern (or just different) stories? How about replacing 30% of literature stories with film stories? I am not exactly sure of the goal of literature education (is there one? really?), but I think these changes would still meet any goal other than, "know the classics". — ZhouBoTong

It might be that literature, as in literary art, is slowly becoming a vanishing art form (?)—something in parallel to how layered oil paintings are (of which relative moderns such as Salvador Dali championed and which were the rule during the Renascence). Comparing literature to movies has in my experience been a comparison between apples and oranges. They’re two wildly different mediums for storytelling. And, when considering the best of both, the aesthetics captured by neither medium can be satisfactorily translated into the other. Still, literature education is arguably the best way of teaching literacy to students via applied practice; imo, far better than by merely teaching theoretical rules or spelling and grammar, which are dry, tedious, and very boring by comparison.

As to what 50% or so of Shakespeare should be replaced with. I won’t fib; I’ve my own list of likes that I would have enjoyed reading in high school. Asimov, Bradbury, Dumas, the novel Dune, I’ve already mentioned Kafka, I’ll even say stuff such as Fielding’s Tom Jones. Granted each education is different to some extent, but, still, I nevertheless appreciate having been given to read a wide breadth of literature during high school: historically starting with Beowulf and Ten Summoner’s Tales—neither of which were easy readings but yet very interesting for their historicity—all the way to Virginia Wolf’s To the Lighthouse, Orwell’s 1984, London’s Martin Eden, and the like. And yes, some Shakespeare in between. :grin: I sense, if not know, that it was due to good English teachers that most of the literature and poetry we were taught became meaningful to us students. All the same, I guess my own perspective is that I’d rather more fellow citizens be exposed to these historically important works so as to have a common body of knowledge in society pertaining to a common history—this rather than focusing in on more varied modern novels (even those I just mentioned liking).

Or maybe you are suggesting the influence is similar to something like The Avengers, but it has been around for centuries and for most of those centuries very little art was created {relative to the last 30 years} so Shakespeare's works were read by a significant percent of literature readers?) — ZhouBoTong

Yes, along these lines.

(we may just conclude that I have some social inadequacies that cause my disagreements): — ZhouBoTong

Who doesn't? :razz: I've come to notice that pretentiousness is certainly not one of them. It's humbling in a good way. :up: Staying true to one's own aesthetics is something that should be done more often.

[...] so I would say things like, terrestrial, earth-bound, fish-like [...]

Now, we have all the adjectives on the board. And we notice that many are actually antonyms for each other. — ZhouBoTong

Hm. Maybe I didn’t express myself well enough. My art teacher would have wanted to know how these adjectives can describe a bird that is in space, “space” here being more akin to outer space; maybe most aptly expressed: a bird that is in flight within layers of atmosphere. I’m still suspecting that the case can be made that if the adjective can apply to a bird in space, thus understood, the adjective will then likewise apply to the statue.

Correct me if I'm wrong.

My deeper understanding in that moment was that once "art" becomes "abstract" it can mean literally anything - sometimes it is up to the artist, sometimes it is up to the viewer. I can see how you were led to the conclusion you came to, but can you see that with just a tiny change in perspective, my view is also a reasonable conclusion? — ZhouBoTong

TMK, this is a very popular motif in modern art critique. I would concur that artworks are a bit of both. But I disagree with the view I’ve too often heard, specifying that what the artist intended is fully superfluous to the artwork, and that the only thing which matters is what the viewer interprets when looking at it. In a way, to me, this is analogous to ordinary language. What we intend to say matters—even when our expression is less than sufficient to so convey, or when others interpret things which we never intended. To me, so thinking that what the artist intended is unimportant does an injustice to most, if not all, artist out there—for no artwork can be manifested devoid of intention to so manifest; and because what one intends is, to me, an important variable in what makes an artistic expression valuable. Another variable is the quality of the expression to that which was intended. (So: If the idea is not impressive, esthetics might still be there due to the quality of idea’s expression. Or, if the idea’s expression is poor but the idea itself is stupendous, one could again find the artwork aesthetic. If, however, there is a poor idea coupled with a poor expression, more likely than not the artwork will then be found to have a poor aesthetic quality as artwork. And the judgment of what is poor and what is not is, to me, again relative to one's general understanding.) I’ve here given a rough draft of my own views concerning this matter—fully knowing that this subject can in itself lead to a very long debate, were it to be pursued.

In short, I believe I get what you’re saying. Still, I’ll for now be stubborn and continue upholding that the statue "Bird in Space" does a good job of conveying its subject matter via abstract form. (It’s not among my favorite, btw: its aesthetics are too cognitive for me; the aesthetics I most like are felt viscerally. But I’ll toe the line for now, so to speak.)

Some, including myself, in the process came to discover what makes it aesthetic. — javra

I don't really understand this part; I think my understanding of "aesthetic" is far more simple. — ZhouBoTong

I brought this example up because, to me at least, it serves to exemplify how one’s increased general understanding in relation to an artwork can at times transform that which is deemed relatively unaesthetic into something whose aesthetics are appreciated.

Sometimes the artist creates meaning, but other times the artist is providing inspiration for us to create the meaning. If the rabid dog in To Kill a Mockingbird somehow symbolizes racism, can't Decepticons also symbolize racism, sexism, or the negative side of our emotions? — ZhouBoTong

Of course. I’ve already mentioned a little about my take on the intention/interpretation dynamic to artworks. Staying true to that, I so far find that both the rabid dog and the Decepticons were roughly intended to symbolize the "negative side of our emotions" (Decepticons alluding to deceptions).

Because of this, to the average adult person who can comprehend and enjoy both, — javra

Just to see where we are both coming from, what percent of adults do you think can comprehend and enjoy both (epistemological and ontological topics)? — ZhouBoTong

I maybe wasn’t sufficiently clear. I meant “comprehend and enjoy both movies: the Transformers and The Matrix” (e.g., some young preadolescents that enjoy Transformers might not understand why the Matrix is found more aesthetic by many adults). But you bring up a good point:

Don’t know that I can be labeled an optimist, but I do find that people generally hold emotive understandings of subjects which, when philosophically addressed, are not yet very well understood consciously. These include both epistemological and ontological topics. For example, we all (emotively) know what justice, good, aesthetics, etc. are, but when we start trying to consciously pinpoint them, we then often times enter into debates.

This goes back to my take being that good aesthetics ring true—that they emotively speak to us of things which we are emotively knowledgeable of, but of which we often cannot make sense of at a conscious level. Hence, for example, adults that don’t comprehend and enjoy epistemological and ontological subjects of philosophy will nevertheless tend to be more fascinated by the Matrix than by the Transformers—and this because the former has greater depth in its epistemology and ontology.

To further debate this, though, there is again a benefit to a common understanding of what aesthetics are and are not. Without such a basic understanding, we could easily end up talking past each other. You were saying that your understanding of aesthetics are likely simpler than mine. Still curious to know how they wouldn't fit the three descriptions I previously offered.

If you are NOT entirely bored with this topic, — ZhouBoTong

No, I find the topic immensely interesting; but it’s a very complicated subject. And I’m honestly trying to economize my personal time. It might be a while till my next reply.

Why do we teach a lot of Shakespeare and zero Transformers? — ZhouBoTong

Doubtless this is so due in large part to Shakespeare’s works having greatly influenced our cultural heritage in the west—whereas Transformers has had little of such impact on western society. But this reason is not of itself an issue of directly experienced aesthetics—rather, it’s more one of western culture’s history of aesthetics.

If you are thinking about profound vs trite, it is a safe bet that most high school students find NOTHING profound in ANYTHING they are forced to read for school. — ZhouBoTong

My bet is that this is in large part due to bad pedagogy. Same with math being typically taught without its purpose and, hence, its relevance, being taught (I didn’t understand what the heck calculus was for until I entered the university, and so didn’t enjoy it in high school); or history being taught as facts when in fact it can be the most intense of human dramas. And awareness of relevancy often takes deeper understanding than can be gleamed from an immediate acquaintance—and the gaining of this understanding is often benefited by good teachers. To me, a good example: our high school teacher brought out images of Brancusi’s Bird in Space. We were less than impressed with this supposedly seminal work—basically seeing it as horse dung (at least I did). He put the sculpture aside and asked us to express as many adjectives as we could that described a bird in space. We started listing: graceful, austere, elegant, serene, etc. When the chalkboard was full with adjectives, he then asked us which if any of these adjectives didn’t describe the sculpture. They all did. At this point we all had a deeper understanding of the sculpture’s abstract significance and, with it, a newfound appreciation for it. Some, including myself, in the process came to discover what makes it aesthetic.

I am not saying they would find Transformers profound, just that is an unfair measure as it RARELY occurs. — ZhouBoTong

OK; I’ll try to better illustrate my view: Transformers are about morals, courage, some light sci-fi, and, more recently, a lot of eye-candy. Compare its cultural impact to movies such as Bladerunner or, more recently, the Matrix. The later, for example, has most of what the Transformer movies have, but its sci-fi concepts have more depth, and it touches upon—what in philosophical slang are—epistemological and ontological topics, some of which are nearly as old as philosophy itself. Because of this, to the average adult person who can comprehend and enjoy both, Matrix movies will tend to hold greater value than Transformer movies. Yes, aesthetics is in the eye of the beholder, but there are a lot of beholders out there, and our degree of general understanding tends to correspond to the statistical bell-curve. What affects the median the most is that which will have the greatest impact on society at large—and, hence, what will be commonly deemed better.

If only 1% (being generous) of art or philosophy is "profound", then are we just wasting time the rest of the time? — ZhouBoTong

In my given statement more profound was merely the opposite of more trite—and not intended to be taken as an absolute. So, whatever is deemed to not be trite will have more profundity to it by comparison—even when it is not deserving of the title “profound”.

I am suggesting there are other benefits (possibly even other areas of more "prime" importance) of art other than some profound experience. — ZhouBoTong

In considering this and your previous post to me, I find that we might end up going around in circles if we don’t come to a more explicit understanding of what aesthetics are—and what they are not.

To me:

First off, do we agree that aesthetics are first and foremost an emotive experience (rather than an intellectual desire of consciousness)? Secondly, the emotive experience can’t simply be any attraction toward—e.g., we can be emotively attracted toward food or drink even when not hungry or thirsty (like when having a full stomach), but this attraction doesn’t pertain to our aesthetic tastes (we’re not driven to eat that which is aesthetic to us—and if, by chance, a certain food is for some reason deemed aesthetic by us, eating it will always to us feel as though we are destroying something whose continued presence has value). Thirdly, and however ambiguously, we form a connection, an emotive bond somewhat akin to that of sympathy, to that which we find aesthetic—such that our sense of what is aesthetic becomes an extension of our very selves; of who we at core are as a person. In at least this one way, aesthetics are not to us a fun distraction, or a diversion—which are by their nature ephemeral, dispensable, and superfluous to what makes us us. By contrast, the most aesthetic artifact one has ever known—regardless of what it might be—is cherished on a par to how much one cherishes one’s own person; and, on average, one desires for its preservation about as much as one desires one’s own preservation (despite preferring that it is destroyed instead of oneself--were such a hypothetical to be presented). This is not to say that the two are the same: aesthetics being an emotive calling (toward what is to me a very interesting open question), whereas one’s own conscious self is that which is being called (arguably, by one’s unconsciously originated emotive drives). Hence, for example, when this just mentioned aesthetic artifact of great worth is demeaned by the opinions of others, we feel the value of our own person being demeaned (especially when we respect the other)—and when it is valued by others, we more often than not feel exalted.

(I don’t take these three aspects to define the aesthetic; but, to me at least, everything that can be deemed aesthetic will fit these three descriptions—including biological aesthetics, especially where the want to possess that which is beautiful is not involved.)

A lot said (don't have enough time to make this post more concise), but:

-- If you disagree with these three partial facets of the aesthetic, can you then explain what the aesthetic signifies to you such that it doesn’t fit these descriptions?

-- If, however, there is no significant disagreement, then why dispel the conclusion that some aesthetic experiences are better than others—not on some mathematically precise linear scale, but relative to the general understanding of the beholder(s) concerned?

(To again emphasize: no one’s experienced aesthetics is ever wrong. However, from the vantage of the bell curve’s mean, some aesthetics will hold greater value than others relative to the populace addressed.)

BTW:

We have created a massive formal academic field of art, that contributes very little to actual art. — ZhouBoTong

If I understand you correctly, and as you may have picked up from my previous posts, I’m in general agreement here. The emperor’s new clothes in the world of art is, imo, produced by too many people being untrue to their own heartfelt aesthetics. Still, were one to be true to one’s aesthetic tastes (rather than succumbing to authoritarian decrees or wanting to so become authoritarian), I strongly believe one would remain open to understanding why others find aesthetic value in givens one does not—as well as remaining tolerant for other people’s genuine aesthetic tastes even when they contradict one’s own.

But this doesn’t nullify there being better and worse aesthetics—this for any individual as well as for any general populace. Otherwise, I’m thinking, this critique of the art world incrementally turning into a farce couldn’t apply—for its aesthetics regarding what constitutes “actual art” would then be of equal value to any other, leaving nothing of it to critique.

so too is a human’s awareness of aesthetics better than that of a chimp’s. — javra


And yet any human that says Transformers is better than Hamlet is wrong. — ZhouBoTong

And how on earth did you arrive at this stupendous conclusion??? Since it’s too grievous a spin to not correct—lest we inadvertently encourage elitism:

No experience of beauty can possibly be wrong. This is in parallel to how no truths are false. Yes, there are some truths—e.g. circles are round but triangles are not—that the average Joe Shmoe doesn’t find quite as worthwhile or impressive to be told about or to contemplate in comparison to others. But none of them are wrong—even the trite ones; all truths are right in so being true—just like all experienced aesthetics are right in so being of the aesthetic (yes, including a chimp’s or elephant’s; how could it be otherwise?).

So, when a person states that the Transformers are to them aesthetically better than Hamlet, they are perfectly right in their expression of what is factually aesthetic to them—as well as what isn’t. But just as one’s degree of general understanding tends to determine which truths are deemed trite and which are deemed more profound, so too with aesthetics. Better and worse; not right and wrong.

Well, you have said more that probably deserves a response, — ZhouBoTong

Thanks for expressing that. :wink:

I am not sure I even understand how that could be the case. Let me take the most simple and obvious "appreciation of beauty". How does a guy admiring a pretty girl lead to wisdom? — ZhouBoTong

When I’ve admired the beauty of the human form via aesthetics I’ve then appreciated the symmetries of figures, the elegance and grace of structures and dynamics, and the like. Young or old, male or female, it wasn’t about who I’d like to kiss but about the presence of the aesthetic as it applies to the human body. My experience is that aesthetics draw me closer toward truths or understanding of the world that are to me so far unknown—in relation to biology, human or otherwise, these for me can include an attraction toward the golden ratio and of fractals, such that I want to understand them better. Sometimes—just sometimes—in asking myself “why I find X aesthetic” the sensual pleasure of the experience transforms into an intellectual eureka moment. Sexual attractions, on the other hand, are in one way or another always about the sexual drive—and not, of themselves, about aesthetics. Michelangelo's David is aesthetic to me as a human form, but not sexually attractive. Still, there’s no law that says the two—aesthetics and sexual attraction—cannot co-occur; and they often do when it comes to heartfelt romance.

But you are correct: it’s a complicated sentiment and mine is only an opinion regarding why aesthetics matter. BTW, Keats wrote it that, “Beauty is truth, truth beauty.” If this in any way resonates, my guess is that there might be some deeper truth to it that attracts you, waiting to be uncovered. If not, then likely not. (It could be a bit too Platonic for many.)

I will get to the whole thing soon so I can give you a nice long annoying response like I give everyone else :smile: — ZhouBoTong

Well, you may have noticed that I’ve so far done my best to answer a number of your questions. At this point, I’d simply like for you to answer my initial two: those of 1) how is my given premise false if you happen to think it is and 2) how would the conclusion not rationally follow if the premise is true?

... Also, I'm still wanting to shy away from the conversation.

Sorry, I was just re-reading the other thread and realized that I did not respond to this portion (but thanks for the little reminder :grin: ) — ZhouBoTong

no worries

Doesn't your logic here suggest that Calculus is better than basic arithmetic? But that doesn't seem right, does it? — ZhouBoTong

Within what contextual purpose is one better than the other, is the implicit question. If aesthetics has the purpose of drawing us toward greater sapience (arguable, but I believe this) this given analogy doesn't stand.

Based on the definition of art I would think that the ability to reach MORE people MIGHT make transformers better? — ZhouBoTong

One might forget that Shakespeare was quite popular in his days, and that his language was not at the time outdated.

Still, your reply doesn’t address the premise and conclusion I presented—upon which the rest of my opinions are grounded.

Nevertheless, to answer this question: If my premise and conclusion are valid, it would then further follow that greater magnitudes of aesthetics which pertain to greater sapience will not be able to be conveyed to others whose degree of sapience is below a certain threshold. In Shakespearian slang, its caviar for the masses. (Certain types of caviar I myself can't stand)

Offer a cat or dog a wondrous bouquet of flowers and the animal won’t know what to do with it (the Romanian saying translates into “giving flowers to a pig” ... whose “tastes” will at best only manifest in finding these flowers good to eat).

Is there no such thing as a distinction between refinement and baseness of sentient nature, of character? And—if as with most people—one would say there is, are their respective tastes of equal worth relative to our aspirations to be endowed with greater sapience?

Yes, my opinion is that the optimum artistic expression can convey a refined aesthetic to a vast quantity of the populace. But—to use some different examples—this does not place the comic book stories of the X-Men on the same aesthetic level as those expressed, for example, by Kafka. I like both, btw. Neither are perfect. But Kafka’s does tend to embody more universal truths pertaining to the human condition.

“Elitism” I hear being cried out by certain members of the audience. As though no human is in any way better than any other in any capacity, including those of talent and taste. Thinking of myself, I’ve always improved in asking others why it is that they find aesthetic those things I so far have no taste or understanding for—given that I didn’t utterly dislike their personality. Couldn’t find the aesthetic value to minimalism until I asked someone who does. It’s still not my favorite, but I get it now. It’s when we start bashing each other over the head with “what I like is good and what you like is inferior crap” that, imo, elitism emerges.

Well, this is doubtlessly a very complex topic … Due to time constraints, I’m planning on shying away from it and giving others the final word. Be this elitist of me or not. :wink:

So thinking is an error of abstraction. — javra

Isn't it the reverse, abstraction is an error of thinking, or are you regarding thinking as an abstraction in this case? — Merkwurdichliebe

Interpret that sentence within its context as conveying: “In having so thought that one can reach the horizon, one will then have engaged in an error of abstract reasoning.” Or was your reply one of dry funniness?

I just think it relevent to point out that the dialect of order/chaos is qualitatively and categorically different than the dialectic of being/nonbeing. — Merkwurdichliebe

Of course it is, but this is neither here nor there in relation to what I tried to present. I’ll try to express myself better:

The chaos/order dichotomy, or dialectic, is amicable to sufficient reasons, and thereby holds the potential to explain why particular things are or are not (one could, for example, logically obtain an absence of all things via absolute order, a state of being analogous to the core of gravitational singularities; but this would not equate to what we understand by nothingness, for being would still be). What I’ve been arguing is that, in contrast, the nothingness/existence dichotomy is not rationally necessitated, if at all rationally supported. For instance: There is no sufficient reason known to mankind as to why there is existence rather than nothingness. Given this, then neither can there be any presently known sufficient reason for why there someday will be nothingness rather than some form of existence. Reasoning not composed of valid reasons is commonly considered irrational. Again, the reality of nothingness is conceivable but, I so far think, cannot be established. This despite many treating it as an established metaphysical fact.

It's not that we can't get what we want when we desire the nothing, but that longing for the nihil is just as much an active engagement with meaningfulness as desiring anything else, because the nothing always manifests itself as a certain kind of substantive within meaningful contexts. — Joshs

Thinking of the horizon as a spatial limit to what can be traversed also holds meaning. It’s not as metaphysical in scope as that of a complete absence of being as the negation of existence in general, but it’s meaningful all the same. This, however, does not contradict the fact that thinking of the horizon in this way is erroneous. One does not experience the end of Earth upon reaching its horizon. So thinking is an error of abstraction.

That a complete absence of being can be meaningful, as can be the yearning for it, does not make the concept accordant to what is metaphysically real. Consider that a person yearning to reach the horizon will also live a meaningful life in so yearning—this while reaching the horizon is a physical impossibility. Hence, just because a concept is meaningful does not then imply that its referent is real or, hence, obtainable. Unicorns come to mind as yet a different example of this.

There are alternative ways of thinking about being. Instead of the easily conceived dyadic categories of being and nonbeing one could, for example, present the two extremes of a complete chaos of being and a complete order of being—with existence as is residing in-between these two extremes. As to physical correlates, the very first instants of the Big Bang can be deemed a near-complete chaos of being; this while the very core of a gravitational singularity—wherein space, time, and mass no longer hold meaning (this within the very same models that predict gravitational singularities)—can be likened to a complete order of being. So the concept of a complete absence of being is in no way logically necessitated as a factual counterpart to the factual reality of being. In other words, it does not need to "always manifest" (though it is well ingrained in our western minds).

All the same, I’m not disagreeing with your analysis of what is a staple portion of historical western thought.

Agreed. Personally, I'm one to uphold that ultimate beginnings of being are not knowable even in principle by any ego. Laugh all you want; my big thing is how on earth did life evolve out of nonlife ... metaphysically speaking. It had to have been. Yet, not being a physicalist, when poetically expressed, I gravitate toward a will and representation view of existence. How to conceive of will existing in the absence of life eludes me. (Not that I deem physicalism a better alternative.) But yes, a redistribution of consciousness is something that I sometimes ponder.

(I also have an idea similar to Javra's maybe, that people aren't brought from nothing into the world, its more like a redistribution of consciousness, so antibatalism wouldn't work anyway, but I can't really argue that. ) — csalisbury

I'm in good company then. :grin: I often enough feel the same way, but haven't been able to find a stringent argument for it.

I’m at the level of individual actor decisions to not bring another existence into the world, not existence of sentient beings as a whole. — schopenhauer1

Does this then signify that you are only semi-antinatalist? Meaning: to each their own. Isn't this the way its always been and always will be?

I guess I then fail to understand why you want others to cease the continuation of life rather than allow them/us the freedom to do what we deem rational, what we see fit. There's something in the way here.

Um. You're ignoring what I re-posted and boldfaced. Where is the logical fallacy to the argument and its conclusion?

And how would this alleviate an eternal return of suffering?

I’m thinking at the margins, not the whole pie. It’s the decision of the individual. For example, one persons meat eating dies or negate another’s veganism. — schopenhauer1

Didn't sound like it, but OK. Still, how does your reply address the logic/fallacy to this argument:

As far as hypotheticals and their logical consequences go, one could hypothetically manage to obliterate all sapience off of the planet but, logically, the same magnitude of sapience will only re-evolve to its current state. This is because givens such as the planet and its bacteria will remain even after the destruction of all sapient life—and this because one will not have actualized a complete nothingness (via an omnipotence that also obliterates itself?). Given that nothingness is not actualized, the same magnitudes of experience-dependent pleasure and suffering will, then, again unfold among increasingly intelligent sentient beings—only so that life once again finds itself at the magnitude of relative wisdom that we as a human species are at currently. The hypothetical is analogous to a suicidal Sisyphus that always gets reborn to re-experience the same suffering … played out at a magnitude of species. — javra

Edit: I'm here allowing for the hypothetical that, somehow, all individuals will make that decision that your advocating for.

Thanks. :wink:

Here’s a premise I’d like for anyone to debunk: Nothingness*--i.e., the complete absence of being—is a chimerical abstraction of human imagination that, thereby, does not reference anything real.

* This concept, however worded, here stands in contrast to the transient nonbeing of givens within a context of underlying being/existence: As in, after breaking a mug into a thousand pieces proceeding to claim that the mug is no longer, that it now holds no being, that it is now nothing … when, in fact, all that’s happened is that its constituents have changed their structure while yet existing just as much as before.

Without the just stipulated premise being evidenced false, the longing for nothingness holds the exact same properties as the longing to arrive at the planet’s horizon. It can’t be done. Not that it’s inconceivable; it is—as evidenced by our ability to understand the concepts. It’s just that it’s metaphysically impossible and, hence, a complete falsehood.

Advice for those who will try to evidence the premise false: Address nothingness without in any way presenting it to be endowed with any form of presence—for, were it to be endowed with presence, it would be being rather than nonbeing (it would thereby hold some form of existence). An example of what not to do: do not claim that existence can turn to nothingness on grounds that existence was/is itself caused by nothingness—for this entails that nothingness is itself a causal agency, thereby entailing that nothingness is something that holds being (minimally, as a causal agency): Thereby resulting in quite the logical contradiction in regard to being.

I would like to know where this "mission" comes from? — schopenhauer1

As far as hypotheticals and their logical consequences go, one could hypothetically manage to obliterate all sapience off of the planet but, logically, the same magnitude of sapience will only re-evolve to its current state. This is because givens such as the planet and its bacteria will remain even after the destruction of all sapient life—and this because one will not have actualized a complete nothingness (via an omnipotence that also obliterates itself?). Given that nothingness is not actualized, the same magnitudes of experience-dependent pleasure and suffering will, then, again unfold among increasingly intelligent sentient beings—only so that life once again finds itself at the magnitude of relative wisdom that we as a human species are at currently. The hypothetical is analogous to a suicidal Sisyphus that always gets reborn to re-experience the same suffering … played out at a magnitude of species.

Given that actualizing nothingness is a metaphysical impossibility, I’d say that the quote-unquote mission is there because there is no other way—metaphysical or otherwise—of alleviating existential suffering at large than via increased understanding.

What we pointed out in the art thread, was that an educated art critic is the one most likely to ascribe some great artistic significance to an elephant's rambling scribbles (as long as you tell them it was by some brilliant young up and coming artist). — ZhouBoTong

Yea, I’ve already written a bunch. But to not be lopsided about my reply given your post:

The issues addressed in this quote represent, at least to me, an all too commonly occurring instantiation of the emperor’s new clothes. People who don't have the courage to stay true to their own aesthetic tastes - but instead label beautify/aesthetic that which they think will earn them greatest social status. Thereby making a farce of what is aesthetic.

To me, good art is emotively powerful, felt from the guts if not also intellectually, at least relative to the audience for which it is intended. It has power to transfix and to transform; to change one’s worldview and understanding via the expression of truths (personal to universal) that are best conveyed via means other than ordinary language. But one can only subscribe to this perspective once one also subscribes to there being such a thing as good art v. bad/stupid/ineffective art.

How much of today’s art has the power to bring vast proportions of young adults into states of awe? That, to me at least, is roughly equivalent to the amount of modern art that is good. A good artist (painter, poet, sculptor, musician, etc.) has enough wisdom to know how to transmute her/his personal truths into expressions that captivate a large number of people. A relative rarity, to be sure. But, imo, this is a large factor in what makes artists good.

Furthering my spiel, most of today’s good art is found below the belt, so to speak: in advertising. Bummer that it has no inherent worth to its artists—that it doesn’t express any truths which the artist per se values; nor, for that matter, any personal truths pertaining to those who pay his/her wages for the artistic creations. The art is instead a means of getting costumers to purchase things that they/we don’t need and wouldn’t otherwise want, this via emotively powerful expressions—ones that are for the most part devoid of any inherent aesthetic value, but are instead fully instrumental in the accumulation of somebody’s stashes of cash. I’m not claiming it’s the only type of modern art out there that has an impact on society … but do find that it, today, is the most prolific among these.

Anyway, my two dimes on the matter.

I was called out for off topic, so I just responded to your post in this thread.

Yea, you know, if you're one to believe that an elephant's painting is as aesthetically valuable as is a human's, to each their own. — javra — ZhouBoTong

To reword my initial argument, to which your quote alludes:

Premise: We humans value sapience; we, for example, want ourselves to be sapient, rather than non-sapient. As another example that is applicable to the philosophy forum: we almost by definition value those historical philosophers we deem to have been of greater wisdom, and do not value those whom we deem to have been utterly devoid of wisdom (given that philosophy is a love of wisdom).

Is there anyone who disagrees with this premise? If so, please explain on what grounds the disagreement stands.

If this premise stands—and if wisdom is not concluded to be an irrational or fallacious concept in respect to what is real—then I offer that this conclusion then rationally follows: We, thereby, likewise value those artworks which to us expresses great sapience over those artworks that to us are either devoid of sapience or express minimal amounts of it. This regardless of whether it’s Shakespeare, the Transformers, or the Simpsons. To find aesthetic value in a blank canvas as a finished work of art, or in a musical piece that is devoid of sound, one will need to experience it as endowed with worthwhile wisdom; otherwise, one will not find aesthetic value to such pieces of art.

If the offered premise stands, how would the given conclusion be erroneous?

-----

By the way:

This is not to deny the truism that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. But, as previously illustrated by comparison between a chimp and a human (both of which have been known to paint), that beholder of greater sapience will likewise be privy to greater awareness of aesthetics as direct experience. No dog or cat will witness beauty in any artwork, much less endeavor to create it. Many humans will.

Yes, of course, complexities abound in what is and what is not aesthetic—as contrasted to mere attraction toward (most will agree that a heap of cash does not embody the aesthetic; while proportionality of form and color often time does). Not to even mention that no one in the history of mankind has as of yet discovered a satisfactory philosophical description of the experience—an experience which we nevertheless all seem to recognize as real. Yet, unless one wants to drastically redefine it, it is a facet of experience at large that strictly pertains to minds capable of abstraction and, hence, of wisdom. Aesthetics does not pertain to the experiences of insects, cats, or dogs, and only marginally to some chimps and elephants.

To emphasize: I am not saying that wisdom equates to aesthetics; the former is a property of psychological being whereas the latter is an experience applicable to the former. And no, magnitude of wisdom cannot be linearly plotted on some chart. Many forms of wisdom can and do occur—and to each their own aesthetic calling.

Nevertheless, just as a human’s arithmetic is better than a chimp’s, so too is a human’s awareness of aesthetics better than that of a chimp’s. To doubt the second is on par to doubting the first.

Yea, you know, if you're one to believe that an elephant's painting is as aesthetically valuable as is a human's, to each their own.

Are you, or are you not, saying that if something is more sapience-oriented, then it is of better value, or greater aesthetic value? — S

Yes. To recap:

P: We as sapient beings value sapience
C: Artwork that is of greater sapience is therefore of greater aesthetic value to us

an argument, that's all

That's all I need to know, because that won't ever work for the reasons I've explained. — S

Ah, but the reasons you've explained are pivoted around the rationality of using sapience as a measure. Hence:

The question remains beside the point. — S

... is completely fallacious.

Is "sapience" a rational concept despite not being measurable via a metric stick or some such?

Wow. OK. How then is the quality of sapience in any way rational to uphold? Or is sapience an irrational concept? — javra

It has nothing to do with sapience, it has to do with aesthetic value. — S

At any rate, the question still stands: Is "sapience" an irrational concept on grounds that is it not measurable?

You must of not read my initial post on this thread, then.

Rationality in this context allows us to set a measure, and draw conclusions from it, but outside of that context, it is meaningless or impotent. There is nothing forcing me or anyone else to adopt whatever measure you happen to present to us. I don't think you're capable of demonstrating a measure that's some sort of super measure that's absolute. The holy grail of all measures! — S

Wow. OK. How then is the quality of sapience in any way rational to uphold? Or is sapience an irrational concept?

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Remember, you've already said that it hods a factual referent. Best I can interpret your former reply, at least.