:grin: Just as long as it doesn't turn into a coherency theory of truth. :ok:

Maybe coherentism is too complex for me. I'm asking myself "acceptable for what?" and I can't come up with a good answer.

Can the knowledge that platen Earth is approximately spherical be to any measure justified by the two facts that a) pyramids are not square and that b) oranges have an orange color? — javra


Okay, now this is more my speed. My answer here is no, not on the face of that justification alone. — fiveredapples

So are we now cool with the claim that justification requires coherency of beliefs?

Would you say that one does not know whether a rock that is to be thrown up into the air at some point in the future will fall back to down to earth? — javra


Yes, that's what I'm saying. — fiveredapples

Hm, I can understand your logic for so affirming, but it doesn't so far strike me as in accord to the term's common usage. I, for example, make numerous decisions based on things I presume within what I consider a context of knowns regarding the future - such as that gravity will apply or that the sun will again rise. But again, to me all knowns are to varying extents fallible.

But it was a genuine request. I don't know the terminology. — fiveredapples

LOL. Yea, I get how "valid justification" might seem weird on it own. But "invalid justification" sounds about right to me. So until we can devise a different term for the matter ... I'll be peevishly using it.

To not beat around the bush, your reply doesn’t address the heart of the matter in relation to the one principle discrepancy you pointed out: coherentism (which I've just now seen you've amended in your first post to me). Cohrentism comes in two varieties: the coherence theory of truth, which I disagree with, and the coherence theory of justification, which I agree with. My question to you was whether or not it makes sense to you that justifications which are not coherent are to be deemed well grounded, acceptable, and/or correct (since you don’t like the colloquial use of “valid”).

Well, I would assume that that satellite is providing information for the basis of your belief. I would assume that your cat's position next to the plant provided similar information. — fiveredapples

As to the details of your reply, you’ve addressed a presumption of how the two stated facts are intended to cohere into the belief which is claimed to be knowledge, this in the first example I gave – it seems by importing the details of the second example which is coherent into the first. I’ll try for a more forthright example: Can the knowledge that planet Earth is approximately spherical be to any measure justified by the two facts that a) pyramids are not square and that b) oranges have an orange color?

If so, how? Here there are no contradictions but I don’t find that there is any coherence between the two facts and the knowledge claimed.

My question, again, is bluntly this: Can a justification hold if it does not consist of givens that cohere into that which is justified, if not also into each other?

As an aside, or maybe not so aside, I have always considered beliefs about the future outside the realm of knowledge -- for the simple fact that they could be defeated by things not turning out as you predict. — fiveredapples

Would you say that one does not know whether a rock that is to be thrown up into the air at some point in the future will fall back to down to earth?

There are also more worn-out examples such as knowing that the sun will rise again tomorrow.

Is validity used to talk about justification? Having studied a little logic, it has always bothered me when people use the colloquial use of 'valid' in philosophical discussions. Sorry, just a pet peeve. But do enlighten me, not that it matters to our discussion (as I understand you) if I'm wrong about validity as a term for justification. — fiveredapples

It's the colloquial use. Tell me of your preferred term for claimed justification that doesn't amount to a squat of beans, and I'll use it in our debates.

But more importantly, this asking me to enlighten you is to me a little irksome – maybe because of the day I’ve had. If you ever happen to seek some form of enlightenment, I’d recommend that you don’t ask other people for it. Simply because there are a lot of charlatans out there, as I’m certain @Bartricks would agree, and they all claim wisdom. From a song by Leonard Cohen called Teachers that I happen to greatly like: “’Follow me’ the wise man said, but he walked behind.”

So, my position - as described in the OP - is that knowledge consists of a feeling Reason is adopting towards true beliefs. — Bartricks

As we once concluded a few days back, I’m not profound enough to understand the subtleties of your position regard Her: Reason. To which I again say, so be it! Off to the shallow tides with me.

But to give a reply given the best of my understanding regarding the position you affirm:

I have yet to encounter this person you refer to as Reason. But if I did, I’d do my best to explain to Her that truth is a conformity to what is real, that only if something is true can it be justified without error regardless of degree, and that there can be no knowledge in the absence of truth. I think I’d try to tell Her this even if Reason’s feelings might get hurt by me so saying. (I don’t like unnecessarily hurting persons, even if they are strangers to me.)

This may or may not be in accord to your position. But again, I’m not of that depth.

But it still seems true (and would seem true to them too, were they aware of the nature of their situation) that they do not, in fact, possess knowledge. — Bartricks

As I believe I've addressed in my posts, I agree with this.

To me the conceptual problems only emerge when we presume (or else intend to gain) an omniscient perspective of reality and, thereby, possession of an infallible knowledge. We never hold such.

Still:

declarative knowledge is: true belief that, on account of being true, can be factually justified without end were one to so want and be capable of doing. — javra

True propositions that can be thereby justified ad infinitum without problems - where it to be feasible to so justify - occur. When they occur will always remain to some measure fallible for all of us non-omniscient beings.

Just in case an example would be of help:

Suppose I affirm knowledge that it will rain today. You ask me why. I then reply by justifying this belief to true with the following: there’s a satellite up in the sky and my cat is next to a plant out in the backyard – with this being the full scope of my justification. The two givens, even if true, do not cohere in any intelligible manner to my belief.

Here, I’d consider that my justification was invalid.

Now suppose that I explain things in a coherent manner as such: the satellite up in the sky has given a weather forecast of 80% chance of rain and my cat has always had a weird habit of sitting next to a plant in my backyard a few hours before it rains, next to which he is now sitting. The same basic truths are presented, but now the explanation provided makes them cohere with my belief that it will rain today.

Here, I’d consider that my justifications were valid – even if less than perfect.

In case it does rain – thereby evidencing my belief-that to be true – I can then maintain my claim of having had JTB in the latter case, but I can't claim JTB in the former case.

(edited the last sentence for better semantics)

No worries.

Do you mean...Can I reasonably hold two beliefs which don't cohere? — fiveredapples

No, that anybody can.

Can you validly justify a belief-that via use of givens that do not cohere?

Am I wrong that you're a Coherentist? — fiveredapples

In its pure traditional form, quite.

Coherency of beliefs applies, in part, to justifications - not to truth. Do you find that justifications for beliefs can be incoherent and yet valid?

No, that's not enough. If that were enough, then he could simply guess the correct time and he'd have knowledge, according to your definition. This is an even weaker conception of knowledge than JTB.

At least JTB attempts to tie the belief to reality by way of a reliable source of truth. — fiveredapples

I will not repeat what I said in my previous posts, but this clearly did not take what I said in context.

May I ask which scenario you are referring to: the Russell example or the counter-example? — fiveredapples

Via the Russel example, I was addressing the understanding that the man can only know its 3 o'clock if his beliefs conform to reality. His primary belief is that he is observing the reality of a working clock, from which is derived the second belief of what time it is. In Russell's scenario, the second belief (is assumed to) conform to reality only via the first belief's (assumed) conformity to reality. Differently stated, in the stipulated case, it is only the (assumed) truth of a working clock that justifies the man's (assumed) truth of what time it is - which, in this example, luckily happens to be correct.

But the first belief is untrue.

Still, it is - or would be - the reality of a working clock that leads - or would lead - to knowledge of what time it is.

Because the man has no justification by which to deem that the clock to not be working, to him he holds knowledge of what time it is.

To those who are aware that the clock is not working, the man does not hold knowledge of what time it is - this because the primary belief upon which his second belief is founded is untrue, thereby making the second belief factually unjustified, despite if happening to be correct by mere luck.

I suppose the pivotal part of my previous post was this:

declarative knowledge is: true belief that, on account of being true, can be factually justified without end were one to so want and be capable of doing. — javra

From my perspective, since the man would not be capable of so justifying his conviction of what time it is, he does not hold what he and everyone else deems to be knowledge.

In the Russell example Bartricks gives, the man has justification under the JTB conception of knowledge. If he didn't, it would pose no problem for the JTB conception of knowledge. The problem is that our intuitions about knowledge tell us that something is awry. We don't think he has knowledge, pace JTB, and we pinpoint the problem to the source of his belief: namely, the broken clock. There is no human fallibility at play here. To think fallibility is at work here -- to respond that the man made a mistake in thinking the broken clock was a working clock -- is to not realize that the justification criterion, per JTB, has actually been satisfied in the example. — fiveredapples

(Nice posts, btw).

Why, or how, does the man know that it’s 3 o’clock? Only because he looked at the clock which, to his mind, was working properly. The obtainment of truth that it is 3 o’clock is thus here directly determined solely by the reality of there being a working clock.

As uncomfortable as this might be, remove the god’s eye view from the scenario. If the man goes about life from here on out without ever observing anything which contradicts with his conviction that it was 3 o’clock on account of a working clock so showing, to the man this belief will be a known. Hence, to him and all others that he interacts with, there will be no evidence that he did not obtain a true state of the world (the correct time) from observing a working clock (a reality to which his beliefs accurately conform). If enquiry was made into how he knows this, his justification (of a fact, rather than ethical justification for the acceptability of so believing – the two forms of justification sometimes get conflated) will be that a working clock informed him of it so being. Here, a working clock showing that its 3 o’clock is, again, the reality to which his true proposition of it being 3 o’clock conforms. And again, because nothing he encounters will contradict his justified true belief, that it was 3 o’clock will to him be knowledge.

Now, where he to any point in the future to discover things that contradict with what is to him a known, he at this point will know (as per the LNC) that some or all of the data involved are in fact mistaken. At this point what is and isn’t known becomes doubted to varying degrees. Say he then discovers that this same clock was not working properly via enquiry. Now, he gains awareness that his then held truth of it being 3 o’clock (on account of a working clock so showing) was in fact a belief-that (a belief of what is true) that did not conform to what was real – was in fact a false belief. He can now ethically justify his stance that it was 3 o’clock but can no longer factually justify it – for the reality on which it was dependent turn out to be bogus.

The person now knows that he was wrong in what he presumed to be knowledge.

None of us have a god’s eye view of the world. Factual justification of our beliefs of what is true in fact being true is all we have to go by. Most of the time, we don’t spend a lot of time in justifying our knows. They simply cohere into other knowns without contradiction and this, typically, serves as sufficient justification for them. But when there is a contradiction between what we take to be knowns, then we know that some of the givens we’ve taken to be knowns are not.

Placing the god’s eye view of the scenario back in, the terminology gets confused: the man only thinks he knows that its 3 o’clock – something we know on account of knowing that the reality of it being a working clock is bogus. But, because the person is unware of this, to the person his known is, at least for the time being, fully secure, and he has no reason to doubt his knowledge.

My take away from this is that declarative knowledge is: true belief that, on account of being true, can be factually justified without end were one to so want and be capable of doing. In practice, we never spend an entire lifetime factually justifying one single belief-that, so our justifications are never perfect but always approximate. Regardless, we assume that anything we consider a known could be so justified ad infinitum without and problems manifesting in the process. The shortened version of all this is then, imo, JTB.

The Pythagoreans originally insisted vehemently that every number could be expressed as a ratio of two integers, and then someone refuted that by showing that some definitely cannot. Is that refutation not set in stone now, as much as the observation of one black swan forever refutes the claim that all swans are white? — Pfhorrest

It's in trying to answer questions like these that I believe the Ancient Skeptics got such a bad reputation over the years. :wink: It requires illustration of possibilities that evidence a lack of infallibility which then gets others to doubt things unreasonably.

There's this fallback:

if one cannot prove that at no future time will anyone find conceivable what to us is currently inconceivable (say some sapient being that will exist a million years from now) then neither can one demonstrate the infallibility of the claim. We find it impossible to conceive of how the square root of 2 is not irrational; can this of itself demonstrate that all intelligences that shall exist for all time yet to come will likewise find it impossible to conceive of some justifiable alternative to this affirmation? If not, then we have not demonstrated that no unknown future refutation is possible. — javra

This same argument would apply for the refutation of all swans being white as well.

Being only humorous, what if all swans that appear to be black were in fact white swans that some person painted with permanent ink? Yes, this is absurdly non-credible for a number of reasons. Yes, other more sci-fi possibilities could be easily produced, maybe without end - some of which might hold more sway. But before the topic enters into issues such as that of mass selective hallucinations telepathically produced by aliens with a funny sense of humor, and the like, the point to any such possible example is here only to show that the criteria of being "perfectly secure from all possible error", i.e. of being infallible, hasn't been met.

And this absence of currently held infallibility will then apply even for the refutation of any given argument.

But not all fallible, psychological certainties are of the same strength. One can be certain of a gut feeling that one has not justified but most will deem such psychological certainties to be weaker than the thoroughly justified psychological certainty that planet Earth is spherical. Strong refutations, just like strong arguments, are of strong psychological certainty.

Am a bit tired now, but if didn't express something properly or am wrong about something, I'm sure I'll find out about it later.

Very nicely said!

a market of fair competition. — javra

Has given us landfills . — ovdtogt

So its your stance that economic competition has so far been mostly equitable?

I don't find it to be so. But I won't be debating the issue.

If I were to try to play devils advocate, I'd try using Agripa's trilemma as a counter. But I'll be forthright. At first glance, I like you're argument B.

Just in case it is sound:

Hence, all sound deductive reasoning is less than infallible in its conclusions. — javra


Agreed. — TheMadFool

:smile: :razz: ... This wouldn't tarnish the argument's strength though.

I hear you. The definitions can be contentious, often emotively so. For example, socialism for most - at least in my neck of woods - most always invokes notions of what I term Stalinism. I do favor Sanders (a socialist democrat) as a candidate in the USA, but I for example can also find a lot of merit in Warren, who's a self-proclaimed capitalist. But to the degree I'm wrong in my terminology, I stand corrected. Regardless of terminology, though, I do uphold a market of fair competition.

To be clear, by "capitalism" do you just mean free trade, or do you mean the division of society into a class of owners and a class of laborers? — Pfhorrest

Not a very easy question to properly answer. In earnest, by "capitalism properly structured" I interpret a meritocratic system of capital acquisition wherein those with greatest ability gain the most. The leading problem I currently find with capitalism as-is is that it selects for those with most greed to be endowed with most capital and, hence, economic power. The stock market has nearly no interest in long-sighted success but, instead, is most interested in short term gains, nowadays at least - often time leading to long-term calamities (economic, environmental, etc.). A CEO that destroys a company, instead of being financially ruined him/herself, often gets selected to run other companies. If the head destroys the body, its unnatural for the head to be placed on another healthy body and prosper. By comparison - as an ideal economic model to be pursued and developed - an economy structured by the people (with the people at large being its governance) in manners that select for qualities we value (as per the golden rule) to gain greatest economic power would by my appraisals be commendable. There would still be competition for capital here and, hence, to me the latter is yet a system of capitalism.

But less idealistically and more directly, in a forced choice, I'd select the "free trade" meaning of the word. Still, class division is by my appraisals not requisite for capitalism. As one example, cooperatives can - or at least could - prosper economically with a system of fair competition - if we actually lived in such a system. Here, the owners are in part or in whole the laborers.

Gave a longer spiel than anticipated. I usually try to shy away from partaking in these subjects due to their complexity - especially when it comes to debates. It just that the idea of economy in the absence of any governance doesn't so far strike me as realistic.

Do you by any chance interpret the financial aid provided by governments to corporations and banks in 2008 - and still provided by governments to petroleum companies, for example - as welfare? If not, why not? It is financial aid provided by the government to those it deems to be in need.

I ask in part because I don’t find evidence that economy ever prospers - or maybe even exists - in the complete absence of governance. What type of governance, and governance by whom, to me are the pivotal issues.

To that effect, governance of economy and governments alike by an ever concentrated sum of corporate oligarchs is to me not a good thing, and that’s where I see things headed. So I’m not misunderstood, I do endorse capitalism when properly structured.

The basic question is: Is logic derived from how the world works or is logic independent and prior to how the world behaves? — TheMadFool

I’ll offer my perspective, but, before I do, as per the contents of my previous post, I do find that no matter the answer affirmed, it will be less than infallible.

As for my non-orthodox view, on one level, all sound deductive logic will require true premises. The truth of premises will in all cases require some reality that is conformed to. The conformity to the referenced reality will be less than infallible. Hence, all sound deductive reasoning is less than infallible in its conclusions.

As to logic itself as laws, principles, and rules into which data is inputted, so to speak, logic cannot be used to substantiate the credibility of logic, for so attempting presumes the very conclusion one is attempting to arrive at from the very get go - this irrespective of the specific instantiation of logic used. This makes the credibility of logic in general less than epistemically infallible. Notwithstanding, we are psychologically stuck with needing to find logic in general trustworthy; to my mind, that should answer that.

As to the metaphysics of logic, my own view is that logic is neither derived from the world nor independent of the world. Logic when generally addressed, hence when starting with rudimentary laws of thought, is rather an a priori aspect of awareness (my view is somewhat Kantian on this). From its a priori aspects we sapient beings can then extrapolate axiomatic rules and experiment with them via trial and error. But logic when more loosely interpreted as the rules which govern reasoning and inferences (rather than formalized logic or, else, the study of the rules which govern inferences) is, again, an a priori aspect of experience - again, neither derived from the world nor independent of it.

[edit: The laws of identity and of non-contradiction, for example, are integral to any instantiation of immediate experience. For instance, because everything that occurs within any given moment of immediate experience will occur during the same span of time, these contents cannot be discerned to be mutually exclusive strictly from the given experience and, hence, can only abide by the law of non-contradiction (contradictions require that givens discerned to be mutually exclusive are further discerned to co-occur at the same time, at least imo). And these two laws' innateness to experience is prior to use of these same laws to infer their manifestation via abstract thought. This in itself is probably deserving of further explanation, but I thought I should better substantiate my aforementioned claim that logic is an a priori aspect of experience.]

Don’t know if it’s of any benefit but that’s my current take. And while I’m certain there is a lot that could be debated in at least some of what I’ve just affirmed, my basic point was this: Logic itself cannot be epistemically evidenced to be infallible – this though we have no choice but to trust its capacity of producing accurate results whenever devoid of errors.

I’m avoiding the particle-wave duality issue because I don’t want to here engage in speculations of how QM might not in any way be inherently contradictory.

The problem of induction and Popper's falsifiability anticipated. I don't know if it works for deductive logic though. The square root of 2 was irrational before the Pythagoreans deduced it and will always be irrational till the end of time itself. — TheMadFool

As for example, when someone proposes an argument to us that we cannot refute, we say to him, "Before the founder of the sect to which you belong was born, the argument which you propose in accordance with it had not appeared as a valid argument, but was dormant in nature, so in the same way it is possible that its refutation also exists in nature, but has not yet appeared to us, so that it is not at all necessary for us to agree with an argument that now seems to be strong."

Sextus Empiricus — ZzzoneiroCosm

The square root of 2 being irrational to me seems to be precisely the type of affirmation which we cannot refute in practice. While I find the boldfaced text somewhat weak in its argument (and, for that matter, dislike the emotive tone of what follows and thereby ends the sentence), the idea that I make out is this: if one cannot prove that at no future time will anyone find conceivable what to us is currently inconceivable (say some sapient being that will exist a million years from now) then neither can one demonstrate the infallibility of the claim. We find it impossible to conceive of how the square root of 2 is not irrational; can this of itself demonstrate that all intelligences that shall exist for all time yet to come will likewise find it impossible to conceive of some justifiable alternative to this affirmation? If not, then we have not demonstrated that no unknown future refutation is possible.

I mention this because a) it (fallibly) evidences that all our affirmations are fallible, even the ones we cannot refute (such as the example you've provided) and, to me far more importantly, b) it illustrates the absurdity of doubting the truth of any affirmation merely because it is not evidenced to be epistemically infallible.

Also the word "refutation" says a lot about what Sextus Empericus meant. It implies a premise or premises will turn out to be false but it's unlikely that there will be a problem with validity. This ties in quite neatly with the problem of induction and Popper's falsifiability doesn't it? — TheMadFool

Not "will turn out to be false" but "might (or might not) turn out to be false". We already know that "all swans are white" is false. That "all swans are either white or black" might someday turn out to be false just as readily as it might never turn out to be false (the latter on account of being ontically true).

Yes, I for one do see an important tie with induction and the principle of falsification - and, hence, with knowledge gained from the empirical sciences.

Does the prospect of a unknown future refutation make the strongest argument weak? — ZzzoneiroCosm

No. The purpose of an argument or justification is to substantiate that one's belief-that (always of what is true) is in fact true (in fact conforms to that which is real). The unknown of whether or not an unknown future refutation to that which is affirmed exists doesn't change the fact that the given substantiation for the affirmation is strong.

The unknown of whether or not an unknown future refutation exists only makes the substantiation, and therefore the affirmation, less than epistemically infallible.

Should it at the very least temper a dogmatic approach to knowledge- and certainty-pronouncements? — ZzzoneiroCosm

If the dogmatism deals in infallible pronouncements - such as in "it is unquestionably true because I (or he, etc.) says so" - then yes. Otherwise, it to me seems contradictory that affirmations are not a product of psychological certainty for that affirmed. The affirmation quoted in the OP gives all indications of Empiricus being very psychologically certain of what he states, for example.

Addendum: It's wise to beware (moreover) of an uknown future refutation of the possibility of an unknown future refutation. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Agreed.

Is it possible to refute the possibility of an unknown future refutation? — ZzzoneiroCosm

Until such refutation is provided, it can only remain unknown whether or not such refutation is possible. But until it is provided, all affirmations remain less than infallible, i.e. fallible to varying degrees.

My take so far is that their fallibility is why we must be capable of justifying our beliefs to be true if they are in fact true. If they're untrue, our attempts to justify them will at some point become inconsistent, incoherent, or both. Hence the notion of (fallible) knowledge-that as JTB.

Got it. Thanks.

As for me, consciousness - as in "that which is aware of" - is itself other than information - as in "that which informs". The former is informed by the latter. But this seems to be neither here nor there in this debate.

At any rate, thanks again for the forthright reply.

That is irrelevant if you understand the distinction between the things I labeled “physical/actual” vs things I labeled “abstract/virtual”.

Those are two distinct categories of existence as I described, and you may label them as you wish or think about them whatever you want, but as long as we agree the distinction exists, then the question still stands whether qualia belongs in one or the other category. — Zelebg

Going by this created dichotomy, all instantiations of immediate experience would be "physical/actual". Abstract concepts that emerge from these instantiations of experience would then be "abstract/virtual".

More specifically, qualia as an abstract conceptualization is abstract/virtual, but any instantiation of qualia as immediate experience (say, a sensed aesthetic) would be physical/actual.

But so dichotomizing doesn't so far make sense to me. This because I do not deem actual, concrete experience to be the same as physicality. It almost seems that you believe in experience's equivalence to physicality. Can you better explain this, or how this is a mistaken interpretation of your view? My bad if I've missed this explanation somewhere in the thread.

As we concluded over the last few pages there are only two possible modes of existence we know of, actual and virtual. Thus the nature of subjective experience, aka qualia, can either be physical or abstract phenomena. — Zelebg

Firstly, physicality is itself an abstraction. Secondly, immediate experience (be it of pain/pleasure or of empirical givens) is itself not an abstraction but, instead, that from which abstractions result.

If abstractions are virtual and immediate experiences are actual, then the following doesn't contextualize the issue properly:

Now, if we can agree with all the above, then the question is what do you think ‘subjective experience’ or qualia is, physical or virtual phenomena? — Zelebg

It's true.

The only way it's truth-value would be problematic is *if* you have never told a lie in your life *and* you know this to be true *and* you speak what you know to be untrue. You find this scenario feasible in real-world applications?

'I am a liar.'

is already a paradox. Tell me if you know I am a liar or not? — ovdtogt

The strengthened liar paradox – “this very sentence is false” - is an abstraction obtained from either “I am a liar” or “I am lying”.

A liar: a) someone who tells lies (not “someone who never tells truths”), b) someone with a propensity to lie, such that they are attracted to lying, or c) someone whose propensity to lie is greater than average.

A lie: an intentionally (or, less commonly, unintentionally) told statement known to the speaker to be untrue whose contents are intended to be believed true by those to whom the statement is told. (If the speaker believes her statement to be true, the statement would not be a lie.)

“I am a liar” (or “all people are liars”, etc.) cannot then feasibly be a contradiction, for it intends to correlate to the fact that the individual (or that all people, etc.) has told lies or, else, has some propensity to lie in certain contexts. Or, in some contexts, it would be the momentarily honest expression that one or all of one’s cohort has a greater than average propensity to lie. In all such cases the statement would be unequivocally true.

It is not feasible that a human never utters a true sentence in the entirety of their lives. If for no other reason, no such person could tell successful lies, for no trust would be imparted upon such person and, so, none of their false statements would be believed true by others. Hence, the equivalence of a liar to someone that never tells truths – something that appears required for the liar paradox to obtain - is a product of mistaken reasoning.

“I am lying,” on the other hand, is in real world application made in reference to sentences that have already been spoken or, less commonly, that have yet to be spoken. This, again, is not a contradiction. The statement of “I am lying” would itself be unequivocally true in these cases.

The liar paradox is then always abstracted from mistaken reasoning applied to the significance of real world cases in which “I am a liar” or “I am lying” is spoken. Given the verity of this, the liar paradox – both strengthened and non-strengthened – is the product of faulty reasoning. And, if the product of faulty reasoning, then the contradiction it presents is itself as specious as would be any other contradictory outcome of reasoning.

You didn't take my last post seriously, did you. Please do.

You're out of your depth. — Bartricks

You, guy, are more than correct in this. When someone does not know what is meant by the law of noncontradiction but considers dialetheism to be consistent with his theory ... I at that point am out of my depth.

Shallow sounds about right right now.

I do not know what you mean by LNC, or how what you're saying responds to what I have already said about this.

Dialetheism is the theory that there can be true contradictions.

That's not a theory about truth, but a theory about what can be true.

It is consistent with my theory. — Bartricks

Um, OK. I was hoping you'd provide something I could reply to, though.

You agree with gibberish? What do you agree with? — Bartricks

Unless I misunderstood creativesoul's remark, I agree that reasoning is subject to laws of thought and that these are presupposed true in the very use of reasoning - such that their truth can only be a priori to any use of reasoning, including any assertion thereby obtained. Hence, that truth and reasoning are two different things. This in a way touches upon my first post on this thread which you've not yet replied to.

The correspondence theory of truth is not a substantial theory of truth. It is true - no one disputes that it is true - but it is true because it is trivial. It says "a proposition is true when it corresponds to the facts", yes? — Bartricks

This is only a particular instantiation of, "a proposition's correspondence to that which is real", and I take the latter to sum up the correspondence theory of truth. I in my own way agree that the correspondence theory of truth is insufficient, but I do take it to be a necessary aspect of any theory of truth that addresses propositions. (When I say it's insufficient, it for example does not easily explain "the arrows aim was true" or "a true friend" and like semantics of the same term, so to me there's something more general involved.)

But you disagree that it is a theory of truth at all. True is an adjective whereas truth is a noun form of this same adjective. To me truth is not a sharply different semantics from true but, instead, addresses what all instantiations of true hold in common as their property.

I get we don't agree on what truth is. But I'd ask you to reply to my previous post as pertains to the validity of your own theory. For ease, I'll re-post it here:

Dialetheism is the position that some statements are both true and false, i.e. that some contradictory propositions express what is termed “true contradictions”. I hold disregard for dialetheism, but the point is that it uses reason to make and substantiate this assertion. Dialetheism stands in contradiction to the law of noncontradiction (the LNC), which also uses reason to make and substantiate its assertion.

If truth is that which Reason asserts, given that reason can assert both dialetheism and the LNC, would both dialetheism and LNC be true?

If they’re not both true, wouldn’t this evidence that truth is not a product of what reasoning asserts? Reason can assert both dialetheism and the LNC but, here, they’re not both true – hence one given which reason asserts is here necessarily false.

Alternatively, if they are both true, then how does this not negate the LNC in favor of dialetheism and, in the process, evidence that truth is not a product of what reasoning asserts? Reason can assert the LNC but, if both dialetheism and the LNC are true, the LNC would necessarily be false as entailed by the true contradiction of both being true – thereby again making something which reason asserts false. — javra

(As to its last paragraph, I get the incomprehensibility of the LNC being false if it were to be true in conjunction with dialetheims - but this is what contradictions are, incomprehensible. Nevertheless, since the LNC stipulates that no contradictions can occur, were any contradictions to be deemed correct, the LNC would be false - and dialetheism contradicts with the LNC.)

Reason presupposes truth as correspondence by virtue of presupposing the truth of it's premisses. — creativesoul

As should be apparent, I fully agree. A tricky philosophical question that ensues: To what does reasoning’s premises (first principles at least) correspond to?

As for me, since I have idealistic leanings, these correspond to universally applicable aspects of awareness – regardless of its type or degree – such that awareness per se is presumed a metaphysically real given (rather than a physically real given). Quite the mouthful, I know, but here truth as correspondence to that which is real is maintained.

I’m curious to discover alternative understandings regarding what reality the first principles of reasoning would correlate to.

As an example, one could make the case that Aristotle's laws of thought pertain to the physical wold and we gain knowledge of them via empirical observation - such that their truth is a correspondence to physical reality. The problem I find in this is that it places the cart before the horse: we as aware beings require the laws of thought aprioristically in order to engage in empirical observations - at the very least, the law of identity - and, moreover, aprioristically require these same laws of thought so as to hold the capacity of obtaining generalities (in this case, reasoning's premises) from observed particulars.

Edit: Just realized I might have misinterpreted what you meant by "reasoning's premises". You many have been strictly addressing formal reasoning which, as such, requires premises from which to infer things. If so, please interpret my usage of "reasoning's premises" as strictly specifying the laws of thought which we premise to be required for correct reasoning to obtain.

So, absent some good reason to think otherwise, our working hypothesis should be that truth is a performative of Reason. What it is for a proposition to be true, is for Reason to be asserting it. — Bartricks

Dialetheism is the position that some statements are both true and false, i.e. that some contradictory propositions express what is termed “true contradictions”. I hold disregard for dialetheism, but the point is that it uses reason to make and substantiate this assertion. Dialetheism stands in contradiction to the law of noncontradiction (the LNC), which also uses reason to make and substantiate its assertion.

If truth is that which Reason asserts, given that reason can assert both dialetheism and the LNC, would both dialetheism and LNC be true?

If they’re not both true, wouldn’t this evidence that truth is not a product of what reasoning asserts? Reason can assert both dialetheism and the LNC but, here, they’re not both true – hence one given which reason asserts is here necessarily false.

Alternatively, if they are both true, then how does this not negate the LNC in favor of dialetheism and, in the process, evidence that truth is not a product of what reasoning asserts? Reason can assert the LNC but, if both dialetheism and the LNC are true, the LNC would necessarily be false as entailed by the true contradiction of both being true – thereby again making something which reason asserts false.

Hey, in adding some content to my previous post, here presenting a counterpoint to the “it’s too late” angle:

If the global mass disruptions that are now inevitable will in turn result in a global consensus of what should be done – rather than a global, tyrannical, surveillance-infused dystopia the likes of which we have never known – then research dollars will be heavily invested in carbon capture programs, along with more efficient renewable energy, etc. (One current problem is that over five percent of the global GDP is spent subsidizing fossil fuels rather than being invested in renewables.) In this optimistic scenario, although there will be extreme damage done to humanity and to life in general, there will also be a) relatively successful counter measures resulting from b) a global accord regarding (none tongue in cheek) democratic values. But all this is obviously a very big “if”, to say the least – especially since it will need to be global to have any meaningful effect. And this can only come from the people themselves.

As general rule, though, people don’t like immediate pain and suffering, so when it will hit most of mankind, things will either change for the better or for the worse. But whichever direction the change occurs, it will be significant.

As with yourself, I’m not here degrading the issue by entertaining thoughts of human caused climate change possibly being a hoax propagated by fake news. Or was it China?

The question is on par to asking: Is the challenge of changing the global status quo of “greed is good” something that is too great for humanity to handle?

It’s not something that can be easily answered.

But I reckon that those who still have a whole life ahead of them will address the issue with motivations that differ from those who’ve become jaded by the life they’ve so far lived.

My answer: Don't know.

Meaning, if the language of mathematics (metaphysical abstracts) is encoded into all of the physical/natural world, what does that infer? To me, it infers that a metaphysical reality exists.

The next question would be here, did that metaphysical truth always exist independently, or did humans invent it(?). Objectively, not sure anyone knows... — 3017amen

Stepping away from mathematics for a moment, I’ll address the possible metaphysical reality of first principles.

Consider the law of identity (A = A). Is the law of identity something that exists apart from our understanding of it? Or is it something we’ve created axiomatically and then put to use which we then reify into a metaphysically real given?

Since its impossible to create it sans the a priori existence of the law itself, and since young enough preadolescents have no understanding of it while yet making use of it (ostensibly, as do lesser animals), I heavily lean toward it being a non-created, a priori, metaphysical reality.

The same can then be stated of a priori mathematical givens: they can become intelligible to us, but exist apart from our understanding of them, all the while constraining what can be.

And as with laws of thought, we're free to concoct any mathematics that we please axiomatically, but those which are metaphysically real shall always remain irrespective of what we assume.

In one word: Trump. Whom we all know is our esteemed comrade of superior equality relative to everyone else in the world, this because he is the bestest leader in the history of trump = unrivaled truth. (Remember now, ignorance is power.)

And if this weren’t enough, he has supporters, both at home and abroad.

Nah, I don’t feel there’s a global conscious awakening on the horizon. Unless it’s about giving the rich more untaxed money so that more could trickle down to the ever growing poor, kind of thing.

Excuse me for my sarcasm. I have to joke about the unpleasantries I do feel in relation to what’s going on so as to keep some morsel of sanity. Still, no, the feeling you’re experiencing isn’t something that everybody else shares – definitely not something shared by me.

Then again, maybe you’ve had a lucky strike of pleasant encounters? I’d still say it’s not something global.

Let's take an empirical claim such as: All objects obey the laws of gravity. Notice that it is a Aristotelean categorical statement. Isn't it necessary then to consider the logical character of such statements before we talk of its empirical import? What do you think? — TheMadFool

While I find a sharp distinction between rationalism and empiricism specious - Kant gave good examples of why this is, imo - the only way to substantiate the claim that you give is empirically, hence inductively. Its truth cannot be derived merely from axioms.

If a scientific theory is categorically true then it is ontically unfalsifiable and the only way we can know that is to show that it's epistemically unfalsifiable. — TheMadFool

The underlined portion doesn't work. That's the thing to induction: it can't evidence something with absolute certainty, which our empirical propositions and theories most often implicitly purport. For instance, "All swans are white" explicitly states a determinate state of affairs as though it were an absolute certainty - that it isn't an absolute certainty remains implicit.

Because we cannot ever show that an empirical claim is ontically unfalsifiable, it will always remain epistemically falsifiable to us. This even if it happens to be "categorically true", in which case it would be ontically unfalsifiable. The best we can do is not be able to falsify it in practice despite trying to - while never knowing if it can be falsified in principle. Not being so able, in turn, substantiates the belief that the claim is true.

Let me cheat and use categorical logic to show that indeed I am, very surprisingly to me, right.

All swans are white in logic doesn't have existential import unlike its negation: Some swans are black which can only be true if and only if there is at least one black swan.

Lacking claims of existence the proposition: All swans are white, is true even if you never saw a swan let alone white swans. I think in predicate logic the statement gets translated as:

IF x is a swan then x is white. Emphasis on "if". — TheMadFool

This thread is about empirical knowledge, I presumed, not axiomatic claims. Aside from which, how would "all unicorns are white" not be a true statement given the system of logic you're presented?

Aside from a contradiction in your statement which I expect to carry some deep meaning I'll focus on the words "impossible to falsify". Such statements would be metaphysical for Popper, right? — TheMadFool

OK, too brief in the expression. No contradiction intended. What I was addressing is a proposition that is epistemically falsifiable but not ontically falsifiable. This presumes that our knowledge is imperfect. To better illustrate via example: I say "all swans are either black or white" while holding imperfect knowledge of the world; I could falsify this claim by observing a red swan in some remote location; so its epistemically falsifiable. However, reality has it (here assuming a perfect knowledge of the world) that only black and white swans exist. So no matter how much I - the one with fallible knowledge - look in attempts to falsify this proposition, I will never be able to. Because only black and white swans exist, the proposition is not possible to falsify ontically.

This state of affairs is what makes the following understandable:

However, if that addressed is falsifiable and if we are unable to falsify it despite our best attempts, then it gives all indications of in fact conforming to that which is ontic (else, of accurately corresponding to that which is real), i.e. of being true. — javra

The above argument looks ok but actually has a flaw in that when predictions fail to materialize (aren't observed) it doesn't always mean the theory in question is false. Take for example the classic case: All swans are white. If you fail to observe white swans it doesn't mean that the claim is false. It just means that you haven't discovered evidence for the claim. The only way we can say that the claim, all swans are white, is false is by observing a non-white swan. — TheMadFool

This one example doesn't work. If one fails to see any swans period, then the proposition of "all swans are white" is no better than "all unicorns are white" - and there are no grounds to believe that swans are real (much less that they're only white) due to the proposition being unfalsifiable (here simplifying things by not introducing reasoned conclusions, such as could apply to the probability of alien life). However, if one does observe swans but fails to see a white swan, then the proposition is falsified.

Can't think of a different example to substantiate the claim you want to make. Maybe you can?

Why is falsification more important than verification to Popper? I think the reason has to do with induction failing to provide definitive truth. If we are to put our trust in a theory it can't be based on it being true because the nature of induction only allows for tentative truth. — TheMadFool

I think the underlined portions miss the mark. Truth is, but appraising when it is is not something that can be done with what others term absolute certainty. For as long as a falsifiable theory is not falsified, it can well be true - in an ontically determinate way. But since our subjectivity is not 100% objective (this being shorthand for a long-winded argument - my bad), we can't subjectively know with absolute subjective certainty that every instantiation of what we deem to be true (personally or collectively) actually is in fact true. However, if that addressed is falsifiable and if we are unable to falsify it despite our best attempts, then it gives all indications of in fact conforming to that which is ontic (else, of accurately corresponding to that which is real), i.e. of being true.

To this effect, hypothesize that a falsifiable proposition or theory is impossible to falsify both in practice *and* in principle. By what reasoning could one claim that this proposition or theory holds any chance of being untrue?

So, I think that we trust falsifiable theories that have not been in any way falsified precisely because we expect them to be true.

I agree with the general gist of your arguments so far, btw.