So your saying that the term "sapience" has no factual, hence impartial, hence objective referent? — javra

No, I'm saying what I said. Do you need me to repeat it? — S

Then, in the context of this:

Therefore, human paintings are of greater aesthetic value than chimp and elephant paintings; again, because human paintings are more sapience-centric. — javra

how does this rationally fit in?:

I don't think that any argument would work, because they'll all be based on an unwarranted premise of that form that if something is more this or that, then it is better, when that's actually just a subjective judgement trying to pretend to be something else. — S

when that's actually just a subjective judgement trying to pretend to be something else. — S

So you're saying that the term "sapience" has no factual, hence impartial, hence objective referent?

I get that we're subjective about what is factually ontic. This to me, however, does not negate the presence of facts ... such as that of sapient beings (e.g., humans at large) being distinct from non-sapient, but yet sentient, beings (e.g. ameba; yes amebas can sense their environments). If I need to clarity: this by incremental gradations, as per biological evolution. (different topic, though)

How about this one:

Most, if not all, of those who can understand the content of Shakespeare can also understand the content of Transformers movies. In contrast, a significant portion of those who get Transformers movies (such as preadolescents, as one example) do not get Shakespeare. Premise: sapience has an importance to us. Conclusion: Shakespeare is a better form of artwork than Transformers … ‘cuz it’s more sapience-oriented.

Consider this analogy: chimps and elephants can paint. Humans can understand the paintings of chimps and elephants; but chimps and elephants cannot understand the paintings of humans. Therefore, human paintings are of greater aesthetic value than chimp and elephant paintings; again, because human paintings are more sapience-centric.

Or is me saying that “an elephant’s painting is of lesser aesthetic value than one of Leonardo’s” simply me being an elitist? I can deal with that, I think. And no, I'm not bashing on the Transformers movies.

:grin: funniness sometimes happens. cool

Oh. For the record, I was being darkly humored as I sometimes get. :wink:

Just throw out the baby, keep the bathwater. — Merkwurdichliebe

Hm. How do you find that that could logically work? Throwing out the aim of an equality between sexes while yet preserving its modern-day outcomes within society …

Besides, disposing of babies down the sewer doesn’t sit too well with most people … this as metaphors go.

Is there something lost in interpretation?

Camille Paglia feminism [...] — Merkwurdichliebe

As it happens, I'm no expert on the modern shenanigans of feminism; just now read up a little on this quoted person. But, yea, bathwater gets dirty after awhile, so out it goes ... just as long as it doesn't get confused for the baby. :razz:

The short answer to the titular question is that it does and it is called Feminism. — Banno

Given what I known about feminism at large, that’s a very astute summative statement.

All the same, most self-labeled “true/real men” associate most everything regarding femininity to a weakness of mind and body. As in, “women are emotional” and such. Thereby detesting this “–ism” that gets attached to “feminine” and which seeks to be of equal importance to masculinity. To these men feminism is, or at least symbolizes, a direct affront to their social power of superiority relative to women. So addressing their interests via feminism is rather mute.

That aside, even when not addressing those who view male superiority over women to be a natural/god-given right (plenty of these worldwide), there’s still an oddness to addressing men’s issues via the label of feminism:

To try to make my point, I’ll use myself as one honest example: I’d love to find a lifelong mate that at least in part personifies Elizabeth Stanton’s spirit; and so she would be quite proud and dignified in calling herself a feminist—despite all the spin-mongering against feminism that our present culture offers. I’d share her sentiments and ethics regarding the issues of feminism. But I’d still feel odd in declaring myself to be a feminist. This is because I’m a male and value those beneficial masculine attributes that typically pertain to the male sex. There is no doubt that feminist women such as Elizabeth Stanton value the same beneficial masculine attributes in men that an equalitarian such as myself does. Feminism, after all, is not anti-masculinity. But, nevertheless, there’s something amiss with labeling a man feminine, this rather than masculine … and this is something which the term “feminism”, as a term (rather than a historic movement), often tends to imply culturally. Especially since our culture is in part composed of those antagonistic to equality between the sexes.

In short, I’m pro-feminism (as per Elizabeth Stanton, who historically epitomizes the movement and its aims … one will notice that it extends beyond the concerns of a particular race of economic class), but can’t feel comfortable labeling myself a feminist.

Just as former liberals are now labeled progressives to stand apart from neo-liberalism, it seems that feminism would be benefited by a new term so as to more easily make its point: an equality of worth between the biological and sometimes psychological differences of the sexes.

All the same, pleasantly humbled to see other males that don't bash feminism. :up:

I'm an egalitarian, and quite frankly as well as technically that is NOT feminism. — Anaxagoras

Here’s the problem with that statement:

Feminism is a range of political movements, ideologies, and social movements that share a common goal: to define, establish, and achieve the political, economic, personal, and social equality of the genders. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feminism

Well, yea, I was familiar with these perspectives prior to making my posts on this thread. Is there any particular argument you want to make? The quoted text is one of presumed authority, but no logical arguments are provided for its basic affirmations. And, as per the arguments I've previously offered against a completely causal determinism and for a (metaphysical) freedom of choice, I disagree with these basic affirmations. But we can always agree to disagree.

A perspective seeking to exit the merry-go-round:

Suppose that all our “dos” are driven by “wants” … this including our doing of reasoning: since wants are emotive, as per Hume, reasoning is foundationally driven by underlying desires. Further suppose that our wants are in search of a resolution to that wanted. Reasoning, then, is arguably an optimal means of discovering how to best obtain and thereby satisfy our wants.

Given any degree of realism (here not confused with physicalism), there will then be constraints to how these wants can obtain their sought after aim of resolution. These constraints will then—in some way or another—(pre)determine which actions can factually satisfy our wants and which actions (though intending to so satisfy) cannot.

Those behaviors that factually satisfy our wants will then be logically correct means of so satisfying. They will be the right behaviors for us. And, since what we want is for our wants to be satisfied, right behaviors will constitute good, beneficial, behaviors for us. That aim, whatever it might be, that satisfies all our wants will then be conceptualized by us as complete good: “the Good” as Plato worded it.

And vice versa: all our intentions and subsequent acts to satisfy our wants that are fallaciously conceived to so satisfy our wants will then be wrong behaviors to engage in—for they always lead to frustrated wants and, in due measure, suffering. They will be deemed to be bad behaviors by us for this very reason.

To the same degree that there occur universal and fundamental wants among all humans (or mammals, or life in general), there will then also logically result aims that are universally good to that cohort considered. Being universally good, these aims will hold existential presence in manners that are impartial to the (sometimes fallacious/wrong) intentions of individual beings to satisfy their wants. In this sense, then, this universally good aim (or maybe aims) shall then, by certain definitions, be validly labeled that which is objectively good.

Within this general train of thought, then, subjective want-driven good entails there being some objective good—which can be expressed as “that end which satisfies all wants”—that, whether or not obtainable within our current lifetime in complete form, is nevertheless pursued by all subjective beings.

Discerning what this objective good is can itself be a fallacy of reasoning (a wrong/bad appraisal) or a discovery of what is in fact true (a right/good appraisal). Disparity between discernments of what is objectively good then leads to divergent ethical norms—as well as to, at times, what are labeled acts of evil by the society at large.

***This hypothesis is to illustrate that there is no entailed logical contradiction between subjective good/bad and objective good/bad.

As to Hume’s dilemma when looked at from this offered vantage: figure out what the logically and factually correct aim is that satisfies your wants (this factually correct aim being an “is) and then you logically derive what should be done to get there (this being an “ought”) … thereby deriving ought from is.

So, here, good and bad are determined by wants which naturally entail their own resolution as aim/goal--and this within the constraints of some form of realism.

It take it from your terminology, you hold to a few Aristotilean presuppositions. — Merkwurdichliebe

Yes. As I’ve previously expressed, I do believe in Aristotle’s four different types of determinacy.

In layman terms, causality is nullified by immutability, qua. the deterministic model. — Merkwurdichliebe

Nicely summarized.

The important distinction is, as you say: existing, versus standing out. But I might argue that this standing out is existing, as such. [...] — Merkwurdichliebe

The sneaky issue is that of the first-person point-of-view’s existence. It is, has being, but it does not stand out even to itself. You look into a mirror and see all the biological apparatuses via which you as a first-person point-of-view can physiologically see—but you never physiologically see yourself as that first-person point-of-view which is seeing … and which can also see with the mind’s eye. So if to exist is defined as to stand out, does one as first-person point-of-view of awareness exist?

It’s this same, ever-changing, first person point of view that does the choosing.

[...] And, if the deterministic model does essentially negate the deciding agent, then, then thing that exists is gone, and what are we left with: the model and irrelevant spectators. — Merkwurdichliebe

Yup, I agree with the conclusion.

Thank you. You have a nice way of framing it all. — Merkwurdichliebe

Thanks

I would add there is also the important debate of whether predetermined factors allow for the existence of the will, and to what degree it is free in relation to those factors. — Merkwurdichliebe

True. It’s why I find interest in exploring the mechanisms of volition. It can’t be completely determined, nor completely undetermined. Nor are our lives and experiences helped out by forsaking the subject of volition on grounds of it being illusory—this due to upholding a model of causal reality that (as I previously tried to illustrate) is contradictory to causal efficacy.

The eternal decision. I think this is what makes the willing agent relevent, whether or not its decision manifests into reality. In fact, I would say that when the will does not correspond to any existing state of affairs, it takes on even more importance. — Merkwurdichliebe

Via example, what I generally have in mind is: there’s my decision to move my hand, followed by the state of affairs of my hand moving as I willed; likewise, when I decide to not move my hand, my hand does not move. So there generally is a uniform correlation between what I willfully intend to do and what ends up being done.

On occasion though, my will shall not be efficacious. If I decide to express an idea I have in confident manners but instead end up being tongue-tied in the idea’s expression, the resulting state of affairs will not correlate with what I willed to occur.

As I interpret it, then, you’re saying that the property of will is more important when it is not efficacious—this as per my second example of ending up being tongue tied.

I’m curious to find out more about why you think so.

I will agree that every choice is in itself another cause of a long line of events, so it is the efficient cause in that sense. I do not see how it is the "originating" cause if it itself is also caused. — NKBJ

These are indeed the hard to depict nuances that, all the same, distinguish causal determinism (including those forms that claim compatibilism) from any position affirming any type of metaphysical freewill (including those forms that also claim compatibilism).

We typically say that lightning causes thunder. In fact, lightning is fully determined by antecedent efficient causal factors; the thunder is then causes not by the lightning but by the set of these antecedent causal factors. Between these factors and the thunder, lightning is just an immutable link and is thereby fully non-efficacious. In other words, given the verity to these antecedent causal factors, lightning in truth holds no causal agency of its own. Hence, logically, it is not the lightning which causes the thunder but its antecedent causal factors.

In a system of causal determinism, then, there is no causal agency to speak of. All appraisals of causal agency become chimerical. Everything is causally predetermined in full by antecedent causal effects ad infinitum, such that causal agency as we “naively” conceive of it is an impossibility.

When it comes to choice between alternatives, what I’m saying is that despite its determinacy by motives (and other non-causal determinants), we agents in fact cause the effect. In effect, our commonsense notions of causal agency are in fact accurate representations of one underlying metaphysical form of causality, one that applies to freewill.

Each and every moment of our being we are different, thought the same person, and will have been in part predetermined by our former choices in life. Yet at each juncture of choice—part, present, and future—we again engage in being the agency for effects as decisions, or commitments, to future realities, this given two or more alternative means toward the end of resolving our want(s).

As causal agencies—and unlike the lightning bolt—we of our own constituency of being originate the effect of our particular decisions. … Whereas the lightning bolt does not causally originate the thunder of its own being (again, this since the thunder is causally predetermined by causal factors antecedent to the lightning).

If there’s a need, I’ll have to reply later on.

Would you say this is true regardless of whether the choice can be shown to have any causal relation to the corresponding state of affairs? — Merkwurdichliebe

From my vantage, it easy to forget or overlook that causation (of any variant) cannot be shown (empirically demonstrated) to be factual. The philosophy of causation is metaphysical in full. From the ontology of Aristotle, to the works of Hume, to those who have affirmed that reality is fully non-causal (e.g., instead being fully mathematical), the "showing" part can only pertain to reasoning and logic. I think for most of us, ideally a reasoning that is accordant to empirical world we experience.

Correlation does not entail causation. Yet causation is always co-relational. Given a sufficient quantity of uniform correlations between some given and its antecedent, one simply presumes causation.

So whether choice has any causal efficacy in relation to the corresponding state of affairs is, I believe, the crux of the freewill debate. Causal determinists presume it doesn't. Those who uphold freewill presume it does. And resolving this via empirical data has at least so far proven futile.

I was going to pull just that aspect out from your dissertation there! :wink: — NKBJ

:yikes: :cool:

I agree that is a "want" that pushes us towards certain decisions, in fact, a whole host of them, sometimes contradictory ones pulling us in opposite directions.

The distinction if that want is determined or not is the crux of the matter. I would say that these wants are products of both our experiences and our biology, and that they are fully determined. In fact, if they were not determined, they would not be trustworthy. — NKBJ

As I so far see things, want is of course determined: by biology, by experience, as well as by our previous choices in life. I'll even go so far as to suggest that some form of meta-want is even a metaphysically predetermined facet of any awareness, or sentience--devoid of which no such thing as ego can be.

My contention is, again, in that the actual choice of which of two or more alternatives to choose (so as to approach and obtain the want's resolution) will itself not be an immutable link in infinite causal chains/webs. Rather, the act of making the specific choice will stem from the momentary form of the agent as an originating efficient cause, such that its effect is the choice taken.

So are you saying that this "want" or "motive" is determined or the part of choice that is not fully determined? — NKBJ

Stating it differently: there can be no choice (an action or motion) without some form of want (a driving motive where "motive" is understood as "something that determines motion"). The motive--irrespective of what it itself is determined by--determines the process of choice making.

Though more vague than what I had in mind, I think I can relate to that. The mechanisms to volition is what most intrigue me in relation to this theme.

What part is not determined? — NKBJ

If the non-equivalence between determinacy and causation as I’ve previously described it is accepted, freewill could then be argued to be necessarily (pre)determined at all times.

--> It would only not be fully determined by antecedent efficient causes—such that the decision-as-effect which is produced holds that which makes the decision to be the metaphysically terminating origin—hence, originating efficient cause—of the decision (... this rather than the decision being a link in an infinite chain, or web, of efficient causal processes devoid of any exception).

One means of potentially arguing this is to provide for the contradiction of (a fully) causal determinism: In summation of one such argument, we agents (i.e., sentient beings; hence, instantiations of awareness in the form of ego) can only hold presence (i.e., exist, but not necessarily “stand out” … a subtle but metaphysically important clarification of semantics for some) given the presence of change, hence motion—this irrespective of whether the change/motion is physical or mental. That being a given, when impartially appraised, a world of full causal determinism does not logically allow for the possibility of change/motion—this since all relations of efficient causation are within this model perfectly immutable by definition, and because everything is deemed to consist of these perfectly immutable causal relations. Here, then, our experience of being directly contradicts with our theory of a fully casually deterministic being—for our experience entails the presence of change whereas the model of reality entails a perfect changelessness of being. I fully grant that the summation of this argument many be emotively lacking; yet I would challenge anyone to find rational fault with it. BTW, to hypothetically then claim that awareness is an illusion on grounds of the model used is to place the cart before the horse: it is our awareness which devises models of what being is; not vice versa.

If this logical contradiction is valid and if awareness holds ontological presence (rather than being chimerical), then (a fully) causally deterministic universe is rationally concluded to be an error of reasoning. This, minimally, then facilitates the possibility of freewill as I’ve just described it.

Another means is to address experiences (here granting that our awareness is not perfectly chimerical): we are aware that we strive to choose which alternative to commit to whenever we deliberate between alternatives. We are typically aware via non-physiological sensations (i.e. emotively) that there is a want in us whenever we so deliberate. This want, whatever it may be, is the a propelling motive for us to make a choice between alternatives—and this propelling motive determines our motion (roughly, our change of being) in actively making a decision; i.e., determines that we engage in the psychological action. Each want (each propelling motive) has some either ready established or else not yet established resolution that is pursued. The resolution to the want attracts us—and it too is a motive that determines what we choose; it is a fully teleological (goal-based) determinant that is entailed by the want. So when we deliberate in order to come to a decision we are determined by our propelling want and by that end/goal which we deem to resolve the given want. As to the actual alternatives between which we chose, at any given moment of deliberation, these are not determined by us as aware agents (but are instead determined, arguably, by our unconscious mind); these ready alternatives, instead, (pre)determine what our future courses of action can potentially be at any given instance of choice. We choose that alternative which best satisfies our motives—our desire when this is conceptualized as a propelling motive of want that simultaneously entails a sought after resolution to the same want, the latter being the telos/end that attracts or pulls.

In short, we are always determined by motives and by the alternatives we are aware of in the choices we make. Our choices are thereby never chaotic.

But add to this the following possible paradox: when we deliberate between alternatives, each alternative will be both a credible means toward the attracting motive we are determined by (otherwise we wouldn’t entertain it) AND each alternative will be to some extent an uncertain optimal means toward the attracting motive, which serves to determined what we choose (otherwise, were we to be certain that one alternative is better than all others, there would be no need for deliberation). Choosing which alternative is the best means toward the telos-motive, then, is a matter of metaphysical freedom—freedom strictly from antecedent efficient causes. We at these junctures of deliberation in essence momentarily become the causal origin of the ensuing decision as effect--thereby rationally holding responsibility for our choices.

I’m not claiming that what I’ve so far expressed is comprehensive. Though it’s an expansive topic, I’ve already written a mouthful, I’m thinking.

I am wanting to claim that what I’ve expressed does rationally illustrate how our choices are always determined and yet are—or at least rationally can be—metaphysically free from an otherwise infinite web of perfectly fixed efficient causations … and this without being in any way chaotic.

You'd have other reasons that caused your action, though. — NKBJ

Using this train of thought as a springboard:

In common modern parlance, determinacy is not equivalent to causation. The material used in a construction determines the relative flexibility of the edifice (e.g., wood makes the edifice flexible in comparison to the material of stone); yet the material does not efficiently cause the flexibility of the structure: the material and the structure are simultaneous. The same can be said of formal determinacy—what determines some particular form (with emergent properties of constituents as one possible example)—as well as for teleological determinacy, namely those of motives that most always determine particular motions of sapient beings and which simultaneously co-occur with the given motions. Causation as commonly understood pertains only to efficient causation—wherein the cause temporally precedes the effect it has the agency to produce. (This, though, is not do deny that at times all four of Aristotle’s categories of determinacy can be addressed as causal factors—further obfuscating the issue with unnoticed equivocations.)

Freewill as defined by the op seems to me to be, at best, a logical contradiction: effects being themselves determined by some originative cause that a) is devoid of motives for the action of effect origination and also b) is non-stochastic.

If freewill does exist, it is always semi-determined by, at minimum, motives—which are not efficient causes. It’s just that what one chooses will not be fully determined by antecedent (efficient) causes. In other words, that which does the choosing will itself be a terminating efficient cause of the effects produced within the constraints of, at minimum, the motives that are present.

Yea, I’m battling with windmills in thinking this is going to hold any sway in soundbite form—though I find nothing irrational about what I’ve just addressed. And this is one means of going about a compatibilist universe: one where freewill requires determinacy for its very manifestation (but is contradictory to being fully determined by antecedent efficient causes, i.e. a causally deterministic universe).

So, with all that said, should there be a distinct and credible men's rights movement? — Not Steve

I find myself onboard with your posts, but also find the term “men’s rights” lacking in its description of what you are addressing. To me (and I think to many others) a ‘rights’ movement connotes an intention to ameliorate the lack of rights applicable to a certain cohort.

My initial reaction to the title of this thread was: Is this about wanting to increase men’s rights so that they at last become of equal power to the social, economic, and political rights of women … because the latter have historically been used to oppress the rights of men? Or is this about men’s natural rights / God-given rights (choose as one’s pleases) being oppressed by the opposite sex’s wants. As one possible example of the latter: the oppressing of each man’s right to do as he wants with forty virgins that he owns as property … if not during one’s life on earth than in the afterlife; or, as a similar example: the right of certain skin-toned men (but not others) to impregnate any woman they want (this irrespective of the women's wants) being an unquestionable good that, thereby, should not be oppressed by anyone anywhere.)

Having read your posts, I'll assume you’d agree with the absurdity of these given examples.

How about a “men’s wellbeing or health movement” rather than one addressing rights? This, I’d agree, is direly needed considering all the suicides and such.

A personal observation: men’s wellbeing is most prevalently undermined by other men—rather than by women, though I hold no doubt that exceptions to this do occur. To be more explicit: engaging in very traumatizing unjust wars, the lack of reliance upon empathy or sympathy for one’s ailments, or any number of other male issue that impede men’s mental and physical wellbeing are most often caused by men in the same society ... that goad everyone into unjust wars, that decry affectionate men as [pick your pejorative: fairies, wusses, etc.], and so on.

From this vantage: it is not a lack of men’s rights that is the problem but, instead, the predominant, implicit, societal rights of men in current culture: the societal right to outcast those men who question authority in its decrees of war; the right to demean the human value of a man who sheds tears, even if in private; and so forth. … And yes, some women will sometimes reinforce the same by, I hold, following the social norms of ingrained rights that authoritarian men enforce in our shared culture.

For me, at least, it’s a complex and tough topic to handle. Especially since it, in part, addresses touchy-feely issues … which are, again, a current societal pariah among males. And in part because toughness is still often enough required; though I'd say this is valid for men and women alike, each in their own ways.

Fair enough. Never mind my post. I don't have the heart to enter into discussions about the proper significance of all the terms you've pointed out.

First, I wouldn't say that anything is objectively true. I see that as a category error. — Terrapin Station

I was making use of terminology previously used in this thread. The rest seems to also be about nitpicking semantics. Ignore what I said, then.

If a) it is objectively true that subjective beings hold presence, if b) it is objectively true that all subjective beings share a grouping of core characteristics that thereby validly makes them subjective beings, and if c) it is objectively true these core characteristics entail common, or universal, core wants (e.g., that of living life with minimal dolor), then: it is objectively true that all subjective beings hold an implicit, if not also explicit, understanding of what is good for them, this being a core reality that is universal to all subjective beings.

A possible candidate for this core preference universal to all subjective beings: the preeminent, basic, and generalized want of not having one’s intentions, or context specific wants, obstructed or barred (to be barred from doing what one wants to do will arguably always lead to some degree of displeasure in the short term if not also in the long term); or, more succinctly, the minimization of dolor, of suffering.

Then, considering such core and universal preference: parents who hold child vaccinations to be good and parents that hold child vaccinations to be bad, for example, will both operate from the same core preference universal to all subjective beings: say, that of minimizing dolor, this then of itself being an/the objective good (which is just as much an objective truth as is the existence of subjective beings to which this universal core preference pertains).

Given the objective good of the here hypothesized universal preference of minimizing personal dolor among all subjective beings, there will then be an objectively better and worse means of optimally actualizing this objective good—in the given example, via either vaccinating children or not.

But in short, if there is an objective good, it will not be found outside of subjective beings (like rocks over there are) but, instead, it will be an invariant and intrinsic preference universal to all subjective beings, one that is as objectively true as is the very presence of subjective beings.

Devil’s in the details. Nevertheless, to deny such objectively true good is to deny that subjective beings share any core characteristics of want/desire/need which defines all of them/us as subjective beings. Again, such as the generalized, hence universal, want of minimizing personal dolor—a preference whose universality among subjective beings can well be argued to be an objective truth.

I’m not intending by this to prove the reality of an objectively true good. I’m only adding to what previous posters mentioned: that a preference based ethics is in no way contradictory to the presence of an objectively true good.

Would you agree that confidence is required for activity, and doubt being an activity therefore requires confidence, but certainty is a special type of confidence which is not required for doubt? — Metaphysician Undercover

yes

p.s. I should say "yes" with certain caveats, but these would amount to the same overall summary I'm thinking.

Meta is the one who involved the word "possibility" in this discussion. Wittgenstein was content to remove the practicality of doubt. — Banno

Got it.

The problem specifically is that I often have the confidence required to proceed with an action, while I am actively doubting whether I will be successful in that procedure. This confidence I would not call certainty, because I am doubtful. So I am really calling into question your definition of certainty. If certainty is a type of confidence, as you claim, then it must be a type of confidence in which doubt is excluded, [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

I look upon it this way: all subjective certainties will entail respective states of confidence, but not all states of confidence will entail certainties. This to me gets into the complexities of human consciousness—which, imv, always entwines with our sub/unconscious mind, from where emotive states result. Hence, for one example, we can be emotively confident of an activity while consciously doubting ourselves in terms of this very activity. And yes, ditto to certainty being a type of confidence wherein the mental activity of doubt is absent—this for the timespan of the given certainty.

Debating definitions of certainty I think is deserving of its own thread, especially since folks here want to get on with their analysis of Wittgenstein. I’m hesitant to currently start one. Still, for accuracy’s sake, I personally define certainty so (this in the most general way possible): the state, or an instance, of givens that do not compete with alternative givens and thereby hold determinate presence. For example, an idea X which we consciously hold in manners devoid of alternative ideas that compete with idea X for what in fact is shall, then, be a held certainty concerning idea X—this for the timespan in which idea X holds a determinate cognitive presence within our minds; again, this on account of not competing with credible alternatives for what in fact is. As a more concrete example, Pyrrho held a certainty, thus defined, that his methods lead to eudemonia (rather than being uncertain or doubtful about this being so).

Let me know if you’d like me to start a thread dedicated to definitions of certainty, uncertainty, and doubt. I have an online chapter that addresses this very subject which I could link to, and which could do with some criticism. But I doubt I’ll partake in the thread as much as would be appropriate. I might start it next weekend if there is a call for it.

In the context of Wittgenstein, you might be correct in your arguments about “eliminating the possibility of doubt” being untenable. I have not read him so I don’t know.

In the context of philosophical skepticism, the subject matter changes tremendously. Here’s one reference to this point:

Consider next the notion of doubt. Doubt is often considered the hallmark of skepticism. So how can it be that ancient skepticism is not about doubt (Corti 2010, Vogt 2014a)? Insofar as ‘to doubt’ means no more than ‘to call into question,’ the ancient skeptics might be described as doubting things. However, skeptical investigation as Sextus Empiricus describes it does not involve doubt (I shall focus here on Pyrrhonism; on Cicero’s use of dubitari, see Section 3.3). — SEP (Ancient Skepticism)

Pyrrhonism is arguably the most extreme form of non-Cartesian philosophical skepticism. And, as stated in the quote, it does not involve doubt. Rather, it upholds a fallible subjective certainty (i.e., a consciously entertained confidence) that its methods result in eudemonia. No non-Cartesian philosophical skeptic ever expressed holding the stance of global doubt. If you disagree, please provide a credible reference to the contrary if such exists.

As to your more detailed observations concerning my stance:

Going by common usage of the term, doubt is well defined as “to call into question”—as per the definition given in the quoted text —thereby being a cognitive activity, and not a mood or generalized attitude. You also want to pigeonhole the term “certainty” to in all cases signify “the property of being indubitable”—which is not how the term is commonly used: e.g., I’m very certain (rather than somewhat certain) that the term holds the synonyms of sureness and certitude. To the extent to which we disagree about the semantics of these terms—which currently seems significant—we then have no bearing for a proper argument concerning the terms’ referents.

I'm totally cool with that. Let's do our bit to give some status to principled non-conformism, especially when it results in crucifixion. — unenlightened

If your sarcasm’s jab doesn’t contain hypocrisy, then you uphold that every social movement that has ever been was conducted by a bunch of cretins. Unless, that is, no risks in being humiliated by the powers that be were incurred in speaking truth to power—as though this were a realistic model of how the world is.

A contemporary example: Have those in charge call investigative journalists “the enemy of the people”, and only those who are deplorable cretins will continue investigating and reporting the same issues rather than becoming humiliated into proper shape. And yes, these unwanted journalists sometimes get assassinated (crucified, allegorically speaking)—in some countries a lot more than in others. Your rebuke: These journalists are imbeciles living in Lala land for not becoming properly humiliated in a timely manner; or even better, for not living life in manners that eliminate the risk of humiliation to begin with.

Or am I misunderstanding you yet once again? Maybe you’re totally cool with crucifying principled non-conformists, ya’ know, like those in the USA who claim that climate change is not a hoax. Imbeciles that they are, because a certain Trump so treats them.

No, I don't think you're catching my drift. — unenlightened

My bad in misinterpreting, then. As things go, I of course agree that your last post presents an accurate general overview. Most generalities do have their exceptions, though. I admire good willed people that persevere through hard times, rather than having their will broken – more specifically, rather than succumbing to unjustly imposed societal humiliation by becoming in fact humiliated at heart (they include some Jews that went through the Holocaust – from what I've gathered in my life, at least). I’d like to think that what I’ve just said is somehow intelligible to you. Was trying to speak up for those I find admiration for. (To be honest, this because I’d like to have a social context with more such people in it – and denying their presence, or even possibility, is antithetical to such want.)

I don't see how you can make a valid argument here. I'm doubting the location of my cup. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

Doubt (as we are addressing it) is a conscious activity. Do we agree?

So, when doubting the location of the cup, can one simultaneously doubt that one is doubting, and furthermore doubt that one is in doubt about one's doubting of where the cup is, and this in infinite regress, at a level of momentary conscious awareness? If not, one will be psychologically certain that one is in doubt at the moment one is in doubt. Thereby making global doubt a psychological impossibility.

That one can doubt everything more or less sequentially if one wants (fist doubting this then doubting that) does not imply a global doubt (one that is fully devoid of any momentary certainty) ... unless one equivocates between infallible/absolute/indubitable subjective certainty and regular subjective certainty as it is commonly understood. But, then, if by "global doubt" one intends to express the held psychological certainty that there are no infallible certainties, this would in itself be a position one is certain about - and this, of itself, contradicts the position of global doubt.

I'm trying to address extremes since less extreme examples don't appear to be convincing to you.

As to the rest of your arguments, I noticed that they revolve around the issues of what words mean. As I previously mentioned, I have not read much of Wittgenstein. Started reading On Certainty but then lost interest. So I'll abstain from arguing these issues in general. I will make the observation that we cannot help from being momentarily certain of what we mean by the words we express to convey our meaning. Otherwise, why would any words be expressed by us?

Having by now read your post, I agree with most everything you’ve stated. Goths can serve as a good example of strong but not big egos, yes.



To be in pain, pissed, or even in states of despair over the injustice that befalls oneself is, to you, to be in states of humiliation without exception. OK

Your argument for this in simplified format:

I don't want to dismiss the personal side of identity, but [...] you can think what you like - in Lala land. — unenlightened

OK

Not much left to discuss on my part.

But as I've been explaining to unenlightened, there is a fundamental inconsistency between probabilities and impossible. Any impossibility created through probability is not a true impossibility, as the principle of plenitude indicates. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m in agreement with this.

So maybe you can explain to me what the others have not been able to. Why must there be an underlying psychological certainty? Take your example. I've lost my cup. — Metaphysician Undercover

The leading implicit (psychological) certainty in this hypothetical is that “I’ve lost my cup”. Devoid of this certainty, how would doubts as to where it might be begin manifesting?

I’ll do my best to summarize my position. Both certainty and uncertainty (but not doubt) can be linguistically applied to either a) ontology or b) epistemology. Emotive reasons for such statements aside, when it is said, “It is certain that the planet Earth is not flat,” one here affirms, what I’ll term, an ontic certainty: a determinate state of affairs that thereby holds no alternative possibilities. In contrast, when one says that, “I’m certain that planet Earth is not flat,” one here affirms, what I’ll term, a subjective certainty: a determinate state of mind pertaining to an awareness wherein this awareness deems that which its certain of to be the sole credible possibility, notably, regarding what is in fact ontically certain. Conversely, there are statements such as, “the future’s uncertain,” which can specify an ontic uncertainty: the indeterminate state of affairs that is found in the timespan we term the future. And: “I’m uncertain about the future,” which specifies a subjective uncertainty: an indeterminate state of mind wherein multiple credible alternatives compete for what in fact is the ontically certain (or determinate) state of affairs as it pertains to the future.

I’m hoping that the intelligibility of these four sentences here suffices in substantiating the validity of these two distinct categories of certainty and uncertainty: those which are ontic and those which are subjective.

Ontic certainties and uncertainties are not taken by us to be possibilities but, instead, to be factual states of being. These to me are fancy ways of re-expressing the concept of “is”—which isn’t a possibility but, in our cognition, an absolute. “The cup is on the table” doesn’t express a probability but a fact, which, as facts go, are taken by us to be absolute/total/complete actualities (in so far as they are not mere possibility, or mere potential regarding being). Extreme scenario: the stance that there are no ontic certainties is itself cognized, however implicitly, as depicting that which is ontically certain, thereby resulting in contradiction (hence, an error of reasoning). We think in terms of ontic certainties. A tangential: all ontic uncertainties (i.e., indeterminate states of affairs), if they factually hold presence, shall themselves be ontically certain; e.g. that the future is uncertain, if it is factually so, will itself be a(n ontic) certainty. Otherwise, we couldn’t claim that ontic uncertainties / indeterminate states of affairs factually occur/are.

All subjective certainties (including both psychological and epistemic) will hold some ontic certainty as referent. E.g., if one is certain that planet Earth is not flat one will hold this affirmation to adequately depict that which is ontically certain (or, that which is a determinate state of affairs). The clincher is that no known subjective certainty can be infallible in what it upholds to be ontically certain—but this here seems to be an aside.

With this as general background:

All subjective uncertainties (of which doubt is a type) will likewise be about some given state of affairs, about something which in fact is. This given or set of gives one is uncertain or doubtful about, however, shall itself be subordinate to a subjective certainty (which upholds a referenced ontic certainty): namely, that there is a determinate state of affairs (an ontic certainty) to the subject matter one is uncertain or doubtful about. Devoid of our subjective certainty that there is a relevant, underlying ontic certainty to be discovered, states of uncertainty and doubt become meaningless. This last sentence might be the hardest point to convey given your stances so far, but, as an example: if I am uncertainty/doubtful about whether or not the cup is on the table (or anything else), I already hold a certainty that some cognitive possibility that is conceivable adequately depicts that which is ontically certain regarding this matter. It’s just that I can’t figure out which of the multiple cognitive possibilities I’m pondering this one cognitive possibility is (this for as long as I remain uncertainty/doubtful). Devoid of this underlying subjective certainty that some relevant ontic certainty holds presence, uncertainty and doubt would again not be possible—the multiple alternatives that go through my mind would then not be competing for what in fact is (each, instead, then being its own stable reality, even if they are contradictory to each other).

More briefly, one must first be certain that something is in fact the case in order to be uncertain or in doubt about what the case might in fact be.

Going by the aforementioned, the conclusion is that no subjective uncertainty (including that of doubt) is possible in the complete absence of all subjective certainty. (To me related: also, no ontic uncertainty is possible where it’s presence to not be ontically certain—and, thus, and ontic certainty). Hence, the presence of uncertainty is always subordinate to the presence of certainty.

I’ve condensed my views a lot in this post. Won’t be surprised if there happens to be lack of clarity in what I’ve written. But, if so, point out the pertinent areas where I’ve been less than sufficiently clear.

But generally, we are playing in the field of competing images, and some images are supported by power structures. — unenlightened

I very much agree with this.

This is quite interesting to me. It looks as though there are in the case of the guy in front of the tanks, 2 conflicting world views, both of which might be zero sum, but with opposing signs ... the guy is hero or villain he is humiliated or the army is humiliated.

If so, then it doesn't quite get to the place I am wanting to contrast with zero sum. — unenlightened

For the sake of simplicity, I’m going to try to distill two identity types and hope the end result won’t sound too fictitious. On one side is the authoritarian; this guy can only be when and if there are subordinates/losers/weaklings/idiots/etc. by which his proud title of dominator/winner/strong guy/intellectual that is of a different class than the inferiors is gained; here is found supremacist attitudes and autocratic governance. On the other side is the egalitarian; this guy believes in the ideal that we are all at least birthed of equal value and deserve to be treated impartially for what we are as persons, at the very least before the law; here is found a far more complex grouping of beliefs that include those of multicultural attitudes (even if it only means not visiting a foreign country as though one were taking a trip to Disneyland), democratic ethos and governance, and a valuing for objectivity, impartiality, and truth … here you can on occasion also find tree-huggers and we-are-all-one-ers … it’s a complex bunch.

The two are in conflict, because their wants are directly antagonistic. To the authoritarian, the egalitarian’s want to make his environment more egalitarian indicates that the equalitarian is a direct threat to the authoritarian’s wellbeing; the more egalitarian things become, the more the authoritarian loses his status of supremacy and hence his very being; the equalitarian is a source of terror, and the sole roundabout means at the disposal of the authoritarian to safeguard his very life and identity is to destroy the egalitarian’s identity as such—either via death or via some form of enslavement. Ditto for the equalitarian; he too finds the authoritarian guy to be a threat to his life and identity; only that the egalitarian tends to want to turn the authoritarian into someone who is also egalitarian, for that’s what in the nature of egalitarians to want. The egalitarian thinks, we’ll then be buds and both enjoy the gist of John Lennon’s “Imagine”. But what he often does not see is that, were he to be successful, he’d destroy the authoritarian’s identity as such—turning him into something he has so far not been.

The authoritarian does his best to humiliate the equalitarian by trying to make him feel like an inferior, which can include leaving him penniless—unless the equalitarian starts playing the authoritarian’s game of giving homage to what the authoritarian wills (much like a mafia cartel, this is when the authoritarian claims to be responsible for keeping his subordinates safe from harm and whatnot).

The equalitarian does his best to humiliate the authoritarian by shouting things like, “shame, shame, shame!” when the authoritarian lies, cheats, steals, etc. … not really carrying that the authoritarian couldn’t give two dimes about this word which reference an emotion he’s never personally experienced. Still, egalitarians for the most part don’t find great conform in humiliating others. Restraining others when appropriate, sure, but with as much dignity as is feasibly possible.

But to shorten this up: the two are, in an odd enough way, themselves stuck in a zero-sum dilemma of sorts. The authoritarian must destroy the identity of the egalitarian if the authoritarian is to maintain his way of life—and this by making the equalitarian into a fearful inferior that learns to love kissing ass and Big Brother. Conversely, the egalitarian can only maintain his way of life if he destroys the present identity of the authoritarian—this by turning the authoritarian into that which the authoritarian has always despised as being weak, stupid, mushy, etc.

Still, two authoritarians in the same room will antagonistically conflict till one is the top dog over the other. Here, there can be only one winner in the zero-sum game—with quote unquote lesser winners being those who kiss ass properly.

Two egalitarians in the same room will do their best to coexist, and will often be benefited by their efforts, with mushy aspects such as gained wisdom, fraternal love, etc. Here, the zero-sum game is won when everyone becomes, or else is, of an egalitarian ethos.

Humanity has always been composed of both characters, and these have always been antagonistic toward each other in their own ways. I’ll add my observation that villains most always tend to be of an authoritarian slant.

To get back to the example of the guy who stood in front of a tank. Because he was antagonistic to the authoritarianism of his environment, I place him in the egalitarian camp. But I still don’t believe that he stood any chance of being humiliated. Suppose a tank ran over a leg. He’d have felt pain galore, but, I’m thinking, not humiliation because his ideals (and his accordance to them) would have remained intact.

It’s the ideal of being top dog (and accordance to this ideal) that becomes damaged when one loses material things, be this legs or wealth or the popular opinion of the times (here thinking of abolitionist in the US: they were in the minority, and initially didn’t have popular opinion on their side). This causing autocrats, roughly speaking, to be humiliated by such events—but not egalitarians. The egalitarian black slave who was caught in the act of being of an egalitarian ethos and then viciously whipped may have lost a great many things, but not their dignity.

My late night way of going about my reply.



I'll reply later.

I think you'll actually find the greatest potential humiliation comes from not big egos but weak egos and insecurity. — Judaka

You bring a good counter example. I’m tempted to theorize that we are humiliated in the examples you’ve given on account of valuing the opinions of those who humiliate us to the point that our self-esteem is dependent on their opinions. Were we to not value their opinions, we’d be injured, hurt, would possibly lose social capital, but not in modes that represent (at least what I interpret to be) humiliation—which, to me, indicates a loss of personal dignity.

Or—my ego sayin’ this might be an even better rebuttal—big egos necessarily require insecure egos to be subservient in order to so be or become big egos. Deprived of subservient insecure egos, big egos become insecure egos themselves, that are then subservient to other big egos. If true, it’s the flipside of the same coin, or of the same worldview. Insecure egos require praise from without in order to feel dignified—and will often become big egos themselves when this praise is consistent (thereby safeguarding that they no longer feel insecure by means of being big egos).

Gandhi might exemplify someone who was neither. The guy was humble (not weak, but quite confident and capable without being inflated) and was ridiculed galore at the time by his oppressors. His self-esteem was not contingent on popular opinion. And, although he ended up winning his battle, there was no guarantee of this. If he would have lost, he would have lost big time. But I doubt he would have died feeling humiliated.

So if a person wears extravagant clothing not to show off or to get compliments but due to it being an honest portrayal of what they deem to be aesthetic, and is well grounded in their reasoning and emotions, some popular other claiming the attire to be awful will not humiliate the person—because the person will know better. No big ego required. Though the experience would likely yet be unpleasant for the individual.

What's the difference between feeling embarrassed and humiliated? — Judaka

Hm. I can only speak for my current state of understanding. To me humiliation cuts to the very marrow of bone, such that one’s sense of dignity becomes lost, whereas embarrassment does not. One can be embarrassed and still hold dignity in so being.

People who think their high status is untouchable are less likely to feel humiliated than people who care about their status and fear to lose it. So whether you've got a big ego or not, only impacts how likely you are to perceive loss of status, bigger ego mightn't see it as easily because they always see themselves in an unrealistically positive light. — Judaka

In the book/movie Dangerous Liaisons, the villainess had one of the bigger egos one can imagine. Yet when publicly booed at the end of the story, was mortified by humiliation. Does this seem unrealistic to you? (Other easily expressed examples don’t currently come to mind).

At any rate, I’ve mentioned a simplified theory of what I think might be going on. Though, again, I’m aware that human psychology is very complex.

What do you make of the above? Would you say Gandhi had a big ego and, if so, why?



I’ll get back to your post at a later time.

I suppose that if you could exclude all doubt from your mind, you would have absolute certainty. I do not think that this is humanly possible. You mentioned "absolute doubt", so I assume that this would be to exclude all certainty. Why would absolute doubt be a bad thing? An attitude, or "frame of mind" of doubt does not prevent you from proceeding, it simply produces a cautious attitude toward procedures, with due respect for the possibility of mistake. While certitude produces a careless attitude toward procedures, because it inclines disrespect for the possibility of mistake. It appears to me, that to exclude the attitude of certainty (absolute doubt), would be a good thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

If I’m not misunderstanding:

For what I’ve so far read it seems to me that doubt has mostly been equated to uncertainty; a very common practice which, if I’m correct, is an improper definition of doubt.

As per common usage, if Ted is simply interested in learning more about the properties of X, he does not hold certainty about those properties of X he wishes to learn more about--and is thereby, technically, uncertain about those properties of X he wishes to discover. (We can only be curious about things we are not fully certain about psychologically). However, in this scenario, Ted cannot be validly stated to doubt X’s properties. (Curiosity does not entail doubt for that which one is curious about.) Else: not being omniscient, we are all to some extent uncertain about what the future holds; however, this of itself does not entail that we doubt the specifics of what the future holds.

A hypothesis that I belief to be correct: Doubt is an uncertainty about some previously held certainty, be it one’s own or others, be this held certainty psychological or epistemic. For example:

If I were to claim that the future holds attribute A, and were you to be uncertain that my belief (held beliefs are always held psychological certainties) is valid, then you would doubt that the future holds property A. But without me, you, or anyone else purporting specifics about the future, there would be nothing to doubt about the future—even though one would yet remain uncertain about the future’s specifics.

Doubt demolishes a previously held certainty by making it one credible alternative among rivaling others (not by proving it false). Doubt is one form of uncertainty. But uncertainty in general does not entail doubts:

All enquiry, learning, curiosity, sense of wonder (and maybe some others) require an uncertainty about what if fact is—none entail doubt for that enquired into, learned, wondered upon, and so on.

-----

In what I believe to be agreement with your general sentiment, I do contend that one can well subsist with an acknowledgment that no such thing as infallible/absolute certainty can be obtained. And that belief that infallible certainties can be obtained is untenable.

Still, to hold any form of uncertainty—including that of doubt—one must first hold a psychological certainty that some contextually relevant given is real/true. E.g., to be uncertain about whether one forgot a cup on a table, I must first hold a psychological certainty that there is a reality/truth to whether or not the cup is presently on the table, that there in fact is a table, and so forth.

So uncertainty cannot hold an absolute psychological presence (much less can doubt). The aforementioned instead results in the position of fallibilism*, such that less than infallible certainties of various strengths are maintained till evidenced wrong (with acknowledgment that all of one's certainties are to some extent fallible).

*Which to my mind is validly equivalent to non-Cartesian forms of global skepticism (as in “thoughtful; enquiring”) Global doubt is that pursued by Cartesian skepticism, and this only in the hopes of arriving at infallible certainties that are thereby indubitable.

-----

p.s., haven't read much of Witt

if as I have been suggesting, humiliation is loss of status - a public matter, if somewhat nebulous, of social standing, then we can answer the question. And the answer will have to do with how the incident feeds out into the wider world, who controls the story, how the other managers and other workers respond. — unenlightened

I was interested in the discussions regarding humiliation and identity. Trying to entice more discussion of this, some opinions:

Humiliation can be defined as depriving someone of their previously held pride. Double-checking with Wiktionary, it can also be defined as making someone humble, i.e. endowing them with humility.

Here’s a possible monkey wrench thrown in: humility is not always a personal negative, as humiliation is understood to always be.

Speaking from some personal experience, a person can gain great happiness from being made more humble by other’s actions and abilities—given that what humbles oneself is the ability of some other which one greatly reveres in society at large, as well as in oneself. A trite example: I’ve been known to like and to dabble in poetry. I can distinctly remember times I was elated at being humbled by others’ poetry at poetry readings. Same can hold true for most any other talent or ability. It elates the spirit to know that what one values in the world is not only present in it but excels what one previously was aware of as being present. One is here humbled and simultaneously enlivened with verve, hope, and, sometimes, rekindled aspirations.

On a different train of thought: Christian doctrine is fond of saying that the meek (the humble) shall one day rule the world (paraphrasing—and leaving the issue of historical hypocrisy out of it). Here, humility, the state of being humble, is pivotally valued (at least in speech).

However, for some—and going by dictionary definitions, for many—to be made humble is necessarily synonymous to being humiliated (in the negative connotation sense). And, in the process, one is made subservient to that which one was once not subservient to. Hence being made humble—aka, humiliation—is here synonymous to abasement and loss of power (i.e., ability to accomplish).

Tying this into identity:

Personal identity can be thought of as that which one at core is, which to me can be made into a dichotomy. In one train of thought, there’s identity of character: this can be one’s affinities and aversions, and, hence, one’s sum intentions: i.e., one’s character. Here one identifies which others of like characters (e.g., people who like the same music for the same roundabout reasons, who hold the same roundabout values for life, who make the same decisions one would oneself make (were one to be in the same situation), etc.) and will not identify with others of unlike characters (e.g., people who proudly cheat, steal, lie, deride, murder, etc.). In a different train of thought, there’s identity of physicality: the core of what one is is here intuited as consisting of physical elements: ones skin/hair/eye color, one’s height/size (e.g. midgets as the “other”), one’s sex, one’s owned possessions, etc.

Its complex due to the two stated forms of personal identity always being to some extent converged, but to keep things on the simple side: Where race plays a crucial factor to personal identity, one will tend to favor others of unrelated characters—say, unethical individuals—just as long as they are of the same race, this by comparison to those individuals of related characters (say, ethical individuals) who differ from you in their racial makeup. The converse applies for those who self-identify most with their own propensities of intention: here, one tends to form bonds of empathy, etc., with those of like natures regardless of their race, nationality, economic class, etc.

Re: identity and humiliation

Those who identify with a zero-sum worldviews shall always be humiliated in being made humble. In this worldview, to not be on top of others is to necessarily be trampled by those who are on top. Here, to be humble is to be trampled upon as someone else’s inferior (and being trampled upon is here always shame-worthy).

The same entailment does not apply to those who do not so identify with zero-sum worldviews (egalitarians included, I presume). More likely, here the “other” is found to be those who strictly pertain to a zero-sum worldview of winner/looser relations—regardless of their physical attributes (be they rich or poor, etc.). That guy who was filmed standing in front of tanks in Tiananmen Square (hope most know of him) seems to serve as an example of this personal identity type: He didn’t lose pride in so doing, though he likely knew he was taking the risk in losing all his social capital, if not also his very life (potentially via torture). Else said, he wasn’t humiliated by the powers that disdained him and wanted him to be “put in his place” of subservience, this while seeming to retain his humility (and dignity in so being)—and the risks he took were for others of the same character which he himself identified with (those who desired non-autocratic governance), rather than people of particular colors, ethnicities, etc.

Place IMOs wherever you may; and, again, I know its complex; society has always been a conflux of these two personal-identity worldviews; and the two identity types can be easily found comingling in most individuals to different extents.

In short: The less humble, the greater the ego(ism), and hence the greater the potential humiliation—and, thereby, the greater the want/need to crush others who could make one humble. (acknowledgedly, this coming from someone with an ego of notable size, me thinks). Those who are humble in dignified manners, however, will in due measure not be humiliated by ridicule (though they might lose their ability to accomplish what they want).

I’ll cut these opinions short. Still, I’d like to read more views out there concerning identity and humiliation in general. Nice topic.

This seems to be the very crux of the disagreement. I could phrase in terms of there being a pivotal difference between a) pulling the plug on a very complex machine and b) pulling the plug on some living being who’s on life support. It’s not the same thing — javra


If the machine was conscious though it would be immoral either way. — Devans99

I feel like we’re starting to go around in circles. The property of being conscious is one held by living systems. The point of the “pulling the plug” example being that humans (and other living beings) are something other than mere “complex machines”—mere complex machines not being living and thereby lacking the property of being conscious.

Would you class a virus as intelligent? What about a single celled organism? What I'm getting at is there a point where a machine (biological or otherwise) becomes intelligent? All life evolved from inanimate matter and inanimate matter is not intelligent. Early forms of life (pre single cell creatures) must have been simple machines without DNA, RNA. Would they qualify as intelligent? At what point of complexity of matter does intelligence first manifest? — Devans99

As it happens, I’ve address much of this in my last reply to @Harry Hindu. Viruses are not living. Living things are autopoietic (roughly: self-sustaining). A bacterium, which is autopoietic, might be argued to hold some miniscule form of mind and intelligence, but not a virus (which is not autopoietic). Autopoiesis being a negentropic process. Otherwise, what would the distinction between life and non-life be? Or is there no distinction whatsoever?

As to life being “machinery”, be it simple or complex, one can think of it this way: There are two forms of machines: living and non-living, which brings us back to square one: differentiating the properties of life (such as that of degree of intelligence) from those of non-life.

Thought your ‘entropic/negentropic’ distinction was spot on. — Wayfarer

It’s good to know I’m not the only one. :smile: Thanks.

I’ll likely be backing away from this discussion. Happy holidays and a good new year to everyone.

I don't see anything particularly special about life: we are just complex machines. — Devans99

This seems to be the very crux of the disagreement. I could phrase in terms of there being a pivotal difference between a) pulling the plug on a very complex machine and b) pulling the plug on some living being who’s on life support. It’s not the same thing.

Still, this ultimately revolves around differing ontological perspectives regarding the nature of agency … which winds its way toward the ontological nature of reality.

There are aspects of intelligence (self-awareness, consciousness) that only the more advanced life possess but I think these aspects are outgrowths of the more simple intelligence rather than something unique to life that could not be achieved with computers. — Devans99

I don’t disagree with this, btw. But again, for me, only if computers were to somehow become living. ... Well, a correction: I don't disagree with the contents of the quote save that intelligence is unique to life.

I can relate to inanimate things being capable of displaying what we interpret to be intelligence. A smartphone is after all considered to be “smart”. It learns your typing habits, for example. And the greater the complexity of these processes, the more intelligence seems to be displayed.

I however question the ontological verity of real, rather than faux, intelligence being applicable to givens devoid of animate agency. Which again resolves into issues of life v. non-life.

Take robots found in Transformers or Terminator, for example. They were alive in so far as they could be killed, subsequent to which they’d undergo entropic processes of decomposition. A better example for me are the organic androids of Blade Runner. In all these cases we can relate ourselves as living beings to other forms of living systems. This being not too different than our capacity to relate to extraterrestrial aliens in sci-fi. We, for example, understand that they strive and suffer in manners that are in some ways similar to us, which enables us to hold sympathy for them (in certain situations).

But these are all examples of negentropic beings. What we have today is not this. I take today's AI to be complex decoys of life and of intelligence proper. But not instances of real intelligence as it holds the potential to apply to life.

As to terms, their semantics can differ between different cohorts of people. An electronic watch can be deemed intelligent. Even a crystal which “knows” how to grow over time. But this is not the intelligence I refer to when I express the term (real, or actual) intelligence in non-allegorical manners.

From Wiktionary: Intelligence: (1) Capacity of mind […]

I associate mind with life.

No, the problem is that your definition of entropy and negentropy isn't clear. — Harry Hindu

What parts were unclear? I thought I’d simplified the concepts into very clear terms. Entropy: energy moving toward thermal equilibrium. Negentropy: energy moving away from thermal equilibrium.

Where do you draw the boundary of life and non-life? Are dragonflies entropic or negentropic? What about starfish, jellyfish, an oak tree, mushrooms, bacteria or viruses? — Harry Hindu

Hm. Viruses, viroids, and prions are non-life; I don't know of any such thing as a dead virus, viroid, or prion. Bacteria and everything more complex is life; all these can be either living (and not decomposing) or dead (and decomposing in entropic manners).

We could approach this issue via the cybernetic concept of autopoiesis. But without background on these concepts we might be running around in circles. And I grant that my knowledge of cybernetics is only second-hand. Still, I know something about autopoiesis.

Life is just more complex non-life. — Harry Hindu

This can translate into “negative entropy is just a more complex form of entropy”.

Can you provide justification for this? To be clear, something that is not mere speculation.

Yes, our empirical world evidences that non-life developed into life. I’m not dispelling this. But you’re forgetting that no one understands how. Also that there is a clear distinction between life, which is animate, and non-life, which is inanimate.

But they're still entropic. Right?

You guys have read my full post.

Is there disagreement, for example, in that you uphold life itself to be entropic rather than negentropic?

You guys want to say that we'll be making negentropic computers soon. OK. I can't argue with this issue of faith (other than by questioning what the benefits would be of so doing). But my point was that until its negentropic its not thinking, or understandings, or intelligent, etc.

Entropy is the process in which energy progresses toward thermal equilibrium. Some express it as ordered systems progressing toward uniform disorder.

Negative entropy is an opposite process. One in which the organization of thermodynamic systems increases. Biological process such as those of homeostasis exemplify negentropy. Here, the complexity of a system is either maintained or else increased over time.

Life is about negative entropy whereas non-life is about entropy. Some could make this far more complex. Still, I take this to be the simplified stance. May I stand corrected if wrong in my summary.

Living things, including brains, restructure their “hardware”. For brains, this is called neural plasticity. As the “hardware” is restructured, so too do the capacities of the “software” change in turn (which can further restructure the hardware). This, generally, either maintains or increases complexity over time; roughly, till death occurs.

The computers we have today, regardless of how complex, do not restructure their hardware via the processes of their software so as to either maintain or increase complexity as a total system—no matter how much electricity is placed into them.

I don’t have a link for this (I’ve lost track of the researcher’s name) but it’s rudimentary by today’s standards. Take an insect like body with basic sensory inputs, allow for a chaos algorithm together with a preset goal of arriving at some location, and the robot will adapt to any obstacle put in its path, even with legs bent or cut off, in its motions toward the given location. Very sophisticated stuff as far as artificial intelligence goes. Its behaviors are nevertheless entropic. Given its preset instructions, its energy follows paths of least resistance toward thermal equilibrium. It, for example, can’t change its immediate goals of its own volition—this as intelligent lifeforms do so as to maintain or increase total system organization. So doing being one integral aspect of intelligence as we know it to apply to ourselves.

Programs can mimic the intelligence of lifeforms rather well in some but not all contexts. And their computations certainly outperform human intelligence in many ways. But I yet maintain that until robots and/or their programs can become negentropic, they will only mimic intelligence without actually so being intelligent. Their intelligence being only allegorical.

To be frank, to me this issue boils down to one of whether or not ontology is one of hard causal determinism. If it is, crystals can be stated to be intelligent by comparison to rocks. If its not, than intelligence strictly applies to valid metaphysical agency ... something which is a property of living systems. I find myself in the latter camp. So to me computers need to become living beings prior to being endowed with real, and not just artificial, intelligence.