No, bonobos are quite fertile animals.

Re strategies: From my studies, it boils down to choice between one of two strategies for males: shoot seeds like a madman to increase the probability that some offspring will survive (quantity of offspring) or invest energy in ensuring that the few offspring one does have will all survive (quality of offspring).

The female also has one of two choices: either chose a male that is about quality of parenting (maximizing the likelihood of offspring survival) or, to make something complex oversimplified, mate with a male that is about quantity of offspring and, ideally, having this genetic offspring raised by some male that is about quality of offspring (again maximizing the likelihood of offspring survival).

Humans, we're a mixed bag of all conceivable strategies. I reckon that's due to our behavioral plasticity, itself due to our relatively great degrees of intelligence (and reduced behavioral reliance upon genetically hardwired instincts).

It isn't clear to me that bonobo behavior is at odds with the general thrust of what I am saying. — petrichor

The thrust, to summarize, was that our emotions on sexual intimacy are grounded in evolutionary functionality. Right?

Bonobos, one of our two closest evolutionary kin, have evolved to be promiscuous in manners that do not consist of "cheating", and are emotionally comfortable with that. Point being, this then serves as a major impediment to the theory that we, humans, are the way we are in relation to sexual intimacy due to our evolutionary history.

If you observe animals, you see plenty of examples of them protecting their opportunities to pass on their genes, and strong feelings are obviously involved. — petrichor

Yes, well, bonobos are horny and kinky little monkeys (great apes, to be exact). They'll have sex in exchange for a banana with no hard feelings on anyone's part, Orgies (group sex) are not unheard of. They're also thoroughly bisexual, both females and males. They're anecdotally believed to be more intelligent than chimps by researchers. And they're about as close to us genetically as are chimps - only that we share more analogous evolution with bonobos, such as in the facial expression of smiles (same look, same function).

No, we didn't evolve from chimps or from bonobos. We evolved from a common ancestor whose lineage bifurcated into us and a separate branch which itself bifurcated into chimps and bonobos. But these two great apes are our closest evolutionary kin. So if one looks to evolution, one should be looking to both chimps and bonobos ... as opposed to, say, starfish.

Um, I’ll be one of the prudes, if labels are requisite. I don’t give a damn about how safe the sex is, if a sexual partner of mine (I’m into that mono-amorous stuff) were to have sex with another that would chap my hide. If she were to be in a safe-sex orgy, doubly so.

I find that the OP is onto something.

For the record, for prudes such as myself, where she to kiss another lovingly in a french freedom kiss style (hey, if us US Yankees have freedom fries sanctioned by our esteemed elected leaders …) that would piss me off worse than if she were to have casual sex with him/her.

And kissing has never led to pregnancies.

So yes, there’s something significant about sexual intimacy. For at least a good portion of the populace, including for non-Abrahamic bleeding heart progressives such as myself.

But hey, to balance this shpeal off, there’s nothing sexier than seeing the love of your life look at you lovingly while talking in the other part of a room with a handsome guy at a party, kind of thing. To be loved and wanted by someone you want and love, its a good aphrodisiac.

Cool. No worries.

There's a difference between "I advocate X because I am Y", and "I advocate X because of problems A, B, and C, that affect Ys". — StreetlightX

Sure. But of course. 100% thumbs up. But the tone and overall content of your reply puzzles me. Its as if it was written by a person other than that which wrote this in the OP:

Now, the civil rights activist's point was quite simple: all politics has an effect on the identity of those involved, therefore, all politics is identity politics. This is, in some sense undeniable. But here's the issue: this doesn't mean that identity politics exhausts what politics can involve. All politics is identity politics, but all politics isn't just identity politics. — StreetlightX

You should notice that in all my posts in this thread I did not sanction that all politics is identity politics – not even to the minimalist degree the OP does. I’ve only addressed the notion that all politics concern (the philosophical notion of) identity. To me this shouldn’t have been a news flash, especially not from the person who wrote the OP.

Since you seem familiar with anthropology, you’ll be acquainted with the anthropological distinction between organized Politics and “politics with a small ‘p’”. The latter basically translates into human interaction. It can well be argued to be about ability to obtain what’s wanted in the context of interactions between two or more persons. All wants that hold value will hold value to egos – such that the human identity of these is primarily composed of the wants they value and seek to satisfy. Not their nation, skin color, or the girth of their wallet – which, however, is among the more common ways we interpret identity in the context of identity politics. So, hence, all politics pivots around two or more identities that cooperate, conflict, or are neutral in respect to each other – and is thereby fundamentally about identity – but not all politics is what we commonly understand as identity politics.

Organized Politics is only a more structured version of the same.

You disagree with this? So far in this thread, you’ve debated with me against positions I’ve never expressed, and do not hold. To go back to my first post, for example, I’ve explicitly stated the two (philosophically pertinent) identities of those who value a checks and balances of power and those who value a winner takes all attitude. Let me know of an “identity politics” which doesn’t have a winner takes all attitude toward those who don't fit into the specified 'identity'.

BTW, in reference to statements such as:

It's all too often the case that those who complain about identity politics do so in order to disqualify any politics of race, gender or class, to which is usually opposed some mythical "good of all", or the "community" or "nation" or some such. — StreetlightX

How on earth do you equate nation to community. Like sex and love, its swell when they co-occur, but they’re two different things.

There's a legitimate way out here and its to focus on philosophy or literary criticism. Or gardening, or religion, or meditation. But focusing on the political, as a theorist, is fraught, and has to be sustained with extra-scholastic efforts, otherwise it's just building models in a designated model-space, safe and away. — csalisbury

First, I agree with the sense of political powerlessness. Secondly, darn it but stifling talk about how things could improve is the biggest means of creating hopelessness in people. Not knowing what ideals to aspire toward is like being a chicken running around without a head that nevertheless wants to get somewhere meaningful. And there's no way to find and then agree upon these ideals if individuals don't talk to each other about them. The more people start talking about politics in big picture terms, the more empowered they become by comparison to not so talking about politics. And in light of things such as global warming, I'd welcome more big picture political talk.

Or: who's a good exemplar of 21st leftist who has broke this mould? — csalisbury

Chomsky, Banksy, Amy Goodman, and if you like professional comedians, Bill Hicks. I've got a few others on my mind, but why wouldn't any of these suffice? (Or was the mold-breaking you referred to that of not engaging in extra-scholastic efforts while still effecting change?)

I'm not too far removed from the sentiment of your reply. In fairness, I was addressing that aspect of the OP where it's offered that all politics deals with some form of identity. As @NOS4A2 commented since, though, "identity politics" typically connotes in most, or at least many, cases a biological commonality - rather than a more philosophical meaning of identity. This in parallel to how "power" typically connotes a capacity to do with some other(s) as one pleases - rather than the more formal meaning of "ability to do or accomplish", something ubiquitous to most all living beings most of the time.

Still, approaching things from a more philosophical perspective of identity (this being the only way I can make sense of the statement that all politics concern identity):

The whole question of what you call 'association' is 'backward' looking, at it were. Its anchor is in the past. I 'am' this history or body that has made me (past tense), who I am; and given this, how do I proceed? That's how I understand identity politics in the most broad sense. But politics doesn't have to be about 'association'; that a community wants better roads, or better school curriculums, is largely not a matter of 'associating' oneself with anything at all. — StreetlightX

I did mention tendencies of intention, which are always about goals toward which one proceeds. By 'association' I, in part, meant to address affinity toward other. Things such as empathy, compassion for, and sympathy. Some guy looses in politics. If I feel bad because of this, a part of me (my identity) holds an affinity toward the guy (his identity - including the intentions he has), and I will hold the belief that our identities in some measure overlap. If I don't feel bad about his loss, I in no way associate, or maybe better said, relate, to him, nor his present goals in life, and likely not to the life history that his past goals would have produced. Don't know. Maybe we interpret human identity too differently, this from a philosophical pov.

But yes, some build their personal sense of identity around conserving those aspects of the past they deem to have been of greater benefit for them and their ilk. Others build it around goals toward which they seek to progress. As per your example, such as that of living in a better community of people (a personality type which I happen to associate with, btw). Nevertheless, these two senses of identity, imo, are not always neatly separated from each other. Conservatives do seek to proceed so as actualize their goals. Progressives will learn history and maintain their roots, such as by not forgetting about people such as Martin Luther King, for one example.

Eh, maybe I'm rambling. If there's anything in this post worth furthering, do let me know.

During a recent public round table discussion, I was dismayed when a particularly well spoken civil rights activist made the claim that 'all politics is identity politics'. The problem wasn't that he was wrong. He was in fact quite right about that. The problem was what the statement was meant to imply. — StreetlightX

But there are different modes of identity association. The humanitarian often associates him/herself with a humanitarian identity, where all other humanitarians (regardless of ethnicity, nationality, social class, etc.) are part of his/her identity and group. The racist, nationalist, or rich guy/gal might in turn associate with his/her particular race, country, rich frat club, etc. as being #1.

How about this idea in regard to politics and identity association:

There’s a “checks and balances of power among all people” identity association in political pursuits. Wishy-washy to some, but its what the American forefathers had in mind. As one example, tmk, the second amendment wasn’t about killing deer with machine guns but about granting the general populous the power to overthrow central governments by force were the government to become overly corrupt. BTW, since most people aren’t allowed to own fully armed Apaches, and the like, in their backyards, this potential to overthrow a corrupt government by armed force is nowadays nonexistent – regardless of how many semiautomatics one might own. Wasn’t the case some 200+ years ago.

In contrast, there’s the “winner takes all” identity association in political pursuits. Here, one is inclined to do anything so as to become the winner at the expense of all those that are other.

The first is about optimal cooperation among people that are not perfectly innocent and, hence, somewhat corrupt themselves – or at least hold the potential to so become (namely, each and every human that has ever been). The second is about screwing over all those who are deemed other – via, at best, subjugation.

As to identity, identity is about “who am I”. Some will look to their skin color and proclaim to have discovered who they are. Some will more readily associate who they are to tendencies of intention and the personas that follow suit. Both of these, however, will constitute identity affiliations.

you're asking me for a reference which affirms the nature (or in this case that which is not the nature) of a law of thought you're claiming even 1 year old babies have. — Isaac

Um, no. I was asking you to reference the bit about the law of identity being what you've purported it to be.

I'll agree to disagree at this point.

Simply that a thing must be identical to itself - but... In order for the proposition to not be a tautology, the thing referred to must be a specific and the referring must be general. This requires object permanence which children (very young babies) do not seem to have. Without object permanence one cannot identify that X is X. The two Xs must be specfic/general, otherwise the statement is tautologous and trivial. If we treat X as a state of affairs at T0, then to say that the state of affairs at T0 is the state of affairs at T0nis tautology. To say that the specific, the identified subset of the state of affairs at T0 is the same subset we're referring to when identifying it at T1, is the law of identity. It only applies to logic because only logical objects can be said to have this permanence, unless you're a realist on forms (which is far from an agreed upon position among adults, let alone babies). There's no evidence at all that babies treat logical objects any differently than they do extended ones. — Isaac

This, then, is an important point of divergence. Now, I acknowledged the possibility of my being wrong, so I’ll ask you to reference where you obtain the affirmation that the law of identity specifies T0 = T1 in reference to X, or else that it necessitates a specific/general dichotomy.

Alternatively, explain these two points:

1) Given any semblance of process theory – wherein at least everything physical is in perpetual change (things such as laws of thought not being physical) – how can any physical given X be identical at two different times?

Object permanence, after all, basically has it that objects don’t miraculously appear and disappear out of / into thin air. It does not specify that physical objects do not change over time.

This issue doesn't have to do with cherry-picking properties (what you've termed subsets?) of objects to compare at different times - e.g., the green of a apple tree leaf is as green as that of a ripe apple on the tree, so, therefore, the green is identical. It has to do with the entire physical object itself.**

2) How can one arrive at the conclusion of T0 = T1 in reference to X in the complete absence of the conclusion that T0 = T0 in reference to X, as trivial and tautological as the latter might be?

Given examples such as (1) just aforementioned, it seems to me that T0 = T1 in reference to X does not hold a mandatory ubiquitous application (a newly bloomed flower is not identical to a wilting flower) **. Whereas T0 = T0 in reference to X does seem to hold a mandatory ubiquitous application, thereby having the latter being properly termed a law of thought. But not the former.

** Please note, we have been addressing laws of thought - and not metaphysical issues of what identity (as in sameness) is - which are still much contested among philosophers (not so much scientists). But such metaphysical enquiries into what identity consists of, after all, require laws of thought in order to proceed - and among these is the law of identity (A = A).

I'll reply to your latest post better if you explain something to me.

What do you understand the law of identity to be?

[...] The doctrine still sounds strange: "Die at the right time!" [...] ... In your dying, your spirit and virtue should still glow like a sunset around the earth: else your dying has turned out badly." (Z, "On Free Death") — StreetlightX

Beautiful quote. :up:

Mixing in what I take from some Native American thought - as in "It's a good day to die": If every moment of one's life could be lived so that one would be at least sincerely content to pass away naturally (be this in a battle for virtue or not), than one will have lived one's life to the fullest ... regardless of how long one lives. But Nietzsche's expression definitely outshines mine - and, oddly, is far clearer.

I'm afraid I have no idea what you're talking about here. I don't recognise a thing 'being' to say whether it's presence is absurd or not, I don't know what 'being' is. — Isaac

Being can be expressed as the generalized notion of "anything which was, is, or will be", although as @Wayfarer noted, in many philosophies it is more typically expressible as "any awareness which was, is, or will be". Either way, I stand by my claim that it is 100% absurd - due to its presence being arational.

... from nothing to being there is no logical bridge. — William James quoted on https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Being

How does a human way of thinking affect physics? There's no such thing as hydrogen atoms, there's no such thing as helium atoms, these are both human constructs, there is only stuff (presuming you are a realist about the external world at all). — Isaac

Hold on a minute. This to me sounds like a confusion between the epistemic and the ontic ( -ology is usually added to indicate "the study of"). (BTW, I was addressing the known beginnings of our physical universe after the Big Bang.) We can only use the epistemic to reference the ontic. Much of the human epistemic can be well argued to be a human construct - but not the ontic which it references. There are such things as hydrogen and helium atoms - even if our knowledge of them is imperfect and perpetually improving. You do not agree?

Our laws of thought are about the way we've decided to break up the world, so they're an entirely human invention too (although I think some animals may we have evolved the same or similar tactics). — Isaac

I'm very on board with lesser animals using the same pivotal laws of thought we ourselves use. But - to keep things more concrete - the law of identity is something that we've invented??? When do you suppose this invention occurred?

For the record, my previous post was an attempted argument for pivotal laws of thought, such as that of identity, being time-invariant givens that are thereby non-invented/created - but which instead just are - so I naturally disagree with your current stance.

The evidence (which I know is unpopular around these parts) contradicts this idea. Very young children do not necessarily display an innate understanding of the law of identity, nor of object permanence, nor theory of mind. — Isaac

First off, I said "children" (which can include at least young adolescents) and not "infants" or "toddlers" - only the latter do not exhibit mastery of object permanence (and, possibly, if young enough, of a theory of mind). But please explain how any of the aforementioned do not exhibit use of the law of identity.

If laws of thought are an innate aspect of being, and if the presence of being is (technically) absurd, then the best and only thing we can do to better understand them is enquire into them via philosophy. — javra

I don't follow this line of argument. Are atomic forces not an innate aspect of being? I mean life would be impossible without them. We also have no idea why atomic forces came to be so. Does that mean that atomic forces should be studied by philosophy also? — Isaac

Atomic forces are not blatantly arational. We thereby hold the capacity to obtain sufficient reasons for them. As to your concluding question: Why not? As you've mentioned toward the end, philosophy and science are not "mutually exclusive". They rather benefit from each other.

The fact the it talks about it is not evidence that it addresses it. Otherwise the same is true of psychology. It definitely talks about "that which is not observable via our physiological senses", so why does philosophy get the honour of 'addressing' the problem? — Isaac

I've had the privilege of doing some research in cognitive science psychology as well as in neuroscience. Cog Sci had far less confounding variables and biases of measurement than did the neuroscience research I was exposed to (in other words, cog sci was a "harder science" than neuroscience - this in my particular exposure to both). That mentioned for balance, when it comes to psychology as per Freud, Jung, and others: how is this type of psychology more science than philosophy? I find it to be rather the opposite: it is more philosophy rather than an empirical science. Hence, it is yet philosophy that 'addresses' the problem (as best it can).

BTW, in science, testable hypotheses are basically the testable presumption of a given set of scientists' philosophy regarding a certain topic. Again, philosophy and science are by no means mutually exclusive.

The thing about philosophy is that there is no body of knowledge. Absolutely every position is it possible to hold is held by some philosopher somewhere, and on most matters there is still widespread disagreement. — Isaac

But there are common bodies of knowledge in philosophy - its just that these are not always (especially not historically) obtained via the empirical sciences' peer review method. A ubiquitous and thereby trivial example: all philosophers agree that being holds presence. How is this not knowledge?

I could expand a bit, but have written enough as is for now.

EDIT: I forgot to ask somewhere along the way: How can the empirical sciences discover, for example, what knowledge entails? Is this aspect of mind not the proper subject for philosophy?

Yes. As opposed to "straight." But these terms tend to take on multiple and often contradictory meanings as they are used by different voices over time. To be "straight" can also mean to be boring, uptight and puritanical. "Queer" now refers to all sorts of different performances or stances inhabited by both hetero- and homosexuals.

It's dialogically liberating to listen to and understand the same word one uses being used by others in different contexts which generate different meanings. When someone takes a monologic stance on the meaning of some of these terms, they refuse to acknowledge differences in word use and intentionality, or they attempt to impose a single meaning as "correct." I think on forums it's very easy to forget that we all have many different associations and meanings for words and concepts. — uncanni

Reminds me of a joke: "How do serpents move when they're piss-ass drunk? Straight, of course."

So .... um. Does that make all non-drunk snakes naturally queer?

What? It's a philosophy forum!

On a more sober side:

No species has been found in which homosexual behaviour has not been shown to exist, with the exception of species that never have sex at all, such as sea urchins and aphis. Moreover, a part of the animal kingdom is hermaphroditic, truly bisexual. For them, homosexuality is not an issue. — a quote by Petter Bøckman found on https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homosexual_behavior_in_animals

Seems natural enough to me.

Trick question. I don't. I believe they're a deterministic aspect of sentience endowed existence — javra


That's actually what I meant by "come about", I should have been clearer. I meant to distinguish it from my understanding that such laws are made-up, like maths. I don't believe laws can evolve. I don't really believe in laws at all, other than as a human-constructed convenience. — Isaac

Laws being "human-constructed" is, to me, a very clear means of saying that they "come about". So I'm not very certain of your stance in terms of opposition to the "coming about" of laws of thought. If they evolved to so be, they came about - holding presence after a timespan in which they did not. If they are a byproduct of human society, they likewise came about. Etc. Until you can better clarify you stance, I'll use the terminology as I best understand it.

As to natural laws, here including laws of thought, being non-constructed:

First and foremost, let it be presented that the presence of being is (in the strict philosophical sense of the term) 100% absurd. Absurd because it is, and can only be, arational (meaning beyond the scope of reasoning (and not irrational, i.e. erroneous reasoning)). There is no possible sufficient reason for why there is being rather than ubiquitous nonbeing. Being just is.

That said, laws of thought can either a) emerge somewhere in the course of being (i.e., "come about") or b) they are as ubiquitous to being as is being itself (i.e., they're a (pre)determined aspect of being). Take the law of identity. One imperfect variant of its expression that to me seems adequate: "No given shall be other than itself at any given time". Again, either this property of being developed during the course of being or, else, it always was and always will be in time-invarient ways. Were it to have developed over time, hydrogen atoms might have been other than hydrogen atoms long before helium atoms came about - and so might have helium atoms, etc., till the law of identity presented itself within being. If one cares to argue for this, one will, I believe, quickly slip into nonsense - at the very least, when addressing the history of physical reality (which we address and know of via thought). If, however, the law of identity holds presence in time-invariant ways, then it is a deterministic aspect of being. And no quantity of empirical science can explain why it is present to being:

One does not first learn of laws of thought prior to applying them (children, for instance, utilize laws of thought prior to being aware of them). Rather, our knowledge of laws of thought stem from introspective observation of referents that are, at least in one sense, immutable. One cannot do without the law of identity and remain cogent, to not address mentally healthy. This can be paralleled to our knowledge of the law of gravity. We still don't know exactly what gravity is, but it is immutable, and to jump off of a tall building in the belief that gravity is not ubiquitous is to shortly thereafter no longer be. The referents which we address as "laws" are immutable aspects of being - hence the term we provide them of "laws". Our knowledge of them, however, is less than perfect. Here, I'm thinking of laws of thought in a Kantian manner, as per his categories.

If laws of thought are an innate aspect of being, and if the presence of being is (technically) absurd, then the best and only thing we can do to better understand them is enquire into them via philosophy. The empirical sciences is the cart that is guided by the horse which pulls (the latter here representing laws of thought). For the former to address the latter in non-philosophical manners is for the horse to be guided and pulled by the cart.

Supplementary question: if the empirical sciences cannot address laws of thought (whatever they turn out to be), then how would philosophy have a better chance? Empirical science's measure of rightness is predictability, what would philosophy's be? — Isaac

If it were easy, I suspect it would have already been done. Philosophy too is driven by the same laws-of-thought horse, so to speak. But to address the second question: Firstly, science's measure of rightness consists of far more than predictability (unless one obfuscates the two separate fields of technology and science); it also consists of the replication of data, it consists of fully falsifiable hypotheses that are tested, as well as many of the same principles that generally guide (or, imo, should guide) the measure of rightness in philosophy: parsimony (such as Occam's Razor), consistency (e.g., no contradictions), and explanatory power (how much is explained by the addressed given). One big difference between philosophy and the empirical sciences is that the former can and does address that which is not observable via our physiological senses (visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, etc.). Maybe ironically, thoughts, emotions, intentions, awareness, and will, among other aspects of mind, are not givens that can be observed via our physiological senses. Science, after all, is founded upon philosophy, namely the philosophy of science. And not the other way around. So, for example, that "all humans have thoughts" is not philosophy-devoid science. Rather, to the extent this trivial fact might be scientific, it is science built upon a foundation of philosophy.

Hope I've address the most pertinent parts of your questions.

will try to better address this later on tonight. Need to go to work for now.

Why do you think that the laws of thought "come about" in that way? — Isaac

Trick question. I don't. I believe they're a deterministic aspect of sentience endowed existence, i.e. any conceivable existence wherein sentience dwells. However, I also do very firmly uphold the reality of biological evolution, wherein many aspects of mind evolve over time.

To the physicalist, or to those empathetic of this view, it would, imo, only be logical to claim that laws of thought should have evolved together with sentience-endowed organic matter.

RE: (neuro)science, thoughts, and philosophy. Not intending to stay long in this discussion, but, as an observation:

The actualization of thoughts is not possible in the complete absence of laws (principles) of thought. Things such as the law of identity and that of noncontradiction. At best, a ubiquitous chaos would result in the complete absence of such principles.

I find it indisputable that the study of neuroscience, and the like, benefits us in very many ways. But empirical science is not even close to specifying how laws of thought come about, not to mention what they are. To state the obvious, laws of thought are a priori to thoughts about the empirical sciences and the implications of respective data.

To be explicit about the conclusion: The empirical sciences cannot fully address everything that mind entails (such as its laws of thought). Philosophy as its own branch of study is required if we are to hold any hope of so doing.

What comes to mind:

All our choices between alternatives we sense, regardless of how trivial, are us standing at crossroads. The path we choose obliterates the path(s) we thereby choose against. Each choice leads to its own domino effect of future choices where we will stand at crossroads not yet materialized. But not all of our crossroads are of the same magnitude. The larger the importance of the crossroad, the greater the change in the course of our future lives—and of everything which we affect.

IMO echoing your own examples, this being a kind of chaos theory, replete with the butterfly effect, that is applied to a compatibilist reality.

Thank you for your further clarification. I do, however, feel that I am in agreement with your point of view in all general regards save that of there being such a thing as a homunculus. Please correct me where you disagree.

A favorite example of mine is one’s awareness of “a word that is at the tip of one’s tongue”. Here, the individual has no momentary awareness of what the phenomenal word is (neither via auditory nor visual awareness, etc.), but does, nevertheless, apprehend via awareness its non-phenomenal meaning (which the individual is seeking to express via phenomena). Had a professor I greatly liked who talked to me about “knowing that one knows”; to me also interesting on the same level, but more complex to get into. Awareness of one’s own happiness or suffering, certainty or uncertainty, etc., as a first person point of view also easily qualifies—for none of these are phenomenal; they’re not visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile, etc.; and yet one knows of them via direct awareness.

BTW, from my own baggage of trial and error, I’ve found that “perception” isn’t the most beneficial word to use when it comes to meaning apprehension. It works in the Latin language(s) I know of, where it quickly connotes “understanding”--very akin to the English “see” (as in “do you see what I mean”)--but, in English, perception is greatly associated with, and only with, phenomenal percepts (sight, sound, smell, touch, taste, proprioception, etc.). Though I know that a proper technical term for awareness of such things as thoughts and emotions is lacking.

At any rate, to better express my previous post, I wasn’t intending to reach toward scientism. Rather, we empirically know from others and historically that were we to lose a limb, we’d likewise lose a great deal of awareness that manifests via that limb. We know that were brain damage to occur, we as first person points of view would in due measure to the damage have impaired awareness (in the broadest sense of awareness possible). In other words, whatever the metaphysical relation between mind and body may be, we also know from experience that we as first person points of view are most often unified with our bodies (exceptions such as numbness in a limb being relatively rare).

Nevertheless, our bodies are things, whereas out awareness is not a thing. Our awareness is tethered to our bodies in often indistinguishable ways, but this does not of itself come close to denoting what awareness is. To be curt, what awareness is metaphysically is still a mystery.

Again, my main contention in this thread is that awareness—the first person point of view which perceives phenomena, senses emotions and the like, and understands meanings and abstractions—is not itself a thing within a thing. Hence, that we are not homunculi.

This, I hope, is a better summation of my view.

Since this is of interest to me, and so as to further debate:

I personally view this perceiver as my "self". The self is subject to experience. — Andrew4Handel

I am beginning to sympathise with the idea that perceiver might be the soul [...] — Andrew4Handel

Self, as might be no surprise, if a very convoluted concept. As one example of this, when I strongly empathize and/or sympathize with another such that their state of being becomes my own, they in many a sense become a part of my own self. If a romantic partner, they are not my property but, instead, are and ever become a part of me (belonging can connote both values). More individualistically, self consists of ones unconscious mind and, if for example one accepts Jungian philosophy, also some portion of the universal unconscious (the latter can tentatively be espoused as vehicle for some other person being part of one's self). All this mostly to say that the first person point of view is not an island divided from its total mind--nor, again, is it a static thing; its not a homunculus, as far I understand it.

Roughly speaking, Ancient Latin had it that the soul is the anima and that the mind (mens) consists of animus. While both terms are related to "breath/life", as well as animation, to my best understanding/interpretation the anima was conceived to be more along the lines of that which endows one's body with breath/animation/vitality (even when in dreamless sleep). By comparison, the animus was a realm of challenge, a realm wherein will exerted itself.

Thus conceived, both anima and animus are aspects of one's self. Aspects of self to which the first person point of view is central, but, again, not in a static manner.

Curious to find out the extent to which you'd disagree with these perspectives.

Cheers. FYI, as religions go, I'm a fan of Gnosticism. And am a bit peeved about the at the very least cultural genocide of the Gnostics after the Council of Nicea. I'll be trying to stick out of this debate, though.

From one of Tom Waits' songs, as best I recall: “Everything you can think of is true [...]” This can only make sense, thought, from the roundabout perspective that whatever is believed to be true will, for that same span of time, be true to the given believer. The topic is complex for me since it gets into complex epistemological dichotomies between, what I will for brevity term, “believed truths” and “true beliefs”.

Still, being in accord with your observation that to claim no objectivity exists is to claim an objective/impartial stipulation of what is objective/ontically real (in which case, the statement becomes a logical contradiction: objectivity both exists and does not exist at the same time and in the same respect):

Because the only noncontradictory conclusion obtainable is that some non-relative ontic reality exists (so to phrase), some believed truths can only be untrue. More specifically, wherever there is logical contradiction between believed truths, one, some, or else all of these believed truths will need to be false. This, at least, wherever the law of noncontradiction is granted.

Romans 8:29 For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren. — Gnostic Christian Bishop

Yea, but this term, "image" has always bothered me in Abrahamic scripture, at least as it is conveyed in English. The term ought to be "likeness".

"Image" denotes looks, whereas "likeness" denotes character or, maybe better stated, one's nature as a being. Its the difference between "wear what JC wore" and "be like JC in spirit", for one hypothetical example.

I gave a very simple definition though right? “Something is conscious if it has subjective experiences” — khaled

This is an odd phrasing. What would “subjective experience” stand in contrast to? “Non-subjective experience” comes to mind, but this would be a semantic quagmire at best.

I’m preferential to using “the property of being aware” instead. This since awareness and consciousness are synonymous in most, if not all, ways (save for ocasions when consciousness, unlike awareness, connotes an entailed ability to be aware of awarness).

Second, can you say someone else is conscious with the same degree of certainty you can say the length of a 1 m long rod is 1 m? Where is your measuring instrument? — khaled

Were one to ascribe the capacity of will to consciousness—this as per common sense understandings—then the issue would be resolved for all intended purposes. That which exhibits actions and reactions relative to environmental stimuli will be endowed with consciousness. This because it exhibits both an ability to be aware and an ability to will.

As to strenght of certainty that something which looks like, sounds like, and moves like a duck is in fact a duck and not a robotic decoy, I will grant that the degree of certainty is lesser than that which I hold that I myself am not a robotic decoy. Nevertheless, until evidence emerges that might sugest otherwise, when I will witness something that looks like, sounds like, and moves like a duck, I will remain psychologically certain that it in fact is a duck. For emphasis, this yet remains a type of certainty—rather than an uncertainty or doubt.

In this picture the brain is the perceiver that somehow processes the information received from the nerves into a perception. This does face a homunculi problem of who the observer is.

However the story seems much more problematic when we talk about retrieving memories, accessing word meanings, dreaming and having ideas. — Andrew4Handel

I agree with the gist of your perspective, but don't believe the "mind's eye"—as its sometimes called (i.e., the presence of a first-person point-of-view)—serves as a homunculi problem.

All percepts obtained via physiological senses will be consciously known precisely because they are known (in an acquaintance sense of the term) to the first person point of view. Furthermore, the first person point of view does not stand apart from the physical body but is instead in many ways unified with the body. Tactile perception is often overlooked, but makes for a good example: When feeling oneself touching the ground via one's feet, for instance, this will be the first person point of view which so senses the ground via the skin of one's feet.

Secondly, we hold ample empirical evidence to know that the first person point of view—including its abilities to perceive, sense, understand, and act—is bound by the physiological makeup of its body; in vertebrates, this being primarily constituted of the Central Nervous System.

To my best understanding, a homunculus is a little human within the human body. While this can be a consequence of Cartesian thought (re: the thinker within the body), imo it does not apply to awareness, i.e. the perceiver, i.e. the first person point of view. Reworded, the homunculus is a thing (the thinker) within a thing (the body). By comparison, the perceiver, aka the first person awareness addressed, is—if anything that can be currently inferred—more akin to a process, as per process theory. But it is not a thing and, hence, not a homunculus. Or so I so far believe.

(edited "homunculi" to "homunculus" where appropriate)

So, just got done typing away another long reply. But then I realized that it's all skirting around underlying issues regarding universals—rather than directly addressing the specific comparison you have in mind. Yea, despite my continued interest in the topic, I think we may have well gone as far as we can.

So, I’m now replying, basically, to let you know that I’ve enjoyed talking to you.

As I won't even agree to disagree, haha, you are likely right that we have gone as far as we can with this. I am happy to read and respond to more, but ENTIRELY understand a desire to bow out. — ZhouBoTong

Thanks for this. Cheers.

(to those who decry long posts, feel free to not read this)

[...] Because I don't see how your definition created universality.[...] — ZhouBoTong

There’s a lot that I haven’t yet replied to. Even if I don’t get around to all of it, I thank you for the candid replies. It in the meantime struck me that we might not ever resolve our differences due to reasons that are far more foundational philosophically: those pertaining to our underlying views concerning human universals. I’ll do my best to illustrate this possible disparity via one analogy:

The aesthetic experience is not the only human-relative experience that conforms to the three descriptions we’ve so far roughly agreed upon in relation to aesthetics. In want of addressing the issue somewhat more impartially, I’ll here reference the experience of being in love. Being in love is a) an emotive experience, b) is a narrow subset of attraction-toward, and c) becomes intertwined with one’s own being such that others’ derisions of that person one is in love with is in many ways sensed as a derision of one’s own being.

In further rough parallel to the experience of aesthetics: While some can sincerely fall in love multiple times in the course of a lifetime, others never do experience this state of being. Some find this emotion to be very transient; others can be affected by this emotion for the remainder of their lives. Those givens, such as personality traits, with which one person falls in love with will very often not be those which some other person falls in love with. Relative to individuals that can experience it, this state of being can be of greater intensities and of lesser intensities. Also, there are no currently known empirical means of establishing the specifics of what this experience is like for the average human psyche.

Chances are you’d fall in love with people with whom I’d not fall in love with, and vice versa—this though we’d both experience the same emotive state of being we term “being in love”. Chances are no two people can experience the exact same psychological states of being when being in love—just like no two people can likely ever experience the exact same visual impressions of the same physical object (for no two people share the same spatiotemporal point of view in relation to a commonly experienced physical object). Chances are that being in love with some person qualitatively fluctuates over time. Etc.

Now, if due to the aforementioned you are one to argue that, therefore, what we English speakers commonly term the experience of “being in love” cannot be validly upheld to hold a universal referent relative to our human species—a universal referent relative to which greater or better, and lesser or worse, instantiations of this universal can occur in individuals—I find that we then sharply disagree on the far more basic issue of human ontology at large. This, specifically, in relation to universal properties of human psychology (As an example: such as the human capacity to experience the color red; while some colorblind people may not be so able, this, to me, does not then dispel the human universality of the experience of red as a color). If this disagreement is there, than no amount of discussion on aesthetics per se can resolve our differences, for these differences are then rooted in our differing perspectives in relation to ontology of mind—again, particularly, in relation to the nature of human psychological universals.

If it is the case that we disagree on this rudimentary issue pertaining to the human mind, I’ll then respectfully bow out of this discussion - primarily because the discussion would enter a completely different ballpark.

I am not sure I am answering your aesthetics questions satisfactorily (I certainly have not answered it directly, but think my position can be seen). Feel free to point out where you would like me to state something more directly. — ZhouBoTong

I’ll start with a joke: An artist presents his much anticipated work at a gallery. It’s a large blank canvas. A commoner askes the artist what it’s supposed to be. The artists proudly expresses that it’s a never before so perfectly depicted scene of a cow amid fields of grass. The simpleton asks, “Where’s the grass?” The artist explains that the cow ate it all. “OK, but where’s the cow?” the commoner then asks, still being thoroughly bewildered. The elite artist replies, “The cow walked away in search of other pastures, of course!”

This is my shortcut way of again expressing that I agree with the view that too much of modern art is … well, not good art. My main contention in this thread, though, is that there is such a thing as better and worse aesthetics. I assume that if the just mentioned joke makes any sense, this truism of better and worse aesthetics is at the very least implicitly acknowledged.

Movies and books that average one star reviews, for example, can then be deemed to typically hold poorer aesthetics (this relative to the average human ) than those which average four star reviews or greater.

Since the issue of aesthetics in general, as I broadly understand it, does tie in with one of @Terrapin Station 's recent posts to me, I’ll mention his observation:

Claiming that something is the case for most people for something like this would require empirical studies that no one has done. — Terrapin Station

Very many attributes pertaining to the average human psyche are not possible to empirically demonstrate (as least not currently). As one example, it is impossible to empirically demonstrate that most people out there experience the same exact thing we do in relation to what we all address as the color red—yet there is good reason for all of us to hold this belief to be true. To my mind, this gets into heavy duty issues of epistemology—many being very contentious—of which I have no interest to investigate in this thread.

Nevertheless, it is true that this general aspect of epistemology does apply to issues such as those of imagination (e.g., what of this faculty is commonly experienced among at least most humans, what then constitutes more of it for most humans, and, in consequence, what best improves it for most humans—here of interest, known human conditions pertaining to visualizations can range from photographic memory to aphantasia (the inability to visualize) … and this doesn’t even touch on things such as imagined smells, tastes, etc., or the more complicated forms of conceptual imagination—which is how new theories are for example produced); it likewise applies to the attribute of intelligence (e.g., intelligence’s definition is currently controversial, which of itself makes IQ tests less than objective/unbiased … yet, correlations between IQ scores and other human capabilities often do hold statistical importance), and—here skipping a potentially very long list of psychological attributes—the same epistemological issue also applies to the human capacity to experience aesthetics (an experience not shared to any degree with most lesser animals, and only somewhat with lesser animals of greater intelligence).

Again, without wanting to get into epistemological debates about all of this: As we typically hold good reason to uphold that all humans experience the same quality of color when claiming to see the color red, and that imagination and intelligence as we experience it is something universal to humans at large, so too do we hold good reason to presume that experiences of the aesthetic are universal to humans at large. Likewise, as we hold good reason to judge that some reds are redder than others, and that imagination and intelligence can be more/greater/better, so too can we then hold good reason to judge that some givens are more aesthetic than others (i.e., that some givens hold better aesthetics).

I offer these (imo, generally accepted) perspectives without in any way denying that beauty is in the eye of the beholder, or that variations in magnitude of aesthetic experience can, and likely do, occur among different humans (e.g., the professional musician can be argued capable of finding far more beauty in a liked melody than the typical tone-deaf non-musician who enjoys the same melody; or a mathematician to find more beauty in a mathematical paradigm than the non-mathematician who also likes the same mathematical paradigm; etc.).

Hence, I take the psychological issue of aesthetics to be a very complex topic—and the background I just offered serves to illustrate some of the complexities I find in it. But—just as can be said of imagination, intelligence, introspection, joy, suffering, etc.—I very confidently believe that aesthetics too can be better and worse, or greater and poorer, or more in comparison to less. This despite the epistemological complexities involved.

Having addressed this summarized general understanding (which might be contentious for some) in the hopes of better illustrating where I’m coming from, what I basically wanted to find out is the following:

I was curious about whether or not your own experiences of the aesthetic can be described by the three descriptions I previously offered. In sum:

• Experienced aesthetics are emotive experiences (akin to those of wonder).
• Aesthetics are a narrow subset of experiences of attraction in general (such that not all attraction-toward constitutes the aesthetic—although aesthetic experiences always attract).
• That which we find aesthetic becomes an aspect of our extended selves—such that its value becomes in some ways to us intertwined with the value of our own being (e.g., regardless of what one finds aesthetic, when it is cruelly insulted, demeaned, or laughed at by others we feel ourselves to be hurt to some degree and in some way; everything from feeling ourselves to be insulted (rather than some object out there in the world which we are not) to feeling ourselves to be somewhat lonely, or isolated—with the converse applying when we encounter others whose aesthetic tastes overlap with our own).

I wouldn’t be surprised that these three descriptors of the aesthetic would not be universally attested to by all humans. But, if not, I would then be curious to understand what “aesthetics” then signifies to such individuals; importantly, such that the understanding yet conforms to the common usage of the term.

It seems to me that once we can roughly agree upon what the aesthetic is as a generalized experience, we could then better address whether or not aesthetics can be better and worse.

I agree with much of your latest post, btw. I’ll reply to it later on.

Since this is beginning to overly deviate from topics of aesthetics, while I disagree, I don't have much left to say here.

great. Can you answer this:

But I acknowledge it’s easier, for example, for parents to put their kids in front of TV sets instead of taking the time to read stories to them. I take it that to you these two activities are of equal value to a person’s mental development? — javra

I'm just pointing out that it's not the same for everyone or in each scenario. It's not the case that one thing or the other catalyzes more imagination for everyone. — Terrapin Station

RE: "for everyone":

I’ll in turn point out that your reliance on exceptions to the general given that “books require more use of imagination than do movies” so as to evidence this same generality false, or else devoid of value, is in many ways analogous to the following: someone’s claiming that doors shouldn’t be the height they are because some adult people are far shorter and some far taller than the common door height of our buildings. Exceptions to a common generality do not evidence the commonality of this generality false.

Do exceptions occur? Of course. Does this then signify that the average person thinks, abstracts, and imagines as much when seeing a movie as when reading a novel? No, it does not. Otherwise, a 600 page novel should be no more challenging than a 2 hour movie of the same story. Resulting in more people willingly reading and finding the experience enjoyable. But I acknowledge it’s easier, for example, for parents to put their kids in front of TV sets instead of taking the time to read stories to them. I take it that to you these two activities are of equal value to a person’s mental development?

By the same token, we could say that with books, all the words/thoughts/descriptions are given to you, whereas with films, you need to fill that stuff in for yourself via your imagination. — Terrapin Station

We appear to hold experiences that greatly differ ... especially when assuming you read my first post given today regarding the differences between film and book formats of stories. So be it.

Sure, but the comparison in degrees of imagination was between a good movie and a good book presenting the same story.

Do you disagree with this:

In movies the imagery is given to you. In literature, the imagery is constructed by you via imagination. Of itself, this presents two very different experiences of cognition. — javra

In the spirit of giving a better impression of where I’m coming from:

In movies the imagery is given to you. In literature, the imagery is constructed by you via imagination. Of itself, this presents two very different experiences of cognition.

Then there is the content that is amenable to movie format v. literature format. For example, in Fahrenheit 451—which I read for fun in high school—one of the parts that affected me the most was the spiel that an old-timer gave the protagonist about the reason people cry at the funeral of loved ones. In far more elegant expression, the perspective held that we cry selfishly, for our own ego’s loss, and not for the loved ones that died—regardless of how they died: either they ceased experiencing all experiences and, thus, all suffering or, else, we believe that they passed on to a better place than that in which we’re in (and this because, via our love for them, we deem them to have been good people). But because this portion of the novel is extraneous to the main plot, because movies focus on action rather than contemplation, and because movies are roughly limited to under two hours of storytelling whereas novels are not, no movie of Fahrenheit 451 can likely do this aspect of the novel justice—nor other like aspects of the novel.

Having both read Dune and seen the movie (I enjoyed both), this same disparity applies to the novel Dune to far greater extents. In the novel, erudite observations of politics abound, as do insights into human psychology. One soundbite-friendly observation that comes to mind, paraphrased, is that the typical adult human would rather die than find himself holding beliefs antithetical to those beliefs he’s assimilated into himself as an adult. The movie greatly skims the theoretical aspects of the book in favor of action that is visually depicted—thereby depriving the story of its more pleasant experiences, this while reading the novel.

If we equate plot to story, the story remains roughly the same in a novel and a movie. But just as plot-depicting cliff notes cannot convey the aesthetic experiences of living through the story—regardless of whether it’s a movie or a novel—so too will a good movie not do a good novel justice, for the movie at best abridges far too much of the novel’s contents: those of perspectives, of background, of psychology, of worldviews, etc. And again, by comparison, a good movie will not flex the mental muscles of imagination (so to speak) anywhere near as much as will a good novel.

Now, though unfortunately too often derided among rational types, imagination is of pivotal importance in everything from finding satisfactory solutions to problems (of all types and breadths) to the progress of the empirical sciences (from arriving at new paradigms which explain all outliers of data, like the Theory of Relativity and the Theory of Evolution, to the formulation of worthwhile hypotheses and adequate tests for these). And, quite arguably, among the best ways of improving this cognitive faculty among all individuals is via the reading of literature. Not everyone will find some particular form of creative activity engaging, but all will find storytelling interesting (and the written forms of these is when imagination is greatly required).

On the other hand, a good movie’s characteristics—often including those of detailed, good imagery and quick action given in a succinct two hours’ time—cannot be captured by a novel, regardless of how good the novel is. Hence, movies that are visually stunning can serve as a good example of experiences that cannot be experienced in writing (thereby the cliché that a picture tells a thousand words). Then again, some stories are not interesting enough to warrant being read in novel format—while yet making a pleasant movie experience.

So, this is why the experience of reading a good novel and the experience of seeing a good movie is to me a comparison between apples and oranges. They can both be good, but to me they’re entirely different species.

I hope this also serves to better express why I feel that the four years of required English in high school is best served by a maximal exposure to literature—rather than via exposure to movies. (As to the history that may be involved, it is not about our history per se—which is about historical facts, something that fiction is not married to. Literature form different time periods can immerse one within the “what it is like” to have lived during that era and culture—but, again, it is not about history proper.)

Anyway, I wanted to share my views so as to better justify my being pro the status quo of high school English teaching English via exposure to literature (in fact, with my whishing that more literature would be taught during this four year span).

I still have plenty more to respond to [...] — ZhouBoTong

I’ll likely wait for you to present your views on what is and is not aesthetics, this in general.

this is a very good question, yes, in the relative sense, 'nothingness' points to something with an essence, albeit a purely abstract and conceptual essence which exists in the realms of abstraction in relation to other things; thus we must distinguish between non-existence in the relative sense, which exists as an abstract concept in relation to other existent things and concepts, and Non-Existence in the absolute sense which cannot exist in relation to Existence, for therein would lie a contradiction, that being the co-existence of both Absolute Non-Existence and Absolute Existence, and if Non-Existence exists in relation to existence, and existence is born out of and contained within Non-Existence, there lies another contradiction, that being the the fact that something Non-Existent cannot possess the potential to contain something existent within itself, for otherwise it would have an Essence and thereby be Existent as opposed to Non-Existent. — javra

I agree with this. :up: Still, it doesn't change the fact that many people find the concept of "Absolute Non-Existence" meaningful. But I see how this could fit in with your model.

since that potentiality is necessarily beyond space, it cannot have a quantity more than one. Of course, within itself, my varying concepts can exist in the abstract sense of the word, but they are not mutually exclusive in relation to the whole; therefore, the non-local substratum of potentiality is a unity which contains multiplicity within itself, but not a multiplicity which contains a unity within itself, if that make sense? — TheGreatArcanum

To be honest, no, I'm not yet understanding. The concept might need some further fleshing out, though. For instance, why must a "potentiality [...] necessarily beyond space" be a quantity (of one or less) rather than being a complete non-quantity? Also, if the potentiality is a unity that contains multiplicity which, in turn, does not of itself contain a unity, how would this unity-as-potentiality (hence a "1") then be differentiated from a unity that is an actuality (and, hence, also a "1")?

You're really forcing me to understand my own conception of what is and what is not here, [...] — TheGreatArcanum

I'm very glad I don't come across as adversarial or some such. Yup, that's what philosophical debates are all about, in the best of times at least. :smile: I myself much prefer the experience of discovering new truths via enquiry over not so discovering.

that is to say that something with an essence, or rather, the potential to point to an essence, which is in itself, an essence, cannot point to something which does not possess an essence (i.e. nothingness) — TheGreatArcanum

But then why does the symbol of "nothingness" as a word point to something that we find meaningful, i.e. something that humans deem to hold an ontological value? Nothingness might be a false concept, but it is yet meaningful conceptually (rather than pure gibberish).

As to the symbol of "0" representing potentiality, how again can we then go about saying there is one potentiality rather than two, or none?

I suppose that mathematics has its first appearance in the Law of Identity, not a = a, but 1 = 1, and that 1 points to something which has an ontological value, that is, an essence, and an essence which is equal to itself and not equal to its antithesis so long as it exists, — TheGreatArcanum

How then would you make sense of the law of identity specifying that "nothingness" = "nothingness"? This where "nothingness" is defined as absence of essence. It's still a = a, but it no longer seems to be 1 = 1 by the standard you've just provided.

(btw, non-quantity can be givens other than nothingness; examples can include those of Nirvana. And I grant that such latter examples do hold essence. But this is likely a very different topic.)

I have invented the following symbolism “1 + 1 = 2” and I discover that it has many applications in life. What else is there say? Do we add anything of value to say “and by the way there are these eternal things out there that correspond to these symbols” If one said “We have proven they do not exist” What am I suppose do? Give up Mathematic? — Richard B

Ok, you made me curious.

Unless you’d be one to presume that reality should follow your inventions in all cases without exception, if 1+1=2 as invention were to be discovered to sometimes not apply to reality (say that you’d sometimes experience that 1 and 1 equate to 3), on what grounds would your persist holding fast to this invented mathematics of 1+1=2?

I am certainly no mathematician, but my presumption is that both one and zero stand for mathematical waves of a particular frequency that are either in a state of potentiality (i.e. 0), or in a state of actuality (i.e. 1). — TheGreatArcanum

Isn't this confounding some mathematical models of physics with mathematics per se? For one example, we could address one potentiality as contrasted with two potentialities.

so the law of non-contradiction extends its reach down into the mircocosm and beyond into the omnipresent field of non-locality which precedes and contains all waves and therefore, all actualized things in relative space and time. — TheGreatArcanum

I'm one to support this perspective. I didn't mention the LNC due to the pesky modern notion of dialetheism, which states that the LNC is not a universal law/principle. And its rather difficult to disprove. But yes, when it comes down to it, I agree with your quoted stance.