Computers are all entropic, algorithms, memory, and all. Life, regardless of how simple, is negentropic—and, quite arguably, always awareness-endowed, for it must survive in an ever changing environment it must be to some measure aware of.

I’m sometimes surprised by how easily we animate inanimate objects via metaphor (“my car’s my baby: listen to her purr/roar”) and then lose sight of the metaphors we use being just that. No one proposes that a marriage license should be sanctioned between cars and those who love them. But when it comes to AI, we have no problem accepting such things in our sci-fi … and then we often make a quantum leap into arguing this fantasy to in fact be reality—one that is always just on the horizon.

Till a computer can be produced by some neo-Frankenstein-like person to be negentropic, it won’t think, nor learn, nor perceive. There’s no smidgen of awareness inside to facilitate these activities. But, then, we hardly know what negentropy is, mechanically speaking … never mind how to produce it.

Still, allegorically addressed, an electrical watch is far more intelligent, far smarter, than a mechanical one: it can remember different times to wake us up, is aware of multiple time zones, and some of the more fancy ones can even be emotionally astute in how they address us (some maybe doing so in sexually alluring voices with which they speak). They’re still entropic, though.

To add to the previous posters:

I’m here addressing what most take to be freewill, agency; roughly: a finite LFW limited by factors beyond any individual’s control, one in part contextualized by a fluid form of causal determinism and in part formed from birth (biologically (and/or karmically for some)) by these same fluid factors of causal determinacy. I take it that most individuals worldwide would agree to something like this as rough description, although evidencing it philosophically is a completely different ball park.

Let’s assume one worst case scenario: the heroin addict once chose to pursue experimentation with heroin despite knowing of all the risks of addiction simply on account of feeling bored with life—as though life itself can ever be deemed boring. (Were the heroin addict to have so become due to extreme psychological or physical pain that was itself not of their choosing, one for which heroin seemed to be the only available remedy, to my mind the scenario of culpability, guilt, would be nowhere near as extreme.)

Even in this worst case, there yet exists the choice on the part of others for things such as forgiveness upon the person’s acknowledgment of having made an error, an understanding born from willingness to step into the other’s shoes, and, consequently, a sympathy—regardless of how mild—via which others attempt to resolve what the heroin addict now recognizes to have been a mistake.

LFW does not apply only to one person, but to everybody. And everybody is fallible—though some will do all they can to deny it, often by placing blame on other(s) for their own doings. In this universally shared fallibility there is the potential for a universally shared forgiveness of imperfections. Not as an encouragement of wrongs but as a—maybe all too idealized—communal effort for mutual assistance to help others out when they are down.

The same becomes far more complex when it is likewise applied to those that intentionally do harm toward others for reasons other than that of self-defense. It is one thing to understand that Charles Manson had an extremely difficult life during his formative years as a child, and to thereby hold sympathy, if not even empathy, for him as a child (something that, from my experiences, unfortunately few people are willing to do). It is an utterly different thing to then deem Charles Manson devoid of culpability for his actions as the adult he became. Notwithstanding, we westerners (or many just those of the USA?) live in a world focused on punishment as retaliation, as communal revenge—this rather than punishment for crimes and misdeeds that is sincerely influenced by motives of successful rehabilitation into society. The former is almost by definition devoid of compassion. The latter almost by definition consists of compassionate forms of realignment to states of moral sanity. But this too is a choice of how to react on the part of those who judge wrongs (as we all always do).

My intend point to all this is that the belief in LFW is not in and of itself something that leads towards less compassion for others. Instead, it is the sense of moral superiority that is, when rationally appraised, bogus which leads to lack of sympathy and empathy for others. For all her imperfections, Mother Teresa would have welcomed helping the heroin addict when she/he asked for help. Whereas your average so called “virtuous person (one that likely believes her/himself to already have a seat in some heaven)” would at best treat such person like lepers not to be touched.

It is true that we all have our limits of inclusion. But while some deal with the us/them divide in terms of absolutes, other’s will address it in terms of degrees, always willing to be more inclusive when they themselves are sufficiently stable in their daily needs.

At any rate, belief in any form of LFW will be belief that LFW is equally applicable to all. There is no grand end of perfect righteousness that anyone of us can obtain in this lifetime (or any other, as the case might be). We all on occasion err. And we all have personal culpability for our errors. From this vantage, we then can choose to assist others in due measure to need, or we can choose to indiscriminately forsake all those who have stumbled while simultaneously declaring ourselves innocent of any “significant” wrong doing … which is bullshit. Our choices today will in part determine what our futures will be; and this applies for every day of our lives.

So no, belief in LFW does not make one less empathetic or sympathetic toward others by comparison to hard determinism. Though it might consist of a somewhat different mindset.

… However, as per William James’ argument, LFW does explain the presence of regret—regretting having chosen this alternative rather than that, something which hard determinism cannot coherently account for. When we don’t succumb to moods of desperation for things we’ve previously done (which is never a good thing for oneself or anyone other we have yet to interact with) our regrets then help us in not repeating the same mistakes ad infinitum, as well as in best remedying the things that are within our control to remedy. Imo, one could well argue that it is the absence of regret which leads to societal mayhem, including lack of sympathy and empathy for others—the rational absence of regret being something that is more in keeping with hard determinism.

The ancients didn't have a concept for "homosexuality". [...] It's difficult sometimes for us to understand the ancients. — Bitter Crank

OK, yea. You’re right. For what it’s worth though, I have a vague memory from some documentary of a Cesar who was ridiculed for being sexually attracted only to women. They might not have had a term for it, but they did have the suspicion that the guy was strangely heterosexual. :rofl:

I somehow imagine (don’t know how much substance my imagination has here) that you’d be more knowledgeable about this than I am. And I currently am not.

Have you heard anything about sexual confusion (i.e., men wanting to be women and women wanting to be men) back in the Greco-Roman days?

I don’t know. Maybe dressing up in the other sex’s attire didn’t matter all that much on account of everybody wearing togas. :joke: No, they did dress differently, come to think of it. Still, I’ve never heard of transvestites back then … which I would think would be a lot more accepted by these two ancient cultures.

At any rate, the history I’ve read holds both the ancient Greeks and Romans as unconfused about their, quite often bi/homosexual, sexuality. Which leads me to tentatively speculate that the “confusion” is largely cultural byproduct of today world rather than a natural aspect of our human biology (which I take homosexuality to be … as well as the far rarer instances of intersexed individuals).

... Which is odd to me considering all the suffering that people confused about their gender have to endure in today’s world. Although this later part is probably a different topic.

I think 'time' is central somehow. — sign

Couldn't agree more.

Should be food for further conversation. — sign

I look forward to them. :cool:

Got it. Thanks for the links.

And he tries to describe the rush of meanings or 'phenomenological time.' — sign

Interesting concept, one that I might be inadvertently paralleling in my own philosophical musings. Husserl is one more person I haven't yet read. Do you recommend any particular work his that best focuses on this concept of "phenomenological time"?

Some people are clearly in the mood to find others in error (possess the truth solely, denying any kind of mystery or darkness yet to be explored.) Others are clearly in the mood to find common ground and maybe share in the pleasure of what they both already understand. I'm no saint. — sign

Yea, I share that feeling. Being anything but saintly myself, I'll gravitate toward closure in some situations. But its one thing I always admired about many of the ancient skeptics (which I've now come to nickname fallibilists): they sought open-mindedness and thereby greater understanding. The other side of things can, often enough, be all-knowning of all pertinent absolute truths. Not my cup of tee.

BTW, wanted to share this since it seems to me to be pertinent to the discussion:

There was a man with tongue of wood
Who essayed to sing,
And in truth it was lamentable.
But there was one who heard
The clip-clapper of this tongue of wood
And knew what the man
Wished to sing,
And with that the singer was content. — Stephen Crane

This in context of meaning as value and the signs we thereby produce. Beside which, I like this guys poetry.

What I mean is something like the 'I' who uses language is not exactly an 'I.' The subject that speaks this theoretical fiction of the subject is already plural in some sense, already speaking 'outward.' — sign

:up: I very much like that. :smile: There is no living being that exists devoid of other living beings with which it interacts. Even the most solitary and un-evolved of lifeforms live among predators and prey. The existence of experience is not an "I" but a "we".

Though, here thinking of Sartre's play "No Exit", this can be a blessing as well as a curse. :razz:

Language is most real, I'm tempted to say, as it rushes by. Meaning both remembers and anticipates. It's not (for me, for the most part) instantaneously present. It is 'stretched' and 'on the way.' — sign

Here again, I agree.

I agree with this. What I had in mind is the nature of this possession. What is it to think the idea of a tree? Of course we 'know.' We can have the experience right now. I vaguely picture a tree. I imagine typical uses of the word 'tree' in sentences. How does it sit in my mind when plucked from the flow of using it unselfconsciously? — sign

I'm not claiming these are easy questions to answer, but to me the key to obtaining answers is found in interpreting all meaning as complex relations of values. Among the most basic are those of positive valency (attraction toward) and negative valency (repulsion from). It's the relevancy something holds to the individual. But buried somewhere in all this is a parallel belief in some forms of universality as it applies to experience, regardless of the individual. This being what makes meaning communicable via signs.

My laconic answer is then: to think the idea of a tree is to noumenally apprehend (with or without imagined phenomena) the value of a tree in relation to oneself, which would include its value in relation to its environmental context(s) as one is aware of them.

What I have in mind is something like a stream of experience with a certain elusiveness for itself. — sign

I'm not sure if what I said addresses this. Could you elaborate if I misinterpreted?

I follow that. I'd only add that many of a more literal mindset have problems with the term "nothingness"; rather than interpreting it as "no-thing-ness" they can only comprehend it as unbeing, or an absolute lack of presence. Using this figure of speech led me to a whole bunch of problems a long time ago. But whatever works in getting the meaning conveyed.

Is this a defense of pure meaning? — sign

Yes.

Can we possess it without the signs? — sign

To keep things simple, in a word on the tip of one's tongue, one knows exactly what one wants to say, so the meaning is possessed without the sign. Its just that one can't express it to anyone other or to oneself.

And do we ever quite possess it even with the signs? — sign

I believe in certain, if not most all, cases we very much do so. I'd say that when we name an abstraction (e.g., world, or animal) we possess the meaning via the name. This, naturally, after we've associated the required meaning with what the name logically necessitates (e.g., neither rocks nor plants can be animals).

To me, part of the complexity is in that different people create and project different meanings that yet correspond to the same sign used to convey meaning. As example, for one person, "animal" more or less means non-human mammal, whereas for those who are more scientifically inclined it will include sponges, insects, fish, birds, etc., and humans as well. Here, the same sign holds two different, though overlapping, meanings.

I agree that it asks for a meaning. I guess one of the things I'm getting from Derrida so far is the impossibility of a perfect separation of sign from signified. As I understand it, this perfect separation is something like the heart of metaphysics. — sign

What do you make of words that are at the tip of one’s tongue?

Here I find a clear example of our awareness of an utterly non-phenomenal meaning—a meaning for which we momentarily do not know the sign for; a meaning which we momentarily cannot re-present. In the pre-Kantian sense of the word, this to me exemplifies our direct apprehension of the noumenal—itself a hidden aspect of all our apprehensions of the phenomenal which hold any type of significance for us. What I'm here aiming to illustrate is the logical possibility that the two are in some way separate and distinct in the here and now—this rather than as a hypothetical potential to be actualized only in some form of absolute state. In other words, though they are almost always intimately entwined, to me the word at the tip of one's tongue illustrates the complete separation between meaning and sign in the form of an experience available to all of us less than ideal subjects.

And thank you for the link. :grin:

Well, it is a sort of semantic game but I think it is the believer who makes it that way, by calling “disbelief” a belief. — DingoJones

From what I’ve so far read, I align myself with @Rank Amateur. In attempts to approach the issue from a somewhat different angle:

In one’s lack of belief concerning a given belief X:

A: Is one unaware of X as a stipulated belief of what is true? If yes, then no cognition of X occurs, as with the infant. If no:

B: Is one uncertain of whether or not belief X presents what is in fact true? Then one is agnostic about the truth-value of X.

Or

C: Is one certain that belief X is false? Then one holds a positive belief that belief X is false.

Where X signifies deity/deities, A is irrelevant to issues of belief, B defines agnosticism, and C defines atheism.

Other than the additional possibility of theism, what other possibilities are there? Else, how are the three offered possibilities wrong?

The question 'what is....?' asks for signs. — sign

I differ here in believing that it asks for meaning ... which is however only conveyable—be it to other or to self—through signs. But to me there is a distinct ontological differentiation between the two.

There are just so many thinkers to read and only so much time. Let me know if you want me to send you a link to a pdf of S&P. It's about 80 pages and is thought to contain essential Derrida. — sign

Please do; thanks. However, while its likely good background to have, I should confess that I don’t have an aesthetic for Derrida-like philosophy; at least as I so far know. I instead prefer systematic approaches. For instance, regardless of what one makes of it as a body of understanding, I greatly admire Spinoza for attempting to make all his premises explicit for each and every conclusion in his Ethics.

It’s a personal aesthetic preference and, as is always the case, when we each honestly follow our own individual aesthetic calling—regardless of how much we deviate from the norm in so doing—we each remain aligned to the truth that is us as well as to the truths with which we have yet to be fully acquainted. The aesthetic, after all, being as much an experience of pleasure as it is a calling toward that which is at once familiar and unknown—toward a heart’s home that awaits on the horizon, so to speak. My way of saying: to each of us our own aesthetic preferences and paths.

But I’ll do my best to read through it as time allows. Thanks again.

How is meaning distributed between the words and in time? What is the 'resolution' of language? Is meaning ever trapped in perfect definiteness at an instant? Is an act of meaning ever perfectly repeated? If meaning is distributed, there is no master-word but only substitutions that may finally point at the distribution of meaning and structure of substitution itself as final, as the impossibility of some other finality, fulfilling the metaphysical quest as it snips its root. But this 'fulfillment' is subject to its own law. It's never perfectly repeated or stable. — sign

...the sign is that ill-named thing, the only one, that escapes the instituting question of philosophy: ' what is ....?' — Derrida


Why does the sign escape this question? I have my thoughts, but I wonder if others like this line and have something to say. — sign

Some musing:

Meaning is equivalent to significance. Placing the etymology of sign-ificance aside, the term/sign of “meaning” (correction: significance ) is defined on Wiktionary as “the extent to which something matters [implicitly: to some set of subjects]” and as “importance [roughly: the extent to which something is, else is worthy of, being imported into oneself as conscious being from without … this due to the degree of affect and/or effect this something might have upon oneself]”

So appraising is one way of arriving at the understanding that meaning is inextricably related to value—value itself always being relative to some given set of beings. The two are of course not synonymous, but there can be no meaning in the complete absence of value. So much so that I believe meaning is in all instances a complex relation of values.

Values are again contingent upon, and relative to, subjects. Given the aforementioned, to objectify meaning is, then, to lose sight of what it is of what it consists of.

Signs then are often arbitrary and, in and of themselves, meaningless. This is not to deny that we also often ascribe signs in manners limited by the wide array of meaning that exists prior to their being produced. But terms such as “cat” and “dog” are, as signs, fully interchangeable were it not for the values we associate with each. The meaning of signs—while at times conforming to the world that surrounds (e.g. a drawn crescent moon as sign for "moon" rather than "sun")—is nevertheless contingent on constructed realities, e.g. cultures, which are themselves the products of a multiplicity of individual value-appraising beings.

So if I understand the latter question properly, signs elude the question of "what is …” because they are in one sense arbitrary and inherently meaningless while simultaneously also serving as anchors by which our communal, value-constructed meanings are tethered and stabilized, this across a given cohort of beings, on account of communal consent.

This all being a rough draft version of my current perspectives.

I haven’t read Derrida, btw.

However, when all is said and done, I do not understand (and that is the pejorative "i don't understand") how one type of cause can affect another type cause such that the explanation for how that happens is not either contradictory or question begging. — Mentalusion

In case you’d like to explore the issue:

As to agents, such as ourselves, our motives are not of themselves efficient causes for what we choose. In a way, at least, that which we choose to do is itself an efficient causation—one which commences with our current state of being making the choice to act and which holds the particular act as the resulting effect. Our motive(s) for these choices, however, governs what we choose by serving at a telos: a future we intend to manifest and are driven by in the choices we make between alternatives. Though which alternative best satisfies out motive-as-telos is fully up to us to decide upon. This is of course conceivable only when one entertains the possibility of a reality that is not fully governed by strict causal determinism.

As to efficient causation that occurs between all inanimate givens, by today’s standards one can hypothetically conjoin what we know of physical entropy (which I take to be somewhat different then entropy as defined by IT) with Aristotelian notions of final cause so as to result in the following: all inanimate efficient causation holds as its motive optimal entropy.

I’m not trying to insinuate that so entertaining of a sudden resolves everything. But I think both scenarios can illustrate how different types of causes—here, namely, particular efficient and final causes—can interact in manners such that both are conceivably governed by an “eternal” final causation.

So I'm not here intending to address the details of how things work but to illustrate how different types of causes can conceivably interact in manners that are neither contradictory nor question begging.

The big issue here, imo, is how agency interacts with inanimate efficient causation in manners that, as you say, are neither contradictory not question begging. To me, one very good example of this would be how inanimate organic matter results in a living—rather than dead—unicellular organism; inanimate matter being of inanimate efficient causation and the living unicellular organism being of a very undeveloped yet still present agency. This would of course be contingent on the entire metaphysical ontology that is presupposed, and I don’t know enough about Aristotelian philosophy to comment on how Aristotle resolves this. Well, other than that he also makes use of formal causation.

OK. However: Were Aristotle’s unmoved mover to be a motive rather than an agency, would you still find 2 & 4 to necessarily contradict?

As for me, Aristotle’s difficulty from the vantage of today’s world is in showing how inanimate objects are governed by motives. But again, while I’m aware that concepts such as that of the Anima Mundi were prevalent back then, I haven’t read his works myself.

1. Motion exists
2. Anything in motion must have been brought into motion by something else
2a. A thing cannot cause itself to move (this needs to be either an assumption or inference from 2 in order for Aristotle to avoid obviously circular argumentation)
3. However, there cannot be an infinite chain of agents causing movement
4. Therefore, there must be something that causes motion which itself is not caused to move. — Mentalusion

Do you believe that any agency can occur in absence of motive(s) for that which the agents perform (think, act, etc.)?

I personally don’t. But then this evokes an issue of motives as driving forces for any agent's performance—and I don’t take motives to be in and of themselves agents but, instead, that which agents intend to manifest.

To my understanding, in Aristotelian causal structures, motives are teleological causes/reasons for motion—i.e., they are part and parcel of Aristotle’s final causes.

So, in this given line of thought, it’s not about an infinite chain of agents but an infinite chain of motives via which agents act.

Now, I’ve only read of Aristotelian metaphysics from secondhand sources—with excerpts from De Anima as exception—so I’m not claiming to go by first-hand knowledge of what Aristotle argued.

Nevertheless, given the reasons aforementioned, Aristotle’s “unmoved mover” then seems to me to be an uncreated fixed motive that either encapsulates or else results in all other motives, including those antagonistic to it … this rather than an agent (i.e.., something that engages in [motive-driven] thoughts).

I’ll certainly not argue against those who hold first-hand knowledge of Aristotle’s metaphysics, but this is how I’ve so far interpreted Aristotle’s position.

Insert name in @name. — Wallows

:smile: Just saw that. Cool

Suppose we have a memory of something.

Ontologically speaking, where does that memory refer to? — Wallows

How about this approach (I find it consistent with what Mentalusion is saying):

Memory is the (re-)experiencing of a previously obtained experience. The latter can either be of the external world or of internal cognitive givens (e.g., dreams, or else formerly obtained ideas). Hence, memories refer to previously obtained experiences.

-----

BTW, how do you guys insert the link of “@username”?

This subject reminds me of something that likewise hits very close to home, given the times we live in: to be tolerant toward intolerance is to eliminate tolerance from society. A complex issue to me.

As to civility when attacked, two quotes that come to mind which I find merit in as ideals to be aspired toward:

“A gentleman [i.e. a civil person] will walk but never run” … From a song by Sting: “Englishmen in New York”. Walking away from a conflict to me implies self-control that is also conveyed to the uncivil attacker, thereby helping to teach the attacker that their aggression was futile in its intentions. So, ok, running is sometimes the best defense, yet in context of the quote, becoming scared in so doing and conveying this fear to the attacker only teaches the attacker that their methods of incivility work … so it reinforces their unjustified aggression.

On the other end of the spectrum, a paraphrase from some likely important person that I can’t now recall:

“If you must kill [to which I’d add: in any way harm] someone, be polite about it.” By “must” I take it that it’s for some overall impartial good—such as that of preventing innocent lives from being killed/harmed by some uncivil individual. Attacking the attacker of one’s children in self-defense would certainly be a good example. By “being polite” I see it as not taking any pleasure form it (for there is guilt involved), not gloating about it, not being willingly cruel, etc. I’m here reminded, for example, of some soldiers who urinated in laughter upon the carcasses of those they killed and then boasted about so doing—this being an impolite/uncivil behavior for the given context of war. And it certainly doesn’t help out the political issues involved.

I am working on Hume's two definitions of causation so I would prefer not to leave Hume out of it completely. — Jamesk

Got it. I don’t know the angle your approaching this topic from, but if this helps out:

There’s a weird paradox that can emerge from Humean causation when it is envisioned to be devoid of all instances of agency (here knowing that Hume himself did sponsor the necessity of agency … I don’t recall that he provided a positive account of how this all works, but I do recall that he concludes that both agency and determinism are equally necessary aspects of the world … it’s been a while though).

The paradox:

Given that each cause is itself the effect of a previous cause, a causal chain can be represented in the following manner:

… e/c – e/c – e/c – e/c … etc. This where “e” stands for “effect” and “c” stands for “cause”.

It doesn’t matter how complex the chain or web of necessarily conjoined instances of e/c becomes. In all instances, it produces a reality devoid of change—for there is no link which is not perfectly determinate and, thereby, immutable. This logical derivation of a perfectly static reality stands in rough parallel to Zeno’s paradoxes.

Discerning what given causes what effect here becomes fully arbitrary and fully contingent on the subjects that so discern, which a) are themselves fully enmeshed into this perfectly changeless reality and, paradoxically, b) cannot experientially be in the absence of change.

Ignoring the awareness of subjects that, here, arbitrarily discern links between causes and effects, what logically results is a changeless space wherein no cause or effect can be validly distinguished—wherein all that is becomes a changeless block with continuous presence devoid of valid instances of causation.

In other words, premising a world of efficient causation devoid of agency can, I think quite validly, result in an objective reality fully devoid of causation.

But this is contrary to our lived reality … everything from personal experience to our scientific enquiries.

If this makes sense and you’re so inclined, feel free to make use of it.

Yes, and in so doing he is limiting himself to efficient causation pertaining to the physically objective world. This being in keeping with the definition of causation he provides. He, for example, addresses billiard balls hitting each other; not the fact that in most instances they are inert in the absence of some human subjects choosing to hit them with a stick.

If this thread is strictly about Hume’s notions of causation, I’ll likely abstain. No biggie.

Not sure how to vote since I agree with Hume in his own context of time and culture but also find his views in many ways outdated.

At any rate, I think it would be proper to first settle on an understanding of what causation is which adequately encompasses all of modern (and ancient) understandings of what it holds the potential to be. This prior to appraising whether or not it is real—and in which ways it might so be.

To give a maybe incomplete list, there’s Aristotle’s four types, there’s the logically conceivable retro-causation, and there are bottom-up and top-down forms of causation (neither of which occur in relation to duration: they each occur at the same instant of time addressed). So yes, Hume’s definition of causation is a bit outdated by modern standards, at least imo.

To my mind, though, all these conceivable forms of causation can be adequately defined via the notion of dependency; hence: When the presence of (set of givens) A (be they entities or processes) is existentially dependent on the presence of (set of givens) B (be these entities or processes), B is the cause to A as effect.

Yes, I’d very much like this curt definition of causation to be questioned for potential flaws; it would help me in better discerning where its deficiencies might be (if any; crossing my fingers here).

Still, tentatively granting this definition of causation, I then would be of the opinion that causation then necessarily exists. Deciphering the details of what causes what being a different matter altogether.

I’m finding myself liking your metaphors.

For what it’s worth, I myself sometimes liken things to a very complex and sometimes Sisyphus-like evolution toward greater self-awareness.

Then why the fuck are you asking anyone else anything at all? — creativesoul

While I don't believe that your comment validly applies to anyone here, I’m guessing it would be for the fuck of it—i.e., so as to facilitate the possibility of orgasmic moments of intellectual insight which can best be obtained via verbal inter-course.

In the words of Depesh Mode: “Pleasure: little treasure”.

So, it would seem that javra's perfect objectivity (impartiality) is, ironically, a form of cultural (collectivist versus individualist) bias. — Galuchat

Here focusing on the term “bias”: (perfect) impartiality can in certain contexts be synonymous to (perfect) fairness. And fairness is what most take to be the principle property of justice. It would be a long stretch to adequately argue this one out, but “fairness” is also commonly taken to entail aesthetics/beauty. Here wanting to say that impartiality is no more a bias than is the drive toward justice, for example. As a hypothesized absolute state of being that is metaphysically determinate, perfect impartiality would then serve as a metaphysical limitation on what can be—this at least as far as our human imaginations can conceive—a conceivable " absolute end-state of being" toward which one either aspires in the here and now in practical manners or else detests and acts against. Yet again, to me bias signifies lack of impartiality. And since none of us are perfectly impartial, we all hold some form of bias. If one so cares to argue, including that bias which aspires for a closer proximity to being devoid of bias.

Is this to say that all things which have awareness also have self awareness (said self awareness vanishing when perfectly impartial awareness is attained)? — Galuchat

This is indeed a very loaded question due to the connotations that self-awareness implicitly presents.

My short answer is “no”.

I’m currently finalizing three logical possibilities of self-awareness; I’ll express these so as to better answer your question. There’s nonreflective self-awareness; this is for all intended purposes a redundant means of addressing the basic constituency of any awareness, no matter how small or undeveloped, for here there is an innate distinction between the point of view concerned as different from that which it regards and interacts with as other. Then there’s conceptual self-awareness; this is when a first-person point of view entertains concepts of itself as a being; the concepts are nevertheless that which the given first person point of view regards and are thereby yet other relative to itself. Then there’s a third type of self-awareness which is what we ordinarily take it to be. I’m still searching for a more adequacy term for it, but am currently using "informed self-awareness". This is when one holds a non-dualistic awareness of what one as a first-person point of view is. For example we can hold a conceptual self-awareness of being “human earthlings” which we can analyze and ascribe truth-values to; in contrast, while reading sci-fi or watching a sci-fi movie, we hold an intrinsic awareness of us so being human earthlings and not, for example, extraterrestrial aliens—this without actively entertaining concepts of so being. [One complexity with this third type is that the empirical sciences evidence that even ants hold such awareness—scratching at blue dots on themselves when in front of a mirror (reference here). So it can either be innate, as I presume it is with ants, or learned via processes such as a habitually entertained conceptual self-awareness , as I hold that most of our human self-awareness is … But this issue aside.]

To then better address the answer, not all living beings will hold the capacity for either conceptual or informed self-awareness. Amoeba and plants I take to be prime examples. However, in general, the greater the intelligence, the greater the quantity and quality of informed self-awareness.

So from where I currently stand, the closer we approach the ideal and metaphysically determinate potential of a perfect impartiality, the greater the quantity, quality, and accuracy of our informed self-awareness becomes. Were it to be possible to actualize, at such juncture this information regarding ourselves as awareness would become literally devoid of limits—though, at the same hypothesized juncture, self as a point of view simultaneously vanishes. Stated more colloquially, our informed self awareness at this hypothesized juncture would become perfect and infinite, thereby entailing that all points of view (which are by nature limited) transcend into a literally selfless awareness. What this would be, or be like, and what would be next, I’ve no idea. I venture that it this unknown regarding a perfect impartiality/fairness/beauty/etc. then leads some—knowingly or unknowingly—to not intend closer proximity to this metaphysical limitation.

I also want to mention that other so termed metaphysical “end-states of awareness” are also conceivable, and are part of what I’m working on. For example, one such conceivable, alternative end-state is that of being an ego of absolute authoritative power over all that is. I hasten to say that to many individuals, but by no means all (the majority?), this is what is addressed by the term “God”: an omnipotent psyche. Other "end-states" are also conceivable. But this is where meta-ethics come into play: there’s a mutually exhaustive list of conceivable alternatives but only one of these can be a metaphysically determinate end-state of being. Because none can be established with epistemic certainty (here skipping the details) there is a choice as to which end-state to pursue. Meanwhile, before any end-state is actualized, competition between these different end-state intentions prevail.

At any rate, no, self-awareness wouldn’t vanish but would instead become without limits, i.e. infinite—the only thing that would dissipate would be the presence of the self as something distinct from something other.

A definition of awareness would be useful, because I cannot determine whether or not "being" is used equivocally (as "subject" obviously is). — Galuchat

I have equivocated in some places for the sake of brevity. I don’t have a definition of awareness other than what can be found in most any dictionary. I can however say that iff the metaphysically determinate reality is that of perfect impartiality, I infer that the only way of finding out what ourselves as egoless awareness is would be by actualizing this end-state. Which again, even if all humans were to so intend at most times in their lives, would yet be a very, very long time into the distant future.

That's a really good analysis, especially the different perspectives on subjectivity, especially that idea of 'dia-subjectivity'. I haven't heard that before, did you devise that terminology? — Wayfarer

:blush: Thanks kindly. I was feeling a bit anxious about the post. Yes, “dia-subjectivity” is a term and concept that I’ve devised.

However I will take issue with the 'perfectly non-subjective'. In my view (which is basically Buddhist in this particular respect) objective and subjective are co-arising or dependent on each other; there is no object without subject, and no subject without object. — Wayfarer

I very much agree with what I've underlined--but am not so certain with the concept of objectivity being a synonym for the presence of objects.

Finding the adequate term that best conveys what is intended, this to a broad number of often different understandings, is difficult for me. To explain my reasoning for the terminology I’ve so far employed:

If you recall form a different thread some time back, I uphold that there are aspects of awareness wherein the object of awareness becomes undifferentiable from the subject of awareness—such that there is no duality between the two. Awareness of one’s own happiness and certitude are easy examples of these. Furthermore, impartiality, which is one sense of objectivity, to me nicely depicts egoless being/awareness. In practical terms—especially when we engage in the empirical sciences and the like—we can either intend to become more objective/impartial or not—but, paradoxically, becoming perfectly impartial/objective would entail the absence of self as a point of view. It would entail a literally selfless presence as being/awareness. And, as a yet different reason for the terminology, when differently addressed, we are all subjects first and foremost not to some king, god, government, etc. but to objectivity itself—from my frame of reference, objectivity as both dia-subjectivity and the metaphysical reality stipulated (upon which dia-subjectivity is reasoned to be contingent). Drastically deviate from objectivity and one’s existence in this world is eliminated. In fact, I find that evolution itself can be pithily expresses as conformity to objectivity over time given haphazard variations. (Here, it is not subjects v. objects but, instead, subjects to objectivity/impartiality as authority.) Lastly, if physical objectivity is dia-subjectivity, then it is the property of being impartially applicable to all beings; so "an object" can be here understood as that whose presence impartially affects all beings.

More metaphysically, I hold the presumption that this state of perfect egoless being is synonymous to Aristotle’s “teleological cause as unmoved mover” And that among numerous other terms and understandings of the same can be, at least potentially, the Buddhist concept of Nirvana—this when addressed from a different cultural vantage. My main point here being that, were this state to in fact be a metaphysically determinate aspect of existence, and were beings to be capable of someday actualizing this state of being in non-hyperbolical ways, then here all sense of subjectivity, of self, would vanish … and one would become perfectly impartial awareness (what I believe Neo-Platonist address by “the One”). Here, as with one’s own awareness of happiness or certainty, no duality could occur between object of awareness and subject of awareness. Yet the end result would be one of perfect impartiality—hence, of perfect objectivity in this sense of the term—wherein subjectivity ceases to be.

I guess I should add in a general way that if such state of being were possible, it would be very, very far away into the distant future. I remember the Dali Lama in a lecture stating that [even he] still has many thousands of lifetimes yet to live before obtaining Nirvana. Be this as it may.

So, if I’ve expressed myself cogently enough: I so far find it easiest to address all this by saying that this metaphysical reality is one of "non-subjective being". The terminology is of course not written in stone, but so far nothing else seems to better express the overall concept via the use of a single term.

Thanks for bringing it up this point of disagreement.

I very much enjoyed the quote and your comments on it, btw. I'm myself dealing with many of the same issues in terms of the philosophy I'm working on.

But it does highlight the way in which the mind 'constructs' or 'creates' reality, in the sense intended by Schopenhauer's 'vorstellung'. — Wayfarer

It is the reflective and creative nature of Idea which I seek to explore. — Fobidium

Currently thinking of Schopenhauer’s Will and Representation, and in attempts to add to the general discussion of awareness and ideas as its creations, here’s a very rough outline of a general concept I’ve been working with.

Tmk, there are four logically possible types of actuality in relation to subjectivity:

1) Intra-subjectivity: That which is exclusively (intra-)personal; e.g., the contents of one’s imagination or of an experienced dream; this attribute in large part demarcates a personal mind.

2) Inter-subjectivity: That which is inter-personal; e.g., cultures, sub-cultures, and languages; these are constructed from a cohort of interacting minds which are in agreement as concerns meaning; more complexly, they include species-specific perceptual interpretations of what is often termed the objective world (e.g., humans’ implicit agreement on what particular things look like; dogs’ implicit agreement what particular things smell like; etc).

3) Dia-subjectivity: That which dia-personal, i.e. that subjective actuality which is equally applicable to all co-existent instantiations of awareness/will in simultaneous ways. Natural laws, the universals of numbers/quantity, causal processes, and the presence of particular objects all serve as examples of what is dia-subjective. While these are all apprehended via subjective faculties of (intra-subjective) minds, they again affect and effect all co-existing instantiations of will/awareness in the same way. As (1) demarcates personal minds, (3) demarcates physical objectivity.

4) Lastly, there’s the logical possibility of a reality that is perfectly non-subjective. Here would be found a metaphysically objective reality. One such possibility is what Aristotelians would term “the primordial final cause as an unmoved mover” and what Neo-Platonists would term, “the One” ... neither of which are about deity/deities.

To keep this brief, while at risk of potential incongruity, it is possible to think of Schopenhauer’s Will and Representation in a stratified manner: (3) is a product of all co-existent instantiations of (1)—via rough analogy, this in the same way that one geometric point is space-less but a multitude of geometric points creates an impartial space within with each point is located; (3) thereby serves as a solidified and perfectly impartial representation of Will/Awareness in general. Yet the solidified causal and natural laws of (3) is also what brings forth all instantiations of (1), from their/our birth to their/our worldly death—here fully including the causal relations between body and mind.

I know quite well that this outline is very far from comprehensive. All the same, in this general approach, the world as idea/representation to me makes more sense than addressing the same in a manner devoid of structure.

It is the reflective and creative nature of Idea which I seek to explore. — Fobidium

It a very interesting topic to me as well. Didn't intend to in any way derail it. Looking forward to reading the conversations. Wanted to clarify this.

In case the point of the analogy was missed, animals and children hold confidence in “what is” just as we adults hold confidence in “what is”. They certainly have not contemplated the issue as much as the typical adult human—and yes, empirically speaking, more intelligent lesser animals given indications of thought, including that of object permanency and of theory of mind … to not address these matters via the evolution of the central nervous system. But then these contemplations we adult humans partake of can sometimes lead to pitfalls instead of improved knowledge.

Anyways, I’m affirming that in the sense of “holding functional confidence in what is”—for lack of better terms—yes, animals and children know reality. This in a worldly, and not metaphysical, way.

Yes, but do calves or children 'know reality'? — Wayfarer

My best reply is a semi-rhetorical question: do adult humans "know reality"? We certainly build constructs to explain what reality is and entails, and they typically are justified to be true beliefs, but given all the disagreements and various inconsistencies, can we affirm which model of reality is actually true without our opinions/biases getting in the way?

But it does highlight the way in which the mind 'constructs' or 'creates' reality, in the sense intended by Schopenhauer's 'vorstellung'. — Wayfarer

I have no issue with this, in and of itself. Yet I do uphold that, first, metaphysically and, secondly, physically, there is/are givens which are not 'created' but is instead are ontically determinate ... here holding notions such as that of "the Good" in mind ... and by no means concepts of a stringent causal determinism.

Nor does it reflect on experience. — Wayfarer

True, no more than grown adults reflect on Kantian categories of experience--until they so contemplate. I'm arguing that both, however, know of reality via a prior notions of what is in the same sense of "innate knowns".



... though, of course, Kantian categories of experience are more metaphysical than a calf's instinctive knowns regarding its worldly context ... But then the calf too would hold the same Kantian categories of experience that humans hold so as to discern things such as distances and "before and afters", I'm thinking.

If a reason is a reason there is no choice, right? — Heiko

A reason can be a cause, a motive (which is basically a teleological cause), or an explanation. What are you addressing by “a reason”? — javra

A reason as such. — Heiko

Then my answer is "no: choice is yet possible" ... with what I've stated in my previous posts as justification for this answer.

All of which we know consciously comes from Ideas built from impressions. — Fobidium

Pointing out that this opinion is very contestable, if not directly contradictory to the nature of experience.

On the one hand, philosophies such as those of Kant have it otherwise. On the other, lesser animals are birthed with a priori notions of reality; e.g., a calf doesn’t struggle to run immediately after birth due to acquired impressions of what is. And so are human infants: e.g., without acknowledgedly crude yet nevertheless preconceived notions of reality, they’d starve to death.

I'd use the term "a prior knowledge" but I don't want to connote "consciously justified, true, belief".

But you have mentally assigned the probabilities based on prior beliefs, and this determines your choice. — Relativist

This conclusion is in direct contradiction to risk taking: from buying lottery tickets to deciding what to do when one falls in love with someone they hardly know and could get badly burnt by … with this list of risks being very long.

Even when in theory everything is composed of infinite causal chains and is thereby perfectly determinate, in practice uncertainties abound and, along with them, indeterminacies in respect to the choices we make. And this irrespective of the amount and quality of reasoning we make use of.

Still, I acknowledge, the issue is at base a metaphysical one, directly pertaining to the existential nature of causation. Belief in a stringent causal determinism will always presuppose the impossibility of any causal process that is not itself a link in one or more infinite chains of efficient causation.



I’ve at times chosen between ice-cream flavors without any deliberation—hence in manners devoid of at least conscious reasoning. The choice was still mine and not any others.

Regarding traveling on a long path or next to a cliff, both getting lost on the path and falling off of the cliff would be detrimental to arriving at C—which is the end that one wants to obtain. Which alternative best facilitates the obtaining of the desired end is then governed by the end pursued.

Where one to want to wander off for the fun of it instead of reaching C, then getting lost on the long path would then become the alternative that best facilitated the wanted end. Etc.

However, because no alternative is known to be better than the rest with epistemic certainty, the uncertainty that results in due measure facilitates an indeterminacy in what one chooses, making the choice directly determined by the will of the agent—this in attempts to best arrive at the intended end.

E.g. maybe descending down the cliff would be a better way of wandering off for the fun of it.

This just expressed view does not however of itself prove the position of freewill here mentioned—for one can always get bogged in the many details of what is and what isn't determined.

Addressing how all aspects of mind are not determinate is also not in keeping with my views. Imo, some aspects of our minds are determinate, some have been acquired via our former choices in life, some are mutable by further choices we make, etc.

What I was addressing is only a perspective on the very activity of choice making. One in which there being a reason, i.e. a motive, for the choice does not in and of itself entail that the choice is thereby fully determinate.

It seems you are giving a modified account of LFW. — Noah Te Stroete

Yes. From today's point of view I am.

I wanted to present the perspective I've mentioned since its uncommon today though very much accordant to positions held by David Hume—who, to my knowledge, was among the first (if not the first) to propose the stance of compatibility between determinism and metaphysically valid free will ... but this clearly not in the form it takes today wherein, as you say, "free will" merely implies acting in non-coerced ways.

A reason can be a cause, a motive (which is basically a teleological cause), or an explanation. What are you addressing by “a reason”?

If you are addressing motives, my previous posts address how motives and choice are compatible.

Why does your agent want to go to C? Did he choose so? Is this just "given"? — Heiko

It’s only a simplified example. The moment we choose our intentions is also when then become to us competing alternatives—themselves governed by other motives that, in this scenario, serve as meta-motives/intentions. This does lead into the question of whether or not there are metaphysical constraints on what we as sentient beings can intend—these then encompassing all of our worldly intentions. I believe that there are—and that, in so being, these metaphysical alternatives are for all intended purposes existentially predetermined. Evidencing this, however, is not an easy thing to do. But, otherwise, I’d imagine it would be turtles all the way down, so to speak.