Closer to our time, logicists hoped to give traditional mathematics an a priori foundation. Recently though these notions have come under attack and have been significantly weakened if not altogether defeated. — SophistiCat

As to mathematics in general, I find that none could be possible in the absence of laws of thought. Some laws of thought can be argued to be, at least in part, invented by us. The principle of sufficient reason here comes to mind; this since there are some things that are factual and which are nevertheless arational (i.e., beyond the boundaries of reasoning, as contrasted to the irrational, here strictly meaning “erroneous reasoning”). A primary example of the arational is the very being of being. Yet, in contrast, other laws of thought can arguably only be discovered. The law of identity serves as a good likely example.

I mention this because I then find the question of what aspects of mathematics are discovered v. invented to be in many ways reducible to the question of what laws or thought, if any, are discovered instead of concocted by us.

For instance, if the law of identity is something existentially determinate which is discovered, rather than something only imagined, then it seems to follow that so too can only be discovered the distinction between the following two: the abstraction of an integral whole of quantity—which we represent by the symbol “1”—and the abstraction of an absence of quantity—which we represent by the symbol “0”. These two abstractions of identity then serve as metaphysical limitations to what identity can be. For instance, in the typical process theory of becoming, no given will either be a strict “1” or “0”—for, given that everything is in flux, no given is either a perfectly integral whole nor is it a perfect non-quantity. Nevertheless, here, 1 and 0 yet serve as limiting extremes to what identity can be.

In sum, I therefor assume that 1 and 0—thus understood as symbolic representations for “an integral unitary quantity” and for “non-quantity”—are as essential to any awareness of reality as is the law of identity. The mathematical—and, if I’ve argued it properly enough, metaphysical—notions of 1 and 0 can thereby only be the discovered limiting factors of existence. They cannot be mere fabrications devoid of truth—for they are determinate limits of what can be.

And, in theoretical understandings of mathematics, I fail to comprehend how any mathematics can be accomplished in the complete absence of these two notions which we codify via “1” and “0”.

p.s. While criticisms are of course anticipated wherever warranted, I mostly mentioned this perspective because I’m curious to see if anyone knowledgeable of theoretical mathematics knows of any such maths that are fully independent of the notions of 1 and/or 0.

Edit:

Essentially, if there is not a field of mathematics which concerns mathematics as it relates to ontology, there should be, because without ontology, mathematics is meaningless. — TheGreatArcanum

You beat me to the punch. :smile:

I think this sounds like you might be OK with replacing 50% (+/-) of Shakespeare that is taught in school (below college level) with modern (or just different) stories? How about replacing 30% of literature stories with film stories? I am not exactly sure of the goal of literature education (is there one? really?), but I think these changes would still meet any goal other than, "know the classics". — ZhouBoTong

It might be that literature, as in literary art, is slowly becoming a vanishing art form (?)—something in parallel to how layered oil paintings are (of which relative moderns such as Salvador Dali championed and which were the rule during the Renascence). Comparing literature to movies has in my experience been a comparison between apples and oranges. They’re two wildly different mediums for storytelling. And, when considering the best of both, the aesthetics captured by neither medium can be satisfactorily translated into the other. Still, literature education is arguably the best way of teaching literacy to students via applied practice; imo, far better than by merely teaching theoretical rules or spelling and grammar, which are dry, tedious, and very boring by comparison.

As to what 50% or so of Shakespeare should be replaced with. I won’t fib; I’ve my own list of likes that I would have enjoyed reading in high school. Asimov, Bradbury, Dumas, the novel Dune, I’ve already mentioned Kafka, I’ll even say stuff such as Fielding’s Tom Jones. Granted each education is different to some extent, but, still, I nevertheless appreciate having been given to read a wide breadth of literature during high school: historically starting with Beowulf and Ten Summoner’s Tales—neither of which were easy readings but yet very interesting for their historicity—all the way to Virginia Wolf’s To the Lighthouse, Orwell’s 1984, London’s Martin Eden, and the like. And yes, some Shakespeare in between. :grin: I sense, if not know, that it was due to good English teachers that most of the literature and poetry we were taught became meaningful to us students. All the same, I guess my own perspective is that I’d rather more fellow citizens be exposed to these historically important works so as to have a common body of knowledge in society pertaining to a common history—this rather than focusing in on more varied modern novels (even those I just mentioned liking).

Or maybe you are suggesting the influence is similar to something like The Avengers, but it has been around for centuries and for most of those centuries very little art was created {relative to the last 30 years} so Shakespeare's works were read by a significant percent of literature readers?) — ZhouBoTong

Yes, along these lines.

(we may just conclude that I have some social inadequacies that cause my disagreements): — ZhouBoTong

Who doesn't? :razz: I've come to notice that pretentiousness is certainly not one of them. It's humbling in a good way. :up: Staying true to one's own aesthetics is something that should be done more often.

[...] so I would say things like, terrestrial, earth-bound, fish-like [...]

Now, we have all the adjectives on the board. And we notice that many are actually antonyms for each other. — ZhouBoTong

Hm. Maybe I didn’t express myself well enough. My art teacher would have wanted to know how these adjectives can describe a bird that is in space, “space” here being more akin to outer space; maybe most aptly expressed: a bird that is in flight within layers of atmosphere. I’m still suspecting that the case can be made that if the adjective can apply to a bird in space, thus understood, the adjective will then likewise apply to the statue.

Correct me if I'm wrong.

My deeper understanding in that moment was that once "art" becomes "abstract" it can mean literally anything - sometimes it is up to the artist, sometimes it is up to the viewer. I can see how you were led to the conclusion you came to, but can you see that with just a tiny change in perspective, my view is also a reasonable conclusion? — ZhouBoTong

TMK, this is a very popular motif in modern art critique. I would concur that artworks are a bit of both. But I disagree with the view I’ve too often heard, specifying that what the artist intended is fully superfluous to the artwork, and that the only thing which matters is what the viewer interprets when looking at it. In a way, to me, this is analogous to ordinary language. What we intend to say matters—even when our expression is less than sufficient to so convey, or when others interpret things which we never intended. To me, so thinking that what the artist intended is unimportant does an injustice to most, if not all, artist out there—for no artwork can be manifested devoid of intention to so manifest; and because what one intends is, to me, an important variable in what makes an artistic expression valuable. Another variable is the quality of the expression to that which was intended. (So: If the idea is not impressive, esthetics might still be there due to the quality of idea’s expression. Or, if the idea’s expression is poor but the idea itself is stupendous, one could again find the artwork aesthetic. If, however, there is a poor idea coupled with a poor expression, more likely than not the artwork will then be found to have a poor aesthetic quality as artwork. And the judgment of what is poor and what is not is, to me, again relative to one's general understanding.) I’ve here given a rough draft of my own views concerning this matter—fully knowing that this subject can in itself lead to a very long debate, were it to be pursued.

In short, I believe I get what you’re saying. Still, I’ll for now be stubborn and continue upholding that the statue "Bird in Space" does a good job of conveying its subject matter via abstract form. (It’s not among my favorite, btw: its aesthetics are too cognitive for me; the aesthetics I most like are felt viscerally. But I’ll toe the line for now, so to speak.)

Some, including myself, in the process came to discover what makes it aesthetic. — javra

I don't really understand this part; I think my understanding of "aesthetic" is far more simple. — ZhouBoTong

I brought this example up because, to me at least, it serves to exemplify how one’s increased general understanding in relation to an artwork can at times transform that which is deemed relatively unaesthetic into something whose aesthetics are appreciated.

Sometimes the artist creates meaning, but other times the artist is providing inspiration for us to create the meaning. If the rabid dog in To Kill a Mockingbird somehow symbolizes racism, can't Decepticons also symbolize racism, sexism, or the negative side of our emotions? — ZhouBoTong

Of course. I’ve already mentioned a little about my take on the intention/interpretation dynamic to artworks. Staying true to that, I so far find that both the rabid dog and the Decepticons were roughly intended to symbolize the "negative side of our emotions" (Decepticons alluding to deceptions).

Because of this, to the average adult person who can comprehend and enjoy both, — javra

Just to see where we are both coming from, what percent of adults do you think can comprehend and enjoy both (epistemological and ontological topics)? — ZhouBoTong

I maybe wasn’t sufficiently clear. I meant “comprehend and enjoy both movies: the Transformers and The Matrix” (e.g., some young preadolescents that enjoy Transformers might not understand why the Matrix is found more aesthetic by many adults). But you bring up a good point:

Don’t know that I can be labeled an optimist, but I do find that people generally hold emotive understandings of subjects which, when philosophically addressed, are not yet very well understood consciously. These include both epistemological and ontological topics. For example, we all (emotively) know what justice, good, aesthetics, etc. are, but when we start trying to consciously pinpoint them, we then often times enter into debates.

This goes back to my take being that good aesthetics ring true—that they emotively speak to us of things which we are emotively knowledgeable of, but of which we often cannot make sense of at a conscious level. Hence, for example, adults that don’t comprehend and enjoy epistemological and ontological subjects of philosophy will nevertheless tend to be more fascinated by the Matrix than by the Transformers—and this because the former has greater depth in its epistemology and ontology.

To further debate this, though, there is again a benefit to a common understanding of what aesthetics are and are not. Without such a basic understanding, we could easily end up talking past each other. You were saying that your understanding of aesthetics are likely simpler than mine. Still curious to know how they wouldn't fit the three descriptions I previously offered.

If you are NOT entirely bored with this topic, — ZhouBoTong

No, I find the topic immensely interesting; but it’s a very complicated subject. And I’m honestly trying to economize my personal time. It might be a while till my next reply.

Why do we teach a lot of Shakespeare and zero Transformers? — ZhouBoTong

Doubtless this is so due in large part to Shakespeare’s works having greatly influenced our cultural heritage in the west—whereas Transformers has had little of such impact on western society. But this reason is not of itself an issue of directly experienced aesthetics—rather, it’s more one of western culture’s history of aesthetics.

If you are thinking about profound vs trite, it is a safe bet that most high school students find NOTHING profound in ANYTHING they are forced to read for school. — ZhouBoTong

My bet is that this is in large part due to bad pedagogy. Same with math being typically taught without its purpose and, hence, its relevance, being taught (I didn’t understand what the heck calculus was for until I entered the university, and so didn’t enjoy it in high school); or history being taught as facts when in fact it can be the most intense of human dramas. And awareness of relevancy often takes deeper understanding than can be gleamed from an immediate acquaintance—and the gaining of this understanding is often benefited by good teachers. To me, a good example: our high school teacher brought out images of Brancusi’s Bird in Space. We were less than impressed with this supposedly seminal work—basically seeing it as horse dung (at least I did). He put the sculpture aside and asked us to express as many adjectives as we could that described a bird in space. We started listing: graceful, austere, elegant, serene, etc. When the chalkboard was full with adjectives, he then asked us which if any of these adjectives didn’t describe the sculpture. They all did. At this point we all had a deeper understanding of the sculpture’s abstract significance and, with it, a newfound appreciation for it. Some, including myself, in the process came to discover what makes it aesthetic.

I am not saying they would find Transformers profound, just that is an unfair measure as it RARELY occurs. — ZhouBoTong

OK; I’ll try to better illustrate my view: Transformers are about morals, courage, some light sci-fi, and, more recently, a lot of eye-candy. Compare its cultural impact to movies such as Bladerunner or, more recently, the Matrix. The later, for example, has most of what the Transformer movies have, but its sci-fi concepts have more depth, and it touches upon—what in philosophical slang are—epistemological and ontological topics, some of which are nearly as old as philosophy itself. Because of this, to the average adult person who can comprehend and enjoy both, Matrix movies will tend to hold greater value than Transformer movies. Yes, aesthetics is in the eye of the beholder, but there are a lot of beholders out there, and our degree of general understanding tends to correspond to the statistical bell-curve. What affects the median the most is that which will have the greatest impact on society at large—and, hence, what will be commonly deemed better.

If only 1% (being generous) of art or philosophy is "profound", then are we just wasting time the rest of the time? — ZhouBoTong

In my given statement more profound was merely the opposite of more trite—and not intended to be taken as an absolute. So, whatever is deemed to not be trite will have more profundity to it by comparison—even when it is not deserving of the title “profound”.

I am suggesting there are other benefits (possibly even other areas of more "prime" importance) of art other than some profound experience. — ZhouBoTong

In considering this and your previous post to me, I find that we might end up going around in circles if we don’t come to a more explicit understanding of what aesthetics are—and what they are not.

To me:

First off, do we agree that aesthetics are first and foremost an emotive experience (rather than an intellectual desire of consciousness)? Secondly, the emotive experience can’t simply be any attraction toward—e.g., we can be emotively attracted toward food or drink even when not hungry or thirsty (like when having a full stomach), but this attraction doesn’t pertain to our aesthetic tastes (we’re not driven to eat that which is aesthetic to us—and if, by chance, a certain food is for some reason deemed aesthetic by us, eating it will always to us feel as though we are destroying something whose continued presence has value). Thirdly, and however ambiguously, we form a connection, an emotive bond somewhat akin to that of sympathy, to that which we find aesthetic—such that our sense of what is aesthetic becomes an extension of our very selves; of who we at core are as a person. In at least this one way, aesthetics are not to us a fun distraction, or a diversion—which are by their nature ephemeral, dispensable, and superfluous to what makes us us. By contrast, the most aesthetic artifact one has ever known—regardless of what it might be—is cherished on a par to how much one cherishes one’s own person; and, on average, one desires for its preservation about as much as one desires one’s own preservation (despite preferring that it is destroyed instead of oneself--were such a hypothetical to be presented). This is not to say that the two are the same: aesthetics being an emotive calling (toward what is to me a very interesting open question), whereas one’s own conscious self is that which is being called (arguably, by one’s unconsciously originated emotive drives). Hence, for example, when this just mentioned aesthetic artifact of great worth is demeaned by the opinions of others, we feel the value of our own person being demeaned (especially when we respect the other)—and when it is valued by others, we more often than not feel exalted.

(I don’t take these three aspects to define the aesthetic; but, to me at least, everything that can be deemed aesthetic will fit these three descriptions—including biological aesthetics, especially where the want to possess that which is beautiful is not involved.)

A lot said (don't have enough time to make this post more concise), but:

-- If you disagree with these three partial facets of the aesthetic, can you then explain what the aesthetic signifies to you such that it doesn’t fit these descriptions?

-- If, however, there is no significant disagreement, then why dispel the conclusion that some aesthetic experiences are better than others—not on some mathematically precise linear scale, but relative to the general understanding of the beholder(s) concerned?

(To again emphasize: no one’s experienced aesthetics is ever wrong. However, from the vantage of the bell curve’s mean, some aesthetics will hold greater value than others relative to the populace addressed.)

BTW:

We have created a massive formal academic field of art, that contributes very little to actual art. — ZhouBoTong

If I understand you correctly, and as you may have picked up from my previous posts, I’m in general agreement here. The emperor’s new clothes in the world of art is, imo, produced by too many people being untrue to their own heartfelt aesthetics. Still, were one to be true to one’s aesthetic tastes (rather than succumbing to authoritarian decrees or wanting to so become authoritarian), I strongly believe one would remain open to understanding why others find aesthetic value in givens one does not—as well as remaining tolerant for other people’s genuine aesthetic tastes even when they contradict one’s own.

But this doesn’t nullify there being better and worse aesthetics—this for any individual as well as for any general populace. Otherwise, I’m thinking, this critique of the art world incrementally turning into a farce couldn’t apply—for its aesthetics regarding what constitutes “actual art” would then be of equal value to any other, leaving nothing of it to critique.

so too is a human’s awareness of aesthetics better than that of a chimp’s. — javra


And yet any human that says Transformers is better than Hamlet is wrong. — ZhouBoTong

And how on earth did you arrive at this stupendous conclusion??? Since it’s too grievous a spin to not correct—lest we inadvertently encourage elitism:

No experience of beauty can possibly be wrong. This is in parallel to how no truths are false. Yes, there are some truths—e.g. circles are round but triangles are not—that the average Joe Shmoe doesn’t find quite as worthwhile or impressive to be told about or to contemplate in comparison to others. But none of them are wrong—even the trite ones; all truths are right in so being true—just like all experienced aesthetics are right in so being of the aesthetic (yes, including a chimp’s or elephant’s; how could it be otherwise?).

So, when a person states that the Transformers are to them aesthetically better than Hamlet, they are perfectly right in their expression of what is factually aesthetic to them—as well as what isn’t. But just as one’s degree of general understanding tends to determine which truths are deemed trite and which are deemed more profound, so too with aesthetics. Better and worse; not right and wrong.

Well, you have said more that probably deserves a response, — ZhouBoTong

Thanks for expressing that. :wink:

I am not sure I even understand how that could be the case. Let me take the most simple and obvious "appreciation of beauty". How does a guy admiring a pretty girl lead to wisdom? — ZhouBoTong

When I’ve admired the beauty of the human form via aesthetics I’ve then appreciated the symmetries of figures, the elegance and grace of structures and dynamics, and the like. Young or old, male or female, it wasn’t about who I’d like to kiss but about the presence of the aesthetic as it applies to the human body. My experience is that aesthetics draw me closer toward truths or understanding of the world that are to me so far unknown—in relation to biology, human or otherwise, these for me can include an attraction toward the golden ratio and of fractals, such that I want to understand them better. Sometimes—just sometimes—in asking myself “why I find X aesthetic” the sensual pleasure of the experience transforms into an intellectual eureka moment. Sexual attractions, on the other hand, are in one way or another always about the sexual drive—and not, of themselves, about aesthetics. Michelangelo's David is aesthetic to me as a human form, but not sexually attractive. Still, there’s no law that says the two—aesthetics and sexual attraction—cannot co-occur; and they often do when it comes to heartfelt romance.

But you are correct: it’s a complicated sentiment and mine is only an opinion regarding why aesthetics matter. BTW, Keats wrote it that, “Beauty is truth, truth beauty.” If this in any way resonates, my guess is that there might be some deeper truth to it that attracts you, waiting to be uncovered. If not, then likely not. (It could be a bit too Platonic for many.)

I will get to the whole thing soon so I can give you a nice long annoying response like I give everyone else :smile: — ZhouBoTong

Well, you may have noticed that I’ve so far done my best to answer a number of your questions. At this point, I’d simply like for you to answer my initial two: those of 1) how is my given premise false if you happen to think it is and 2) how would the conclusion not rationally follow if the premise is true?

... Also, I'm still wanting to shy away from the conversation.

Sorry, I was just re-reading the other thread and realized that I did not respond to this portion (but thanks for the little reminder :grin: ) — ZhouBoTong

no worries

Doesn't your logic here suggest that Calculus is better than basic arithmetic? But that doesn't seem right, does it? — ZhouBoTong

Within what contextual purpose is one better than the other, is the implicit question. If aesthetics has the purpose of drawing us toward greater sapience (arguable, but I believe this) this given analogy doesn't stand.

Based on the definition of art I would think that the ability to reach MORE people MIGHT make transformers better? — ZhouBoTong

One might forget that Shakespeare was quite popular in his days, and that his language was not at the time outdated.

Still, your reply doesn’t address the premise and conclusion I presented—upon which the rest of my opinions are grounded.

Nevertheless, to answer this question: If my premise and conclusion are valid, it would then further follow that greater magnitudes of aesthetics which pertain to greater sapience will not be able to be conveyed to others whose degree of sapience is below a certain threshold. In Shakespearian slang, its caviar for the masses. (Certain types of caviar I myself can't stand)

Offer a cat or dog a wondrous bouquet of flowers and the animal won’t know what to do with it (the Romanian saying translates into “giving flowers to a pig” ... whose “tastes” will at best only manifest in finding these flowers good to eat).

Is there no such thing as a distinction between refinement and baseness of sentient nature, of character? And—if as with most people—one would say there is, are their respective tastes of equal worth relative to our aspirations to be endowed with greater sapience?

Yes, my opinion is that the optimum artistic expression can convey a refined aesthetic to a vast quantity of the populace. But—to use some different examples—this does not place the comic book stories of the X-Men on the same aesthetic level as those expressed, for example, by Kafka. I like both, btw. Neither are perfect. But Kafka’s does tend to embody more universal truths pertaining to the human condition.

“Elitism” I hear being cried out by certain members of the audience. As though no human is in any way better than any other in any capacity, including those of talent and taste. Thinking of myself, I’ve always improved in asking others why it is that they find aesthetic those things I so far have no taste or understanding for—given that I didn’t utterly dislike their personality. Couldn’t find the aesthetic value to minimalism until I asked someone who does. It’s still not my favorite, but I get it now. It’s when we start bashing each other over the head with “what I like is good and what you like is inferior crap” that, imo, elitism emerges.

Well, this is doubtlessly a very complex topic … Due to time constraints, I’m planning on shying away from it and giving others the final word. Be this elitist of me or not. :wink:

So thinking is an error of abstraction. — javra

Isn't it the reverse, abstraction is an error of thinking, or are you regarding thinking as an abstraction in this case? — Merkwurdichliebe

Interpret that sentence within its context as conveying: “In having so thought that one can reach the horizon, one will then have engaged in an error of abstract reasoning.” Or was your reply one of dry funniness?

I just think it relevent to point out that the dialect of order/chaos is qualitatively and categorically different than the dialectic of being/nonbeing. — Merkwurdichliebe

Of course it is, but this is neither here nor there in relation to what I tried to present. I’ll try to express myself better:

The chaos/order dichotomy, or dialectic, is amicable to sufficient reasons, and thereby holds the potential to explain why particular things are or are not (one could, for example, logically obtain an absence of all things via absolute order, a state of being analogous to the core of gravitational singularities; but this would not equate to what we understand by nothingness, for being would still be). What I’ve been arguing is that, in contrast, the nothingness/existence dichotomy is not rationally necessitated, if at all rationally supported. For instance: There is no sufficient reason known to mankind as to why there is existence rather than nothingness. Given this, then neither can there be any presently known sufficient reason for why there someday will be nothingness rather than some form of existence. Reasoning not composed of valid reasons is commonly considered irrational. Again, the reality of nothingness is conceivable but, I so far think, cannot be established. This despite many treating it as an established metaphysical fact.

It's not that we can't get what we want when we desire the nothing, but that longing for the nihil is just as much an active engagement with meaningfulness as desiring anything else, because the nothing always manifests itself as a certain kind of substantive within meaningful contexts. — Joshs

Thinking of the horizon as a spatial limit to what can be traversed also holds meaning. It’s not as metaphysical in scope as that of a complete absence of being as the negation of existence in general, but it’s meaningful all the same. This, however, does not contradict the fact that thinking of the horizon in this way is erroneous. One does not experience the end of Earth upon reaching its horizon. So thinking is an error of abstraction.

That a complete absence of being can be meaningful, as can be the yearning for it, does not make the concept accordant to what is metaphysically real. Consider that a person yearning to reach the horizon will also live a meaningful life in so yearning—this while reaching the horizon is a physical impossibility. Hence, just because a concept is meaningful does not then imply that its referent is real or, hence, obtainable. Unicorns come to mind as yet a different example of this.

There are alternative ways of thinking about being. Instead of the easily conceived dyadic categories of being and nonbeing one could, for example, present the two extremes of a complete chaos of being and a complete order of being—with existence as is residing in-between these two extremes. As to physical correlates, the very first instants of the Big Bang can be deemed a near-complete chaos of being; this while the very core of a gravitational singularity—wherein space, time, and mass no longer hold meaning (this within the very same models that predict gravitational singularities)—can be likened to a complete order of being. So the concept of a complete absence of being is in no way logically necessitated as a factual counterpart to the factual reality of being. In other words, it does not need to "always manifest" (though it is well ingrained in our western minds).

All the same, I’m not disagreeing with your analysis of what is a staple portion of historical western thought.

Agreed. Personally, I'm one to uphold that ultimate beginnings of being are not knowable even in principle by any ego. Laugh all you want; my big thing is how on earth did life evolve out of nonlife ... metaphysically speaking. It had to have been. Yet, not being a physicalist, when poetically expressed, I gravitate toward a will and representation view of existence. How to conceive of will existing in the absence of life eludes me. (Not that I deem physicalism a better alternative.) But yes, a redistribution of consciousness is something that I sometimes ponder.

(I also have an idea similar to Javra's maybe, that people aren't brought from nothing into the world, its more like a redistribution of consciousness, so antibatalism wouldn't work anyway, but I can't really argue that. ) — csalisbury

I'm in good company then. :grin: I often enough feel the same way, but haven't been able to find a stringent argument for it.

I’m at the level of individual actor decisions to not bring another existence into the world, not existence of sentient beings as a whole. — schopenhauer1

Does this then signify that you are only semi-antinatalist? Meaning: to each their own. Isn't this the way its always been and always will be?

I guess I then fail to understand why you want others to cease the continuation of life rather than allow them/us the freedom to do what we deem rational, what we see fit. There's something in the way here.

Um. You're ignoring what I re-posted and boldfaced. Where is the logical fallacy to the argument and its conclusion?

And how would this alleviate an eternal return of suffering?

I’m thinking at the margins, not the whole pie. It’s the decision of the individual. For example, one persons meat eating dies or negate another’s veganism. — schopenhauer1

Didn't sound like it, but OK. Still, how does your reply address the logic/fallacy to this argument:

As far as hypotheticals and their logical consequences go, one could hypothetically manage to obliterate all sapience off of the planet but, logically, the same magnitude of sapience will only re-evolve to its current state. This is because givens such as the planet and its bacteria will remain even after the destruction of all sapient life—and this because one will not have actualized a complete nothingness (via an omnipotence that also obliterates itself?). Given that nothingness is not actualized, the same magnitudes of experience-dependent pleasure and suffering will, then, again unfold among increasingly intelligent sentient beings—only so that life once again finds itself at the magnitude of relative wisdom that we as a human species are at currently. The hypothetical is analogous to a suicidal Sisyphus that always gets reborn to re-experience the same suffering … played out at a magnitude of species. — javra

Edit: I'm here allowing for the hypothetical that, somehow, all individuals will make that decision that your advocating for.

Thanks. :wink:

Here’s a premise I’d like for anyone to debunk: Nothingness*--i.e., the complete absence of being—is a chimerical abstraction of human imagination that, thereby, does not reference anything real.

* This concept, however worded, here stands in contrast to the transient nonbeing of givens within a context of underlying being/existence: As in, after breaking a mug into a thousand pieces proceeding to claim that the mug is no longer, that it now holds no being, that it is now nothing … when, in fact, all that’s happened is that its constituents have changed their structure while yet existing just as much as before.

Without the just stipulated premise being evidenced false, the longing for nothingness holds the exact same properties as the longing to arrive at the planet’s horizon. It can’t be done. Not that it’s inconceivable; it is—as evidenced by our ability to understand the concepts. It’s just that it’s metaphysically impossible and, hence, a complete falsehood.

Advice for those who will try to evidence the premise false: Address nothingness without in any way presenting it to be endowed with any form of presence—for, were it to be endowed with presence, it would be being rather than nonbeing (it would thereby hold some form of existence). An example of what not to do: do not claim that existence can turn to nothingness on grounds that existence was/is itself caused by nothingness—for this entails that nothingness is itself a causal agency, thereby entailing that nothingness is something that holds being (minimally, as a causal agency): Thereby resulting in quite the logical contradiction in regard to being.

I would like to know where this "mission" comes from? — schopenhauer1

As far as hypotheticals and their logical consequences go, one could hypothetically manage to obliterate all sapience off of the planet but, logically, the same magnitude of sapience will only re-evolve to its current state. This is because givens such as the planet and its bacteria will remain even after the destruction of all sapient life—and this because one will not have actualized a complete nothingness (via an omnipotence that also obliterates itself?). Given that nothingness is not actualized, the same magnitudes of experience-dependent pleasure and suffering will, then, again unfold among increasingly intelligent sentient beings—only so that life once again finds itself at the magnitude of relative wisdom that we as a human species are at currently. The hypothetical is analogous to a suicidal Sisyphus that always gets reborn to re-experience the same suffering … played out at a magnitude of species.

Given that actualizing nothingness is a metaphysical impossibility, I’d say that the quote-unquote mission is there because there is no other way—metaphysical or otherwise—of alleviating existential suffering at large than via increased understanding.

What we pointed out in the art thread, was that an educated art critic is the one most likely to ascribe some great artistic significance to an elephant's rambling scribbles (as long as you tell them it was by some brilliant young up and coming artist). — ZhouBoTong

Yea, I’ve already written a bunch. But to not be lopsided about my reply given your post:

The issues addressed in this quote represent, at least to me, an all too commonly occurring instantiation of the emperor’s new clothes. People who don't have the courage to stay true to their own aesthetic tastes - but instead label beautify/aesthetic that which they think will earn them greatest social status. Thereby making a farce of what is aesthetic.

To me, good art is emotively powerful, felt from the guts if not also intellectually, at least relative to the audience for which it is intended. It has power to transfix and to transform; to change one’s worldview and understanding via the expression of truths (personal to universal) that are best conveyed via means other than ordinary language. But one can only subscribe to this perspective once one also subscribes to there being such a thing as good art v. bad/stupid/ineffective art.

How much of today’s art has the power to bring vast proportions of young adults into states of awe? That, to me at least, is roughly equivalent to the amount of modern art that is good. A good artist (painter, poet, sculptor, musician, etc.) has enough wisdom to know how to transmute her/his personal truths into expressions that captivate a large number of people. A relative rarity, to be sure. But, imo, this is a large factor in what makes artists good.

Furthering my spiel, most of today’s good art is found below the belt, so to speak: in advertising. Bummer that it has no inherent worth to its artists—that it doesn’t express any truths which the artist per se values; nor, for that matter, any personal truths pertaining to those who pay his/her wages for the artistic creations. The art is instead a means of getting costumers to purchase things that they/we don’t need and wouldn’t otherwise want, this via emotively powerful expressions—ones that are for the most part devoid of any inherent aesthetic value, but are instead fully instrumental in the accumulation of somebody’s stashes of cash. I’m not claiming it’s the only type of modern art out there that has an impact on society … but do find that it, today, is the most prolific among these.

Anyway, my two dimes on the matter.

I was called out for off topic, so I just responded to your post in this thread.

Yea, you know, if you're one to believe that an elephant's painting is as aesthetically valuable as is a human's, to each their own. — javra — ZhouBoTong

To reword my initial argument, to which your quote alludes:

Premise: We humans value sapience; we, for example, want ourselves to be sapient, rather than non-sapient. As another example that is applicable to the philosophy forum: we almost by definition value those historical philosophers we deem to have been of greater wisdom, and do not value those whom we deem to have been utterly devoid of wisdom (given that philosophy is a love of wisdom).

Is there anyone who disagrees with this premise? If so, please explain on what grounds the disagreement stands.

If this premise stands—and if wisdom is not concluded to be an irrational or fallacious concept in respect to what is real—then I offer that this conclusion then rationally follows: We, thereby, likewise value those artworks which to us expresses great sapience over those artworks that to us are either devoid of sapience or express minimal amounts of it. This regardless of whether it’s Shakespeare, the Transformers, or the Simpsons. To find aesthetic value in a blank canvas as a finished work of art, or in a musical piece that is devoid of sound, one will need to experience it as endowed with worthwhile wisdom; otherwise, one will not find aesthetic value to such pieces of art.

If the offered premise stands, how would the given conclusion be erroneous?

-----

By the way:

This is not to deny the truism that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. But, as previously illustrated by comparison between a chimp and a human (both of which have been known to paint), that beholder of greater sapience will likewise be privy to greater awareness of aesthetics as direct experience. No dog or cat will witness beauty in any artwork, much less endeavor to create it. Many humans will.

Yes, of course, complexities abound in what is and what is not aesthetic—as contrasted to mere attraction toward (most will agree that a heap of cash does not embody the aesthetic; while proportionality of form and color often time does). Not to even mention that no one in the history of mankind has as of yet discovered a satisfactory philosophical description of the experience—an experience which we nevertheless all seem to recognize as real. Yet, unless one wants to drastically redefine it, it is a facet of experience at large that strictly pertains to minds capable of abstraction and, hence, of wisdom. Aesthetics does not pertain to the experiences of insects, cats, or dogs, and only marginally to some chimps and elephants.

To emphasize: I am not saying that wisdom equates to aesthetics; the former is a property of psychological being whereas the latter is an experience applicable to the former. And no, magnitude of wisdom cannot be linearly plotted on some chart. Many forms of wisdom can and do occur—and to each their own aesthetic calling.

Nevertheless, just as a human’s arithmetic is better than a chimp’s, so too is a human’s awareness of aesthetics better than that of a chimp’s. To doubt the second is on par to doubting the first.

Yea, you know, if you're one to believe that an elephant's painting is as aesthetically valuable as is a human's, to each their own.

Are you, or are you not, saying that if something is more sapience-oriented, then it is of better value, or greater aesthetic value? — S

Yes. To recap:

P: We as sapient beings value sapience
C: Artwork that is of greater sapience is therefore of greater aesthetic value to us

an argument, that's all

That's all I need to know, because that won't ever work for the reasons I've explained. — S

Ah, but the reasons you've explained are pivoted around the rationality of using sapience as a measure. Hence:

The question remains beside the point. — S

... is completely fallacious.

Is "sapience" a rational concept despite not being measurable via a metric stick or some such?

Wow. OK. How then is the quality of sapience in any way rational to uphold? Or is sapience an irrational concept? — javra

It has nothing to do with sapience, it has to do with aesthetic value. — S

At any rate, the question still stands: Is "sapience" an irrational concept on grounds that is it not measurable?

You must of not read my initial post on this thread, then.

Rationality in this context allows us to set a measure, and draw conclusions from it, but outside of that context, it is meaningless or impotent. There is nothing forcing me or anyone else to adopt whatever measure you happen to present to us. I don't think you're capable of demonstrating a measure that's some sort of super measure that's absolute. The holy grail of all measures! — S

Wow. OK. How then is the quality of sapience in any way rational to uphold? Or is sapience an irrational concept?

----

Remember, you've already said that it hods a factual referent. Best I can interpret your former reply, at least.

So your saying that the term "sapience" has no factual, hence impartial, hence objective referent? — javra

No, I'm saying what I said. Do you need me to repeat it? — S

Then, in the context of this:

Therefore, human paintings are of greater aesthetic value than chimp and elephant paintings; again, because human paintings are more sapience-centric. — javra

how does this rationally fit in?:

I don't think that any argument would work, because they'll all be based on an unwarranted premise of that form that if something is more this or that, then it is better, when that's actually just a subjective judgement trying to pretend to be something else. — S

when that's actually just a subjective judgement trying to pretend to be something else. — S

So you're saying that the term "sapience" has no factual, hence impartial, hence objective referent?

I get that we're subjective about what is factually ontic. This to me, however, does not negate the presence of facts ... such as that of sapient beings (e.g., humans at large) being distinct from non-sapient, but yet sentient, beings (e.g. ameba; yes amebas can sense their environments). If I need to clarity: this by incremental gradations, as per biological evolution. (different topic, though)

How about this one:

Most, if not all, of those who can understand the content of Shakespeare can also understand the content of Transformers movies. In contrast, a significant portion of those who get Transformers movies (such as preadolescents, as one example) do not get Shakespeare. Premise: sapience has an importance to us. Conclusion: Shakespeare is a better form of artwork than Transformers … ‘cuz it’s more sapience-oriented.

Consider this analogy: chimps and elephants can paint. Humans can understand the paintings of chimps and elephants; but chimps and elephants cannot understand the paintings of humans. Therefore, human paintings are of greater aesthetic value than chimp and elephant paintings; again, because human paintings are more sapience-centric.

Or is me saying that “an elephant’s painting is of lesser aesthetic value than one of Leonardo’s” simply me being an elitist? I can deal with that, I think. And no, I'm not bashing on the Transformers movies.

:grin: funniness sometimes happens. cool

Oh. For the record, I was being darkly humored as I sometimes get. :wink:

Just throw out the baby, keep the bathwater. — Merkwurdichliebe

Hm. How do you find that that could logically work? Throwing out the aim of an equality between sexes while yet preserving its modern-day outcomes within society …

Besides, disposing of babies down the sewer doesn’t sit too well with most people … this as metaphors go.

Is there something lost in interpretation?

Camille Paglia feminism [...] — Merkwurdichliebe

As it happens, I'm no expert on the modern shenanigans of feminism; just now read up a little on this quoted person. But, yea, bathwater gets dirty after awhile, so out it goes ... just as long as it doesn't get confused for the baby. :razz:

The short answer to the titular question is that it does and it is called Feminism. — Banno

Given what I known about feminism at large, that’s a very astute summative statement.

All the same, most self-labeled “true/real men” associate most everything regarding femininity to a weakness of mind and body. As in, “women are emotional” and such. Thereby detesting this “–ism” that gets attached to “feminine” and which seeks to be of equal importance to masculinity. To these men feminism is, or at least symbolizes, a direct affront to their social power of superiority relative to women. So addressing their interests via feminism is rather mute.

That aside, even when not addressing those who view male superiority over women to be a natural/god-given right (plenty of these worldwide), there’s still an oddness to addressing men’s issues via the label of feminism:

To try to make my point, I’ll use myself as one honest example: I’d love to find a lifelong mate that at least in part personifies Elizabeth Stanton’s spirit; and so she would be quite proud and dignified in calling herself a feminist—despite all the spin-mongering against feminism that our present culture offers. I’d share her sentiments and ethics regarding the issues of feminism. But I’d still feel odd in declaring myself to be a feminist. This is because I’m a male and value those beneficial masculine attributes that typically pertain to the male sex. There is no doubt that feminist women such as Elizabeth Stanton value the same beneficial masculine attributes in men that an equalitarian such as myself does. Feminism, after all, is not anti-masculinity. But, nevertheless, there’s something amiss with labeling a man feminine, this rather than masculine … and this is something which the term “feminism”, as a term (rather than a historic movement), often tends to imply culturally. Especially since our culture is in part composed of those antagonistic to equality between the sexes.

In short, I’m pro-feminism (as per Elizabeth Stanton, who historically epitomizes the movement and its aims … one will notice that it extends beyond the concerns of a particular race of economic class), but can’t feel comfortable labeling myself a feminist.

Just as former liberals are now labeled progressives to stand apart from neo-liberalism, it seems that feminism would be benefited by a new term so as to more easily make its point: an equality of worth between the biological and sometimes psychological differences of the sexes.

All the same, pleasantly humbled to see other males that don't bash feminism. :up:

I'm an egalitarian, and quite frankly as well as technically that is NOT feminism. — Anaxagoras

Here’s the problem with that statement:

Feminism is a range of political movements, ideologies, and social movements that share a common goal: to define, establish, and achieve the political, economic, personal, and social equality of the genders. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feminism

Well, yea, I was familiar with these perspectives prior to making my posts on this thread. Is there any particular argument you want to make? The quoted text is one of presumed authority, but no logical arguments are provided for its basic affirmations. And, as per the arguments I've previously offered against a completely causal determinism and for a (metaphysical) freedom of choice, I disagree with these basic affirmations. But we can always agree to disagree.

A perspective seeking to exit the merry-go-round:

Suppose that all our “dos” are driven by “wants” … this including our doing of reasoning: since wants are emotive, as per Hume, reasoning is foundationally driven by underlying desires. Further suppose that our wants are in search of a resolution to that wanted. Reasoning, then, is arguably an optimal means of discovering how to best obtain and thereby satisfy our wants.

Given any degree of realism (here not confused with physicalism), there will then be constraints to how these wants can obtain their sought after aim of resolution. These constraints will then—in some way or another—(pre)determine which actions can factually satisfy our wants and which actions (though intending to so satisfy) cannot.

Those behaviors that factually satisfy our wants will then be logically correct means of so satisfying. They will be the right behaviors for us. And, since what we want is for our wants to be satisfied, right behaviors will constitute good, beneficial, behaviors for us. That aim, whatever it might be, that satisfies all our wants will then be conceptualized by us as complete good: “the Good” as Plato worded it.

And vice versa: all our intentions and subsequent acts to satisfy our wants that are fallaciously conceived to so satisfy our wants will then be wrong behaviors to engage in—for they always lead to frustrated wants and, in due measure, suffering. They will be deemed to be bad behaviors by us for this very reason.

To the same degree that there occur universal and fundamental wants among all humans (or mammals, or life in general), there will then also logically result aims that are universally good to that cohort considered. Being universally good, these aims will hold existential presence in manners that are impartial to the (sometimes fallacious/wrong) intentions of individual beings to satisfy their wants. In this sense, then, this universally good aim (or maybe aims) shall then, by certain definitions, be validly labeled that which is objectively good.

Within this general train of thought, then, subjective want-driven good entails there being some objective good—which can be expressed as “that end which satisfies all wants”—that, whether or not obtainable within our current lifetime in complete form, is nevertheless pursued by all subjective beings.

Discerning what this objective good is can itself be a fallacy of reasoning (a wrong/bad appraisal) or a discovery of what is in fact true (a right/good appraisal). Disparity between discernments of what is objectively good then leads to divergent ethical norms—as well as to, at times, what are labeled acts of evil by the society at large.

***This hypothesis is to illustrate that there is no entailed logical contradiction between subjective good/bad and objective good/bad.

As to Hume’s dilemma when looked at from this offered vantage: figure out what the logically and factually correct aim is that satisfies your wants (this factually correct aim being an “is) and then you logically derive what should be done to get there (this being an “ought”) … thereby deriving ought from is.

So, here, good and bad are determined by wants which naturally entail their own resolution as aim/goal--and this within the constraints of some form of realism.

It take it from your terminology, you hold to a few Aristotilean presuppositions. — Merkwurdichliebe

Yes. As I’ve previously expressed, I do believe in Aristotle’s four different types of determinacy.

In layman terms, causality is nullified by immutability, qua. the deterministic model. — Merkwurdichliebe

Nicely summarized.

The important distinction is, as you say: existing, versus standing out. But I might argue that this standing out is existing, as such. [...] — Merkwurdichliebe

The sneaky issue is that of the first-person point-of-view’s existence. It is, has being, but it does not stand out even to itself. You look into a mirror and see all the biological apparatuses via which you as a first-person point-of-view can physiologically see—but you never physiologically see yourself as that first-person point-of-view which is seeing … and which can also see with the mind’s eye. So if to exist is defined as to stand out, does one as first-person point-of-view of awareness exist?

It’s this same, ever-changing, first person point of view that does the choosing.

[...] And, if the deterministic model does essentially negate the deciding agent, then, then thing that exists is gone, and what are we left with: the model and irrelevant spectators. — Merkwurdichliebe

Yup, I agree with the conclusion.

Thank you. You have a nice way of framing it all. — Merkwurdichliebe

Thanks

I would add there is also the important debate of whether predetermined factors allow for the existence of the will, and to what degree it is free in relation to those factors. — Merkwurdichliebe

True. It’s why I find interest in exploring the mechanisms of volition. It can’t be completely determined, nor completely undetermined. Nor are our lives and experiences helped out by forsaking the subject of volition on grounds of it being illusory—this due to upholding a model of causal reality that (as I previously tried to illustrate) is contradictory to causal efficacy.

The eternal decision. I think this is what makes the willing agent relevent, whether or not its decision manifests into reality. In fact, I would say that when the will does not correspond to any existing state of affairs, it takes on even more importance. — Merkwurdichliebe

Via example, what I generally have in mind is: there’s my decision to move my hand, followed by the state of affairs of my hand moving as I willed; likewise, when I decide to not move my hand, my hand does not move. So there generally is a uniform correlation between what I willfully intend to do and what ends up being done.

On occasion though, my will shall not be efficacious. If I decide to express an idea I have in confident manners but instead end up being tongue-tied in the idea’s expression, the resulting state of affairs will not correlate with what I willed to occur.

As I interpret it, then, you’re saying that the property of will is more important when it is not efficacious—this as per my second example of ending up being tongue tied.

I’m curious to find out more about why you think so.

I will agree that every choice is in itself another cause of a long line of events, so it is the efficient cause in that sense. I do not see how it is the "originating" cause if it itself is also caused. — NKBJ

These are indeed the hard to depict nuances that, all the same, distinguish causal determinism (including those forms that claim compatibilism) from any position affirming any type of metaphysical freewill (including those forms that also claim compatibilism).

We typically say that lightning causes thunder. In fact, lightning is fully determined by antecedent efficient causal factors; the thunder is then causes not by the lightning but by the set of these antecedent causal factors. Between these factors and the thunder, lightning is just an immutable link and is thereby fully non-efficacious. In other words, given the verity to these antecedent causal factors, lightning in truth holds no causal agency of its own. Hence, logically, it is not the lightning which causes the thunder but its antecedent causal factors.

In a system of causal determinism, then, there is no causal agency to speak of. All appraisals of causal agency become chimerical. Everything is causally predetermined in full by antecedent causal effects ad infinitum, such that causal agency as we “naively” conceive of it is an impossibility.

When it comes to choice between alternatives, what I’m saying is that despite its determinacy by motives (and other non-causal determinants), we agents in fact cause the effect. In effect, our commonsense notions of causal agency are in fact accurate representations of one underlying metaphysical form of causality, one that applies to freewill.

Each and every moment of our being we are different, thought the same person, and will have been in part predetermined by our former choices in life. Yet at each juncture of choice—part, present, and future—we again engage in being the agency for effects as decisions, or commitments, to future realities, this given two or more alternative means toward the end of resolving our want(s).

As causal agencies—and unlike the lightning bolt—we of our own constituency of being originate the effect of our particular decisions. … Whereas the lightning bolt does not causally originate the thunder of its own being (again, this since the thunder is causally predetermined by causal factors antecedent to the lightning).

If there’s a need, I’ll have to reply later on.

Would you say this is true regardless of whether the choice can be shown to have any causal relation to the corresponding state of affairs? — Merkwurdichliebe

From my vantage, it easy to forget or overlook that causation (of any variant) cannot be shown (empirically demonstrated) to be factual. The philosophy of causation is metaphysical in full. From the ontology of Aristotle, to the works of Hume, to those who have affirmed that reality is fully non-causal (e.g., instead being fully mathematical), the "showing" part can only pertain to reasoning and logic. I think for most of us, ideally a reasoning that is accordant to empirical world we experience.

Correlation does not entail causation. Yet causation is always co-relational. Given a sufficient quantity of uniform correlations between some given and its antecedent, one simply presumes causation.

So whether choice has any causal efficacy in relation to the corresponding state of affairs is, I believe, the crux of the freewill debate. Causal determinists presume it doesn't. Those who uphold freewill presume it does. And resolving this via empirical data has at least so far proven futile.

I was going to pull just that aspect out from your dissertation there! :wink: — NKBJ

:yikes: :cool:

I agree that is a "want" that pushes us towards certain decisions, in fact, a whole host of them, sometimes contradictory ones pulling us in opposite directions.

The distinction if that want is determined or not is the crux of the matter. I would say that these wants are products of both our experiences and our biology, and that they are fully determined. In fact, if they were not determined, they would not be trustworthy. — NKBJ

As I so far see things, want is of course determined: by biology, by experience, as well as by our previous choices in life. I'll even go so far as to suggest that some form of meta-want is even a metaphysically predetermined facet of any awareness, or sentience--devoid of which no such thing as ego can be.

My contention is, again, in that the actual choice of which of two or more alternatives to choose (so as to approach and obtain the want's resolution) will itself not be an immutable link in infinite causal chains/webs. Rather, the act of making the specific choice will stem from the momentary form of the agent as an originating efficient cause, such that its effect is the choice taken.

So are you saying that this "want" or "motive" is determined or the part of choice that is not fully determined? — NKBJ

Stating it differently: there can be no choice (an action or motion) without some form of want (a driving motive where "motive" is understood as "something that determines motion"). The motive--irrespective of what it itself is determined by--determines the process of choice making.

Though more vague than what I had in mind, I think I can relate to that. The mechanisms to volition is what most intrigue me in relation to this theme.

What part is not determined? — NKBJ

If the non-equivalence between determinacy and causation as I’ve previously described it is accepted, freewill could then be argued to be necessarily (pre)determined at all times.

--> It would only not be fully determined by antecedent efficient causes—such that the decision-as-effect which is produced holds that which makes the decision to be the metaphysically terminating origin—hence, originating efficient cause—of the decision (... this rather than the decision being a link in an infinite chain, or web, of efficient causal processes devoid of any exception).

One means of potentially arguing this is to provide for the contradiction of (a fully) causal determinism: In summation of one such argument, we agents (i.e., sentient beings; hence, instantiations of awareness in the form of ego) can only hold presence (i.e., exist, but not necessarily “stand out” … a subtle but metaphysically important clarification of semantics for some) given the presence of change, hence motion—this irrespective of whether the change/motion is physical or mental. That being a given, when impartially appraised, a world of full causal determinism does not logically allow for the possibility of change/motion—this since all relations of efficient causation are within this model perfectly immutable by definition, and because everything is deemed to consist of these perfectly immutable causal relations. Here, then, our experience of being directly contradicts with our theory of a fully casually deterministic being—for our experience entails the presence of change whereas the model of reality entails a perfect changelessness of being. I fully grant that the summation of this argument many be emotively lacking; yet I would challenge anyone to find rational fault with it. BTW, to hypothetically then claim that awareness is an illusion on grounds of the model used is to place the cart before the horse: it is our awareness which devises models of what being is; not vice versa.

If this logical contradiction is valid and if awareness holds ontological presence (rather than being chimerical), then (a fully) causally deterministic universe is rationally concluded to be an error of reasoning. This, minimally, then facilitates the possibility of freewill as I’ve just described it.

Another means is to address experiences (here granting that our awareness is not perfectly chimerical): we are aware that we strive to choose which alternative to commit to whenever we deliberate between alternatives. We are typically aware via non-physiological sensations (i.e. emotively) that there is a want in us whenever we so deliberate. This want, whatever it may be, is the a propelling motive for us to make a choice between alternatives—and this propelling motive determines our motion (roughly, our change of being) in actively making a decision; i.e., determines that we engage in the psychological action. Each want (each propelling motive) has some either ready established or else not yet established resolution that is pursued. The resolution to the want attracts us—and it too is a motive that determines what we choose; it is a fully teleological (goal-based) determinant that is entailed by the want. So when we deliberate in order to come to a decision we are determined by our propelling want and by that end/goal which we deem to resolve the given want. As to the actual alternatives between which we chose, at any given moment of deliberation, these are not determined by us as aware agents (but are instead determined, arguably, by our unconscious mind); these ready alternatives, instead, (pre)determine what our future courses of action can potentially be at any given instance of choice. We choose that alternative which best satisfies our motives—our desire when this is conceptualized as a propelling motive of want that simultaneously entails a sought after resolution to the same want, the latter being the telos/end that attracts or pulls.

In short, we are always determined by motives and by the alternatives we are aware of in the choices we make. Our choices are thereby never chaotic.

But add to this the following possible paradox: when we deliberate between alternatives, each alternative will be both a credible means toward the attracting motive we are determined by (otherwise we wouldn’t entertain it) AND each alternative will be to some extent an uncertain optimal means toward the attracting motive, which serves to determined what we choose (otherwise, were we to be certain that one alternative is better than all others, there would be no need for deliberation). Choosing which alternative is the best means toward the telos-motive, then, is a matter of metaphysical freedom—freedom strictly from antecedent efficient causes. We at these junctures of deliberation in essence momentarily become the causal origin of the ensuing decision as effect--thereby rationally holding responsibility for our choices.

I’m not claiming that what I’ve so far expressed is comprehensive. Though it’s an expansive topic, I’ve already written a mouthful, I’m thinking.

I am wanting to claim that what I’ve expressed does rationally illustrate how our choices are always determined and yet are—or at least rationally can be—metaphysically free from an otherwise infinite web of perfectly fixed efficient causations … and this without being in any way chaotic.